git-forensics ran execSync(`git ${cmd}`), interpolating attacker-controlled
filenames from the SCANNED repo (git ls-files / git log --name-only) into a
shell string. A hostile repo containing a file named `commands/$(touch X).md`
achieved zero-interaction RCE on `/security scan <url>`: gitScan is in the
default scanner array and runs OUTSIDE the git-clone OS sandbox (which wraps
only the clone), so it executed unsandboxed on all platforms.
Convert the git() helper to spawnSync('git', [...args]) with no shell; every
call site now passes discrete tokens (shell quoting removed — git does its own
pathspec globbing). The helper throws on non-zero exit, preserving existing
per-category/per-file try/catch semantics.
TDD: adds a failing-first regression (tests/scanners/git-injection.test.mjs)
that builds a hostile-filename fixture repo and asserts the injected command
never runs. RED against execSync, GREEN after the fix.
Also removes two stray committed root artifacts (F-5/F-6): `--json`
(0-byte redirect husk) and .orphaned_at.
Closing gates: full node --test suite 1860/0; gitleaks clean. F-2/F-3 follow
in Session B.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3s6WnubSSrFjAQTLQdVbG
Kjell Tore Guttormsen
e46b5a3256