P18's round 2 ended with two VALIDATED proposals whose affected_item codes
were ordinary words from a road standard's prose -- impulsventilator (4 of
270 N500 documents) and bituminoest baerelag (4 of 1133 N200). Both are
grounded in P7's sense and neither is inert in P18/B1's sense; they are simply
not identifiers of a cost line, and the gate had no stage that could say so.
Known positive MEASURED, not asserted: replayed offline against the bases
those runs were given, both come back Rejection naming the denominator.
IDENTIFIER_FORMS moved from generate.py to validator.py: they now drive both
P8's report and this gate, and two copies of "what an identifier looks like"
would let the two disagree about one run's own input.
B1 -- two new forms, transcribed from measurement. R761's requirement numbers
are bare dotted numbers and all six refs in kontrakt-sorasen's fasit are of
that shape, which neither pre-P19 form matched: r761's whole offer was 3
identifiers over 6.5 MB, and is now 2332. The FIRST form was widened in the
same pass because B2 made these forms decide prose vs identifier, and this
repo's own ENERGI-TOTAL-EL matched none of them -- a gate may only be wrong in
the direction that admits too much.
Three things keep the gate from being a rule about shapes: the generality
guard (it fires only where the input offers forms), the baseline exemption
(stage 0 has already ruled that code real), and full-matching.
Honesty limit, measured and given its OWN arm: a decimal and an R761 process
number are typographically identical, so the form counts both. P8's existing
"bare numbers" arm is narrowed to bare INTEGERS accordingly.
Measured over all nine round-1+2 outboxes: 26 of 36 codes are prose.
Load-bearing measured (22 arms), four mutations all red against the whole
suite (16 / 10 / 1 / 2), green control 1734/5 and the golden byte-unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two paid rounds scored 0 of 26 fasit concepts opened -- the same number twice.
P18 closed the navigation side (a listing is a window, an invented path is
refused by name) and it did not move, which makes it a ROLE question: nothing
in the loop ever asked the model to say what requirement binds the direction it
committed to, so opening one was never on the critical path to an answer.
A PREMISE OF THE ORDER WAS FELLED BEFORE ANYTHING WAS BUILT ON IT. A1 places
the demand in _INSTRUCTIONS[HYPOTHESISER_ROLE] alone. Measured: the stress
command sends --mandate and NOT --explore, the two are refused together by
name, and none of the nine round-1/2 outboxes holds a {run_id}-exploration.json
-- the hypothesiser never runs in a stress round, so A3 would have been
unreachable in exactly the paid runs this order commissions.
A2's own sentence resolves it: the refusal goes to the model "som en tur den
kan rette (samme mekanisme som quick_validate's nekt), ikke som en raise" --
and quick_validate IS a tool. declare_requirement therefore lives in
navigator_tools, held by BOTH roles that navigate (the exploration, and since
S2c the debate). It EXISTS only when the caller offers both sinks, which keeps
every pre-P19 call site byte-identical; one sink without the other is refused
at construction. 'opened' is the SAME list ExplorationToolRecorder fills, so
the refusal reads the run's own read trace.
The marked hypothesis carries 'requirement' as a REQUIRED key: omitted is a
hard error, explicit null is legal and needs 'why_none', a half-named one is
refused. A minted approach carries it; a seed never acquires one. The proposer
prompt names it only when the field exists, and the judge counts a hit against
THIS approach's fasit concepts, never against the base.
Load-bearing measured (12 arms), four mutations all red against the whole
suite, green control 1711/5 and demo-transcript.stdout byte-unchanged.
A-iii's predicted signature was FALSIFIED: the golden stays green because the
demo runs without a mandate, so _build_messages' approach branch is never
taken there. A-iv was GREEN first -- the repo's vacuous-gate class, 24th time:
the arm drove _attributable while the hit is computed at the call site.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P18 parts D and E (order 20260914T105139Z), plus the two things measuring
them turned up.
DEL D -- five paid runs (gpt-4-1-mini, azure, PACE_SECONDS=2), same four
context sets, SAME parameters on all four (--max-rounds 3 --max-tokens
600000), plus one variance repeat of gate-nordvik. All four free
--live-dry-runs first: rc 0, and Grounding-offer numbers IDENTICAL to round 1
(435/272/982/3) -- the control that the Grounding structure did not change
what the gate measures.
MEASURED, round 1 -> round 2:
- runs that died on the token cap: 3 of 7 -> 0 of 5, and two sets now fit a
LOWER cap than round 1 had to give them;
- guessed read paths: 12 -> 0;
- wall time, the two sets whose parameters are directly comparable: n100
140.1 s -> 70 s, n500 73.5 s -> 69 s;
- 5 of 31 read_file calls opened documents BEYOND the default window, so the
window WAS widened -- the trace does not record which knob (finding 1);
- (a) grounded in a fasit concept: 0 of 26, UNCHANGED. That is the mission
gap, and DEL A did not close it.
The a4 falsification arm fails once in each round, on a different set. r761's
a4 is now rejected -- but NOT by B1: the model proposed "Kontraktsum" this
time, so the "appears nowhere" arm caught it, and B1's effect on that row is
proven offline, not live. NEW failure: tunnel-hauglia a4 VALIDATED on
"impulsventilator" (3/270 documents), and fv412 a1 on "bituminost barelag"
(4/1133). Both are ordinary Norwegian words from the standard's prose, not
cost codes. B1 cannot and should not fell them: this is an ANCHORING defect,
not a grounding one, and it is finding 2 with two named remedies and a
recommendation.
C2 isolated by re-judging round 1 with the new judge: kontrakt-sorasen goes
named=3 -> named=1, and the survivor is named_in_measure -- the model's own
words. Two of the three were the whole-base snippet artefact.
DEL E -- docs/2026-09-14-p18-stressrunde-2.md: round 1 against round 2, what
each fix bought (measured, never attributed), the B2 table, variance, and for
EACH remaining ugly finding a NAMED solution with an estimate.
THE MUTATION THAT FOUND A HOLE. B6 (revert run.py to compose ONE blob instead
of one document per concept file) left the WHOLE suite green: 1698 passed / 5
skipped. The composition arm drives _grounding_text with a Grounding it
builds ITSELF, so it cannot see what the RUN handed over -- and a blob has
exactly one boundary, so the floor can never be reached, the share can never
fire, and the measured defect is back intact. The rule is only as good as the
boundaries it is given.
Arm (h) is the gate that was missing: a crafted base with TWELVE concept
files all carrying the same token -- per document 12 of 17 and inert, as one
blob 1 of 1 and grounding -- with a control on a code only ONE file carries,
which must still validate. Measured RED against exactly that mutation. The
mutation was not dropped and the seam was not declared unwitnessed: it got a
witness.
Also: the debate's own bundle pointer (run.py _bundle_pointer) now explains
the window and the filter, alongside the tool description and the navigator
instruction updated in 9b47e5a -- a description that lies about the body IS
the model's instruction (the Fase 3 class). Golden transcript unaffected.
Mutations, all against the FULL suite in an isolated worktree, one at a time:
DEL A 7 of 7 red (control 1685/5), DEL B+C 9 of 10 red (control 1698/5), the
tenth being B6 above. Tables in the report s 9.
Verification: uv run pytest -q 1699 passed / 5 skipped (1670 on cfd9079; +29,
0 removed). ruff check + format clean, mypy clean (38 files). Golden
demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UNCHANGED, shasum -a 1 of the CONTENT =
ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f. No version bump, no push.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P18 parts B and C (order 20260914T105139Z).
B1 -- stage 0b. P7 made it `item.code in grounding`: plain containment over
ONE concatenated string. P16 ran it against a delivered corpus and measured
what containment cannot tell apart: the falsification arm a4-indeksregulering
put 250 000 NOK on a single cost line coded R761 -- the knowledge base's OWN
NAME, carried by all 2 756 of its concept documents -- and the whole gate
said validated (stage 0 skipped, un-anchored run; checker approve).
The grounding is now carried as the DOCUMENTS it is made of (validator.
Grounding), not as a blob. A structure and not a second argument beside the
text: the boundaries and the text are one fact, and .text is derived, so the
gate and P8's report measure the same characters. run.py composes one
document per concept file where the base is already walked; generate.
_grounding_text folds each cost line in as a one-line document.
N and A are MEASURED, not chosen (14.09, four mounted vegnormal bases):
- every must_cite ref and mandate affected_code in the four context sets --
shortest real identifier is FOUR characters (12.1, 52.1), so N = 3 sits one
below the measurement and cannot refuse anything measured;
- document frequency of every code-shaped token per base -- 1 692 distinct
and NOT ONE reaches 5 %. Highest anywhere 6/446 (1.35 %), highest a fasit
names 3/446 (0.67 %), R761 2 756/2 756 (100 %). A = 0.05 therefore sits
3.7x above the highest real token and 20x below the defect.
Length is NOT what makes the defect inert (R761 is four characters); the
share is. And a share is not a measurement without a denominator big enough
to take one (ansikt 4): one of three is 33 %, so an ABSOLUTE floor of 10
documents gates it. Highest absolute count any real identifier reaches is 6,
and every fixture in the repo is far below 10 -- which is why every pre-P18
gate is UNTOUCHED by this rule rather than exempted from it. Grounding.of
(one document) can never reach the floor by construction.
The refusal NAMES the denominator ("appears in 2756 of the 2756 documents
this run was given"), because Step 5 feeds that reason verbatim into the next
attempt's prompt: a proposer told only "ungrounded" answers with another
token of the same kind.
B2 SPIKE (measured, NOT built) FELLED the order's own alternative: option (b)
"ground in what the run OPENED" was run over P16's 16 code rows -- R761
stands in every OPENED document too, so (b) would NOT have caught the defect,
while B1 makes it inert and still grounds the real process line 65
ASFALTDEKKER (29/2756 = 1.05 %). (b) is not a substitute for B1.
C1 -- --docs-dir is optional once --bundle-dir is given (P16 FUNN 2). On the
bundle path docs_dir is never read: retrieval, the chunk tool and the "no
citable content" check all live in the road branch. Bound ONCE from
--bundle-dir, which is byte-identically what the README already tells an
operator to type by hand. NOT the "--docs-dir omvei": no such path is opened
and the road branch still refuses without a real --docs-dir (own arm).
C2 -- the judge's snippet arm counts only under citation_scope == "narrowed",
as (a) already does (PM decision, P16 s 6.2). P16's reason for (b') being
clean -- snippets are bodies while ref/title live in frontmatter, 0 of 446
n100 bodies -- holds for "Krav 4.1.2-1" but NOT for R761, where a process
number like 12.1 stands in the bodies. Under a whole-base citation list that
mark was "cited" before any model call.
tests: test_inert_identifier_loadbearing.py (7 arms; known positive is P16's
OWN artefact replayed against the base that run was given, known negative is
26 of 26 fasit references still grounding), test_docs_dir_optional_
loadbearing.py (5 arms). test_stress_judge_loadbearing.py's snippet arm split
into narrowed/whole-base -- the pair is the discriminator, same snippet, same
mark, only the scope differs. The grounding tests migrate from str to
Grounding.of (the honest reading of a caller that declared no boundaries).
Verification: uv run pytest -q 1698 passed / 5 skipped (1685 after part A,
strict superset, 0 removed). ruff check + format clean, mypy clean (38
files). Golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UNCHANGED, shasum -a 1 of the
CONTENT = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f. No version bump, no push.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
announce() read _DEFAULT_MAX_ROUNDS/_DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS directly, which was correct only while
main() could not do otherwise. MEASURED on the first free drill after --max-rounds landed: the same
stdout said "Stops at: 3 rounds / 100000 tokens" two lines above "max_rounds=8, max_tokens=120000".
The announcement is the ONE thing printed before the first paid call and its whole job is to say
what the run will do -- the Fase-3 class, introduced by the very flag being announced.
Load-bearing MEASURED: arm (f) red before the fix; M16 (read the constants again) -> 1 red, that
arm ALONE. Green control 1670/5, golden BYTE-UNCHANGED (ea8c534...).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
B2's free drill earned its keep on the first command. STATE.md, docs/2026-09-12-p14-kontekstsett.md
and the order all publish the same stress command ending "--max-rounds 8 --max-tokens 120000".
Measured: run.py accepts neither, all four --live-dry-run drills refused with "unrecognized
arguments", and main() never passed max_rounds/max_tokens to run_project at all -- so every CLI run
ever made was silently bound to _DEFAULT_MAX_ROUNDS=3 / _DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS=100_000, with no way to
raise or lower the cap on a run being paid for. Three surfaces described a door that did not exist.
Widening, never breaking: both flags default to exactly those values, so every existing invocation
is byte-identical. Wired to BOTH dispatches -- run_portfolio takes the same two parameters and
main() dropped them there too -- and refused by name in report mode, which returns above every
dispatch (the F4 silent-drop gap).
Load-bearing MEASURED (6 arms, ALL RED before the fix), four mutations all red, green control
1669/5 (from 1663/5, superset, 0 removed), golden BYTE-UNCHANGED (ea8c534...).
MEASURED, REPORTED, NOT FIXED: single-project mode still requires --docs-dir even when
--bundle-dir is given and docs_dir is unused on the bundle path, so the documented command would
have refused for that reason too. The README's own form works; loosening the guard is its own call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pure formatting, no behaviour change. ruff 0.15.18 reported
"3 files would be reformatted, 195 files already formatted" on HEAD 455d611;
after this commit "198 files already formatted". Suite 1570 passed / 5 skipped
before and after, golden demo-transcript.stdout content sha1 unchanged
(ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
Two of the three came from P7 (277bb95), one from P8 (455d611).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P7 is right and landed, but re-measuring it exposed a consequence no row stated: with the gate
live, 29 of 29 cost codes in 13 of 13 delivered proposals fall across the three free recordings
(PM's denominator; 14 of 14 in 8 proposals on the PARSEABLE one -- the five blobs that separate
the numbers are refused by pydantic's `claimed <= total` and never reach stage 0b). All 29 were
invented, so the gate is right; but a gate that always refuses is as useless as one that never
does.
The cause is that the PROMPT asks for something the input cannot supply. `_build_messages`
requires each affected_item to "restate a cost line as the project's price schedule already
carries it", while K2's delivered input carries 9 occurrences / 2 distinct code-shaped tokens --
`SHA-01`/`SHA-10`, both document numbers off a page footer -- and `derive_cost_baseline` refuses
the base outright. There is no cost line in it to restate.
`GroundingOffer(chars, identifiers, cost_lines)` reports it. The PAIR is the diagnosis: "50
identifiers, 0 cost lines" says what neither number says alone. A REPORT, never a gate -- it
blocks nothing, because a blocking requirement IS `--require-cost-baseline` (F4/D-3, opt-in,
untouched), and `_ground_against_input` is untouched.
The callsite is MEASURED, not chosen: `generate.py` composes the grounding per attempt, after
`await _fetch_parsed`, so a report there could only speak once an attempt had been paid for;
`run.py` binds both halves above the `--live-dry-run` cut and before the first `debate.run`, so
the FREE trip says it. `delivered` is bound ONCE and the same variable feeds the report and
`_evaluate`; the report composes THROUGH `_grounding_text`, the gate's own composer.
A pattern is admissible here and not in the gate, and that is the difference between a report and
a falsifier: an unknown form is a token left uncounted -- an under-count, never a false rejection.
The forms are transcribed from the measurement; bare numbers are excluded with the number
(46 394 / 2 117 in K2). `grounding_offer_notice` is the ONE renderer and is silent when the run
CAN anchor -- omission, never an empty row.
Load-bearing MEASURED (tests/test_grounding_offer_loadbearing.py, 12 arms), nine mutations all
red against the WHOLE suite + green control 1570/5 (from 1558/5, strict superset, 0 removed) and
the golden byte-unchanged (shasum -a 1 of the CONTENT = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
Measurement: docs/2026-09-09-p8-forankringstilbudet.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P6 (økt 108) ended in ValidatedProposal (verdict 5fd6272e3725fe68) on two cost
codes -- M-04-01 / M-04-03 -- that appear in NO prompt of that run. Measured
here first, verbatim: validate_proposal(p, baseline=None) validates it; the same
proposal against any non-empty CostBaseline is rejected naming both codes.
So the hole was never "fabrication goes uncaught" -- _reconcile_against_baseline
exists and is right -- but that the falsifier is reached only through
`if baseline is not None`. The input always exists; the baseline does not.
New stage 0b (_ground_against_input), OUTSIDE the baseline branch, after stage 0
so an anchored run's message is byte-identical to before. ONE Rejection, the
validator's own type, naming EVERY ungrounded identifier "; "-joined in the
proposal's own order (økt 94's completeness reason).
The rule has NO pattern -- `code in grounding`, exact substring -- and that is a
measurement: over the delivered corpora (K2 1108 files / 2 005 561 chars, the
three N payloads 8 excerpts each) the identifier forms are heterogeneous, and a
pattern chosen to cover them would be a rule about shapes. Bare numerals are the
one inert class (46 394 occurrences / 2 117 distinct in K2); the rule fails OPEN
there, never closed.
Evidence is three non-model-authored sources: what run_project DELIVERED (the
rendered cut/pointer/chunks plus the base's context_files -- never files, which
would make the type: verdict layer evidence), the project's own cost lines, and
the baseline's codes when anchored. The rendered PROMPT is deliberately NOT
evidence, on two measurements: gen_context IS the debate output on the S2c path,
and from attempt 2 the prompt carries the previous Rejection.reason verbatim --
which for this stage QUOTES the identifier it just refused. Grounding in the
prompt would let the gate's own refusal disarm it on its second round.
Prose scanning was chosen against WITH THE NUMBERS: a typed gate catches 2/2
(P6) and 2/2 (S7c) -- 100% of what reached a verdict. What stays uncaught, said
plainly: an ungrounded identifier that lives only in agent/debate prose and never
becomes an affected_item code (2 of 4 P6, 2 of 4 S7c, 1 of 2 P4).
Iron Law: 9 red / 2 green before the rule existed. Ten mutations all red against
the whole suite, green control 1558 passed / 5 skipped (from 1543/5, superset,
0 removed), golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UNCHANGED (shasum -a 1 of the
CONTENT = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
Three existing fixtures changed, no gate weakened -- most of all
test_pre_amendment_bundle_runs_unchanged, which sent the SAME FABRICATED code and
asserted it validated: the økt-108 hole written down as an expectation.
No paid run. Order 20260909T113641Z-38938691-from-.claude.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Funn 99, measured offline against the artefacts the paid Q5=B run left behind — no paid
run here.
ROOT, verbatim from the records: the three failing quick_validate calls all sent
bundle_id="renholdstekniske_funksjonskrav" — a CONCEPT name guessed out of the seeded cut,
while the base's id is k2-trinn1-20260903. Both arguments parsed against the signature, so
it was _resolve_bundle's raise MAF counted, proven by quick_validations being EMPTY while
all three stand in tool_calls. Denominator: 12 tool calls, and those three came BEFORE
list_bundles.
The order's causal chain is FELLED: the quick_validate triple is records 4-6 and the run
continued for 13 more model calls; the triple immediately before the 400 is the navigator's
three read_file refusals on del-ii-bilag-7-prisskjema*. The limit fired TWICE.
(A) ChatClientException is caught on BOTH seams — the exploration dispatch and the full-run
dispatch — because the debate's own model calls go through the same provider. The line is
"run stopped:", not "run refused:" (a stated divergence from the order): the argv was fine
and tokens were already spent, which is the MAJOR-2 arm's own reason, verbatim. Caught
INSIDE the try/finally so the exploration artefact still lands.
(B) quick_validate answers an unknown base id with {"decision": "refused", ...} naming the
configured ids, and records it in the sink. MAF turns a tool raise into the opaque
"Error: Function failed." (_tools.py:1426), so the one thing the refusal knew and the model
did not never reached it — the replies show it guessing at the JSON format instead.
read_file/read_dir/read_bundle still raise: measured, reported, out of scope.
Seven mutations all red against the whole suite, green control 1529/5, golden ea8c534
unchanged. One existing gate REWRITTEN, not deleted; its second half is what keeps (B)
scoped. The test double raises from the reply_selector seam rather than a new
_inner_get_response body, so the S2.5 consolidation guard stays untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
F3 and F4, the two findings the S7 acid test (session 98) reported and left. The order required
both descriptions to be treated as PREMISES. One held; the other was felled before anything was
built on it.
F3 -- premise FELLED, asymmetry real. The order read arm C's two refused calls as "the path names
a document that EXISTS". Measured against the base that ran: its root holds 27 directories named
del-ii-bilag-N-... and 12 documents named inbox-del-ii-bilag-N-....md, and the requested path
matches NEITHER -- it is the directory naming convention applied to a document whose real name
carries an inbox- prefix. So the two live rounds were the UNKNOWN-path class, and this delivery
does NOT recover them (gated). What IS real: read_file on a directory has named read_dir since
session 95, while read_dir on a document named neither the rung nor the path.
okf.DocumentPathRefused closes that one direction -- a ValueError, a SIBLING of BundlePathNotFound
rather than a subclass, built from context_files (never files) and through the same in_dimension
predicate the listing uses, quoting the document's REAL name so what it hands back resolves.
F4 -- premise HELD, option (c) felled by measurement. All four live artefacts stamped
cost_baseline_anchored: False and each arm invented its cost codes. derive_cost_baseline refuses
against the delivered base: K2's price schedule is a pandoc SIMPLE table with ONE column header,
so making --derive-cost-baseline reachable there would mean inventing a rule for an unmeasured
form -- MAJOR-4's own honesty limit. Chose (b) over (a): --require-cost-baseline /
run_project(require_cost_baseline=...), OPT-IN and never default, so every bundle without a
cost-baseline.json runs unchanged. The gate sits where both branches have bound baseline and ABOVE
the dry-run cut, so it fires on the free trip too and, on the paid one, before the first model
call. Three CLI refusals by name, each with an rc-0 control.
12 mutations, all red against the WHOLE suite. Green control 1493/5 -> 1511/5 (+18 node-ids, 0
removed); golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UNCHANGED (shasum -a 1 of the CONTENT =
ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f). No paid run: both findings measured offline.
Measurement: docs/2026-09-08-f3-f4-nekten-og-forankringen.md
Order: 20260908T020419Z-5837110336-from-portfolio-optimiser
Co-Authored-By: Claude <Opus 5>
Q5 = B, bygget som MAALT OPSJON. --prepass-payload gir DEBATTEN et deklarert
kutt og trekker de fire navigatoerverktoeyene; --prepass-seed gir UTFORSKNINGEN
det samme kuttet som utgangspunkt og BEHOLDER verktoeyene.
Nekten M32/F4 staar ORDRETT. B er et nytt flagg, aldri en loesning av den, og
hjemmelen er konsumkontraktens SS 2.2: en skill maa ikke lese «outside what the
payload delivers or explicitly names as reachable». Andre ledd er hele arm B, og
PrepassDeclaration.rest_reachable er det som gjoer de to lesningene skillbare i
ettertid -- paakrevd uten default av cost_baseline_anchoreds grunn, fordi begge
defaults ville loeyet om hvilken arm som leste kuttet.
Soemmene:
admit_payload er EN opptaks-gate (form -> montert base -> tom-leveranse-nekt)
delt av begge doerer; to kopier ville latt en doer slippe inn det den andre
nekter.
render_seed deler header, regel->ANTALL-foldingen og DATA-blokkene med
render_context. Det eneste som skiller dem er avsnittet som sier hva
leseren kan gjoere videre.
explore(seed_context=...) legger kuttet i TASK-MELDINGEN, aldri i prompt:
_finish bygger Mandate.objective av prompt, og en kommisjon med 22 335
tokens utdrag i objektivet er uleselig for den som skrev den. Tom streng gir
en byte-identisk task-melding.
trace_payload(prepass=...) skriver deklarasjonen fra en finally. MAALT baerende
-- den seedede kjoeringen som doede paa en Azure-400 etterlot likevel kuttet
deklarert.
Fem nekter ved navn. --checkpoint-dir baerer en beslutning: en gjenopptatt
etappe kjoerer i en prosess som aldri saa payloaden og ville overskrevet den
parkerte etappens deklarasjon med prepass: null.
--dimension-config er BEVISST ikke nektet (arm A nekter den): maalt bygger
utforskningen navigator_tools(bundle_dirs) UTEN dimensjon, saa aa skope
seedet ville nektet tekst den samme loekka kan aapne et oeyeblikk senere.
MAALT PAA K2 MED LEVENDE MODELL, og maalingen taler MOT aa gjoere B til default:
like-for-like gratis 4 317 -> 227 675 o200k (x 52,7), og betalt er manageren
x 21 paa samme antall prompter. Viktigere enn prisen: den USEEDETE kontrollen
hentet prisskjemaet i fire steg (del-ii-bilag-7-prisskjema/prissammenstilling-
sheet-1.md), mens BEGGE seedede armer lot vaere -- den ene med null verktoeykall
fordi manageren rutet til hypotesisereren i alle tre runder, den andre ved aa
gjette stier ut av kuttets egne konsept-navn og mynte en base-id som ikke finnes.
Erkjennelsen kom (manageren skrev i hver runde at utdragene ikke rakk),
handlingen ikke. Ingen av de 40 svarene brukte ett eneste av kontraktens fem
literaler. NOK 2,78 av taket 5, 0 x 429. Anbefaling skrevet, beslutning ikke
tatt -- den er operatoerens.
Load-bearing maalt: 26 armer, 16 mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten, groenn
kontroll 1493 passed / 5 skipped (fra 1467/5; +26 node-ider, 0 fjernet), golden
demo-transcript.stdout byte-uendret (shasum -a 1 av innholdet =
ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
To armer var GROENNE AV FEIL GRUNN og ble rettet, ikke droppet: tool_calls alene
kan ikke skille «et verktoey ble kalt» fra «basen var aapen», fordi recorderen
appender FOER call_next; og id-enighets-armen maalte den stale digesten i stedet
for id-gaten. Sonden var dessuten feil foer koden var det -- foerste
diskriminator var norsk, og verktoeysvar serialiseres med \uXXXX-escapes.
Avvik, uttalt: implementasjonen ble skrevet FOER testfila. Roedmaalingen er gjort
etterpaa ved aa reversere src/ til HEAD (16 av 24 armer roede), deretter
restaurert med shasum-verifikasjon. Beviset er ekte, rekkefoelgen var ikke.
Rapportert, ikke fikset: ChatClientException (Azure 400, «No tool call found for
function call output») etter tre quick_validate-nekter paa rad -- den ligger
utenfor main()s nekt-tuppel og forlater CLI-en som traceback.
Azure-konfigurasjonen er uendret; endepunktet utledes inline fra az og er aldri
lagret i fil. Ruff + mypy rene.
Maaling: docs/2026-09-07-prepass-mater-q5b-k2.md
Ordre: 20260907T234344Z-9062321009-from-.claude
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Steg 6 og 7 av planen. Flagget lastes fail-fast ved siden av `--mandate` (samme
try/except, saa manglende/ugyldig fil lander paa `run refused:` uten traceback) og
traades inn i BEGGE `run_project`-dispatchene -- dry-run og full kjoering. En egen arm
SPIONERER paa argumentet, ikke paa exit-koden: et flagg som parses, valideres og
droppes er F4-klassen, og de to utfallene er samme rc.
SEKS NEKTER, hver ved NAVN, hver med en rc-0-kontroll paa en argv som ellers ville
blitt AKSEPTERT:
- `report_forbidden` -- report-modus returnerer OVER hver dispatch, saa en utelatelse
er et stille DROPP. Kontrollen bruker en JSON-ARRAY-ledger; et objekt ville gjort
armen roed av feil grunn (maalt i oekt 89).
- `single_only` -- navngir `--portfolio`, ALDRI det delte `--prepass-payload`-tokenet:
en droppet rad faller gjennom til `--bundle-dir`-kravet, hvis melding ogsaa navngir
flagget, saa en arm paa det delte tokenet ville staatt groenn mot sin egen mutasjon.
- krever `--bundle-dir`; nektet med `--proposals-from-mandate` (returnerer over
debatten, saa flagget ville vaert stille inert), med `--dimension-config` (pre-passet
kuttet uten aa kjenne dimensjoner, saa aa aere skopet ville droppe utdrag
deklarasjonen teller som LEVERT -- da er nevnerne feil for kjoeringen som publiserte
dem) og med `--explore` (utforskningen leser HELE basen med de fire verktoeyene
payloadet trekker, saa kjoeringen som helhet ville lest langt utenfor kuttet den
erklaerer).
Blokka ligger paa FUNKSJONS-nivaa etter mode-dispatchen, aldri nestet under en annen
grens -- under en av dem ville en bar kombinasjon falt rett gjennom.
`hosting.py` er BEVISST URØRT (briefens non-goal, MAJOR-4/S7b-presedensen): feltet
kommer inn i ingen av de tre settene, saa den generiske `unknown field(s)`-400-en
svarer alt, og Fase 4es to halvdeler staar. Gatet av en testarm i stedet for en
redigering -- inkludert den negative halvdelen (hvert videresendt felt ER en
`run_project`-parameter, hvert konsumert er det ikke).
README-blokka navngir alle seks partnerne, uttrykker seg i kundevendt terminologi
(aldri "OKF bundle") og sier BEGGE aerlighets-grensene hoeyt: dette kjoeper et
DEKLARERT kutt, ikke en billigere kjoering; og en TOM leveranse er bevis for fravaer
mens en FULL ikke er bevis for tilstedevaerelse. Uttrekkeren tar BLOKKA (ikke en
delstreng over hele fila -- `--portfolio` og `--report` staar overalt), med
`--plan-review`-blokka som kjent-positiv kontroll.
1466 passed / 5 skipped (fra 1446/5, +20, 0 fjernet). ruff + mypy rene. Golden
`shasum -a 1` av INNHOLDET = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f, BYTE-UENDRET.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
[skip-docs]: CLI-flagget og README-blokka kommer i neste commit.
`prepass_notice` er ENESTE renderer, tar den ALT OPPLOESTE deklarasjonen (aldri en
payload-sti -- en renderer som leste fila paa nytt ville vaert en andre oppløsning fri
til aa vaere uenig med kjoeringen den beskriver), og returnerer `None` uten payload.
Omisjonen er entydig her paa en maate `proposal_review_notice`s bevisst ikke er: en
kjoering sier ingenting om et kutt fordi operatoeren ikke ga noe, og det finnes
noeyaktig EN maate aa gi et paa. Golden-transkriptet er det uavhengige, eksisterende
vitnet for den halvdelen. To kallsteder: dry-run og full kjoering.
`outbox.write_prepass` skriver `{run_id}-prepass.json` IFF et payload ble gitt --
`write_proposal_reviews`-regelen, og her gjoer den en andre jobb: siden et payload
TREKKER navigatoerverktoeyene er `{run_id}-debate.json`s `tool_calls` tom ved
konstruksjon paa denne stien, og DEN fila skrives ubetinget nettopp fordi et tomt spor
ER S2c-regresjonen. Uten dette artefaktet ved siden av ville "trukket med vilje" og
"regrert" lest likt. TILSTEDEVAERELSEN er det som skiller dem, og en egen arm
observerer BEGGE filene paa SAMME kjoering.
Skrevet fra `finally` (`write_parse_failures`-presedensen) ved et DIREKTE kall, ikke
via `_write_or_report`: den helperens paakrevde `in_flight` bindes foerst inne i
genererings-blokka, og `None` der ville latt en `OSError` fortrenge en `BudgetExceeded`
i luften -- noeyaktig defekten helperen finnes for. En egen arm driver et budsjettstopp
midt i debatten og krever at deklarasjonen likevel ligger der.
Regel -> ANTALL i baade rendereren og artefaktet; en arm beviser at 20 tilbakeholdte
konsept-ider naar HVERKEN stdout eller artefaktet mens antallet gjoer det.
1446 passed / 5 skipped (fra 1440/5, +6, 0 fjernet). ruff + mypy rene. Golden
`shasum -a 1` av INNHOLDET = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f, BYTE-UENDRET.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
[skip-docs]: CLI-flagget og README-blokka kommer i steg 6/7; `prepass_payload` er
foreloepig bare naabar for en bibliotek-kaller.
`run_project(prepass_payload=...)` forgrener bundle-armen. UTEN payload er hver linje
uendret -- pekeren, de fire verktoeyene, siteringer over hele den navigerte basen. MED
et payload faar debatten et DEKLARERT KUTT og verktoeyene trekkes (SS 2.2: kontekst
pre-passet holdt tilbake ble holdt tilbake med vilje; en debatt som holder BEGGE er fri
til aa gaa rundt kuttet den nettopp erklaerte).
Nekten PROPAGERER, aldri en stille degradering tilbake til pekeren -- `load_mandate`s
regel. Maalt paa NULL modellkall, ikke paa exit-koden.
`delivered == 0` nektes ved NAVN foer debatten, med nevnerne, spoersmaalet og ref-en
sitert: maalt er den tilstanden bare naabar naar hvert konsept feilet leksikalsk (den
andre tomme saken nekter produsenten selv), altsaa bevis for FRAVAER. Uten den falt
kjoeringen gjennom til `run.py`s siteringsvakt, hvis melding navngir `docs_dir` -- som
er `None` paa denne stien.
`bundle_excerpt_citations` (datasource) siterer de LEVERTE konseptene alene: et stempel
som siterer hele korpuset for et forslag som saa fire, gjenoppfinner den uerklaerte
paastanden sømmen finnes for. Kroppen tas fra den NAVIGERTE `BundleFile`, ikke fra
payloadets `text` -- den leverte teksten er NFC-normalisert med strippet hale, saa en
locator over den ville ikke indeksert fila den navngir. Deler dermed ogsaa
`bundle_citations`' verdict-eksklusjon i stedet for aa gjenta den.
MCP-appenden ligger BEVISST under forgreningen: dette trekker navigatoerverktoeyene,
ikke verktoeylista. Maalt: en tom liste naar traaden som `tools: None`, saa ingen
uproevd tom-array-form innfoeres.
`RunResult.prepass` og `DryRunReport.prepass` DEFAULTER (`skipped_links`-halvdelen:
`None` er det sanne utsagnet "ingen payload ble gitt"), bundet i BEGGE grener saa ingen
`NameError` venter paa veg-stien. `ProvenanceStamp` er BEVISST urørt -- stempelet
beskriver gaten som doemte EN kandidat, dette er et RUN-nivaa-faktum om hva kjoeringen
i det hele tatt fikk lese.
Tilbaketrekkingen asserteres paa `fresh_workflow(tools=...)`, ALDRI paa
`debate_tool_calls`: maalt er det sporet allerede tomt MED alle fire verktoeyene, fordi
en `ScriptedChatClient` aldri emitterer et verktoeykall. En arm skrevet paa det kan
ikke skille de to implementasjonene. GATE, IKKE VEGG: en egen arm beviser at den gatede
ExpeL-folden fortsatt naar hypotese-prompten (0.82) under et payload.
1440 passed / 5 skipped (fra 1425/5, +15, 0 fjernet). ruff + mypy rene. Golden
`shasum -a 1` av INNHOLDET = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f, BYTE-UENDRET.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
Funn d71a5d72 (MINOR, MISSING_ERROR_HANDLING, run.py:1202). Begge
finally-skriverne ligger i propageringsstien til nettopp det unntaket de er
bevis for: en OSError fra mkdir/write_text mens BudgetExceeded eller
ProposalReviewInputError er i flukt ERSTATTER den - og hverken
`except ProposalReviewInputError` (:3404) eller nekt-tuppelen (:3412) fanger
OSError, saa operatoeren fikk traceback og grunnen til at kjoeringen stoppet var
borte. Review-skriveren gaar paa HVER kjoering med reviewer; parse-skriveren
har samme form.
`_write_or_report` er EN kopi for begge kallstedene (koe-(p)): en regel om hva
en skriver faar gjoere med et unntak i flukt, kopiert, blir en regel anvendt paa
bare det ene. Vakten er BETINGET, aldri en blanket except - uten noe i flukt
finnes ingen stoppgrunn aa beskytte, og en kjoering som ikke fikk skrevet
utboksen maa si fra ved aa feile. Feilen SIES uansett, fordi et fravaerende
artefakt ellers leses som en kjoering uten noe aa registrere (T10/T11).
`in_flight` fanges eksplisitt (`except BaseException as stop: ... raise`), ikke
via `sys.exc_info()`, som ville lest et ytre except-lag hos en bibliotekkaller
som en flukt her.
MAALT mot HELE suiten, to mutasjoner, hver med sin egen signatur, kontroll
1367 passed / 5 skipped og golden `demo-transcript.stdout` BYTE-UENDRET
(`shasum -a 1` av INNHOLDET = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f):
MC vakten detached (2 roede - de to in-flight-armene) - MD svelg ubetinget
(1 roed - KONTROLL-armen alene, altsaa er betingelsen selv gatet).
Iron Law: begge in-flight-armene skrevet FOERST og maalt roede mot uendret
run.py; kontroll-armen var groenn foer fiksen, som er nettopp
diskrimineringen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
To funn, ETT commit, fordi de deler vitnet ved konstruksjon: 02159d21
(run.py:2738, PLAN_EXECUTE_DRIFT) er vakten, da485928
(tests/...:1344, MISSING_TEST) er armen som skulle sett den. AA dele dem ville
krevd en kastbar duplikattest.
VAKTEN: `if args.checkpoint_dir is not None` nektet --proposal-review for HVER
argv med en checkpoint-katalog - men --resume KREVER --checkpoint-dir
(run.py:2776), saa komposisjonen nekten selv anbefaler («pass --proposal-review
at --resume instead») var unaabar, og run.py:2218-helpen, README.md:546 og
MAJOR-2-raden beskrev en sti ingen argv kunne ta. Vakten nekter naa en PARK
(en etappe som returnerer foer noen kandidat finnes), aldri et LOEFT.
ARMEN: `test_the_door_composes_with_resume` sendte hverken --resume,
--checkpoint-dir eller --review-inbox - den var en vanlig enkeltkjoering T13
allerede dekket, altsaa groenn mot nettopp den defekten den var navngitt for.
Den driver naa en EKTE resume: dag 1 parkerer en ekte plan-review gjennom
run.main, ekspertens svar legges i en ekte innboks, og dag N sender
--resume ... --checkpoint-dir ... --review-inbox ... --proposal-review med
run_project innspilt og _refuse_model som kontroll paa null modellkall.
MAALT, i denne rekkefoelgen (Iron Law): armen skrevet FOERST og kjoert mot
uendret vakt -> ROED med nettopp nektlinja i stderr («pass --proposal-review at
--resume instead»), calls == []. Etter vakt-fiksen: 49 passed i fila, og
park-nekten (test_the_door_and_a_parked_exploration_contradict, M39) staar
groenn - den sender --explore uten --resume.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ordre 20260904T173146Z-8102814273-from-portfolio-optimiser, steg 8 av 10.
Dispatcheren faar proposal_reviewer og videresender den til hver per-base run_project.
EN gjenstand, aldri en kopi per base: dispatchen er SEKVENSIELL, saa en terminal-reviewer
komponerer. Assertert med `is`, ikke `==` - en fersk reviewer per base ville vaert en annen
gjenstand med identisk oppfoersel, som `==` paa en vanlig callable ikke kan skille (samme
identitets-leksjon test_multibase_loadbearings store-arm ble rettet til).
Doera faar sitt EGET vitne (S7a-3-regelen: hver doer som aapner en base faar sin egen
mutasjon, fordi en uvitnet kopi kan regrere alene).
run_portfolio faar INGENTING - samtidige boelger deler en terminal, som er --portfolio-
partisjonens egen grunn - og fravaeret er ASSERTERT, saa en senere "symmetri"-endring er en
roed test og ikke en stille utvidelse.
RODT foer impl: T22 (TypeError paa ukjent keyword).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ordre 20260904T173146Z-8102814273-from-portfolio-optimiser, steg 6 av 10.
(a) argparse --proposal-review. (b) rader i BEGGE partisjonene (report_forbidden og
single_only) - report-modus og portefoelje returnerer over dispatchen, saa en utelatelse
er et STILLE DROPP, ikke en nekt (F4-gapet). (c) TRE navngitte nekter i EN topp-nivaa-blokk
if args.proposal_review: - plasseringen er MAALT, ikke plassert paa oeyemaal: naboen
--scripted-replies/--live-dry-run er nostet under if args.scripted_replies, og
--explore/--live-dry-run under if args.explore, saa under noen av dem ville et bart
--live-dry-run --proposal-review falt rett gjennom til dry-run-dispatchen og droppet flagget.
(d) reviewer bygget paa KALLSTEDET + except ProposalReviewInputError -> "run stopped:" rc 1,
en DISTINKT kanal fra "run refused:". (e) proposal_review_notice printes fra kjoeringens EGEN
post. (f) _load_scripted_replies' aerlighetsgrense navngir review-stien.
--resume KOMPONERER (A3 verifisert av en arm, ikke utsatt): resume-blokka gir mandatet og
faller gjennom til SAMME full-run-dispatch.
RODT foer impl: 9 armer. T13 og T16 kjoerer i et BARN (P4). Nekt-armene kjoerer in-process
med _default_factory som REISER - ved exit-koden ser en nekt etter forbruket identisk ut med
en foer (oekt 57).
TO ARMER BLE FALSIFISERT AV MAALINGEN FOER de kunne gate noe:
(1) T18s rc-0-kontroll avslorte at F4-testens ledger-fixtur ({"entries": []}) faar rc 1 av
SavingsLedger.load ("must be a JSON array"), ikke av partisjonsraden - armen ville vaert
groenn mot en fjernet rad. Fixturen er naa en JSON-array, og kontrollen beviser at argv-en
ellers ville blitt AKSEPTERT.
(2) notice-null-armen ga BudgetExceeded i stedet for en avvist kjoering: et to-stegs
proposer-manus mot max_attempts=3 faller til default-svaret, som aldri parser, og rundeboka
fyrer - noeyaktig aerlighetsgrensen _load_scripted_replies uttaler, reprodusert ved uhell.
Manuset har naa like mange steg som forsoek.
Planens T19 er foldet inn i T13 og uttalt: "et bart, uskriptet flaggparse" ville kalt en
levende modell, saa argparse-vitnet er barnets egen unrecognized-arguments-assert.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ordre 20260904T173146Z-8102814273-from-portfolio-optimiser, steg 4 av 10.
run_project faar proposal_reviewer (keyword-only, None => byte-identisk kjoering), eier
sinken expert_reviews ved siden av parse_failures, og skriver
{run_id}-proposal-reviews.json fra den EKSISTERENDE genererings-finally-en.
Skriveregelen er IFF en reviewer ble gitt, OGSAA naar lista er tom (D4). Begge halvdeler
er baerende og trekker hver sin vei: write_debate_tools skriver ubetinget fordi DER er det
tomme tilfellet regresjonen; her maa en reviewer-LOES kjoering la utboksen staa byte-identisk
(to eksisterende tester pinner et EKSAKT fire-navns-listing), mens en reviewer som ble tilbudt
og aldri konsultert er et faktum artefaktet maa kunne SI.
Noeklingen: med mandat er hver post noeklet - kjoeringens eget forslag paa OWN_PROPOSAL_ID -
og None betyr kun EN ting: det fantes intet mandat. RunResult.expert_revisions bygges FRA
sinken, aldri ved siden av (kø-(p)).
RODT foer impl: 8 armer.
REGRESJON FANGET AV FULL SUITE OG RETTET HER: steg 3s _FeedbackAwareChatClient kopierte
_inner_get_response-kroppen og gjorde test_scripted_client_consolidation
::test_inner_get_response_collapsed_to_two_sites roed. Doblen overstyrer naa _next_reply i
stedet - basen har alt lagt DENNE kallets prompt i received_texts naar den ber om et svar,
saa sommen holder uten en tredje kopi av kroppen, og registeret i vakten trenger ingen ny
oppfoering. Aa registrere fila som foreign lineage var ikke mulig og heller ikke riktig:
Group B bruker ScriptedChatClient, som den vakten nekter for nettopp den lista.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MAJOR-3/S7a-3 gjorde utforskningen billig og lot pipelinen staa. Maalt paa K2
(630 konsepter, S7bs eget instrument, kjent-positiv-kontrollen reprodusert
eksakt FOER bruk): okf.bundle_context er 648 962 o200k-tokens og rir i TRE
kopier = 1 947 342 = 99,1 % av en kjoerings prompt-tokens.
Et premiss i maaledokumentet ble presisert foerst: de tre kopiene er tre
DEBATT-turer (proposer x2, checker x1), mens genererings-prompten er 156
tokens, fordi gen_context = debate_output or context. Det avgjorde formen -
generering trengte ingen egen soem, for aa binde `context` binder
siste-utvei-fallbacken ved konstruksjon.
run_project sender naa en PEKER (fast tekst + erklaert bundle_id + antall
konseptdokumenter i scope + stigen, O(1) i korpuset) og gir debatten de SAMME
fire verktoeyene utforskningen bruker - explore.navigator_tools gjenbrukt,
aldri en andre kopi av policyen.
Etter: 753 tokens like-for-like (samme manus, samme fire prompter, -99,96 %)
og 8 942 med en debatt som faktisk gaar stigen (-99,5 %), mot operatoerens
terskel 195 000 = 4,6 % av taket. Validert besparelse og validatorens dom er
UENDRET (850 000 NOK av 3 852 500, 2 av 5 felt paa stage 4 og 5, samme
dom-noekkel), og utforskningens 18 355 er uendret til tokenet.
§4.1a maatte flytte, ikke forsvinne: dimensjonsfilteret bodde i renderingen og
bor naa i VERKTOEYENE, paa begge trinn - en listing som skjuler et fremmed
dokument mens read_file serverer det paa sti er et filter i navnet alene.
okf.in_dimension er eneste predikat.
Sporet er kaller-eid (ExplorationToolRecorder -> RunResult.debate_tool_calls ->
{run_id}-debate.json fra en finally) og skrives ogsaa TOMT: en debatt som
navigerer ingenting ER S2c-regresjonen, saa den maa kunne leses.
Load-bearing MAALT: aatte mutasjoner roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1306/5 (fra 1295/5), golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET
(shasum -a 1 av innholdet = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M7 falsifiserte seg selv, ikke gaten - staar som maalt.
Maaling: docs/2026-09-04-s2c-debatt-k2.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fiks-ordre 20260904T070930Z-8335015575-from-.claude. Two scoped defects the
S7b syretest observed and left unfixed (docs/2026-09-04-syretest-s7b-k2.md
§ 3.6):
1. `BudgetExceeded` (a RuntimeError, econ 56) could leave `--explore` as a
raw Python traceback from TWO raise sites: the exploration loop's own
round/token cap (`explore()`/`resume_exploration()`, uncaught in
`main()`'s exploration `try`), and `generate_via_llm`'s retry loop when a
mandate's own-proposal evaluation hits an unparseable reply (the full-run
dispatch's `except` tuple only knew `ValueError`/`FileNotFoundError`/
`ValidationError`). Both now end as `run refused: {exc}` on stderr, rc 1,
same shape as every other loader refusal in run.py.
2. `{run_id}-exploration.json` carried rounds/tool_calls/plan_reviews/
quick_validations but not the approaches the loop actually shaped — those
stood only in the stdout mandate announcement. `explore.trace_payload`
now takes a required `mandate` keyword and renders `mandate.approaches`
under an "approaches" key, so an operator reading the artefact days later
(the whole point of the async U12 door) can recover what the run decided
to evaluate without the terminal.
Fifteen mutations across three detach points, all red against the full
suite: the exploration-loop except clause (2 red), the full-run except
tuple (1 red), and the approaches rendering (1 red) — plus a control per
fix proving the happy path is unaffected. Green control 1295 passed / 5
skipped (supersett of S7b's 1290/5, 0 removed), golden
demo-transcript.stdout byte-unchanged (shasum -a 1 = ea8c534…), ruff +
mypy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEL A + DEL C av ordre 20260903T204605Z-215167684-from-.claude.
Soem 1: okf.load_optional_ir_projection ved siden av den fail-faste, moensteret
fra load_cost_baseline/load_optional_cost_baseline. Et PAR, ikke et required=-flagg:
PM-tillegg 5 maalte hva en uoevet parameter koster (elleve evidence_for-kallsteder
brukte defaulten til den andre grenen raatnet), og et flagg ville dessuten gjort
usanne de fem docstringene som siterer load_ir_projection som DEN fail-faste
presedensen. Toleransen stopper ved fravaer: en malformed projeksjon reiser fortsatt.
De tre kallstedene fikk HVER SIN stilling:
* _project_from_bundle - fravaer hopper over en fail-fast som ikke har noe aa
sjekke mot; en projeksjon som FINNES og navngir et annet prosjekt nekter
fortsatt. Divergens-vakten er kontrakten multi-base-dispatchen hviler paa.
* run_mandate_across_bundles - FILA FOERST, basens ERKLAERTE bundle_id som
fallback (S7a-3). Presedensen baerer i begge retninger: erklaering-foerst ville
re-adressert hver eksisterende base der project_id != bundle_id.
* bundle_candidate_features - optional_bundle_candidate_features, og de TO
konsumentene svarer ULIKT paa fravaeret. Steg-1-folden HOPPER OVER og sier
hvor mange tidligere dommer som dermed aldri naadde hypotese-prompten;
seed_store_from_bundle NEKTER ved navn (VerdictKeyUnavailable), fordi aa mynte
en noekkel for en dom som erklaerer ingen er nettopp defekten S3.2 lukker.
Synligheten: RunResult.unkeyed_verdicts (ANTALL, ikke flagg - koe-(y)-regelen) +
run.unkeyed_verdicts_notice som ENESTE renderer, None ved null (omisjon, aldri tom
rad). Baereren er MAALT: dry-run-kuttet returnerer OVER folden, saa et felt paa
DryRunReport kunne bare rapportert null - ulikt cost_baseline_anchored og
skipped_links, begge opploest over kuttet. Ikke paa ProvenanceStamp: stempelet
beskriver gaten som doemte EN kandidat.
Prosjektnavnet var et ikke-spoersmaal, og det er maalt: SavingsProposal har intet
navnefelt, saa projeksjonen har aldri vaert en navnekilde. Project.name kommer
fortsatt fra type: project-konseptets title med id-en som siste utvei.
DEL C: --mandate lagt i report_forbidden. Den var ELDRE enn partisjonen og hadde
aldri faatt en rad, saa --report --ledger X --mandate Y droppet kommisjonen i
STILLHET - F4-klassen. Testarmen kjoerer mot en argv report-modus ellers ville
AKSEPTERT, med en kontroll som beviser rc 0 uten flagget.
Kontroll: 1290 passed / 5 skipped (fra 1275/5 - supersett, 0 fjernet).
Golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET, shasum -a 1 (INNHOLD, ikke git-blob)
= ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f. ruff + mypy rene.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
To funn fra review foer lukking av ordren.
(1) evaluate_mandate_candidates kaller assert_declared_ids_agree, men INGEN
mutasjon beviste det. S7a-3-raden enumererer doerene med vilje ("separat gir
den sin egen mutasjon per doer") fordi en uvitnet kopi kan regrere ALENE mens
de to andre staar groenne. En base hvis konsepter erklaerer to korpus ville
ellers rutet paa reconcile_bundle_id sin fallback og produsert en kandidat
tilskrevet en omstridt identitet. M16 -> 1 roed.
MAALINGEN KORRIGERTE TESTEN: foerste form erklaerte de to id-ene paa
rot-index.md og den ene konseptfila, og sto GROENN - S7a-3 holdt rot-indeksen
UTENFOR enighets-settet med vilje, fordi konsept-slaar-index er en
PRESEDENS-regel: en index i utakt med sine konsepter er fallbacken som taper,
ikke to konsepter som kolliderer. Armen bruker naa TO konseptfiler.
(2) project_id=args.project_id or "" er erstattet av en assert. Unaabar i dag
(required-args-guarden fyrer langt over), men "" ville naadd
derive_cost_baseline og myntet en CostBaseline(project_id="") - en fabrikkert
identitet, som er nettopp formen cost_baseline_anchored er
paakrevd-uten-default for aa forby. Asserten sier det i stedet for en default
som stille er uenig med den.
Load-bearing MAALT paa nytt: 16 mutasjoner, 15 ROEDE mot HELE suiten + groenn
kontroll 1275/5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S7b-forberedelse, fase 2. Bruksscenarioet "dokumenter + konkret oppgave ->
forslag" hadde ingen vei: eneste kandidat-kilde var generate_via_llm.
DEN TILFOEYDE VEIEN. Eksperten sier HVA (label -> measure, verbatim), HVILKE
linjer (affected_codes) og HVOR MYE (claimed_saving_nok); dokumentet sier
MENGDE og PRIS (derive_cost_baseline, MAJOR-4). Ingenting her oppfinner et
tall. Tre nekter ved navn - manglende anslag, ingen koder, ukjent kode - og
hver av dem er ekspertens aa skrive, aldri vaar aa defaulte
(write_concept_file-regelen).
ANSLAGET BOR PAA APPROACH, IKKE PAA MANDATE, og det foelger av settle sin egen
regel: tilnaerminger er ALTERNATIVER og summeres aldri, saa ett tall paa
mandatnivaa ville vaert tvetydig over N. Det er heller ikke kjoeringens MAAL -
contracts.GoalContract eier nettopp ett saant, og skillet staar skrevet der
feltet innfoeres, ellers leses det som den driften modulen forbyr.
NULL MODELLKALL ER STRUKTURELT: evaluate_mandate_candidates er SYNC, saa den kan
ikke aware et chat-kall - ingen mutasjon av kroppen kan stille innfoere ett.
CLI-armen asserterer det likevel ATFERDSMESSIG (_default_factory patchet til aa
raise), fordi rc 0 alene ogsaa er utfallet til en doer som gjorde ingenting.
allow_own_proposals faar en not_evaluated-RAD, ikke en nekt: raden kan ikke
fylles uten en modell, men aa utelate den gjoer den uskillbar fra en
tilnaerming ingen bestilte (ApproachOutcome sin egen regel), og aa nekte hele
kjoeringen ville vaert feil andre veien - feltet defaulter til True.
Fire CLI-nekter, alle ved navn: krever --mandate, krever
--derive-cost-baseline, nektet i --portfolio (ved NAVN, ikke ved gjennomfall)
og i report_forbidden (der en utelatelse er et stille DROPP, ikke en nekt -
F4-gapet).
LOAD-BEARING MAALT: 15 mutasjoner, 14 ROEDE mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll
1274/5 (fra 1257, supersett, 0 fjernet) og golden demo-transcript.stdout
BYTE-UENDRET (shasum -a 1 = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
TO MUTASJONER FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse):
* M5 (bygg lazily) sto GROENN - armen asserterte kun pytest.raises, og BEGGE
implementasjoner reiser; ingen rad naar kalleren uansett, saa de er
uskillbare utenfra. Oekt 57s regel ("en nekt etter forbruket ser identisk ut
ved exit-koden") anvendt paa CBC-solves: testen TELLER naa solves, med en
kontroll som beviser at telleren faktisk beveger seg.
* M14 (rut paa mount-navnet) sto GROENN - armen brukte f"not-{declared}", som
matcher verken mount eller erklaering. Fixturene erklaerer ingen bundle_id
(S7a-3 maalte null ^bundle_id-treff under tests/), saa de to SAMMENFALLER
der. Ny arm bygger en base som erklaerer en id ulik katalognavnet og
asserterer BEGGE halvdeler: erklaert ruter, mount nektes.
EN MUTASJON FORBLIR GROENN, OG DET ER EN AERLIGHETS-GRENSE - IKKE EN GATE:
M7 (doem UTEN baselinen) er strukturelt uobserverbar, fordi kandidaten er
BYGGET fra baselinen og stage 0 derfor avstemmer med 0 % avvik ved
konstruksjon. baseline= staar som en DEFENSIV, uvitnet soem
(budget_stop-presedensen), ikke som noe en test holder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S7a-3 pkt. 1. Til i dag NEKTET reconcile_bundle_id en base som erklaerte en id
katalogen ikke bar. Maalt mot K2 - den foerste leverte basen som erklaerer sin
egen id (618 av 630 konseptfiler + rot-index, alle "k2-trinn1-20260903", levert
som "K2-bundle-20260903") - betydde det at basen ikke kunne aapnes slik den var
levert, og at eneste botemiddel var aa montere den paa nytt for haand, en gang
per leveranse. PM-beslutning: konsumenten slakker.
- Erklaert vinner (B1s rekkefoelge uroert), avviket REGISTRERES:
ResolvedBundleId.mount + ProvenanceStamp.bundle_id_source +
DryRunReport.bundle_id_source + run.bundle_id_notice (None ved enighet).
Stempel-feltet er PAAKREVD uten default: None er en VERDI (veg-stien).
- Det som fortsatt nekter er den EKTE kollisjonen: to KONSEPTER i en base som
erklaerer ULIKE id-er (okf.assert_declared_ids_agree, kalt ved hver doer som
aapner en base). Rot-index er IKKE med i enighets-settet - konsept-slaar-index
er en presedens-regel, saa en index i utakt er fallbacken som taper.
- KONSEKVENS, ikke scope-krype: explore._bundle_index loeser naa den erklaerte
id-en. Den brukte Path(raw).name mens dispatcheren brukte reconcile...id; med
erklaert-vinner ville explore() myntet approaches som navngir MOUNTET mens
dispatcheren ruter paa ERKLAERINGEN - en utforskning med uruterbart mandat.
Load-bearing MAALT: 10 mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1243 passed / 5 skipped og golden demo-transcript.stdout byte-uendret
(shasum -a 1 = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M1 1 / M2 1 / M3 1 / M4 9 / M5 2 / M6 1 / M7 1 / M8 2 / M9 2 / M11 1.
Tre armer i test_bundle_id_reconciliation_loadbearing er SKREVET OM (ikke
slettet) - de pinnet nekten beslutningen fjernet. (j) ble skarpere enn den den
erstattet: erklaert id ruter, mountet nektes.
Kontrakt: docs/okf-konsum-kontrakter.md § 3.1. Invariantrad i CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MAJOR-4 (misjonsreview v2 section 7), owner B = the consumer. Neither existing
projection into ir.CostBaseline can serve an ingested tender corpus:
cost-baseline.json is hand-written per project and baseline_from_project belongs
to the road domain, so a K2-shaped bundle could be navigated and never anchored.
okf.derive_cost_baseline reads the numbers already in the bundle.
The premise was MEASURED before anything was built on it, and the order's two
pointers named two different forms. examples/*/expected-bundle/ carry pipe
tables, but every one of them is csv- or sql-sourced via render.render_table --
the xlsx path never reaches render_table at all. Measured with pandoc 3.10.2
under the producer's own writer and arguments: extract._extract_office converts,
and inbox.py hands that text to render_inbox_concept untouched, so an
xlsx-sourced concept file carries a pandoc SIMPLE table whose dash rule defines
the column spans. A pipe-only reader would have been inert on exactly the corpus
this exists for. Both forms are read, by two scanners over one role mapping and
one number grammar.
No judgement anywhere: the header vocabulary and the number grammar are closed,
and every ambiguity refuses -- no candidate table, more than one, two columns
claiming one role, two rows sharing a cost code, a row that prices nothing. A
partly-priced schedule refuses in full, because a half-derived baseline anchors
some codes while cost_baseline_anchored reports True.
Wired behind --derive-cost-baseline and never silently: one resolution in
run.py's bundle arm serves both the full run and the dry run, and the refusal
propagates rather than degrading to the file loader.
The two fixtures are pandoc's output verbatim, not hand-typed. The unpriced one
is K2's actual pre-award shape, and the columns survive as blanks -- so the
table IS a candidate and the refusal is the sharp one.
Load-bearing MEASURED: 18 mutations all red against the WHOLE suite, green
control 1230 passed / 5 skipped (from 1208/5, superset, 0 removed), golden
demo-transcript.stdout byte-unchanged (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M17 is the one that matters for arm (b): dropping the positivity guard makes the
mutant raise pydantic ValidationError, which IS a ValueError but is NOT the named
class -- so pytest.raises(ValueError) would have stayed green against exactly the
mutation the arm exists to catch. Verified directly, not argued.
Honesty limits stated in the invariant row: NS 3451 section rows are not
classified (K2 itself was not available to measure), the stamp records that a run
was anchored and never which projection anchored it, the hosted surface is
deliberately untouched, and no live K2 file was read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
[skip-docs] — the invariant row for this plan lands in Step 13, where the mutations
that force it have been measured. Documenting a seam before its measurement is
the claim-without-evidence class this repo writes rows against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
`--scripted-replies` tok EN konstant streng per rolle, saa ingen skriptet rolle
kunne emittere et `function_call`: maalt 0 verktoeykall / 0 approaches / 1 runde
paa 4/4 baser, mens hvert andre felt i artefaktet saa ut som en kjoering som
hadde virket. En operatoer som foelger dette repoets egen maalestige — «bevis saa
mye som mulig gratis foer det dyre trinnet» — kunne ikke bevise at navigatoeren
aapner noe.
En UTFORSKNINGSROLLE kan naa faa en LISTE av trinn, der et trinn er en tekst
eller ETT verktoeykall (`{"call": "<tool>", "args": {...}}`). Formen utvider den
ENE kanoniske `_inner_get_response`-kroppen (S2.5-konsolideringen) — ikke en
andre klient: rapportens vedlegg-A-`RecordingClient` var maaleinstrument, og en
kopi av kroppen ville drevet fra de tre conftest-dublettene som rir paa den.
Manuset ligger VED SIDEN AV selektoren, ikke inni: en selektor returnerer `str`
ved kontrakt, og et verktoeykall er ikke tekst. Naar manuset er tomt svarer
selektoren som foer, saa et utloept manus degraderer til konstantformen, ikke til
stillhet.
Listeformen NEKTES for debattens roller ved navn (proposeren svarer `generate`s
eget kall, ikke en agent-loekke som kan kalle et verktoey mellom turer), og hvert
malformet trinn nektes ved navn — validering, ALDRI reparasjon
(`write_concept_file`-regelen). Et trinn som slipper gjennom naar
`step["call"]` og krasjer midt i kjoeringen, som er nettopp MAJOR-2-klassen
filas foerste halvdel lukket.
MAALT: ni mutasjoner, alle roede mot HELE suiten, hver med sitt eget vitne +
groenn kontroll 2 failed (F15-diffen, KJENT) / 1087 passed / 5 skipped:
M1 detach recorderen fra explore() OG resume (1 roed) · M2 dropp `tool_calls`
fra `trace_payload` (3) · M3 sorter+dedupliser sinken (2) · M4 registrer navnet
uten basen (3) · M5 nekt listeformen igjen (2) · M6 aksepter lista men emitter
tekst (1) · M7 toler et malformet trinn (1) · M8 la en debattrolle ta
listeformen (1) · M9 dropp ukjent-noekkel-whitelisten (1). Golden
`demo-transcript.stdout` BYTE-UENDRET (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M7 FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse, TOLVTE gang):
nekt-testen brukte `{"invoke": "list_bundles"}` og sto GROENN med forms-sjekken
detached — UKJENT-NOEKKEL-grenen fanget den i stedet, saa den nekten som var
under test hadde intet vitne. De to grenene oeves naa av to armer med hver sin
mutasjon (M7 og M9).
Aerlighetsgrense, uttalt: at en LEVENDE modell kaller verktoeyene er fortsatt
ikke bevist (samme klasse som structured-output-grensen) — dette gjoer den
GRATIS halvdelen av stigen ekte, ikke den betalte.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
run_project KREVDE verdict_input og kjorte capture_verdict ubetinget; CLI-en
defaultet det til {"approved", "reviewed by expert"} og hosting listet det som
PAAKREVD. Netto: hver flaggloes kjoering myntet en ekspertgodkjenning ingen ga,
den gikk inn i den delte storen, og run_portfolio bar den inn i neste prosjekts
hypotese-prompt som en prior expert verdict -- paa flaten som ble overlevert
14.08. Non-goal 3, brutt i en soem.
RunResult.verdict er naa Verdict | None, og None er hva stillhet produserer:
ingenting myntes, ingenting lagres, ingenting varsles. Prinsippet sto allerede i
repoet -- RunFailure sin docstring: aa fylle et felt med en dummy legger
FABRIKKERT proveniens inn i aggregatet.
Traceability koster ingenting: RunResult.verdict_key (property, derivert fra
kandidaten) er verdicts.verdict_key sitt alt dokumenterte formaal -- identisk
med verdict.id naar en dom BLE gitt, og fortsatt meningsfull naar ingen ble det.
Det er den outboxen og den hostede responsen stempler.
Halv dom NEKTES paa begge doerer (FeedbackContract er eneste sted formen
valideres; CLI-en nekter ved navn FOER enhver mode-dispatch). Validering, aldri
reparasjon. De to mode-partisjonene fikk --decision/--rationale inn: kommentarene
sa ordrett at en aerlig nekt var uimplementerbar fordi de non-None
argparse-defaultene gjorde en eksplisitt verdi uskillbar fra defaulten -- med
defaultene borte er den implementerbar.
Hosting er WIDENING, ikke bryting: verdict_input flyttet fra _REQUIRED_FIELDS
til _OPTIONAL_FIELDS. Ingen ekstern kaller brekker.
AERLIGHETS-GRENSE: referanse-fixturens SYNTETISKE verdict_input-rader staar
uroert -- de er merket SYNTETISK paa fire steder og er reviewens F5 (maaling av
misjonspaastanden), ikke F2. Project.verdict_input er naa valgfri.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_ungiven_verdict_loadbearing.py, 15 armer), aatte
mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten + gronn kontroll 1080/5 og golden
demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
En mutasjon falsifiserte testen foerst (vakuoes-gate-klassen, ellevte gang):
--report-armen brukte et bart --report, som nekter rc 1 uansett fordi --ledger
mangler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F4 gjorde "be om svar, BRUKE svarene" naabar, men bare SYNKRONT: terminal_plan_reviewer
blokkerer loekka paa et menneske ved en terminal, saa svaret maa komme mens prosessen lever.
Maalbilde §3s tidsskala er den andre - eksperten svarer dager senere, i en prosess som aldri
saa kjoeringen.
--checkpoint-dir PARKERER reviewen (FileCheckpointStorage + {run_id}-plan-review.json) og
avslutter; --resume <run_id> leser svaret fra --review-inbox i en fersk interpreter. Det
eneste som krysser prosessgrensen er disk.
MAALT FELLE (Verifiseringsloven ansikt 4): list_checkpoints (_checkpoint.py:386-388) svelger
en blokkert deserialisering til en logger.warning og returnerer TOM liste. Uten BEGGE
MagenticPlanReviewRequest/Response i allowed_checkpoint_types feiler en resume som et FRAVAER,
ikke som en feil. _ALLOWED_CHECKPOINT_TYPES har derfor EN kopi, checkpoint_storage er eneste
konstruksjonssted, og en tom listing ved park raiser CheckpointUnreadable i stedet for aa
skrive et spoersmaal ingen kan besvare.
Budsjettet og revisjons-capen spenner over suspensjonen (meter.charge(parked.tokens_spent) +
trace.ledger.extend), ellers faar hver park et helt budsjett paa nytt. Fail-closed paa
ekspertens egen fil: request_id-mismatch, ord utenfor vokabularet og revise uten innhold
refuseres alle ved navn. hitl.pending_plan_reviews er registeret over hvem som venter.
Load-bearing MAALT: 17 tester, TRETTEN mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1059 passed / 5 skipped, golden demo-transcript.stdout byte-uendret
(ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
EN MUTASJON FALSIFISERTE SUITEN (vakuoes-gate-klassen, tiende gang): detach av
trace.plan_reviews.extend(parked.plan_reviews) lot HELE suiten staa groenn - capen leser
parked.plan_reviews DIREKTE, saa den binder uansett, og de to foerste legene er identiske
under begge implementasjoner. Gaten maatte bli det TREDJE leget, der artefaktet ellers taper
dag 1s revisjon og to ulike planer deler indeks 1. Ny test skrevet mot mutasjonen foerst.
Aerlighets-grenser: hostet flate NEKTER fortsatt (synkron review ville blokkert baade
requesten og event-loekka som svarer /readiness); en park midt i loepet etter en stall har
ingen naabar sti under det skriptede manuset, saa carry-overen som betjener den drives gjennom
en CRAFTED parkert tilstand.
Ordre 20260825T114645Z-6622513622-from-portfolio-optimiser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kommentaren over explore-kallet i run.py teller opp hva som fortsatt KAN forlate sloeyfa etter at
konfig-nektene er hoistet. Etter F4 er det tre ting, ikke to - en ubesvart plan-review er den
tredje. Repoet gater prosa-paastander flater gjoer om seg selv; en liste som ikke lenger er komplett
er den samme klassen, bare i kommentarform.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LtMDsh2zfp4Bmw8KGJ4aLD
F4 fra misjonsreviewen: begge operatorflatene nektet enable_plan_review, og eneste doer var
explore(..., plan_reviewer=...) i bibliotek-APIet. Maalbildets HITL-loop var dermed unaabar for
enhver som ikke importerte pakka. Reviewens tre fil:linje-paastander ble verifisert mot kilden foer
bygging og stemte.
Flate: CLI. `--plan-review` bygger en terminal_plan_reviewer() og gir den til den UENDREDE sloeyfa.
Operatoren vises planen og svarer "approve" eller "revise <hva>"; en revisjon gaar tilbake til
manageren, som replanlegger og spoer IGJEN om den NYE planen.
Gaten er den ANDRE halvdelen av setningen. En doer som printer planen, leser linja og kaster den
bestaar "operatoren ble spurt" og feiler maalbildet -- repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse. T1 er derfor
test_explore_loadbearing sin T15 loeftet til CLI-niva og er ROED mot en alltid-godkjenn-reviewer.
Vitnet er {run_id}-exploration.json (skrevet fra en finally), ikke skrapet stdout.
Fail-closed paa operatorens egen input: alt utenfor vokabularet spoerres paa nytt, og EOF raiser
PlanReviewInputError -- stillhet er aldri en signatur.
Fire nekter ved navn, hvorav to lukket et stille dropp ingen test dekket: report_forbidden (report-
modus returnerer FOER hver utforsknings-nekt) og portefoelje-partisjonen. De to konfig-avhengige
nektene deler tokenet enable_plan_review og har derfor ulik saertekst; den eksisterende testen
asserterte paa det delte tokenet og er rettet (oekt-57-mutasjonen, niende gang).
Hosting nekter fortsatt -- reviewen er synkron og ville blokkert bade HTTP-requesten og event-loekka
som svarer /readiness -- men meldingen navngir na CLI-doeren i stedet for aa paasta at biblioteket er
den eneste.
Mid-loep-spoersmaal er IKKE bygget, og fravaeret er MAALT: _magentic.py har noeyaktig ETT
ctx.request_info (:1044, plan review) i hele modulen. Reviewens "kun plan-review FOER loepet" er
derimot upresist -- samme forespoersel fyrer ogsaa ved re-plan etter en stall.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_plan_review_cli_door_loadbearing.py, 12 tester), elleve mutasjoner
alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 1040/5 og golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET
(ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LtMDsh2zfp4Bmw8KGJ4aLD
_SCRIPTED_ROLES = ("proposer", "checker") var det ENESTE rollesettet
_load_scripted_replies validerte OG returnerte. explore()s tre ekstra
roller (manager/navigator/hypothesiser) ble filtrert bort selv når de
fantes i --scripted-replies-JSON-en, og manglet en av dem krasjet CLI-en
med en rå KeyError midt i eksplorasjonssløyfa i stedet for en ren
"run refused:"-linje (MAJOR-2, docs/2026-08-25-syretest-vei-ab.md).
_EXPLORATION_SCRIPTED_ROLES legges nå til kravet KUN når --explore er
satt, slik at en manglende rolle nektes VED NAVN ved døren, før
explore() kalles. En rein debattkjøring skal ikke måtte svare for
roller den aldri bruker.
Målt (ikke bare antatt): med alle fem roller scriptet fullfører CLI-en
uten krasj, men sløyfa er fortsatt delvis vakuøs (1 runde, 0 approaches)
som syretesten forutså — en konstant streng per rolle kan ikke svare
korrekt på magentic-managerens stadiespesifikke former.
1028 passed / 5 skipped (+3 nye tester, RØD→GRØNN). Golden
demo-transcript byte-uendret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YSHNrYvKxDR5uct1QoVZng
Ordrens premiss («endrer run_project sin signatur») er FALSIFISERT foer bygging,
og ordren ba selv om nettopp den sjekken. run_project kan ikke ta mer enn en
bundle_dir: paa bundle-stien avleder den FIRE enkeltverdier fra DEN basen -
prosjektet (_project_from_bundle fail-faster naar basens egen project_id ikke er
den forespurte), validatorens stage-0-baseline, agentenes lesekontekst og
ExpeL-noekkelen - og returnerer ETT stemplet RunResult. En andre katalog paa den
signaturen ville tvunget et stille velg-en for alle fire. Planens egen setning
sier det samme lest naert: «pipelinen kjoeres per bundle som i dag
(run_portfolio-formen)» = N kall, ikke ett kall med N.
Levert form, tre soemmer:
- mandate.Approach.bundle_id (default "" - hvert mandat skrevet foer i dag er
fortsatt gyldig og dispatchbart uendret)
- mandate.route_by_bundle - ren partisjon, fail-fast paa et mandat som ikke kan
utfoeres som skrevet (load_mandate-regelen). En base som ingen approach navngir
kjoeres ikke; med NOEYAKTIG en base absorberer den alt uten navn, som ikke er en
gjetning men det eneste mulige svaret.
- run.run_mandate_across_bundles - dispatchen. INGEN project_id-parameter:
hver base sitt prosjekt leses fra DEN basens egen IR-projeksjon, altsaa den
verdien _project_from_bundle allerede fail-faster mot. En delt VerdictStore
traades paa tvers (kryss-base-laering, run_portfolio-formen), og med
portfolio_meter gjelder de to S3.4-tennene som HAR mening her: oppstartsnekt
(BudgetRefused) og aldri-startet + budget_stop + not_evaluated-rader.
INGEN eksisterende kaller endrer signatur - CLI, hosting og simulation sender
fortsatt en base hver, og kan fortsatt gjoere det.
explore(): hver myntet approach baerer bundle_id; markoeren kan navngi basen;
en umerket markoer med flere baser NEKTES (HypothesisParseError), med en base
resolveres den. Froe-approaches VALIDERES men skrives ALDRI om (§ C.6 doer 1 er
en bevaringsregel) - og valideringen skjer FOER foerste modellkall, samme
oekt-57-hoist-grunn: ved unntaket alene ser en nekt etter forbruket identisk ut.
explore()-docstringens gamle aerlighets-grense («venter paa at run_project tar
mer enn en bundle_dir») er RETTET - den ville vaert usann fra i dag.
Load-bearing MAALT, 12 mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1020/5 (fra 999/5 + 21 nye tester); golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET
(ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f): detach myntet bundle_id (2) ·
stille gjennomfall ved >1 base (1) · ukjent id resolvert etter rekkefoelge (1) ·
froe-sjekk etter forbruket (2) · ruteren gjetter foerste base (1) · uroutbar
approach droppet (1) · dispatchen kollapser til en base (5) · project_id fra
foerste base (2) · detach aldri-startet-tannen (1) · unreached urapportert (1) ·
fersk store per base (1) · detach oppstartsnekten (2).
EN MUTASJON FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse, aattende
gang): store-testen sammenlignet med ==, og VerdictStore er en pydantic-modell
med VERDI-likhet - tre ulike tomme stores er alle like, saa «fersk store per
base» lot hele suiten staa groenn. Delt INSTANS er paastanden, saa testen
asserterer naa paa `is`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3YHobQC3WzYVoxSgZus4d
Tre review-funn fra oerkt 57, alle handtert.
1. DEFEKT, funnet i review og REPRODUSERT foer fiks: --explore --outbox-dir uten
--run-id kjoerte HELE utforskningen og ble deretter nektet av run_project, som
eier outbox-kontrakten og nekter paa sin FOERSTE setning - tidlig nok for enhver
sti som fantes foer U4, men utforskningen kjoerer FORAN det kallet. Artefakt-
skrivingen hoppet ogsaa over (den krever begge), saa ikke engang regnskapet over
hva som ble brukt overlevde. Fiksen er en HOIST i utforskningsblokka, ikke en
andre kopi av regelen - samme hoist main() alt gjoer for de paakrevde argumentene,
av samme grunn. Testen asserterer at INGEN modellkall skjedde, ikke bare at rc er
1: ved exit-koden ser en nekt etter forbruket identisk ut.
2. VAKUOES ASSERT FJERNET (repoets egen klasse, snudd innover): scenarioets
label_in_bundle ble beregnet av den SAMME variabelen vakten raiser paa, saa feltet
kunne strukturelt kun vaere False og assertet kunne ikke feile mot noen
implementasjon - mens docstringen kalte det en kausalitetskontroll «akkurat som
marker_in_run_a_prompt». Feltet og assertet er borte; vakten ER kontrollen, og en
alltid-sann gjentakelse av den ville bare gjort den ekte lettere aa avfeie.
3. MAALINGS-PAASTANDEN PRESISERT: M10 (fjern --explore fra portefoelje-partisjonen)
ble re-maalt mot HELE suiten etter test-fiksen - foer sto den kun maalt med -k.
Invarianten sa «seksten mutasjoner mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 998/5» og
slo dermed sammen tre ulike kontroller; den oppgir naa alle fire (990/5, 996/5,
998/5, 999/5). En paastand om egen maaling som er upresis om sin egen nevner er
premiss-vs-faktum-regelen vendt innover.
Pluss en uttalt aerlighets-grense i invarianten: den HOSTEDE flaten gir ingen innsyn
i hva som formet mandatet (ingen outbox, intet utforskningsfelt i _response_payload).
Bevisst scope-grense, men uttalt, fordi flatens hele argument er at svaret er
etterproevbart.
Sytten mutasjoner totalt, alle roede mot HELE suiten. 999 passed / 5 skipped.
Golden-transkriptet byte-uendret (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
mypy + ruff rene.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YRZhBJcxqTcqWyMW6hBttx
Kallsted (1) + artefaktet (4) av oerkt 57s fire.
--explore "<prompt>" + --explore-config FILE i run.py: utforskningen kjoerer FOER
pipelinen og mandatet den former gaar rett inn i run_project(mandate=...). Flagget
er opt-in, og hver ting det ikke kan aere NEKTES ved navn:
- --explore-config uten --explore (--embedder-config-presedensen, ordrett)
- --explore uten --explore-config: CLI-en oppfinner ALDRI grenser, fordi
MagenticBuilders egen fallback er "ubegrenset"
- --explore + --mandate: TO KILDER TIL ETT MANDAT. Nektet, aldri slaatt sammen -
explore() tar objective fra prompten og hardkoder allow_own_proposals=True, saa
en sammenslaaing ville stille overskrevet tre felt operatoeren skrev selv.
Nekten NAVNGIR biblioteksdoera (seed_approaches), fordi C.6 doer 1 er et ekte
behov denne flaten ikke betjener
- --explore + --live-dry-run (motstrid), --explore uten --bundle-dir (leser
ingenting), --portfolio --explore (partisjonen)
- enable_plan_review=true nektes HER, ikke i explore(): ExplorationError er en
RuntimeError og ligger UTENFOR main()s (ValueError, FileNotFoundError,
ValidationError)-tuppel, saa den ville forlatt som traceback i stedet for rc 1
ExplorationTrace er en KALLER-EID akkumulator (funn-1-sinken, ett lag opp):
explore() raiser BudgetExceeded paa rundetaket og tokentaket fyrer fra middleware
midt i loepet - paa begge stier finnes ingen ExplorationResult, og C.2 krever at
artefaktet er lesbart uansett hvilken vakt som fyrte. ExplorationResult.ledger_log
BYGGES FRA akkumulatoren, aldri ved siden av (kø-(p)).
{run_id}-exploration.json skrives fra en finally (write_parse_failures-presedensen)
med rundene, plan-reviewene og quick_validate-dommene - de siste bor bevisst ikke i
ExplorationResult. `completed` er et eget felt: en stop: null som betyr BAADE
"avsluttet normalt" og "vi fikk aldri vite" er stillheten cost_baseline_anchored
ble paakrevd for aa lukke.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_explore_callsites_loadbearing.py, 15 tester), ti
mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 990/5: detach sink-appenden
(1 roed) - andre liste for rundene (4 roede) - detach --mandate-nekten (1) - detach
--explore-config-nekten (1) - skriv artefaktet kun naar kjoeringen fullfoerte (1) -
detach mandate= inn i run_project (1) - slipp enable_plan_review gjennom (1) -
detach --bundle-dir-kravet (1) - detach --live-dry-run-nekten (1) - fjern --explore
fra portefoelje-partisjonen (1).
EN MUTASJON FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse, syvende gang):
portefoelje-testen asserterte kun at meldingen nevnte --explore, og var groenn UTEN
partisjonen - kjoeringen falt da gjennom til "--explore requires --bundle-dir", som
nevner --explore ogsaa. To nekter som deler en delstreng; testen navngir naa
--portfolio.
Golden-transkriptet byte-uendret (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
mypy + ruff rene.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YRZhBJcxqTcqWyMW6hBttx
PORTFOLIO_OTEL er eneste bryter, lest paa truthiness. Uten den kalles
configure_otel_providers ikke i det hele tatt: spans lages fortsatt
(ENABLE_INSTRUMENTATION defaulter True) og kastes, saa ingenting KAN forlate
prosessen. `console` skriver spans til stderr - demoens stdout er byte-identisk
med fasiten, maalt. `otlp` eksporterer over nett, og kun mot et endepunkt
operatoeren selv har navngitt.
To regler er MAALT, ikke valgt (observability.py:849 bygger exporter-lista i
fast rekkefoelge):
- enable_console_exporters sendes EKSPLISITT False i begge moduser. Overlatt til
miljoeet faller den tilbake paa ENABLE_CONSOLE_EXPORTERS, hvis
ConsoleSpanExporter skriver til STDOUT - nettopp det S6 maalte som oedeleggende
for goldenen.
- `console` NEKTER naar en OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*_ENDPOINT finnes: env-avledede
exportere bygges UBETINGET og FOER vaare, saa ordet "console" ville vaert en
usann paastand om hvor kjoeringens innhold tok veien. Validering, ALDRI
reparasjon - vi fjerner ikke operatoerens variabel bak ryggen paa dem.
Tre kallsteder (run.main, simulation.main, hosting.main): demoen er et skriptet
bevis, ikke produktet, og en soem bare demoen naar ville latt de to inngangene en
virksomhet faktisk kjoerer vaere usporbare. tracing_notice er ENESTE renderer og
returnerer None naar sporing er av - omisjon, aldri tom rad.
IKKE bygget, med grunn: PLAN_CREATED/REPLANNED/PROGRESS_LEDGER_UPDATED hoerer til
sloeyfa U4 bygger; en emitter uten kallsted er en form gjettet i stedet for maalt.
OTLP-exporter-PAKKENE er bevisst ikke deklarert (egress + grpc/protobuf-vekt i et
publisert wheel); uttalt i README/DEPLOY/env.template.
Ny dep: opentelemetry-sdk>=1.42,<2 (operatoerbeslutning 2, 23.08). EN pakke, ikke
to - ConsoleSpanExporter bor inne i sdk-en. opentelemetry-api fulgte med
1.42.1 -> 1.44.0, maalt uskadelig.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_tracing_loadbearing.py), ni mutasjoner alle roede
mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 943/5. Tre av de roede bor i tester som fantes
fra foer (golden-transkriptets fire-linjers stderr + portefoelje-CLI-ens stille
pass), altsaa er omisjons-regelen gatet av uavhengige vitner.
Golden ea8c534... uendret. mypy src + ruff rene.
Ordren tar ogsaa de fire operatoerbeslutningene inn i planens paragraf F.
Laasen paa orchestrations 1.0.1 er ENDELIG (operatoerbekreftelse 23.08), ikke
midlertidig: spike-ordrens "revert hvis E7 staar" er overstyrt av den senere
beslutningen, som betinget paa groenn suite - ikke paa E7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
okf._walk toleret en ulesbar/utenfor-basen lenke uten aa etterlate spor (okf.py:182
"continue # broken link"), og navigate_bundle returnerte kun filene den FANT. En base
der halve innholdet aldri ble lest var derfor umulig aa skille fra en base der de
dokumentene aldri ble skrevet - og toerrkjoeringen sa ingenting.
Toleransen er UROERT: OKF SPEC §4 krever at navigasjonen ikke kaster, og den kaster
fortsatt ikke. Dette er synlighet, ikke en ny nekt.
To tenner (samme form som ordre 20260821T092039Z, synlig uforankring):
1. okf.SkippedLink + Bundle.skipped - strukturert spor, aldri en streng: hvilken fil
lenken sto i, lenketeksten ORDRETT (operatoeren redigerer den teksten, ikke den
resolverte stien), og hvilken av de TO grunnene som gjaldt - outside-bundle (escape,
ofte bevisst) eller missing (inne i basen, ingen lesbar fil, nesten alltid en
skrivefeil). Dedup-grenen (canonical in seen) registreres ALDRI: den er korrekt
navigasjon og det som terminerer sykler.
2. run.skipped_links_notice - EN renderer, tar den alt opploeste tuppelen, returnerer
None naar ingenting ble hoppet over. Printes paa BEGGE flater: --live-dry-run og
den fulle enkeltkjoeringen (en kjoering som PRODUSERTE et forslag fra en halvlest
base er der tausheten kostet mest).
Defaulten er MOTSATT forrige ordres, og forskjellen er innsikten: cost_baseline_anchored
er paakrevd fordi begge defaults lyver, mens en TOM tuppel her er et aerlig positivt
utsagn ("hver lenke ble fulgt") - external_calls-presedensen. Vei-stien navigerer ingen
base, saa tom er bokstavelig sant der ogsaa.
Sporet bor paa RunResult.skipped_links (RUN-nivaa: navigasjonen skjer EN gang per
kjoering, foer noe forslag finnes), aldri paa ProvenanceStamp, som beskriver gaten som
doemte EN kandidat. Ingenting av dette naar bundle_context - derfor er de commons-eide
nav-goldenene byte-uendret, og Bundle( har fortsatt EN konstruksjons-sted (maalt).
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_navigation_visibility_loadbearing.py), aatte mutasjoner
alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 897 passed / 5 skipped:
detach missing-registreringen (6 roede) · detach outside-bundle (2) · kollaps de to
grunnene til en (2) · registrer dedup-grenen (1) · renderer returnerer alltid linja
(3, inkl. kontrollene - omisjonen er selv gatet) · detach dry-run-printen (1) ·
detach full-run-printen (1) · konstant tom trace ut av run_project (4).
Docs rettet der de paasto det motsatte: kunnskapsbase-for-en-kjoring.md §5.7 + §6,
presentasjon-bygge-kunnskapsbase.html (steg 8, steg 9, fallgruve 3, avslutningen),
README-ens navigasjonsavsnitt, og CLAUDE.md-ens navigasjons-kontrakt-invariant.
Maalt oekt 48: en bundle-kjoering uten cost-baseline.json gikk rc 0 uten et ord, og
`grep baseline provenance.py outbox.py` ga null treff - hverken stdout, stempelet eller
utboksen bar at validatorens steg 0 ble hoppet over.
To tenner, begge smaa, og begge fra kjoeringens ENE oppslag av baselinen (koe-(p)):
1. ProvenanceStamp.cost_baseline_anchored - PAAKREVD bool uten default. Begge defaults
lyver: True lar en glemsom konstruktoer paastaa en ankring som ikke skjedde, False
underrapporterer en ekte. Naar utboksen gratis (write_proposal dumper hele stempelet).
DryRunReport baerer det samme - en dry-run stopper foer noe stempel finnes.
2. run.cost_baseline_notice(anchored) - ENESTE renderer, tar den alt opploeste booleanen,
returnerer None naar kjoeringen ER forankret (omisjon, aldri en tom rad). Printes paa
tre flater: --live-dry-run, full enkeltkjoering, og per prosjekt i portefoeljemodus.
IKKE foldet inn i mandate.announce, og det er en MAALING: den fyrer kun med --mandate, saa
nettopp de bare bundle-dry-runsene defekten ble maalt paa ville fortsatt sagt ingenting -
og den renderes foer run_project, altsaa foer noen har opploest baselinen.
Ankeringen forblir VALGFRI (en pre-amendment-base kjoerer uendret) - dette er synlighet,
ikke en ny nekt. Golden-transkriptet er byte-uendret: demoen kjoerer en base som HAR fila.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_baseline_visibility_loadbearing.py, 11 tester), seks
mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 885/5: konstant stamp-wiring
(3 roede) - konstant dry-run-wiring (1) - detach dry-run-printen (1) - renderer returnerer
alltid linja (2, inkl. den forankrede kontrollen) - detach full-run-printen (1) - detach
portefoelje-printen (1). Portefoelje-armen er DEFENSIV og uttalt (ingen referanse-prosjekt
setter bundle_dir; budget_stop-presedensen, crafted PortfolioResult).
Det paakrevde feltet tvang fem eksisterende test-konstruktoerer til aa ta stilling.
Dokumentene som beskrev den gamle stillheten er rettet: kunnskapsbase-for-en-kjoring.md
S4.1 (tabellraden re-maalt live), S6 og S7; README «How it is set up»; CLAUDE.md S4.0-raden.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DA6HAF8HFQxGYC2h6ypRQe
Fase 1b funn 1 lukket. generate._fetch_parsed kastet hvert uparsebart modellsvar i
except: continue, så prosjektets første levende kjøring brant tolv runder på formatfeil
og etterlot null tegn av det modellen faktisk sa. Enhver videre betalt kjøring ville
vært gjetning.
HVOR teksten overflates er avgjort av en måling, ikke av symmetri med Steg 5:
meter.tick_round() raiser BudgetExceeded INNE i _fetch_parsed, og uten mandat fanger
ingen den, så på nøyaktig den stien fangsten finnes for returnerer generate_via_llm
ingenting. Et felt på GenerationResult ville vært blindt for den, og et outbox-artefakt
skrevet etter kjøringen likeså. Sinken speiler meter: en kaller-eid akkumulator hvis
innhold kalleren holder uansett hvordan løkka endte. Artefaktet skrives fra en finally,
ikke except BudgetExceeded, og kun når noe faktisk feilet.
Iron Law: testfila rød ved collection FØR modulen fantes. Seks mutasjoner mot HELE
suiten, alle røde, hver med sin egen signatur; grønn kontroll 859 passed / 4 skipped
(fra 854). Den skarpeste er trunkering som BEHOLDER sentinelen: da faller kun
verbatim-asserten, som er det som beviser at den ene testen bærer den egenskapen.
Samme økt: mutasjonsmålingen økt 34 utsatte for de to Fase 5-gatene er kjørt. Fire
preflight-mutasjoner mot hele suiten, alle røde på riktig test og ingen annen (detach
fallbacken 2 røde, snu presedensen, presence i stedet for truthiness, avslaget navngir
kun vårt navn). To handover-mutasjoner kjørt MÅLRETTET mot egen testfil under tidspress,
ikke mot hele suiten — uttalt, ikke skjult (drop uv.lock, bygg fra arbeidstreet i stedet
for tracked files). De to DEPLOY.md-mutasjonene gjenstår: git archive leser HEAD, ikke
arbeidstreet, så de krever en midlertidig commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WLQd8ojQ9xwxhB8vsETYBs
generate_via_llm consumed each validator Rejection internally (`last`), fed it into the
next attempt's prompt, and dropped it. So Step 5 was real but unobservable: a caller could
see THAT a proposal validated, never that it validated on attempt 2 after the deterministic
validator falsified attempt 1. It was the one step of the eight with no output to show.
The seam is a typed return value -- GenerationResult(outcome, refinements) -- rather than an
out-parameter or a callback: a returned value cannot be silently lost by a caller that forgets
to pass a collector, and mypy forces every call site to acknowledge it.
refinements carries ONLY rejections that were actually fed back. When the attempt budget runs
out the final rejection IS outcome; counting it here would be double-counting, and the bounded
control test goes red on the collect-everything implementation that gets this wrong.
The loop's bound is untouched: max_attempts and meter.tick_round stand, and `last` still drives
the prompt alone, so prompt growth is unchanged. run.py accumulates across _evaluate calls, so
_evaluate_mandate is untouched; RunResult.refinements defaults (the coverage precedent) and is
concatenated across approaches rather than keyed per approach -- stated as an honesty limit.
The simulation now shows it: the scripted proposer overclaims 250000, which the validator
falsifies against P90 = 90000, and the corrected 30000 validates. Only the overclaim is
scripted -- the rejection is computed. scripted_factory takes a per-role reply selector so this
needs no second scripted client body.
README records the two accuracy changes only (Step 5 is now inspectable; the simulation trace
shows the correction). The level-2 publishing claim stays deferred until after the demo (O4).
Load-bearing MEASURED against the full suite with a control, four mutations all red:
detach the returned history (4 tests) - collect-everything (control only) - detach the run
wiring (2 tests) - revert the simulation's proposer to a constant (the demo-protection test).
Control: 759 passed / 4 skipped; ruff, format and mypy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017CcWFcREUi6YPjEpN3ACDP
The egress declaration (Trekk B3) says what a run MAY contact. It cannot say what
it DID: after the run, nothing distinguished "the agents queried the price
register" from "the agents ignored it", and a proposal resting on an external
service should be traceable to it.
ToolCallRecorder(FunctionMiddleware) mirrors BudgetMiddleware(ChatMiddleware) one
layer down — that one observes the debate's chat calls, this one its tool calls.
It observes only: call_next is always awaited, so a trace can never alter the run
it traces. The record lands on ProvenanceStamp.external_calls, read AFTER the
debate so it is a record rather than an intention.
MEASURED, not assumed, before any of it was written: FunctionMiddleware fires for
a tool served over a REAL MCP stdio subprocess, and context.function.name carries
the BARE tool name with no server prefix. That measurement decided the design —
MAF cannot tell us which server a tool came from, so attribution comes from our own
config, and a name allowed by two servers is recorded UNATTRIBUTED (server="")
rather than credited to the first match. Naming a service that may never have been
contacted is the one place a guess must not go.
Only CONFIGURED tools are recorded. The middleware fires for every function the
agents invoke, including the in-process retrieve_cost_docs on the road path;
logging those would turn the record into a false egress claim. An empty list is a
positive statement — nothing outside this process was contacted — which is why it
is always serialized rather than omitted.
Honesty limit, written on ExternalCall itself: this is the call and its source. It
is NOT evidence that the service's answer reached the proposal, nor a verified
rendering of that answer.
One finding, and it is the reason for measuring rather than trusting green: the
road-path negative test was VACUOUS. Its scripted tool call named an argument the
tool does not declare (code vs query), MAF rejected the call before invocation, and
the test asserted an empty record against a run where no tool ran at all — green
under the exact mutation it existed to catch. It now spies on the recorder and
asserts the invocation genuinely reached it before asserting it was not recorded.
This is last session's lesson again: a scenario that cannot distinguish two
implementations proves nothing.
The tool-call double is registered in test_scripted_client_consolidation.py's
_DELEGATING_OVERRIDES — it cannot live in the reply_selector seam, which returns a
reply STRING, and a response that is not text is its whole subject.
Load-bearing MEASURED (tests/test_b4_mcp_call_trace_loadbearing.py) against the
whole 755-test suite, four mutations all red: detach the recorder from the debate
middleware · record every function invocation · attribute an ambiguous name to the
first server · stop reading the recorder into provenance. Control: a run with no
configured servers records nothing, so the empty record is a real answer and not
the only one the seam can produce.
Ran it, not just tested it: the real recorder against a real MCP server subprocess
returns ExternalCall(server='prisregister', tool='lookup_unit_price'), and a
scripted CLI run's outbox artefact carries the empty list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VtRd8y1PDPGwkrRXFhubqr
A run commissioned to evaluate three approaches wrote ONE proposal artefact, so
only the approach it selected could ever receive a verdict. The other two were
evaluated, reported in the settlement, and then taught the learning loop nothing.
The defect class is a key collapse, and it had two halves — fixing either alone
leaves it intact:
* the WRITER wrote one pair per run, so the non-selected approaches never existed
on disk;
* the READER (hitl._read_outbox_proposals) joins proposal to outcome on the
run_id FIELD read from file CONTENT, never the filename. Three files sharing
one run_id collapse onto one dict key, last write wins — so widening only the
filename would have produced three artefacts and still one pending row. This is
the S3.2 collision class: two rows under one key silently become one.
Artefacts are now keyed {run_id}-{approach_id}-*.json AND carry approach_id in the
payload; the join key is (run_id, approach_id). Two properties make them genuinely
judgeable rather than merely present:
* verdict_id is minted per approach (verdicts.verdict_key, the S3.2 content hash)
— reusing the run's single id would let one delivered verdict clear all three
from the queue;
* provenance.validator_decision follows ITS OWN approach — the run's stamp would
report a rejected candidate as validated, and nothing downstream could correct it.
verdicts.verdict_key is public so a run can stamp the key a verdict WILL arrive
under without capturing a decision nobody has made; it delegates to _mint_id
rather than restating the hash (the (p) rule: one keying rule, one copy).
The per-approach set REPLACES the run-level pair rather than joining it — the
selected approach is already among them, and writing both would count it twice in
hitl pending. The selected one carries the run's final outcome, so the outbox can
never disagree with the RunResult; the others carry the validator's verdict, the
only falsifier that ran on them.
mandate.py is deliberately untouched: hanging a ValidatedProposal off a coverage
row would drag validator — and pulp — into a module kept to pydantic+stdlib for
D7 portability, so _evaluate_mandate returns the evaluated outcomes alongside.
Ran it, not just tested it: a real CLI run wrote six artefacts and hitl pending
listed three rows. It also showed the honest edge — three approaches that produce
an identical candidate share one content-hash key, so one verdict settles all
three. That is correct (they were one candidate), and it is now documented.
Load-bearing MEASURED (tests/test_a5_per_approach_artifacts_loadbearing.py) against
the whole 750-test suite, five mutations all red: detach the per-approach writer ·
drop approach_id from the join key · reuse the run's verdict id · reuse the run's
provenance stamp · widen the filename but not the payload. Control: on a full
detach exactly the 5 new tests fail and 745 pre-existing ones stay green — the
no-mandate path is inert, and writes neither the filename segment nor the field.
Docs: bestille-en-kjoring.md (what the commissioner gets) + ekspert-svar.md (what
the expert's queue looks like, and that "rejected" is the validator's verdict on
the numbers, never a professional judgement of the idea).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VtRd8y1PDPGwkrRXFhubqr
Krav 3, and the operator chose the run path explicitly: the external service must
be reachable WHILE the run works, not only when documents are ingested. Until now
the run path had one in-process tool against a local folder — and on the bundle
path the agents had no tools at all.
MAF already ships the client (MCPStdioTool / MCPStreamableHTTPTool, verified in
the pinned 1.9.0 with allowed_tools and request_timeout), so `mcp_tools.py` owns
only what MAF cannot decide for us: which servers a run may contact, which of
their tools it may call, how long it waits, and where the credential comes from.
This is a DIFFERENT seam from ingest_mcp.py on purpose — that one pulls source
documents before a run and speaks to null-argument tools. Same protocol, different
job.
Every refusal is a live hazard, not tidiness. An empty allowlist would let the far
end decide what the agents may call, so naming the tools is mandatory. A
non-positive timeout is an unbounded wait against a third party. An unknown field
is refused rather than ignored, which is also what keeps a literal secret from
being parked in the config — there is no field for one, only the NAME of an env
var. A named-but-unset credential refuses instead of calling anonymously, because
an anonymous call can succeed with the wrong scope.
Egress is declared, always. Every server and permitted tool is named in the run
announcement before the first call — including when no --mandate is given, which
was a real hole: the announcement only printed with a commission, so configuring
servers without one would have contacted third parties with nothing printed at
all. --live-dry-run still opens nothing, because the tools are entered after the
dry-run cut: the promise to stop before the first call now covers egress too.
Threaded through BOTH modes. A flag accepted in one mode and silently dropped in
the other is the defect class this CLI refuses by name.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole 744-test suite, four mutations all red:
build the tools but never hand them to the agents (2) · never enter the
AsyncExitStack, so they are constructed and useless (1) · never declare the egress
(2) · drop the allowlist on the built client (1).
Two live docs claimed MCP was unwired in the run path; both corrected rather than
left to rot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ULCqjLF61rehj5cZmdUoR3
Krav 2: a run must be clear about what it shall do and achieve. `--mandate`
makes both ends explicit. BEFORE the first (paid) model call the run prints what
it was commissioned to do — objective, every named approach, whether its own
proposals are allowed, the scope, the caps, and which external services it will
contact. AFTER the run it settles: one row per approach, validated with the
figure, rejected with the validator's reason, or not evaluated with why.
The announcement is placed with the other refusals and above the scripted
banner, for the reason the required-args guard was hoisted there: a refused run
must not first print a banner about work it never did. `--live-dry-run`
announces without contacting anything, so a commission can be inspected before
it costs money.
`settle` renders the goal verdict it is GIVEN and never decides it. `ledger.to_ore`
is the framework's one NOK->øre conversion and the goal comparison already runs on
quantised integers, but `mandate.py` cannot import it without dragging `verdicts`
— and therefore agent_framework — into a deliberately framework-neutral module,
while a private copy of a money conversion is exactly the (p) defect. So the
caller decides and this renders; a goal figure without a decided verdict makes no
claim at all.
The caps the announcement prints come from named constants shared with
`run_project`/`run_portfolio`'s defaults — a second copy could drift and make the
announcement describe a run that never happened.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole 717-test suite, four mutations all red:
detach the announcement (4) · detach the settlement print (2) · make the CLI
loader tolerant (2) · announce the commission but never hand it to the run (2).
The last one is the one that matters: without it, a run could print a commission
it had no intention of executing.
DEVIATION from the approved plan, stated rather than quietly dropped: --goals is
still refused outside portfolio mode. Accepting it in single-project mode would
have admitted a flag whose documented function (the goal-stop against the ledger)
still does nothing there — the same accepted-but-inert defect --embedder-config
was just fixed for. The mandate's success_criteria carries "what shall this run
achieve" in the expert's own words instead; the numeric target stays portfolio-level.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ULCqjLF61rehj5cZmdUoR3
Carrying an approach into the prompt only half-answers krav 1. The expert asked
for their approaches to be CONCRETELY EVALUATED, which means each must reach a
verdict and each verdict must be visible. `run_project(mandate=...)` evaluates
every commissioned approach in turn — the run's own proposal last, when allowed —
each under the SAME meter. No new loop: the caps already in force are the bound.
`RunResult.coverage` is the settlement, one row per approach: validated (with the
figure), rejected (with the validator's reason verbatim), or not_evaluated (with
why). `not_evaluated` is the row that earns the type its keep — an approach the
run never reached must be reported as unreached, because an omitted row is
indistinguishable from an approach nobody ordered. That silence is the defect
class krav 1 is asking us to remove.
Budget exhaustion mid-list is reported, not swallowed. But if the FIRST approach
exhausts it there is nothing honest to return, so BudgetExceeded propagates
exactly as before — a run that produced nothing must still fail loudly.
RunResult stays single-outcome (portfolio aggregation, outbox artefacts and HITL
keying all rest on that). The choice is deterministic: highest validated saving,
ties by mandate order — never whichever ran last.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole 702-test suite. FIVE mutations red:
evaluate only the first approach (5 red) · drop the rejected rows (3) · ignore
allow_own_proposals (1) · select produced[-1] (1) · select produced[0] (1).
The sixth measurement is why this commit exists in this shape: the ordering
mutation FIRST STAYED GREEN. The test had placed the bigger approach last, where
"highest saving" and "whichever ran last" give the same answer, so an
order-dependent implementation passed it. A scenario that cannot separate two
implementations proves nothing about either — the test now pins BOTH orderings,
and each mutation direction fails one of them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ULCqjLF61rehj5cZmdUoR3
Walked from a fresh clone: `--embedder-config` was accepted in every mode
without `--semantic-retrieval` and then had no effect whatsoever. MEASURED,
not inferred — an injected embedder is consulted ZERO times with the flag
off and once with it on, because the only consumer is the HybridRanker that
flag builds; the default StructuralRetriever takes no embedder at all.
That is the silent-ignore this CLI's flag contract exists to prevent, and
the same ground on which `--semantic-retrieval` itself is already refused
when it cannot take effect.
REFUSED, not wired — the opposite call from `--scripted-replies` in
portfolio mode, and for a stated reason: there the seam already existed, so
refusing would have left a whole mode without an offline door. Here there
is nothing to wire to.
Mode-independent (both modes gate the embedder on the same flag) and placed
ABOVE the scripted door, mirroring the required-args hoist: a refused run
must not first print a banner claiming a scripted loop closed.
Five mutations against the WHOLE suite, all red, each isolating one seam:
detach the refusal (3 red) · scope it to single-project mode (portfolio arm
red) · move it below the banner (banner arm red, rc intact) · build the
ranker unconditionally (the zero-consultation measurement red) · ignore the
injected embedder (its control red).
663 -> 668 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GyAbxJoyypnLLUDcMvnKh8
An independent reviewer found it and the claim was verified by measurement
before being accepted, not taken on trust.
test_portfolio_scripted_pass_makes_no_real_client raised from the patched
_default_factory to prove the scripted portfolio pass never builds a production
client. It cannot: the factory is called inside run_project's coroutine, and
run_portfolio gathers with return_exceptions=True, so the AssertionError was
collected into a RunFailure and never escaped. Measured directly -- with BOTH
the client_factory wiring and the rc rule detached, the blade stayed GREEN. It
was going red on rc alone, which means it was testing defect B while claiming
to test defect A. The original seven-mutation sweep did not catch this because
each mutation was applied singly, and dropping the wiring alone still flips rc.
Replaced with a call sentinel: a list appended inside the factory and asserted
in the test body, which the wave handler cannot swallow. Re-measured -- red on
the wiring detach alone, and red on both detaches together.
The docstring now also states what the sweep could not: blades 1 and 8 are
environment-conditional. The local profile points at loopback, so on a machine
running a local model server the wiring detach would make real calls and could
complete the pass. Their red was real on the machine it was measured on and is
not portable; blade 2's is.
Separately, the budget-stop print is marked as defensive and currently
unreachable from main(), because main() never constructs a PortfolioMeter and
every write to budget_stop is gated on one -- the strict=True precedent
directly above says untested future-proofing must be labelled as such. The
README claim that a portfolio pass reports a cap stop is corrected to say the
cap has no CLI flag yet. Noted for whoever wires that door: BudgetRefused is a
RuntimeError and the existing except clause would not catch it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118noV9rCfrdREH26XqZB5z
