docs(ms-ai-architect): KB-refresh tema-b — Foundry-navnesveip «Azure AI Foundry»→«Microsoft Foundry» (233 filer)

Verifisert mot offisiell MS-doc (juni 2026): «Microsoft Foundry» er det
gjeldende produkt-/portalnavnet; «Foundry (classic)» = gamle «Azure AI Foundry»
(/azure/foundry/ vs /azure/foundry-classic/). Premiss bekreftet før sveip.

Multi-regel, IKKE naiv s/Azure AI Foundry/Microsoft Foundry/ — MS dropper
«Azure AI» (legger IKKE til «Microsoft») for to produktvarianter:
- «Azure AI Foundry Agent[ Service|s]» → «Foundry Agent Service/Agents» (MS-form)
- «Azure AI Foundry Models» → «Foundry Models» (i «Azure OpenAI in Foundry Models»)
- «Azure AI Foundry SDK» → «Microsoft Foundry SDK» (operatør-valg)
- «Azure AI Foundry portal/project» + generisk → «Microsoft Foundry»
- Pre-eksisterende «Microsoft Foundry Models» (4) normalisert → «Foundry Models»

Bevart: «Azure OpenAI», «Azure AI Inference SDK», «Azure AI Search»,
«Azure AI Services», kode-IDer. Historisk ref «(tidligere Azure AI Foundry)»
i model-catalog-2026.md beskyttet via lookbehind. URL /azure/ai-foundry/→
/azure/foundry/ kun i owasp-llm-top10 (KB-ref); docs/-filer deferred.

Scope: skills (inkl. 3 SKILL.md) + commands + agents + README + CLAUDE.
Ekskludert: docs/ (interne), playground/+tests/ fixtures (testdata),
CHANGELOG.md (historisk logg), STATE.md (gitignored).

3 SKILL.md endret (advisor/engineering/security) → judge-cache teknisk
invalidert for disse, men scorer uendret: advisor 91, eng/gov/infra/sec 96
(alle ≥90). validate 239/0. 0 «Azure AI Foundry» igjen (utenom bevart ref).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

skills/ms-ai-security/references/ai-security-engineering/ai-threat-modeling-stride.md

@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Mitigation: Customer data not used for training; apply output redaction for PII
 STRIDE Mapping: Information Disclosure
 ```
 
-**Azure AI Foundry** — Secure MLOps pipelines, managed identities, private endpoints, model registry with versioning
+**Microsoft Foundry** — Secure MLOps pipelines, managed identities, private endpoints, model registry with versioning
 ```plaintext
 Threat: Backdoored Model, ML Supply Chain Attack
 Mitigation: Model provenance tracking, digital signatures, isolated training environments
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ STRIDE Mapping: Tampering
 - LLM Agent (prompt handling, orchestration, plugin execution)
 
 **Usage:**
-1. Load template matching architecture (Azure AI Foundry, Copilot Studio, custom ML)
+1. Load template matching architecture (Microsoft Foundry, Copilot Studio, custom ML)
 2. Identify data flows and trust boundaries
 3. Generate threats using STRIDE methodology
 4. Review AI-specific threat categories (see microsoft.com/security/engineering/threat-modeling-aiml)