feat(budget): enforce a global portfolio token cap before the call, not after it (S3.4/F10)

PortfolioBudget + PortfolioMeter carry ONE token ledger over a whole portfolio
pass -- and, seeded from a persisted spend file, across passes -- while the
per-run Budget/TokenMeter pair is untouched. Three enforcement points, each
doing a different job:

- startup: a remainder that cannot fund one run raises BudgetRefused before
  anything loads (a pass that can afford zero projects is a caller mistake,
  not a result);
- wave assembly: an unfundable project is NEVER STARTED and the pass stops
  structurally (budget_stop + stopped_early, completed runs preserved).
  Because every member of a wave is funded against the SAME pre-wave
  remainder, admission RESERVES each member's requirement -- otherwise a wave
  of k over-commits the cap by up to k runs;
- pre-call: BudgetMiddleware refuses a call the remainder cannot pay for
  instead of making it. The post-charge check stays: real usage is only
  knowable after the response, so the guard stops the NEXT call, never the
  one in flight.

budget_stop is its own field rather than a widened stop_reason -- a goal-stop
is success, this is resource exhaustion, and fusing them would make "we
stopped" unreadable. PortfolioMeter splits record/check so tokens the provider
already billed reach the ledger even when the same charge breaks the run's own
cap. read_spend raises on corrupt content (our own accounting state, unlike
the tolerant RAW inbox layer); write_spend takes a REQUIRED stamp with no
wall-clock default, mirroring promote_verdict.

Load-bearing MEASURED, not asserted -- 6 mutations, all red: detach the wave
check; detach the pre-call guard; detach the wave reservation; check the run
cap before crediting the global ledger; detach the startup refusal; make
read_spend tolerant. Files restored from shasum-verified copies after each.

Two findings worth keeping: the pre-call guard MASKS a detached wave check if
the test asserts on overspend (spend stays under the cap either way), so the
load-bearing assertion had to become failures == () plus never-started; and
the token arithmetic is probed (32 tokens/run at tokens=8), not guessed.

537 -> 553 tests, ruff + mypy green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015EaxFnaDAbMQkmTeX4u7sd
This commit is contained in:
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-07-31 21:34:48 +02:00
commit a831aa1e3b
6 changed files with 733 additions and 11 deletions

View file

@ -8,12 +8,21 @@ call and short-circuits with ``BudgetExceeded`` the moment the cap is crossed.
``strict_usage`` (default ``True``) makes a missing usage a HARD FAIL (``UsageUnavailable``):
a usage regression must never silently disable the cap. Test doubles that legitimately supply
a synthetic ``UsageDetails`` do not trip it.
S3.4 (F10) adds the cross-project half. ``PortfolioBudget`` + ``PortfolioMeter`` carry ONE token
ledger over a whole portfolio pass and, seeded from ``read_spend``, across passes while the
per-run ``Budget``/``TokenMeter`` pair stays exactly what it was. Two teeth follow from that:
the middleware now refuses a call BEFORE making it once the binding cap is exhausted (money not
spent, not money spent and regretted), and ``run_portfolio`` refuses to START a project it cannot
fund. Both are enforcement, never repair nothing is trimmed, retried, or scaled down.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from agent_framework import ChatContext, ChatMiddleware
@ -37,6 +46,24 @@ class UsageUnavailable(RuntimeError):
must fail closed rather than silently stop counting (research 03 Rec 3)."""
class BudgetRefused(RuntimeError):
"""Raised at STARTUP when the portfolio's remaining tokens cannot fund one run (S3.4).
Distinct from ``BudgetExceeded`` on purpose: nothing was crossed and nothing was spent the
pass is refused before it begins, because a pass that can afford zero projects is a caller
mistake, not a resource event. Named for the repo's fail-closed gate family
(``PromotionRefused``, ``IngestStampError``): refusal, never repair.
"""
def __init__(self, remaining: int, required: int) -> None:
self.remaining = remaining
self.required = required
super().__init__(
f"portfolio budget refused: remaining={remaining} cannot fund one run "
f"(requires {required}); raise the global cap or lower min_run_reserve"
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Budget:
"""Hard token + round/iteration caps, required at startup (A4 / D6).
@ -54,22 +81,142 @@ class Budget:
raise ValueError(f"max_rounds must be positive, got {self.max_rounds}")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PortfolioBudget:
"""The GLOBAL token cap over a whole portfolio pass, plus the per-run cap it funds (S3.4/F10).
``max_total_tokens`` bounds everything a pass may spend and, when a ``PortfolioMeter`` is
seeded from persisted spend, everything a SERIES of passes may spend. ``max_tokens_per_run``
is the cap each individual run is given. ``min_run_reserve`` (defaulting to the per-run cap)
is the remainder a run must be able to claim before it is allowed to START: without it a pass
would happily launch a project it can only half pay for, spending real tokens on a run that
cannot finish.
Fail-fast on configurations that cannot mean what they say: a per-run cap above the global one
would let a single run cross the pass's own ceiling, and a reserve above the per-run cap would
demand more than any run can ever spend, refusing every pass forever.
"""
max_total_tokens: int
max_tokens_per_run: int
min_run_reserve: int | None = None
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if self.max_total_tokens <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"max_total_tokens must be positive, got {self.max_total_tokens}")
if self.max_tokens_per_run <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"max_tokens_per_run must be positive, got {self.max_tokens_per_run}")
if self.max_tokens_per_run > self.max_total_tokens:
raise ValueError(
f"max_tokens_per_run ({self.max_tokens_per_run}) exceeds max_total_tokens "
f"({self.max_total_tokens}): one run could cross the portfolio cap on its own"
)
if self.min_run_reserve is not None:
if self.min_run_reserve <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"min_run_reserve must be positive, got {self.min_run_reserve}")
if self.min_run_reserve > self.max_tokens_per_run:
raise ValueError(
f"min_run_reserve ({self.min_run_reserve}) exceeds max_tokens_per_run "
f"({self.max_tokens_per_run}): no run could ever meet it"
)
@property
def required_per_run(self) -> int:
"""The remainder one run must be able to claim to be allowed to start."""
return self.min_run_reserve if self.min_run_reserve is not None else self.max_tokens_per_run
class PortfolioMeter:
"""The ONE token ledger for a portfolio pass, shared by every run's ``TokenMeter`` (S3.4).
``spent`` seeds from an earlier pass (``read_spend``), which is what makes the cap hold ACROSS
passes and not merely within one.
``record`` and ``check`` are deliberately SPLIT rather than fused into one ``charge``. Tokens
the provider already billed must reach this ledger even when the charge simultaneously breaks
the RUN's own cap and raises there — a fused charge that returned early on the run cap would
silently forget that spend and hand the next project a budget that was never really there.
"""
def __init__(self, budget: PortfolioBudget, *, spent: int = 0) -> None:
if spent < 0:
raise ValueError(f"spent must be non-negative, got {spent}")
self.budget = budget
self.spent = spent
@property
def required_per_run(self) -> int:
return self.budget.required_per_run
def remaining(self) -> int:
"""Tokens left in the global cap (never negative — a crossed cap reads as zero left)."""
return max(0, self.budget.max_total_tokens - self.spent)
def can_fund_run(self, *, reserved: int = 0) -> bool:
"""Whether one more run can be started. ``reserved`` is what the caller has already
committed to runs it admitted but that have not spent yet (the wave case): every member of
a concurrent wave is funded off the same pre-wave remainder, so admitting them without
reserving would over-commit the cap by exactly the wave size."""
return self.remaining() - reserved >= self.required_per_run
def record(self, tokens: int) -> int:
"""Accumulate ``tokens`` into the global ledger. Never raises — see the class docstring."""
self.spent += tokens
return self.spent
def check(self) -> None:
"""Raise ``BudgetExceeded`` if the global cap has been crossed."""
if self.spent > self.budget.max_total_tokens:
raise BudgetExceeded("portfolio_tokens", self.budget.max_total_tokens, self.spent)
class TokenMeter:
"""Accumulates token and round usage against a ``Budget``; raises the moment a cap is
crossed."""
crossed. When ``portfolio`` is supplied (S3.4) every charge also lands in the shared portfolio
ledger, so the run is bounded by BOTH its own cap and the pass's global one."""
def __init__(self, budget: Budget) -> None:
def __init__(self, budget: Budget, *, portfolio: PortfolioMeter | None = None) -> None:
self.budget = budget
self.tokens = 0
self.rounds = 0
self.portfolio = portfolio
def charge(self, tokens: int) -> int:
"""Add ``tokens`` to the running total; raise ``BudgetExceeded`` if over cap."""
"""Add ``tokens`` to the running total; raise ``BudgetExceeded`` if over cap.
Both ledgers are credited BEFORE either cap is tested: the spend happened regardless of
which cap it broke, so recording must not depend on the outcome of a check."""
self.tokens += tokens
if self.portfolio is not None:
self.portfolio.record(tokens)
if self.tokens > self.budget.max_tokens:
raise BudgetExceeded("tokens", self.budget.max_tokens, self.tokens)
if self.portfolio is not None:
self.portfolio.check()
return self.tokens
def remaining(self) -> int:
"""Tokens left under whichever cap BINDS — the run's own, or the portfolio's."""
own = self.budget.max_tokens - self.tokens
if self.portfolio is None:
return own
return min(own, self.portfolio.remaining())
def exhausted(self) -> BudgetExceeded | None:
"""The structured error to refuse a call with, or ``None`` while budget remains.
Exhaustion is ``remaining() <= 0``, not ``< 0``: a chat call that costs zero tokens does
not exist, so at exactly-zero the next call can only overspend. Naming WHICH cap binds is
the point a run refused because a sibling drained the pass reads as ``portfolio_tokens``,
not as its own overrun."""
if self.remaining() > 0:
return None
if self.portfolio is not None and self.portfolio.remaining() <= 0:
return BudgetExceeded(
"portfolio_tokens", self.portfolio.budget.max_total_tokens, self.portfolio.spent
)
return BudgetExceeded("tokens", self.budget.max_tokens, self.tokens)
def tick_round(self) -> int:
"""Increment the round counter; raise ``BudgetExceeded`` if over cap."""
self.rounds += 1
@ -80,13 +227,21 @@ class TokenMeter:
class BudgetMiddleware(ChatMiddleware):
"""Chat middleware that charges a ``TokenMeter`` from each response's real
``UsageDetails`` and short-circuits when the cap is crossed."""
``UsageDetails`` and short-circuits when the cap is crossed.
Two teeth, not one. The PRE-call guard (S3.4) refuses to make a call the budget cannot pay
for that is money not spent. The post-charge check is what it always was: the real usage is
only knowable after the response, so a call that crosses the cap can only be caught behind it.
The guard does not replace the check; it stops the NEXT call, never the one in flight."""
def __init__(self, meter: TokenMeter, *, strict_usage: bool = True) -> None:
self._meter = meter
self._strict = strict_usage
async def process(self, context: ChatContext, call_next: Callable[[], Awaitable[None]]) -> None:
exhausted = self._meter.exhausted()
if exhausted is not None:
raise exhausted # BEFORE call_next: the call must never be made
await call_next()
usage = getattr(context.result, "usage_details", None)
total = usage.get("total_token_count") if usage is not None else None
@ -98,3 +253,39 @@ class BudgetMiddleware(ChatMiddleware):
)
return
self._meter.charge(int(total)) # raises BudgetExceeded if over cap
def write_spend(path: str | Path, spent: int, *, stamp: str) -> Path:
"""Persist a portfolio pass's accumulated ``spent`` tokens as deterministic JSON.
``stamp`` is a REQUIRED keyword with no wall-clock default (mirroring ``promote_verdict`` and
the outbox's ``run_id``): the file must be byte-identical for the same spend, so a diff means
the spend changed and nothing else. This is what carries the global cap ACROSS passes the
next pass seeds its ``PortfolioMeter`` from ``read_spend``."""
target = Path(path)
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
payload = {"spent_tokens": int(spent), "stamp": stamp}
target.write_text(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
return target
def read_spend(path: str | Path) -> int:
"""Read persisted spend; a MISSING file reads as ``0`` (there was no earlier pass).
Malformed content RAISES deliberately unlike the tolerant raw verdict inbox
(``load_verdicts_from_dir``). That folder is written out of band by other parties, so skipping
junk is correct there; this file is our OWN accounting state, and reading a corrupt one as zero
would silently hand back a budget that had already been spent."""
target = Path(path)
if not target.exists():
return 0
try:
payload = json.loads(target.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise ValueError(f"malformed spend file {str(target)!r}: {exc}") from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not isinstance(payload.get("spent_tokens"), int):
raise ValueError(f"spend file {str(target)!r} lacks an integer 'spent_tokens'")
spent = int(payload["spent_tokens"])
if spent < 0:
raise ValueError(f"spend file {str(target)!r} carries negative spent_tokens: {spent}")
return spent