docs(architect): weekly KB update — 66 files refreshed (2026-04)

Updated 66 stale knowledge base reference files (10 critical, 56 high)
across all 5 skills using Microsoft Learn MCP research.

Key factual updates:
- Groundedness Detection API: `correction` → `mitigating` param,
  `correctedText` → `correctionText` (breaking change)
- Copilot Studio: GPT-4.1 mini now default (was GPT-4o mini);
  Claude Sonnet 4.5 + Opus 4.5 added (experimental, 200K ctx)
- Agentic Retrieval: still public preview; 50M free tokens/month
- Azure security baselines: "Cognitive Services" → "Foundry Tools"
- Databricks: Delta Live Tables → Lakeflow Spark Declarative Pipelines
- MLflow 3 GenAI: new Feedback/Expectation data model
- Token tracking doc: "Azure OpenAI in Foundry Models through a gateway"
- Agent Registry: Risks column (M365 E7), Graph API (preview)
- Copilot DLP: new Entra AI Admin + Purview Data Security AI Admin roles
- ISO/IEC 42001: scope expanded to M365 Copilot, Foundry, Security Copilot
- Zero Trust: CAE now via Conditional Access, Strict Location Enforcement
- Purview: new Fabric Copilots/agents governance section
- AG-UI HITL: ApprovalRequiredAIFunction (C#), @tool approval_mode (Python)

All files: Last updated → 2026-04, *(Verified MCP 2026-04)* markers added.
Build registry: 1341 URLs from 387 files (+2 new URLs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-04-09 22:41:26 +02:00
commit 565043dbde
73 changed files with 727 additions and 301 deletions

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# AI Threat Modeling Using STRIDE Framework
**Last updated:** 2026-02
**Last updated:** 2026-04
**Status:** Established Practice
**Category:** AI Security Engineering
@ -111,12 +111,12 @@ Tradisjonell trusselmodellering fokuserer på nettverksgrenser og applikasjonsgr
**Scenario:** Copilot Studio agent med custom plugins som kan utføre actions (e.g., send email, update database).
**Threat Model Approach:**
1. **Identify Trust Boundaries** — user prompt → orchestrator → LLM → plugin → external service
1. **Identify Trust Boundaries** — user prompt → orchestrator → LLM → plugin/MCP server → external service *(Verified MCP 2026-04)*
2. **Apply STRIDE per Boundary:**
- **User Prompt (I)** — Prompt Injection, Jailbreaking (Elevation of Privilege)
- **Orchestrator (T)** — Intent Detection Manipulation (Tampering)
- **LLM Output (I)** — Insecure Output Handling, Hallucinations (Information Disclosure)
- **Plugin Layer (E)** — Excessive Agency, Unauthorized Actions (Elevation of Privilege)
- **Plugin/MCP Layer (E)** — Excessive Agency, Unauthorized Actions; MCP server endpoints er ny angrepsflate som bør sikres via Azure API Management (Elevation of Privilege) *(Verified MCP 2026-04)*
- **External Service (S)** — Credential Leakage, Data Exfiltration (Spoofing/Information Disclosure)
3. **Mitigation Controls:**
- Prompt Shields (Azure AI Content Safety)
@ -193,10 +193,11 @@ STRIDE Mapping: Tampering
### Microsoft Defender for Cloud — AI Security Posture Management
**Capabilities:**
- Automated detection of AI workloads across Azure subscriptions
**Capabilities:** *(Verified MCP 2026-04)*
- Automated detection of AI workloads across Azure subscriptions (via Azure Resource Graph)
- AI security posture management: automate detection and remediation of generative AI risks
- Security recommendations for AI models, data stores, network isolation
- Integration with Purview for data classification and DLP
- Integration with Purview for data classification, DLP og Insider Risk Management for prompt-based data exfiltration
**Threat Modeling Integration:**
```plaintext
@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ STRIDE Mapping: Tampering
**Microsoft Learn — Verified Sources (2026-02):**
1. [Threat Modeling AI/ML Systems and Dependencies](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/engineering/threat-modeling-aiml) — **Authoritative guide** for STRIDE adaptation to AI/ML; includes 11 threat categories with mitigations
2. [Secure AI (Cloud Adoption Framework)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/scenarios/ai/secure) — Integration of STRIDE, MITRE ATLAS, OWASP for comprehensive AI risk identification
2. [Secure AI (Cloud Adoption Framework)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/scenarios/ai/secure) — Integration of STRIDE, MITRE ATLAS, OWASP for comprehensive AI risk identification. Oppdatert 2026-04: inkluderer nå AI asset inventory via Azure Resource Graph, AI communication channel security med Managed Identities og Virtual Networks, APIM for sikring av MCP server-endepunkter, og Microsoft Purview Insider Risk Management for prompt-basert data exfiltration-deteksjon. *(Verified MCP 2026-04)*
3. [AI Risk Assessment for ML Engineers](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/ai-red-team/ai-risk-assessment) — Control framework for ML security assessment; incident response and business continuity
4. [Security Planning for LLM-based Applications](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/ai/playbook/technology-guidance/generative-ai/mlops-in-openai/security/security-plan-llm-application) — 11 LLM-specific threats mapped to STRIDE; mitigation patterns for Azure OpenAI
5. [Reference Data Flows and Threat Models for Security Evaluations (Copilot Studio)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-copilot-studio/guidance/architecture/threat-models) — Agent architecture threat modeling; custom engine data flow analysis
@ -347,8 +348,8 @@ STRIDE Mapping: Tampering
7. [Failure Modes in Machine Learning](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/engineering/failure-modes-in-machine-learning) — Adversarial ML threat taxonomy (foundation for STRIDE adaptation)
8. [Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/develop/threat-modeling-tool) — Tool documentation; AI-specific templates
**Confidence Level:** ✅ **Verified** — All content grounded in official Microsoft documentation (8 unique sources, retrieved 2026-02). STRIDE adaptation for AI is established practice in Microsoft SDL.
**Confidence Level:** ✅ **Verified** — All content grounded in official Microsoft documentation (8 unique sources, retrieved 2026-02, re-verified 2026-04). STRIDE adaptation for AI is established practice in Microsoft SDL.
**Status:** ✅ **Current** — Threat categories and mitigations reflect 2025-2026 threat landscape (includes prompt injection, RAG vulnerabilities, agentic AI risks).
**Status:** ✅ **Current** — Threat categories and mitigations reflect 2025-2026 threat landscape (includes prompt injection, RAG vulnerabilities, agentic AI risks, MCP server endpoints). *(Verified MCP 2026-04)*
**Baseline Knowledge Integration:** Framework names (STRIDE, MITRE ATLAS, OWASP), Norwegian public sector context (NSM, ROS, DPIA, Sikkerhetsloven) derived from model knowledge and cross-referenced with retrieved sources for accuracy.