New fixture class for the D4 step-0 split (commons-owned; delivered into catalog's corpus/runner). A nav-golden case is bundle in / expected-read- context out — the shape that expresses "two conformant implementations MUST produce an identical read-context" (method-spec §3 Step 1). - nav-golden-hierarchy/ (positive): depth-first first-seen order, both link forms (/ = bundle root vs relative), one segment per level, resolved-path dedup, cycle termination, recursive verdict exclusion, missing-index binds root alone, flat render. - nav-golden-escape/ (negative, gate must go red): .. escapes and a /etc/passwd root-relative trap; conformant returns only valid.md. Both expected-read-context.md verified byte-for-byte against a conformant navigator implementing §3 Step 1; the negative case verified to diverge under a naive navigator. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUCuNNvnCkayuUDy2WFgeU |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| bundle | ||
| expected-read-context.md | ||
| README.md | ||
| SHOULD-NOT-BE-READ.md | ||
nav-golden-escape — negative navigation golden (the gate must be able to go red)
Per catalog's requirement that step 0's gate must be able to fail (a gate that can
only pass proves nothing), this negative case makes a conformant navigator and a naive one
provably diverge. It is the counterpart to nav-golden-hierarchy (the positive case).
bundle/index.md links one valid sibling and three escaping / trap targets:
| Link | Class | Conformant outcome |
|---|---|---|
valid.md |
in-bundle | returned |
../SHOULD-NOT-BE-READ.md |
.. escape (the decoy really exists, one level up) |
skipped; decoy never read |
../../../../etc/passwd |
deep .. escape |
skipped |
/etc/passwd |
root-relative trap | skipped |
The trap is the load-bearing one. Under the ratified rule, a leading / denotes the
bundle root, so /etc/passwd resolves to {bundle}/etc/passwd (no such file → skip),
NOT the filesystem path. A naive implementation that reads / as filesystem-absolute opens
the real /etc/passwd — a path-traversal breach. This case fails for any implementation
that raises, reads the decoy, or leaks /etc/passwd content; it passes only when the
read-context is exactly valid.md.
The malformed-target sub-class (an embedded null byte, other invalid path components) is
covered by the method-spec §11 Navigation boundary seam as a unit test — a literal null
byte does not belong in a committed text fixture. (See the relocated finding
docs/plan/2026-07-20-funn-portfolio-optimiser-nullbyte.local.md for the concrete
null-byte reproduction that motivates the seam.)