A run commissioned to evaluate three approaches wrote ONE proposal artefact, so
only the approach it selected could ever receive a verdict. The other two were
evaluated, reported in the settlement, and then taught the learning loop nothing.
The defect class is a key collapse, and it had two halves — fixing either alone
leaves it intact:
* the WRITER wrote one pair per run, so the non-selected approaches never existed
on disk;
* the READER (hitl._read_outbox_proposals) joins proposal to outcome on the
run_id FIELD read from file CONTENT, never the filename. Three files sharing
one run_id collapse onto one dict key, last write wins — so widening only the
filename would have produced three artefacts and still one pending row. This is
the S3.2 collision class: two rows under one key silently become one.
Artefacts are now keyed {run_id}-{approach_id}-*.json AND carry approach_id in the
payload; the join key is (run_id, approach_id). Two properties make them genuinely
judgeable rather than merely present:
* verdict_id is minted per approach (verdicts.verdict_key, the S3.2 content hash)
— reusing the run's single id would let one delivered verdict clear all three
from the queue;
* provenance.validator_decision follows ITS OWN approach — the run's stamp would
report a rejected candidate as validated, and nothing downstream could correct it.
verdicts.verdict_key is public so a run can stamp the key a verdict WILL arrive
under without capturing a decision nobody has made; it delegates to _mint_id
rather than restating the hash (the (p) rule: one keying rule, one copy).
The per-approach set REPLACES the run-level pair rather than joining it — the
selected approach is already among them, and writing both would count it twice in
hitl pending. The selected one carries the run's final outcome, so the outbox can
never disagree with the RunResult; the others carry the validator's verdict, the
only falsifier that ran on them.
mandate.py is deliberately untouched: hanging a ValidatedProposal off a coverage
row would drag validator — and pulp — into a module kept to pydantic+stdlib for
D7 portability, so _evaluate_mandate returns the evaluated outcomes alongside.
Ran it, not just tested it: a real CLI run wrote six artefacts and hitl pending
listed three rows. It also showed the honest edge — three approaches that produce
an identical candidate share one content-hash key, so one verdict settles all
three. That is correct (they were one candidate), and it is now documented.
Load-bearing MEASURED (tests/test_a5_per_approach_artifacts_loadbearing.py) against
the whole 750-test suite, five mutations all red: detach the per-approach writer ·
drop approach_id from the join key · reuse the run's verdict id · reuse the run's
provenance stamp · widen the filename but not the payload. Control: on a full
detach exactly the 5 new tests fail and 745 pre-existing ones stay green — the
no-mandate path is inert, and writes neither the filename segment nor the field.
Docs: bestille-en-kjoring.md (what the commissioner gets) + ekspert-svar.md (what
the expert's queue looks like, and that "rejected" is the validator's verdict on
the numbers, never a professional judgement of the idea).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VtRd8y1PDPGwkrRXFhubqr
Two rules existed. verdicts._unquote took quotes off correctly; the
bundle_context title renderer stripped only `"`. Measured before the fix:
`title: " Spaced "` rendered as `## concept: Spaced ` (the whitespace
half kø-(a) named), and `title: 'Single'` rendered its quotes verbatim —
both ordinary YAML a hand-authoring curator writes, and both reach the
agent's read-context.
The (p) defect class: a duplicated conversion drifts, and the drifted copy
decides something. Same fix shape — ONE source, owned by the module that
owns parse_frontmatter. okf.unquote_scalar is now the rule; verdicts
delegates by identity, so the structural key that _mint_id hashes is
unchanged.
The commons-owned nav-goldens could never have caught this: every golden
title is double-quoted with no inner whitespace, so both rules render them
byte-identically. That is asserted as a control, and it goes RED if a
future golden gains a discriminating title.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole suite, three mutations:
- weaken the renderer back to .strip('"') -> ONLY the 2 new rows red,
643 others green (incl. nav-goldens) = it covers ground nothing did
- reintroduce a private _unquote copy in verdicts -> only the identity
test red, 644 green (the copy is behaviourally identical TODAY, which
is exactly why identity is the only thing that catches the class)
- (control, kø-(n)) add `import numpy` to a second src module -> the
existing test_semretrieval_is_the_sole_numpy_importer goes red alone,
confirming that gate is live rather than green-but-dead
638 -> 645 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DVMsih6tXx39VMyq6wJ5H7
seed_store_from_bundle keyed EVERY `type: verdict` file on bundle_candidate_features — the single
candidate the bundle's validator-input.json describes. A bundle carrying verdicts about several
candidates collapsed them onto one key, so a verdict about candidate B scored a perfect structural
match against candidate A's query and could be folded into A's hypothesis prompt. The ExpeL
substrate was single-candidate by construction.
A verdict file may now carry its own structural key in frontmatter (affected_codes / measure_type /
claimed_saving_nok); absent, keying falls back to the bundle candidate, so every pre-S3.2 seed keeps
working unchanged. promote_verdict writes the three fields, so a promoted verdict — frequently about
a different candidate than the target bundle's projection — does not impersonate that candidate.
Semantics decided HERE, not pulled: commons' seeding rule (method-spec §3 Steg 1 + bundle example)
has not arrived; we said we would build locally first. D7 mirroring stays open.
- ALL THREE fields or none. A partial declaration raises VerdictFrontmatterError rather than merging
with the bundle candidate, which would mint a key belonging to NEITHER candidate. Validation,
never repair (mirrors write_concept_file); the tolerant-skip rule belongs to the RAW inbox layer.
- claimed_saving_nok parses via json.loads — the SAME literal rule the IR projection went through —
and is written back with str() of the raw value. _mint_id hashes that value, so 30000 and 30000.0
are different keys; a normalising writer would split one candidate's signal across two ids.
- The structural key is signal-free, so it does not weaken the Step-8 no-leak property (Test C green).
Load-bearing MEASURED, five mutations all red: detach per-verdict keying · detach the fields
promote_verdict writes · make a partial/unparseable key tolerant · normalise the magnitude on write ·
remove the fallback (control — breaks the step1 suite at collection, proving the fallback bears load).
589 -> 597 tests. Full gate green (pytest, ruff, mypy).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QkjvTTxrg9LTrmghebfiij
Both live in the tolerant inbox-read path and both contradicted the module's
own "skipped, never raised" / loader-parity docstrings (S5.1 review: ALLOW,
2 MINOR, non-gating):
- UnicodeDecodeError (a *.json hand-saved in Latin-1 with Norwegian æ/ø/å is
invalid UTF-8) now SKIPPED in hitl._load_json_dict AND
verdicts.load_verdicts_from_dir — was: crashed pending/route with a raw
traceback (a ValueError subclass, caught by neither OSError nor
JSONDecodeError). Fix symmetric across both readers.
- hitl._inbox_verdict_ids now skips a non-iterable affected_codes exactly as
load_verdicts_from_dir does (frozenset() raises TypeError) — was: marked the
proposal judged on key-presence alone → a silent false-negative in the
operator pending queue. hitl-only: verdicts is the correct reference.
TDD: 3 RED-then-green (both UnicodeDecodeError twins + the parity gap) + 1
ground-truth pin locking the loader side so the parity cannot rot.
Gate: pytest → 389 passed, 4 skipped (was 385); ruff check + format clean; mypy clean.
Findings 4-7 from the 2026-07-02 status analysis, per the session plan (S1):
- CHANGELOG rewritten truthfully (was: 'Plan phase - no framework code yet')
- README stack line names the split GA packages, not the agent-framework meta-package
- CLAUDE.md: MCP downgraded to extension point (in-process FunctionTool is the default seam)
- Verdict conflict semantics documented as chosen (store first-write-wins per id,
disk/wiki last-write-wins per file; full B10 taxonomy deliberately deferred)
- docs/extending.md: explicit 90%-principle cut-list (B10, B11, U12, U14, concurrent fan-out)
- .gitignore covers .trekexecute-progress-* (docs/.DS_Store was already untracked/ignored -
the plan's git rm --cached assumption was stale; no-op)
No code behavior changed (docstring only in verdicts.py). Suite 152/4 green, mypy clean,
ruff format --check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AaQCFnfsh3tfq1VfzdJpoi
Close the last agentic-loop seam (målbilde §3/§6/§7/§11 step 6): an
APPROVED verdict is promoted from the raw output layer into the context
layer (the OKF bundle) as a navigable `type: verdict` concept file, so
human/persona-approved knowledge reaches the next run's hypothesis.
- okf.py (pure stdlib, MAF-free): render_frontmatter / write_concept_file
/ link_in_index — the D7-portable OKF write counterpart of navigate.
- verdicts.py: promote_verdict + PromotionRefused gate (fail-closed; only
approved decisions enter the wiki, never raw agent output), provenance
stamp (who/experiment/when; timestamp a required kwarg), neutral index
label (signal reaches a prompt only via the gated ExpeL fold, never
bundle_context), _safe_filename_token (id sanitised for path/link).
- R4 = optional+gated: a public opt-in primitive, NOT wired into
run_project (mirrors write_verdict — the system reads, the gate promotes).
- Load-bearing trio (test_step8_promotion_loadbearing.py): gate refuses a
non-approved verdict, approved verdict is navigable, promoted signal
stays out of the read-context — all proven RED-on-detach. Suite 144->148.
Design hardened by an adversarial plan-critic (12 findings; the BLOCKER —
index-link leak into bundle_context via index_summary — closed by the
neutral label + a no-leak test). Honesty limits documented: promoted file
is minimal (signal as prose only), and the learning-key id means
same-candidate approvals share a filename (last-write-wins).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MHR8iKxJRxDiDfNw8HZmWE
The short loop captured the expert verdict inline into an in-memory store, so a
verdict arriving days/weeks later in a separate run could not influence any future
hypothesis (målbilde §5 row 7). Steg 7 adds the long timescale: run_project gains an
opt-in verdict_dir async inbox that load_verdicts_from_dir -> store.add MERGES into the
store BEFORE the Step-1 ExpeL fold, so a verdict dropped after an earlier run reaches a
separate, later run's hypothesis — fully resumable across runs separated in time.
- verdicts.py: verdict_to_dict / verdict_from_dict (id read verbatim, never re-minted),
write_verdict (public authoring primitive, NOT wired into run_project — system reads
the folder, expert/persona writes it, §3 role split), tolerant load_verdicts_from_dir
(missing/foreign/half-written files skipped, not raised — RAW layer per §10 R2),
VerdictStore.from_dir.
- run.py: verdict_dir kwarg; ingest-merge block after load_contracts (merge not replace
keeps run_portfolio's cross-project threading; store.add idempotent on content-hash id;
no change to the fold). CLI --bundle-dir/--verdict-dir thread the long loop to the
console entry. No auto-persist of the run's own captured verdict (outbox/Steg 8).
- Load-bearing PAIR (test_step7_async_loop_loadbearing.py): a verdict dropped after run A
must reach run B's prompt (run B uses a FRESH store -> the transfer is the file loop,
not in-memory carryover); empty-inbox control proves causality. Marker = a realization
value absent from the bundle (not the seed's 0.82). Proven RED on ingest detach.
Suite 138 -> 140 passed, 4 skipped; mypy + ruff check clean. Målbilde treated as frozen
(no §3/§5/§7 edit). Step 8 (gated wiki promotion) remains.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MHR8iKxJRxDiDfNw8HZmWE
Closes maalbilde §5 gap #1 (the one missing "feedback-into-prompt" dataflow)
for the OKF-bundle path. Before, ExpeL was computed AFTER generation into a
discarded SessionContext, so a prior verdict could not influence any hypothesis
(context_providers=0).
- New okf.py: framework-neutral OKF bundle navigation (index + frontmatter +
cross-links), pure stdlib, no agent_framework/mcp (D7-portable), enforced by
test_okf_is_maf_free.
- verdicts.py: seed_store_from_bundle + bundle_candidate_features build the
ExpeL substrate + the pre-hypothesis query key from a bundle.
- run_project(bundle_dir=...): folds the candidate's prior verdicts into the
generation context BEFORE generate_via_llm; the road path is unchanged.
Load-bearing (maalbilde §7): test_step1_expel_loadbearing proves a prior verdict
reaches the hypothesis prompt and goes RED when the fold is detached (shown via
TDD red->green). The marker is the minted verdict id (content hash) because
docs_dir==bundle_dir lets keyword chunk-stuffing leak the realization rate;
clean layer separation is Fase 2b.
Suite 121->133 passed; mypy + ruff check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MHR8iKxJRxDiDfNw8HZmWE
