Ordre 20260904T173146Z-8102814273-from-portfolio-optimiser, steg 8 av 10.
Dispatcheren faar proposal_reviewer og videresender den til hver per-base run_project.
EN gjenstand, aldri en kopi per base: dispatchen er SEKVENSIELL, saa en terminal-reviewer
komponerer. Assertert med `is`, ikke `==` - en fersk reviewer per base ville vaert en annen
gjenstand med identisk oppfoersel, som `==` paa en vanlig callable ikke kan skille (samme
identitets-leksjon test_multibase_loadbearings store-arm ble rettet til).
Doera faar sitt EGET vitne (S7a-3-regelen: hver doer som aapner en base faar sin egen
mutasjon, fordi en uvitnet kopi kan regrere alene).
run_portfolio faar INGENTING - samtidige boelger deler en terminal, som er --portfolio-
partisjonens egen grunn - og fravaeret er ASSERTERT, saa en senere "symmetri"-endring er en
roed test og ikke en stille utvidelse.
RODT foer impl: T22 (TypeError paa ukjent keyword).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ordre 20260904T173146Z-8102814273-from-portfolio-optimiser, steg 6 av 10.
(a) argparse --proposal-review. (b) rader i BEGGE partisjonene (report_forbidden og
single_only) - report-modus og portefoelje returnerer over dispatchen, saa en utelatelse
er et STILLE DROPP, ikke en nekt (F4-gapet). (c) TRE navngitte nekter i EN topp-nivaa-blokk
if args.proposal_review: - plasseringen er MAALT, ikke plassert paa oeyemaal: naboen
--scripted-replies/--live-dry-run er nostet under if args.scripted_replies, og
--explore/--live-dry-run under if args.explore, saa under noen av dem ville et bart
--live-dry-run --proposal-review falt rett gjennom til dry-run-dispatchen og droppet flagget.
(d) reviewer bygget paa KALLSTEDET + except ProposalReviewInputError -> "run stopped:" rc 1,
en DISTINKT kanal fra "run refused:". (e) proposal_review_notice printes fra kjoeringens EGEN
post. (f) _load_scripted_replies' aerlighetsgrense navngir review-stien.
--resume KOMPONERER (A3 verifisert av en arm, ikke utsatt): resume-blokka gir mandatet og
faller gjennom til SAMME full-run-dispatch.
RODT foer impl: 9 armer. T13 og T16 kjoerer i et BARN (P4). Nekt-armene kjoerer in-process
med _default_factory som REISER - ved exit-koden ser en nekt etter forbruket identisk ut med
en foer (oekt 57).
TO ARMER BLE FALSIFISERT AV MAALINGEN FOER de kunne gate noe:
(1) T18s rc-0-kontroll avslorte at F4-testens ledger-fixtur ({"entries": []}) faar rc 1 av
SavingsLedger.load ("must be a JSON array"), ikke av partisjonsraden - armen ville vaert
groenn mot en fjernet rad. Fixturen er naa en JSON-array, og kontrollen beviser at argv-en
ellers ville blitt AKSEPTERT.
(2) notice-null-armen ga BudgetExceeded i stedet for en avvist kjoering: et to-stegs
proposer-manus mot max_attempts=3 faller til default-svaret, som aldri parser, og rundeboka
fyrer - noeyaktig aerlighetsgrensen _load_scripted_replies uttaler, reprodusert ved uhell.
Manuset har naa like mange steg som forsoek.
Planens T19 er foldet inn i T13 og uttalt: "et bart, uskriptet flaggparse" ville kalt en
levende modell, saa argparse-vitnet er barnets egen unrecognized-arguments-assert.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ordre 20260904T173146Z-8102814273-from-portfolio-optimiser, steg 4 av 10.
run_project faar proposal_reviewer (keyword-only, None => byte-identisk kjoering), eier
sinken expert_reviews ved siden av parse_failures, og skriver
{run_id}-proposal-reviews.json fra den EKSISTERENDE genererings-finally-en.
Skriveregelen er IFF en reviewer ble gitt, OGSAA naar lista er tom (D4). Begge halvdeler
er baerende og trekker hver sin vei: write_debate_tools skriver ubetinget fordi DER er det
tomme tilfellet regresjonen; her maa en reviewer-LOES kjoering la utboksen staa byte-identisk
(to eksisterende tester pinner et EKSAKT fire-navns-listing), mens en reviewer som ble tilbudt
og aldri konsultert er et faktum artefaktet maa kunne SI.
Noeklingen: med mandat er hver post noeklet - kjoeringens eget forslag paa OWN_PROPOSAL_ID -
og None betyr kun EN ting: det fantes intet mandat. RunResult.expert_revisions bygges FRA
sinken, aldri ved siden av (kø-(p)).
RODT foer impl: 8 armer.
REGRESJON FANGET AV FULL SUITE OG RETTET HER: steg 3s _FeedbackAwareChatClient kopierte
_inner_get_response-kroppen og gjorde test_scripted_client_consolidation
::test_inner_get_response_collapsed_to_two_sites roed. Doblen overstyrer naa _next_reply i
stedet - basen har alt lagt DENNE kallets prompt i received_texts naar den ber om et svar,
saa sommen holder uten en tredje kopi av kroppen, og registeret i vakten trenger ingen ny
oppfoering. Aa registrere fila som foreign lineage var ikke mulig og heller ikke riktig:
Group B bruker ScriptedChatClient, som den vakten nekter for nettopp den lista.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MAJOR-3/S7a-3 gjorde utforskningen billig og lot pipelinen staa. Maalt paa K2
(630 konsepter, S7bs eget instrument, kjent-positiv-kontrollen reprodusert
eksakt FOER bruk): okf.bundle_context er 648 962 o200k-tokens og rir i TRE
kopier = 1 947 342 = 99,1 % av en kjoerings prompt-tokens.
Et premiss i maaledokumentet ble presisert foerst: de tre kopiene er tre
DEBATT-turer (proposer x2, checker x1), mens genererings-prompten er 156
tokens, fordi gen_context = debate_output or context. Det avgjorde formen -
generering trengte ingen egen soem, for aa binde `context` binder
siste-utvei-fallbacken ved konstruksjon.
run_project sender naa en PEKER (fast tekst + erklaert bundle_id + antall
konseptdokumenter i scope + stigen, O(1) i korpuset) og gir debatten de SAMME
fire verktoeyene utforskningen bruker - explore.navigator_tools gjenbrukt,
aldri en andre kopi av policyen.
Etter: 753 tokens like-for-like (samme manus, samme fire prompter, -99,96 %)
og 8 942 med en debatt som faktisk gaar stigen (-99,5 %), mot operatoerens
terskel 195 000 = 4,6 % av taket. Validert besparelse og validatorens dom er
UENDRET (850 000 NOK av 3 852 500, 2 av 5 felt paa stage 4 og 5, samme
dom-noekkel), og utforskningens 18 355 er uendret til tokenet.
§4.1a maatte flytte, ikke forsvinne: dimensjonsfilteret bodde i renderingen og
bor naa i VERKTOEYENE, paa begge trinn - en listing som skjuler et fremmed
dokument mens read_file serverer det paa sti er et filter i navnet alene.
okf.in_dimension er eneste predikat.
Sporet er kaller-eid (ExplorationToolRecorder -> RunResult.debate_tool_calls ->
{run_id}-debate.json fra en finally) og skrives ogsaa TOMT: en debatt som
navigerer ingenting ER S2c-regresjonen, saa den maa kunne leses.
Load-bearing MAALT: aatte mutasjoner roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1306/5 (fra 1295/5), golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET
(shasum -a 1 av innholdet = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M7 falsifiserte seg selv, ikke gaten - staar som maalt.
Maaling: docs/2026-09-04-s2c-debatt-k2.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fiks-ordre 20260904T070930Z-8335015575-from-.claude. Two scoped defects the
S7b syretest observed and left unfixed (docs/2026-09-04-syretest-s7b-k2.md
§ 3.6):
1. `BudgetExceeded` (a RuntimeError, econ 56) could leave `--explore` as a
raw Python traceback from TWO raise sites: the exploration loop's own
round/token cap (`explore()`/`resume_exploration()`, uncaught in
`main()`'s exploration `try`), and `generate_via_llm`'s retry loop when a
mandate's own-proposal evaluation hits an unparseable reply (the full-run
dispatch's `except` tuple only knew `ValueError`/`FileNotFoundError`/
`ValidationError`). Both now end as `run refused: {exc}` on stderr, rc 1,
same shape as every other loader refusal in run.py.
2. `{run_id}-exploration.json` carried rounds/tool_calls/plan_reviews/
quick_validations but not the approaches the loop actually shaped — those
stood only in the stdout mandate announcement. `explore.trace_payload`
now takes a required `mandate` keyword and renders `mandate.approaches`
under an "approaches" key, so an operator reading the artefact days later
(the whole point of the async U12 door) can recover what the run decided
to evaluate without the terminal.
Fifteen mutations across three detach points, all red against the full
suite: the exploration-loop except clause (2 red), the full-run except
tuple (1 red), and the approaches rendering (1 red) — plus a control per
fix proving the happy path is unaffected. Green control 1295 passed / 5
skipped (supersett of S7b's 1290/5, 0 removed), golden
demo-transcript.stdout byte-unchanged (shasum -a 1 = ea8c534…), ruff +
mypy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEL A + DEL C av ordre 20260903T204605Z-215167684-from-.claude.
Soem 1: okf.load_optional_ir_projection ved siden av den fail-faste, moensteret
fra load_cost_baseline/load_optional_cost_baseline. Et PAR, ikke et required=-flagg:
PM-tillegg 5 maalte hva en uoevet parameter koster (elleve evidence_for-kallsteder
brukte defaulten til den andre grenen raatnet), og et flagg ville dessuten gjort
usanne de fem docstringene som siterer load_ir_projection som DEN fail-faste
presedensen. Toleransen stopper ved fravaer: en malformed projeksjon reiser fortsatt.
De tre kallstedene fikk HVER SIN stilling:
* _project_from_bundle - fravaer hopper over en fail-fast som ikke har noe aa
sjekke mot; en projeksjon som FINNES og navngir et annet prosjekt nekter
fortsatt. Divergens-vakten er kontrakten multi-base-dispatchen hviler paa.
* run_mandate_across_bundles - FILA FOERST, basens ERKLAERTE bundle_id som
fallback (S7a-3). Presedensen baerer i begge retninger: erklaering-foerst ville
re-adressert hver eksisterende base der project_id != bundle_id.
* bundle_candidate_features - optional_bundle_candidate_features, og de TO
konsumentene svarer ULIKT paa fravaeret. Steg-1-folden HOPPER OVER og sier
hvor mange tidligere dommer som dermed aldri naadde hypotese-prompten;
seed_store_from_bundle NEKTER ved navn (VerdictKeyUnavailable), fordi aa mynte
en noekkel for en dom som erklaerer ingen er nettopp defekten S3.2 lukker.
Synligheten: RunResult.unkeyed_verdicts (ANTALL, ikke flagg - koe-(y)-regelen) +
run.unkeyed_verdicts_notice som ENESTE renderer, None ved null (omisjon, aldri tom
rad). Baereren er MAALT: dry-run-kuttet returnerer OVER folden, saa et felt paa
DryRunReport kunne bare rapportert null - ulikt cost_baseline_anchored og
skipped_links, begge opploest over kuttet. Ikke paa ProvenanceStamp: stempelet
beskriver gaten som doemte EN kandidat.
Prosjektnavnet var et ikke-spoersmaal, og det er maalt: SavingsProposal har intet
navnefelt, saa projeksjonen har aldri vaert en navnekilde. Project.name kommer
fortsatt fra type: project-konseptets title med id-en som siste utvei.
DEL C: --mandate lagt i report_forbidden. Den var ELDRE enn partisjonen og hadde
aldri faatt en rad, saa --report --ledger X --mandate Y droppet kommisjonen i
STILLHET - F4-klassen. Testarmen kjoerer mot en argv report-modus ellers ville
AKSEPTERT, med en kontroll som beviser rc 0 uten flagget.
Kontroll: 1290 passed / 5 skipped (fra 1275/5 - supersett, 0 fjernet).
Golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET, shasum -a 1 (INNHOLD, ikke git-blob)
= ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f. ruff + mypy rene.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
To funn fra review foer lukking av ordren.
(1) evaluate_mandate_candidates kaller assert_declared_ids_agree, men INGEN
mutasjon beviste det. S7a-3-raden enumererer doerene med vilje ("separat gir
den sin egen mutasjon per doer") fordi en uvitnet kopi kan regrere ALENE mens
de to andre staar groenne. En base hvis konsepter erklaerer to korpus ville
ellers rutet paa reconcile_bundle_id sin fallback og produsert en kandidat
tilskrevet en omstridt identitet. M16 -> 1 roed.
MAALINGEN KORRIGERTE TESTEN: foerste form erklaerte de to id-ene paa
rot-index.md og den ene konseptfila, og sto GROENN - S7a-3 holdt rot-indeksen
UTENFOR enighets-settet med vilje, fordi konsept-slaar-index er en
PRESEDENS-regel: en index i utakt med sine konsepter er fallbacken som taper,
ikke to konsepter som kolliderer. Armen bruker naa TO konseptfiler.
(2) project_id=args.project_id or "" er erstattet av en assert. Unaabar i dag
(required-args-guarden fyrer langt over), men "" ville naadd
derive_cost_baseline og myntet en CostBaseline(project_id="") - en fabrikkert
identitet, som er nettopp formen cost_baseline_anchored er
paakrevd-uten-default for aa forby. Asserten sier det i stedet for en default
som stille er uenig med den.
Load-bearing MAALT paa nytt: 16 mutasjoner, 15 ROEDE mot HELE suiten + groenn
kontroll 1275/5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S7b-forberedelse, fase 2. Bruksscenarioet "dokumenter + konkret oppgave ->
forslag" hadde ingen vei: eneste kandidat-kilde var generate_via_llm.
DEN TILFOEYDE VEIEN. Eksperten sier HVA (label -> measure, verbatim), HVILKE
linjer (affected_codes) og HVOR MYE (claimed_saving_nok); dokumentet sier
MENGDE og PRIS (derive_cost_baseline, MAJOR-4). Ingenting her oppfinner et
tall. Tre nekter ved navn - manglende anslag, ingen koder, ukjent kode - og
hver av dem er ekspertens aa skrive, aldri vaar aa defaulte
(write_concept_file-regelen).
ANSLAGET BOR PAA APPROACH, IKKE PAA MANDATE, og det foelger av settle sin egen
regel: tilnaerminger er ALTERNATIVER og summeres aldri, saa ett tall paa
mandatnivaa ville vaert tvetydig over N. Det er heller ikke kjoeringens MAAL -
contracts.GoalContract eier nettopp ett saant, og skillet staar skrevet der
feltet innfoeres, ellers leses det som den driften modulen forbyr.
NULL MODELLKALL ER STRUKTURELT: evaluate_mandate_candidates er SYNC, saa den kan
ikke aware et chat-kall - ingen mutasjon av kroppen kan stille innfoere ett.
CLI-armen asserterer det likevel ATFERDSMESSIG (_default_factory patchet til aa
raise), fordi rc 0 alene ogsaa er utfallet til en doer som gjorde ingenting.
allow_own_proposals faar en not_evaluated-RAD, ikke en nekt: raden kan ikke
fylles uten en modell, men aa utelate den gjoer den uskillbar fra en
tilnaerming ingen bestilte (ApproachOutcome sin egen regel), og aa nekte hele
kjoeringen ville vaert feil andre veien - feltet defaulter til True.
Fire CLI-nekter, alle ved navn: krever --mandate, krever
--derive-cost-baseline, nektet i --portfolio (ved NAVN, ikke ved gjennomfall)
og i report_forbidden (der en utelatelse er et stille DROPP, ikke en nekt -
F4-gapet).
LOAD-BEARING MAALT: 15 mutasjoner, 14 ROEDE mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll
1274/5 (fra 1257, supersett, 0 fjernet) og golden demo-transcript.stdout
BYTE-UENDRET (shasum -a 1 = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
TO MUTASJONER FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse):
* M5 (bygg lazily) sto GROENN - armen asserterte kun pytest.raises, og BEGGE
implementasjoner reiser; ingen rad naar kalleren uansett, saa de er
uskillbare utenfra. Oekt 57s regel ("en nekt etter forbruket ser identisk ut
ved exit-koden") anvendt paa CBC-solves: testen TELLER naa solves, med en
kontroll som beviser at telleren faktisk beveger seg.
* M14 (rut paa mount-navnet) sto GROENN - armen brukte f"not-{declared}", som
matcher verken mount eller erklaering. Fixturene erklaerer ingen bundle_id
(S7a-3 maalte null ^bundle_id-treff under tests/), saa de to SAMMENFALLER
der. Ny arm bygger en base som erklaerer en id ulik katalognavnet og
asserterer BEGGE halvdeler: erklaert ruter, mount nektes.
EN MUTASJON FORBLIR GROENN, OG DET ER EN AERLIGHETS-GRENSE - IKKE EN GATE:
M7 (doem UTEN baselinen) er strukturelt uobserverbar, fordi kandidaten er
BYGGET fra baselinen og stage 0 derfor avstemmer med 0 % avvik ved
konstruksjon. baseline= staar som en DEFENSIV, uvitnet soem
(budget_stop-presedensen), ikke som noe en test holder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S7a-3 pkt. 1. Til i dag NEKTET reconcile_bundle_id en base som erklaerte en id
katalogen ikke bar. Maalt mot K2 - den foerste leverte basen som erklaerer sin
egen id (618 av 630 konseptfiler + rot-index, alle "k2-trinn1-20260903", levert
som "K2-bundle-20260903") - betydde det at basen ikke kunne aapnes slik den var
levert, og at eneste botemiddel var aa montere den paa nytt for haand, en gang
per leveranse. PM-beslutning: konsumenten slakker.
- Erklaert vinner (B1s rekkefoelge uroert), avviket REGISTRERES:
ResolvedBundleId.mount + ProvenanceStamp.bundle_id_source +
DryRunReport.bundle_id_source + run.bundle_id_notice (None ved enighet).
Stempel-feltet er PAAKREVD uten default: None er en VERDI (veg-stien).
- Det som fortsatt nekter er den EKTE kollisjonen: to KONSEPTER i en base som
erklaerer ULIKE id-er (okf.assert_declared_ids_agree, kalt ved hver doer som
aapner en base). Rot-index er IKKE med i enighets-settet - konsept-slaar-index
er en presedens-regel, saa en index i utakt er fallbacken som taper.
- KONSEKVENS, ikke scope-krype: explore._bundle_index loeser naa den erklaerte
id-en. Den brukte Path(raw).name mens dispatcheren brukte reconcile...id; med
erklaert-vinner ville explore() myntet approaches som navngir MOUNTET mens
dispatcheren ruter paa ERKLAERINGEN - en utforskning med uruterbart mandat.
Load-bearing MAALT: 10 mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1243 passed / 5 skipped og golden demo-transcript.stdout byte-uendret
(shasum -a 1 = ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M1 1 / M2 1 / M3 1 / M4 9 / M5 2 / M6 1 / M7 1 / M8 2 / M9 2 / M11 1.
Tre armer i test_bundle_id_reconciliation_loadbearing er SKREVET OM (ikke
slettet) - de pinnet nekten beslutningen fjernet. (j) ble skarpere enn den den
erstattet: erklaert id ruter, mountet nektes.
Kontrakt: docs/okf-konsum-kontrakter.md § 3.1. Invariantrad i CLAUDE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MAJOR-4 (misjonsreview v2 section 7), owner B = the consumer. Neither existing
projection into ir.CostBaseline can serve an ingested tender corpus:
cost-baseline.json is hand-written per project and baseline_from_project belongs
to the road domain, so a K2-shaped bundle could be navigated and never anchored.
okf.derive_cost_baseline reads the numbers already in the bundle.
The premise was MEASURED before anything was built on it, and the order's two
pointers named two different forms. examples/*/expected-bundle/ carry pipe
tables, but every one of them is csv- or sql-sourced via render.render_table --
the xlsx path never reaches render_table at all. Measured with pandoc 3.10.2
under the producer's own writer and arguments: extract._extract_office converts,
and inbox.py hands that text to render_inbox_concept untouched, so an
xlsx-sourced concept file carries a pandoc SIMPLE table whose dash rule defines
the column spans. A pipe-only reader would have been inert on exactly the corpus
this exists for. Both forms are read, by two scanners over one role mapping and
one number grammar.
No judgement anywhere: the header vocabulary and the number grammar are closed,
and every ambiguity refuses -- no candidate table, more than one, two columns
claiming one role, two rows sharing a cost code, a row that prices nothing. A
partly-priced schedule refuses in full, because a half-derived baseline anchors
some codes while cost_baseline_anchored reports True.
Wired behind --derive-cost-baseline and never silently: one resolution in
run.py's bundle arm serves both the full run and the dry run, and the refusal
propagates rather than degrading to the file loader.
The two fixtures are pandoc's output verbatim, not hand-typed. The unpriced one
is K2's actual pre-award shape, and the columns survive as blanks -- so the
table IS a candidate and the refusal is the sharp one.
Load-bearing MEASURED: 18 mutations all red against the WHOLE suite, green
control 1230 passed / 5 skipped (from 1208/5, superset, 0 removed), golden
demo-transcript.stdout byte-unchanged (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M17 is the one that matters for arm (b): dropping the positivity guard makes the
mutant raise pydantic ValidationError, which IS a ValueError but is NOT the named
class -- so pytest.raises(ValueError) would have stayed green against exactly the
mutation the arm exists to catch. Verified directly, not argued.
Honesty limits stated in the invariant row: NS 3451 section rows are not
classified (K2 itself was not available to measure), the stamp records that a run
was anchored and never which projection anchored it, the hosted surface is
deliberately untouched, and no live K2 file was read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
[skip-docs] — the invariant row for this plan lands in Step 13, where the mutations
that force it have been measured. Documenting a seam before its measurement is
the claim-without-evidence class this repo writes rows against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
`--scripted-replies` tok EN konstant streng per rolle, saa ingen skriptet rolle
kunne emittere et `function_call`: maalt 0 verktoeykall / 0 approaches / 1 runde
paa 4/4 baser, mens hvert andre felt i artefaktet saa ut som en kjoering som
hadde virket. En operatoer som foelger dette repoets egen maalestige — «bevis saa
mye som mulig gratis foer det dyre trinnet» — kunne ikke bevise at navigatoeren
aapner noe.
En UTFORSKNINGSROLLE kan naa faa en LISTE av trinn, der et trinn er en tekst
eller ETT verktoeykall (`{"call": "<tool>", "args": {...}}`). Formen utvider den
ENE kanoniske `_inner_get_response`-kroppen (S2.5-konsolideringen) — ikke en
andre klient: rapportens vedlegg-A-`RecordingClient` var maaleinstrument, og en
kopi av kroppen ville drevet fra de tre conftest-dublettene som rir paa den.
Manuset ligger VED SIDEN AV selektoren, ikke inni: en selektor returnerer `str`
ved kontrakt, og et verktoeykall er ikke tekst. Naar manuset er tomt svarer
selektoren som foer, saa et utloept manus degraderer til konstantformen, ikke til
stillhet.
Listeformen NEKTES for debattens roller ved navn (proposeren svarer `generate`s
eget kall, ikke en agent-loekke som kan kalle et verktoey mellom turer), og hvert
malformet trinn nektes ved navn — validering, ALDRI reparasjon
(`write_concept_file`-regelen). Et trinn som slipper gjennom naar
`step["call"]` og krasjer midt i kjoeringen, som er nettopp MAJOR-2-klassen
filas foerste halvdel lukket.
MAALT: ni mutasjoner, alle roede mot HELE suiten, hver med sitt eget vitne +
groenn kontroll 2 failed (F15-diffen, KJENT) / 1087 passed / 5 skipped:
M1 detach recorderen fra explore() OG resume (1 roed) · M2 dropp `tool_calls`
fra `trace_payload` (3) · M3 sorter+dedupliser sinken (2) · M4 registrer navnet
uten basen (3) · M5 nekt listeformen igjen (2) · M6 aksepter lista men emitter
tekst (1) · M7 toler et malformet trinn (1) · M8 la en debattrolle ta
listeformen (1) · M9 dropp ukjent-noekkel-whitelisten (1). Golden
`demo-transcript.stdout` BYTE-UENDRET (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
M7 FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse, TOLVTE gang):
nekt-testen brukte `{"invoke": "list_bundles"}` og sto GROENN med forms-sjekken
detached — UKJENT-NOEKKEL-grenen fanget den i stedet, saa den nekten som var
under test hadde intet vitne. De to grenene oeves naa av to armer med hver sin
mutasjon (M7 og M9).
Aerlighetsgrense, uttalt: at en LEVENDE modell kaller verktoeyene er fortsatt
ikke bevist (samme klasse som structured-output-grensen) — dette gjoer den
GRATIS halvdelen av stigen ekte, ikke den betalte.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
run_project KREVDE verdict_input og kjorte capture_verdict ubetinget; CLI-en
defaultet det til {"approved", "reviewed by expert"} og hosting listet det som
PAAKREVD. Netto: hver flaggloes kjoering myntet en ekspertgodkjenning ingen ga,
den gikk inn i den delte storen, og run_portfolio bar den inn i neste prosjekts
hypotese-prompt som en prior expert verdict -- paa flaten som ble overlevert
14.08. Non-goal 3, brutt i en soem.
RunResult.verdict er naa Verdict | None, og None er hva stillhet produserer:
ingenting myntes, ingenting lagres, ingenting varsles. Prinsippet sto allerede i
repoet -- RunFailure sin docstring: aa fylle et felt med en dummy legger
FABRIKKERT proveniens inn i aggregatet.
Traceability koster ingenting: RunResult.verdict_key (property, derivert fra
kandidaten) er verdicts.verdict_key sitt alt dokumenterte formaal -- identisk
med verdict.id naar en dom BLE gitt, og fortsatt meningsfull naar ingen ble det.
Det er den outboxen og den hostede responsen stempler.
Halv dom NEKTES paa begge doerer (FeedbackContract er eneste sted formen
valideres; CLI-en nekter ved navn FOER enhver mode-dispatch). Validering, aldri
reparasjon. De to mode-partisjonene fikk --decision/--rationale inn: kommentarene
sa ordrett at en aerlig nekt var uimplementerbar fordi de non-None
argparse-defaultene gjorde en eksplisitt verdi uskillbar fra defaulten -- med
defaultene borte er den implementerbar.
Hosting er WIDENING, ikke bryting: verdict_input flyttet fra _REQUIRED_FIELDS
til _OPTIONAL_FIELDS. Ingen ekstern kaller brekker.
AERLIGHETS-GRENSE: referanse-fixturens SYNTETISKE verdict_input-rader staar
uroert -- de er merket SYNTETISK paa fire steder og er reviewens F5 (maaling av
misjonspaastanden), ikke F2. Project.verdict_input er naa valgfri.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_ungiven_verdict_loadbearing.py, 15 armer), aatte
mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten + gronn kontroll 1080/5 og golden
demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
En mutasjon falsifiserte testen foerst (vakuoes-gate-klassen, ellevte gang):
--report-armen brukte et bart --report, som nekter rc 1 uansett fordi --ledger
mangler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F4 gjorde "be om svar, BRUKE svarene" naabar, men bare SYNKRONT: terminal_plan_reviewer
blokkerer loekka paa et menneske ved en terminal, saa svaret maa komme mens prosessen lever.
Maalbilde §3s tidsskala er den andre - eksperten svarer dager senere, i en prosess som aldri
saa kjoeringen.
--checkpoint-dir PARKERER reviewen (FileCheckpointStorage + {run_id}-plan-review.json) og
avslutter; --resume <run_id> leser svaret fra --review-inbox i en fersk interpreter. Det
eneste som krysser prosessgrensen er disk.
MAALT FELLE (Verifiseringsloven ansikt 4): list_checkpoints (_checkpoint.py:386-388) svelger
en blokkert deserialisering til en logger.warning og returnerer TOM liste. Uten BEGGE
MagenticPlanReviewRequest/Response i allowed_checkpoint_types feiler en resume som et FRAVAER,
ikke som en feil. _ALLOWED_CHECKPOINT_TYPES har derfor EN kopi, checkpoint_storage er eneste
konstruksjonssted, og en tom listing ved park raiser CheckpointUnreadable i stedet for aa
skrive et spoersmaal ingen kan besvare.
Budsjettet og revisjons-capen spenner over suspensjonen (meter.charge(parked.tokens_spent) +
trace.ledger.extend), ellers faar hver park et helt budsjett paa nytt. Fail-closed paa
ekspertens egen fil: request_id-mismatch, ord utenfor vokabularet og revise uten innhold
refuseres alle ved navn. hitl.pending_plan_reviews er registeret over hvem som venter.
Load-bearing MAALT: 17 tester, TRETTEN mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1059 passed / 5 skipped, golden demo-transcript.stdout byte-uendret
(ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
EN MUTASJON FALSIFISERTE SUITEN (vakuoes-gate-klassen, tiende gang): detach av
trace.plan_reviews.extend(parked.plan_reviews) lot HELE suiten staa groenn - capen leser
parked.plan_reviews DIREKTE, saa den binder uansett, og de to foerste legene er identiske
under begge implementasjoner. Gaten maatte bli det TREDJE leget, der artefaktet ellers taper
dag 1s revisjon og to ulike planer deler indeks 1. Ny test skrevet mot mutasjonen foerst.
Aerlighets-grenser: hostet flate NEKTER fortsatt (synkron review ville blokkert baade
requesten og event-loekka som svarer /readiness); en park midt i loepet etter en stall har
ingen naabar sti under det skriptede manuset, saa carry-overen som betjener den drives gjennom
en CRAFTED parkert tilstand.
Ordre 20260825T114645Z-6622513622-from-portfolio-optimiser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Kommentaren over explore-kallet i run.py teller opp hva som fortsatt KAN forlate sloeyfa etter at
konfig-nektene er hoistet. Etter F4 er det tre ting, ikke to - en ubesvart plan-review er den
tredje. Repoet gater prosa-paastander flater gjoer om seg selv; en liste som ikke lenger er komplett
er den samme klassen, bare i kommentarform.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LtMDsh2zfp4Bmw8KGJ4aLD
F4 fra misjonsreviewen: begge operatorflatene nektet enable_plan_review, og eneste doer var
explore(..., plan_reviewer=...) i bibliotek-APIet. Maalbildets HITL-loop var dermed unaabar for
enhver som ikke importerte pakka. Reviewens tre fil:linje-paastander ble verifisert mot kilden foer
bygging og stemte.
Flate: CLI. `--plan-review` bygger en terminal_plan_reviewer() og gir den til den UENDREDE sloeyfa.
Operatoren vises planen og svarer "approve" eller "revise <hva>"; en revisjon gaar tilbake til
manageren, som replanlegger og spoer IGJEN om den NYE planen.
Gaten er den ANDRE halvdelen av setningen. En doer som printer planen, leser linja og kaster den
bestaar "operatoren ble spurt" og feiler maalbildet -- repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse. T1 er derfor
test_explore_loadbearing sin T15 loeftet til CLI-niva og er ROED mot en alltid-godkjenn-reviewer.
Vitnet er {run_id}-exploration.json (skrevet fra en finally), ikke skrapet stdout.
Fail-closed paa operatorens egen input: alt utenfor vokabularet spoerres paa nytt, og EOF raiser
PlanReviewInputError -- stillhet er aldri en signatur.
Fire nekter ved navn, hvorav to lukket et stille dropp ingen test dekket: report_forbidden (report-
modus returnerer FOER hver utforsknings-nekt) og portefoelje-partisjonen. De to konfig-avhengige
nektene deler tokenet enable_plan_review og har derfor ulik saertekst; den eksisterende testen
asserterte paa det delte tokenet og er rettet (oekt-57-mutasjonen, niende gang).
Hosting nekter fortsatt -- reviewen er synkron og ville blokkert bade HTTP-requesten og event-loekka
som svarer /readiness -- men meldingen navngir na CLI-doeren i stedet for aa paasta at biblioteket er
den eneste.
Mid-loep-spoersmaal er IKKE bygget, og fravaeret er MAALT: _magentic.py har noeyaktig ETT
ctx.request_info (:1044, plan review) i hele modulen. Reviewens "kun plan-review FOER loepet" er
derimot upresist -- samme forespoersel fyrer ogsaa ved re-plan etter en stall.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_plan_review_cli_door_loadbearing.py, 12 tester), elleve mutasjoner
alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 1040/5 og golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET
(ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LtMDsh2zfp4Bmw8KGJ4aLD
_SCRIPTED_ROLES = ("proposer", "checker") var det ENESTE rollesettet
_load_scripted_replies validerte OG returnerte. explore()s tre ekstra
roller (manager/navigator/hypothesiser) ble filtrert bort selv når de
fantes i --scripted-replies-JSON-en, og manglet en av dem krasjet CLI-en
med en rå KeyError midt i eksplorasjonssløyfa i stedet for en ren
"run refused:"-linje (MAJOR-2, docs/2026-08-25-syretest-vei-ab.md).
_EXPLORATION_SCRIPTED_ROLES legges nå til kravet KUN når --explore er
satt, slik at en manglende rolle nektes VED NAVN ved døren, før
explore() kalles. En rein debattkjøring skal ikke måtte svare for
roller den aldri bruker.
Målt (ikke bare antatt): med alle fem roller scriptet fullfører CLI-en
uten krasj, men sløyfa er fortsatt delvis vakuøs (1 runde, 0 approaches)
som syretesten forutså — en konstant streng per rolle kan ikke svare
korrekt på magentic-managerens stadiespesifikke former.
1028 passed / 5 skipped (+3 nye tester, RØD→GRØNN). Golden
demo-transcript byte-uendret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YSHNrYvKxDR5uct1QoVZng
Ordrens premiss («endrer run_project sin signatur») er FALSIFISERT foer bygging,
og ordren ba selv om nettopp den sjekken. run_project kan ikke ta mer enn en
bundle_dir: paa bundle-stien avleder den FIRE enkeltverdier fra DEN basen -
prosjektet (_project_from_bundle fail-faster naar basens egen project_id ikke er
den forespurte), validatorens stage-0-baseline, agentenes lesekontekst og
ExpeL-noekkelen - og returnerer ETT stemplet RunResult. En andre katalog paa den
signaturen ville tvunget et stille velg-en for alle fire. Planens egen setning
sier det samme lest naert: «pipelinen kjoeres per bundle som i dag
(run_portfolio-formen)» = N kall, ikke ett kall med N.
Levert form, tre soemmer:
- mandate.Approach.bundle_id (default "" - hvert mandat skrevet foer i dag er
fortsatt gyldig og dispatchbart uendret)
- mandate.route_by_bundle - ren partisjon, fail-fast paa et mandat som ikke kan
utfoeres som skrevet (load_mandate-regelen). En base som ingen approach navngir
kjoeres ikke; med NOEYAKTIG en base absorberer den alt uten navn, som ikke er en
gjetning men det eneste mulige svaret.
- run.run_mandate_across_bundles - dispatchen. INGEN project_id-parameter:
hver base sitt prosjekt leses fra DEN basens egen IR-projeksjon, altsaa den
verdien _project_from_bundle allerede fail-faster mot. En delt VerdictStore
traades paa tvers (kryss-base-laering, run_portfolio-formen), og med
portfolio_meter gjelder de to S3.4-tennene som HAR mening her: oppstartsnekt
(BudgetRefused) og aldri-startet + budget_stop + not_evaluated-rader.
INGEN eksisterende kaller endrer signatur - CLI, hosting og simulation sender
fortsatt en base hver, og kan fortsatt gjoere det.
explore(): hver myntet approach baerer bundle_id; markoeren kan navngi basen;
en umerket markoer med flere baser NEKTES (HypothesisParseError), med en base
resolveres den. Froe-approaches VALIDERES men skrives ALDRI om (§ C.6 doer 1 er
en bevaringsregel) - og valideringen skjer FOER foerste modellkall, samme
oekt-57-hoist-grunn: ved unntaket alene ser en nekt etter forbruket identisk ut.
explore()-docstringens gamle aerlighets-grense («venter paa at run_project tar
mer enn en bundle_dir») er RETTET - den ville vaert usann fra i dag.
Load-bearing MAALT, 12 mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten, groenn kontroll
1020/5 (fra 999/5 + 21 nye tester); golden demo-transcript.stdout BYTE-UENDRET
(ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f): detach myntet bundle_id (2) ·
stille gjennomfall ved >1 base (1) · ukjent id resolvert etter rekkefoelge (1) ·
froe-sjekk etter forbruket (2) · ruteren gjetter foerste base (1) · uroutbar
approach droppet (1) · dispatchen kollapser til en base (5) · project_id fra
foerste base (2) · detach aldri-startet-tannen (1) · unreached urapportert (1) ·
fersk store per base (1) · detach oppstartsnekten (2).
EN MUTASJON FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse, aattende
gang): store-testen sammenlignet med ==, og VerdictStore er en pydantic-modell
med VERDI-likhet - tre ulike tomme stores er alle like, saa «fersk store per
base» lot hele suiten staa groenn. Delt INSTANS er paastanden, saa testen
asserterer naa paa `is`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3YHobQC3WzYVoxSgZus4d
Tre review-funn fra oerkt 57, alle handtert.
1. DEFEKT, funnet i review og REPRODUSERT foer fiks: --explore --outbox-dir uten
--run-id kjoerte HELE utforskningen og ble deretter nektet av run_project, som
eier outbox-kontrakten og nekter paa sin FOERSTE setning - tidlig nok for enhver
sti som fantes foer U4, men utforskningen kjoerer FORAN det kallet. Artefakt-
skrivingen hoppet ogsaa over (den krever begge), saa ikke engang regnskapet over
hva som ble brukt overlevde. Fiksen er en HOIST i utforskningsblokka, ikke en
andre kopi av regelen - samme hoist main() alt gjoer for de paakrevde argumentene,
av samme grunn. Testen asserterer at INGEN modellkall skjedde, ikke bare at rc er
1: ved exit-koden ser en nekt etter forbruket identisk ut.
2. VAKUOES ASSERT FJERNET (repoets egen klasse, snudd innover): scenarioets
label_in_bundle ble beregnet av den SAMME variabelen vakten raiser paa, saa feltet
kunne strukturelt kun vaere False og assertet kunne ikke feile mot noen
implementasjon - mens docstringen kalte det en kausalitetskontroll «akkurat som
marker_in_run_a_prompt». Feltet og assertet er borte; vakten ER kontrollen, og en
alltid-sann gjentakelse av den ville bare gjort den ekte lettere aa avfeie.
3. MAALINGS-PAASTANDEN PRESISERT: M10 (fjern --explore fra portefoelje-partisjonen)
ble re-maalt mot HELE suiten etter test-fiksen - foer sto den kun maalt med -k.
Invarianten sa «seksten mutasjoner mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 998/5» og
slo dermed sammen tre ulike kontroller; den oppgir naa alle fire (990/5, 996/5,
998/5, 999/5). En paastand om egen maaling som er upresis om sin egen nevner er
premiss-vs-faktum-regelen vendt innover.
Pluss en uttalt aerlighets-grense i invarianten: den HOSTEDE flaten gir ingen innsyn
i hva som formet mandatet (ingen outbox, intet utforskningsfelt i _response_payload).
Bevisst scope-grense, men uttalt, fordi flatens hele argument er at svaret er
etterproevbart.
Sytten mutasjoner totalt, alle roede mot HELE suiten. 999 passed / 5 skipped.
Golden-transkriptet byte-uendret (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
mypy + ruff rene.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YRZhBJcxqTcqWyMW6hBttx
Kallsted (1) + artefaktet (4) av oerkt 57s fire.
--explore "<prompt>" + --explore-config FILE i run.py: utforskningen kjoerer FOER
pipelinen og mandatet den former gaar rett inn i run_project(mandate=...). Flagget
er opt-in, og hver ting det ikke kan aere NEKTES ved navn:
- --explore-config uten --explore (--embedder-config-presedensen, ordrett)
- --explore uten --explore-config: CLI-en oppfinner ALDRI grenser, fordi
MagenticBuilders egen fallback er "ubegrenset"
- --explore + --mandate: TO KILDER TIL ETT MANDAT. Nektet, aldri slaatt sammen -
explore() tar objective fra prompten og hardkoder allow_own_proposals=True, saa
en sammenslaaing ville stille overskrevet tre felt operatoeren skrev selv.
Nekten NAVNGIR biblioteksdoera (seed_approaches), fordi C.6 doer 1 er et ekte
behov denne flaten ikke betjener
- --explore + --live-dry-run (motstrid), --explore uten --bundle-dir (leser
ingenting), --portfolio --explore (partisjonen)
- enable_plan_review=true nektes HER, ikke i explore(): ExplorationError er en
RuntimeError og ligger UTENFOR main()s (ValueError, FileNotFoundError,
ValidationError)-tuppel, saa den ville forlatt som traceback i stedet for rc 1
ExplorationTrace er en KALLER-EID akkumulator (funn-1-sinken, ett lag opp):
explore() raiser BudgetExceeded paa rundetaket og tokentaket fyrer fra middleware
midt i loepet - paa begge stier finnes ingen ExplorationResult, og C.2 krever at
artefaktet er lesbart uansett hvilken vakt som fyrte. ExplorationResult.ledger_log
BYGGES FRA akkumulatoren, aldri ved siden av (kø-(p)).
{run_id}-exploration.json skrives fra en finally (write_parse_failures-presedensen)
med rundene, plan-reviewene og quick_validate-dommene - de siste bor bevisst ikke i
ExplorationResult. `completed` er et eget felt: en stop: null som betyr BAADE
"avsluttet normalt" og "vi fikk aldri vite" er stillheten cost_baseline_anchored
ble paakrevd for aa lukke.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_explore_callsites_loadbearing.py, 15 tester), ti
mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 990/5: detach sink-appenden
(1 roed) - andre liste for rundene (4 roede) - detach --mandate-nekten (1) - detach
--explore-config-nekten (1) - skriv artefaktet kun naar kjoeringen fullfoerte (1) -
detach mandate= inn i run_project (1) - slipp enable_plan_review gjennom (1) -
detach --bundle-dir-kravet (1) - detach --live-dry-run-nekten (1) - fjern --explore
fra portefoelje-partisjonen (1).
EN MUTASJON FALSIFISERTE TESTEN FOERST (repoets vakuoes-gate-klasse, syvende gang):
portefoelje-testen asserterte kun at meldingen nevnte --explore, og var groenn UTEN
partisjonen - kjoeringen falt da gjennom til "--explore requires --bundle-dir", som
nevner --explore ogsaa. To nekter som deler en delstreng; testen navngir naa
--portfolio.
Golden-transkriptet byte-uendret (ea8c534773acdbe41ae68f2c55724d69aaf8be4f).
mypy + ruff rene.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YRZhBJcxqTcqWyMW6hBttx
PORTFOLIO_OTEL er eneste bryter, lest paa truthiness. Uten den kalles
configure_otel_providers ikke i det hele tatt: spans lages fortsatt
(ENABLE_INSTRUMENTATION defaulter True) og kastes, saa ingenting KAN forlate
prosessen. `console` skriver spans til stderr - demoens stdout er byte-identisk
med fasiten, maalt. `otlp` eksporterer over nett, og kun mot et endepunkt
operatoeren selv har navngitt.
To regler er MAALT, ikke valgt (observability.py:849 bygger exporter-lista i
fast rekkefoelge):
- enable_console_exporters sendes EKSPLISITT False i begge moduser. Overlatt til
miljoeet faller den tilbake paa ENABLE_CONSOLE_EXPORTERS, hvis
ConsoleSpanExporter skriver til STDOUT - nettopp det S6 maalte som oedeleggende
for goldenen.
- `console` NEKTER naar en OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*_ENDPOINT finnes: env-avledede
exportere bygges UBETINGET og FOER vaare, saa ordet "console" ville vaert en
usann paastand om hvor kjoeringens innhold tok veien. Validering, ALDRI
reparasjon - vi fjerner ikke operatoerens variabel bak ryggen paa dem.
Tre kallsteder (run.main, simulation.main, hosting.main): demoen er et skriptet
bevis, ikke produktet, og en soem bare demoen naar ville latt de to inngangene en
virksomhet faktisk kjoerer vaere usporbare. tracing_notice er ENESTE renderer og
returnerer None naar sporing er av - omisjon, aldri tom rad.
IKKE bygget, med grunn: PLAN_CREATED/REPLANNED/PROGRESS_LEDGER_UPDATED hoerer til
sloeyfa U4 bygger; en emitter uten kallsted er en form gjettet i stedet for maalt.
OTLP-exporter-PAKKENE er bevisst ikke deklarert (egress + grpc/protobuf-vekt i et
publisert wheel); uttalt i README/DEPLOY/env.template.
Ny dep: opentelemetry-sdk>=1.42,<2 (operatoerbeslutning 2, 23.08). EN pakke, ikke
to - ConsoleSpanExporter bor inne i sdk-en. opentelemetry-api fulgte med
1.42.1 -> 1.44.0, maalt uskadelig.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_tracing_loadbearing.py), ni mutasjoner alle roede
mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 943/5. Tre av de roede bor i tester som fantes
fra foer (golden-transkriptets fire-linjers stderr + portefoelje-CLI-ens stille
pass), altsaa er omisjons-regelen gatet av uavhengige vitner.
Golden ea8c534... uendret. mypy src + ruff rene.
Ordren tar ogsaa de fire operatoerbeslutningene inn i planens paragraf F.
Laasen paa orchestrations 1.0.1 er ENDELIG (operatoerbekreftelse 23.08), ikke
midlertidig: spike-ordrens "revert hvis E7 staar" er overstyrt av den senere
beslutningen, som betinget paa groenn suite - ikke paa E7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
okf._walk toleret en ulesbar/utenfor-basen lenke uten aa etterlate spor (okf.py:182
"continue # broken link"), og navigate_bundle returnerte kun filene den FANT. En base
der halve innholdet aldri ble lest var derfor umulig aa skille fra en base der de
dokumentene aldri ble skrevet - og toerrkjoeringen sa ingenting.
Toleransen er UROERT: OKF SPEC §4 krever at navigasjonen ikke kaster, og den kaster
fortsatt ikke. Dette er synlighet, ikke en ny nekt.
To tenner (samme form som ordre 20260821T092039Z, synlig uforankring):
1. okf.SkippedLink + Bundle.skipped - strukturert spor, aldri en streng: hvilken fil
lenken sto i, lenketeksten ORDRETT (operatoeren redigerer den teksten, ikke den
resolverte stien), og hvilken av de TO grunnene som gjaldt - outside-bundle (escape,
ofte bevisst) eller missing (inne i basen, ingen lesbar fil, nesten alltid en
skrivefeil). Dedup-grenen (canonical in seen) registreres ALDRI: den er korrekt
navigasjon og det som terminerer sykler.
2. run.skipped_links_notice - EN renderer, tar den alt opploeste tuppelen, returnerer
None naar ingenting ble hoppet over. Printes paa BEGGE flater: --live-dry-run og
den fulle enkeltkjoeringen (en kjoering som PRODUSERTE et forslag fra en halvlest
base er der tausheten kostet mest).
Defaulten er MOTSATT forrige ordres, og forskjellen er innsikten: cost_baseline_anchored
er paakrevd fordi begge defaults lyver, mens en TOM tuppel her er et aerlig positivt
utsagn ("hver lenke ble fulgt") - external_calls-presedensen. Vei-stien navigerer ingen
base, saa tom er bokstavelig sant der ogsaa.
Sporet bor paa RunResult.skipped_links (RUN-nivaa: navigasjonen skjer EN gang per
kjoering, foer noe forslag finnes), aldri paa ProvenanceStamp, som beskriver gaten som
doemte EN kandidat. Ingenting av dette naar bundle_context - derfor er de commons-eide
nav-goldenene byte-uendret, og Bundle( har fortsatt EN konstruksjons-sted (maalt).
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_navigation_visibility_loadbearing.py), aatte mutasjoner
alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 897 passed / 5 skipped:
detach missing-registreringen (6 roede) · detach outside-bundle (2) · kollaps de to
grunnene til en (2) · registrer dedup-grenen (1) · renderer returnerer alltid linja
(3, inkl. kontrollene - omisjonen er selv gatet) · detach dry-run-printen (1) ·
detach full-run-printen (1) · konstant tom trace ut av run_project (4).
Docs rettet der de paasto det motsatte: kunnskapsbase-for-en-kjoring.md §5.7 + §6,
presentasjon-bygge-kunnskapsbase.html (steg 8, steg 9, fallgruve 3, avslutningen),
README-ens navigasjonsavsnitt, og CLAUDE.md-ens navigasjons-kontrakt-invariant.
Maalt oekt 48: en bundle-kjoering uten cost-baseline.json gikk rc 0 uten et ord, og
`grep baseline provenance.py outbox.py` ga null treff - hverken stdout, stempelet eller
utboksen bar at validatorens steg 0 ble hoppet over.
To tenner, begge smaa, og begge fra kjoeringens ENE oppslag av baselinen (koe-(p)):
1. ProvenanceStamp.cost_baseline_anchored - PAAKREVD bool uten default. Begge defaults
lyver: True lar en glemsom konstruktoer paastaa en ankring som ikke skjedde, False
underrapporterer en ekte. Naar utboksen gratis (write_proposal dumper hele stempelet).
DryRunReport baerer det samme - en dry-run stopper foer noe stempel finnes.
2. run.cost_baseline_notice(anchored) - ENESTE renderer, tar den alt opploeste booleanen,
returnerer None naar kjoeringen ER forankret (omisjon, aldri en tom rad). Printes paa
tre flater: --live-dry-run, full enkeltkjoering, og per prosjekt i portefoeljemodus.
IKKE foldet inn i mandate.announce, og det er en MAALING: den fyrer kun med --mandate, saa
nettopp de bare bundle-dry-runsene defekten ble maalt paa ville fortsatt sagt ingenting -
og den renderes foer run_project, altsaa foer noen har opploest baselinen.
Ankeringen forblir VALGFRI (en pre-amendment-base kjoerer uendret) - dette er synlighet,
ikke en ny nekt. Golden-transkriptet er byte-uendret: demoen kjoerer en base som HAR fila.
Load-bearing MAALT (tests/test_baseline_visibility_loadbearing.py, 11 tester), seks
mutasjoner alle roede mot HELE suiten + groenn kontroll 885/5: konstant stamp-wiring
(3 roede) - konstant dry-run-wiring (1) - detach dry-run-printen (1) - renderer returnerer
alltid linja (2, inkl. den forankrede kontrollen) - detach full-run-printen (1) - detach
portefoelje-printen (1). Portefoelje-armen er DEFENSIV og uttalt (ingen referanse-prosjekt
setter bundle_dir; budget_stop-presedensen, crafted PortfolioResult).
Det paakrevde feltet tvang fem eksisterende test-konstruktoerer til aa ta stilling.
Dokumentene som beskrev den gamle stillheten er rettet: kunnskapsbase-for-en-kjoring.md
S4.1 (tabellraden re-maalt live), S6 og S7; README «How it is set up»; CLAUDE.md S4.0-raden.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DA6HAF8HFQxGYC2h6ypRQe
Fase 1b funn 1 lukket. generate._fetch_parsed kastet hvert uparsebart modellsvar i
except: continue, så prosjektets første levende kjøring brant tolv runder på formatfeil
og etterlot null tegn av det modellen faktisk sa. Enhver videre betalt kjøring ville
vært gjetning.
HVOR teksten overflates er avgjort av en måling, ikke av symmetri med Steg 5:
meter.tick_round() raiser BudgetExceeded INNE i _fetch_parsed, og uten mandat fanger
ingen den, så på nøyaktig den stien fangsten finnes for returnerer generate_via_llm
ingenting. Et felt på GenerationResult ville vært blindt for den, og et outbox-artefakt
skrevet etter kjøringen likeså. Sinken speiler meter: en kaller-eid akkumulator hvis
innhold kalleren holder uansett hvordan løkka endte. Artefaktet skrives fra en finally,
ikke except BudgetExceeded, og kun når noe faktisk feilet.
Iron Law: testfila rød ved collection FØR modulen fantes. Seks mutasjoner mot HELE
suiten, alle røde, hver med sin egen signatur; grønn kontroll 859 passed / 4 skipped
(fra 854). Den skarpeste er trunkering som BEHOLDER sentinelen: da faller kun
verbatim-asserten, som er det som beviser at den ene testen bærer den egenskapen.
Samme økt: mutasjonsmålingen økt 34 utsatte for de to Fase 5-gatene er kjørt. Fire
preflight-mutasjoner mot hele suiten, alle røde på riktig test og ingen annen (detach
fallbacken 2 røde, snu presedensen, presence i stedet for truthiness, avslaget navngir
kun vårt navn). To handover-mutasjoner kjørt MÅLRETTET mot egen testfil under tidspress,
ikke mot hele suiten — uttalt, ikke skjult (drop uv.lock, bygg fra arbeidstreet i stedet
for tracked files). De to DEPLOY.md-mutasjonene gjenstår: git archive leser HEAD, ikke
arbeidstreet, så de krever en midlertidig commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WLQd8ojQ9xwxhB8vsETYBs
generate_via_llm consumed each validator Rejection internally (`last`), fed it into the
next attempt's prompt, and dropped it. So Step 5 was real but unobservable: a caller could
see THAT a proposal validated, never that it validated on attempt 2 after the deterministic
validator falsified attempt 1. It was the one step of the eight with no output to show.
The seam is a typed return value -- GenerationResult(outcome, refinements) -- rather than an
out-parameter or a callback: a returned value cannot be silently lost by a caller that forgets
to pass a collector, and mypy forces every call site to acknowledge it.
refinements carries ONLY rejections that were actually fed back. When the attempt budget runs
out the final rejection IS outcome; counting it here would be double-counting, and the bounded
control test goes red on the collect-everything implementation that gets this wrong.
The loop's bound is untouched: max_attempts and meter.tick_round stand, and `last` still drives
the prompt alone, so prompt growth is unchanged. run.py accumulates across _evaluate calls, so
_evaluate_mandate is untouched; RunResult.refinements defaults (the coverage precedent) and is
concatenated across approaches rather than keyed per approach -- stated as an honesty limit.
The simulation now shows it: the scripted proposer overclaims 250000, which the validator
falsifies against P90 = 90000, and the corrected 30000 validates. Only the overclaim is
scripted -- the rejection is computed. scripted_factory takes a per-role reply selector so this
needs no second scripted client body.
README records the two accuracy changes only (Step 5 is now inspectable; the simulation trace
shows the correction). The level-2 publishing claim stays deferred until after the demo (O4).
Load-bearing MEASURED against the full suite with a control, four mutations all red:
detach the returned history (4 tests) - collect-everything (control only) - detach the run
wiring (2 tests) - revert the simulation's proposer to a constant (the demo-protection test).
Control: 759 passed / 4 skipped; ruff, format and mypy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017CcWFcREUi6YPjEpN3ACDP
The egress declaration (Trekk B3) says what a run MAY contact. It cannot say what
it DID: after the run, nothing distinguished "the agents queried the price
register" from "the agents ignored it", and a proposal resting on an external
service should be traceable to it.
ToolCallRecorder(FunctionMiddleware) mirrors BudgetMiddleware(ChatMiddleware) one
layer down — that one observes the debate's chat calls, this one its tool calls.
It observes only: call_next is always awaited, so a trace can never alter the run
it traces. The record lands on ProvenanceStamp.external_calls, read AFTER the
debate so it is a record rather than an intention.
MEASURED, not assumed, before any of it was written: FunctionMiddleware fires for
a tool served over a REAL MCP stdio subprocess, and context.function.name carries
the BARE tool name with no server prefix. That measurement decided the design —
MAF cannot tell us which server a tool came from, so attribution comes from our own
config, and a name allowed by two servers is recorded UNATTRIBUTED (server="")
rather than credited to the first match. Naming a service that may never have been
contacted is the one place a guess must not go.
Only CONFIGURED tools are recorded. The middleware fires for every function the
agents invoke, including the in-process retrieve_cost_docs on the road path;
logging those would turn the record into a false egress claim. An empty list is a
positive statement — nothing outside this process was contacted — which is why it
is always serialized rather than omitted.
Honesty limit, written on ExternalCall itself: this is the call and its source. It
is NOT evidence that the service's answer reached the proposal, nor a verified
rendering of that answer.
One finding, and it is the reason for measuring rather than trusting green: the
road-path negative test was VACUOUS. Its scripted tool call named an argument the
tool does not declare (code vs query), MAF rejected the call before invocation, and
the test asserted an empty record against a run where no tool ran at all — green
under the exact mutation it existed to catch. It now spies on the recorder and
asserts the invocation genuinely reached it before asserting it was not recorded.
This is last session's lesson again: a scenario that cannot distinguish two
implementations proves nothing.
The tool-call double is registered in test_scripted_client_consolidation.py's
_DELEGATING_OVERRIDES — it cannot live in the reply_selector seam, which returns a
reply STRING, and a response that is not text is its whole subject.
Load-bearing MEASURED (tests/test_b4_mcp_call_trace_loadbearing.py) against the
whole 755-test suite, four mutations all red: detach the recorder from the debate
middleware · record every function invocation · attribute an ambiguous name to the
first server · stop reading the recorder into provenance. Control: a run with no
configured servers records nothing, so the empty record is a real answer and not
the only one the seam can produce.
Ran it, not just tested it: the real recorder against a real MCP server subprocess
returns ExternalCall(server='prisregister', tool='lookup_unit_price'), and a
scripted CLI run's outbox artefact carries the empty list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VtRd8y1PDPGwkrRXFhubqr
A run commissioned to evaluate three approaches wrote ONE proposal artefact, so
only the approach it selected could ever receive a verdict. The other two were
evaluated, reported in the settlement, and then taught the learning loop nothing.
The defect class is a key collapse, and it had two halves — fixing either alone
leaves it intact:
* the WRITER wrote one pair per run, so the non-selected approaches never existed
on disk;
* the READER (hitl._read_outbox_proposals) joins proposal to outcome on the
run_id FIELD read from file CONTENT, never the filename. Three files sharing
one run_id collapse onto one dict key, last write wins — so widening only the
filename would have produced three artefacts and still one pending row. This is
the S3.2 collision class: two rows under one key silently become one.
Artefacts are now keyed {run_id}-{approach_id}-*.json AND carry approach_id in the
payload; the join key is (run_id, approach_id). Two properties make them genuinely
judgeable rather than merely present:
* verdict_id is minted per approach (verdicts.verdict_key, the S3.2 content hash)
— reusing the run's single id would let one delivered verdict clear all three
from the queue;
* provenance.validator_decision follows ITS OWN approach — the run's stamp would
report a rejected candidate as validated, and nothing downstream could correct it.
verdicts.verdict_key is public so a run can stamp the key a verdict WILL arrive
under without capturing a decision nobody has made; it delegates to _mint_id
rather than restating the hash (the (p) rule: one keying rule, one copy).
The per-approach set REPLACES the run-level pair rather than joining it — the
selected approach is already among them, and writing both would count it twice in
hitl pending. The selected one carries the run's final outcome, so the outbox can
never disagree with the RunResult; the others carry the validator's verdict, the
only falsifier that ran on them.
mandate.py is deliberately untouched: hanging a ValidatedProposal off a coverage
row would drag validator — and pulp — into a module kept to pydantic+stdlib for
D7 portability, so _evaluate_mandate returns the evaluated outcomes alongside.
Ran it, not just tested it: a real CLI run wrote six artefacts and hitl pending
listed three rows. It also showed the honest edge — three approaches that produce
an identical candidate share one content-hash key, so one verdict settles all
three. That is correct (they were one candidate), and it is now documented.
Load-bearing MEASURED (tests/test_a5_per_approach_artifacts_loadbearing.py) against
the whole 750-test suite, five mutations all red: detach the per-approach writer ·
drop approach_id from the join key · reuse the run's verdict id · reuse the run's
provenance stamp · widen the filename but not the payload. Control: on a full
detach exactly the 5 new tests fail and 745 pre-existing ones stay green — the
no-mandate path is inert, and writes neither the filename segment nor the field.
Docs: bestille-en-kjoring.md (what the commissioner gets) + ekspert-svar.md (what
the expert's queue looks like, and that "rejected" is the validator's verdict on
the numbers, never a professional judgement of the idea).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VtRd8y1PDPGwkrRXFhubqr
Krav 3, and the operator chose the run path explicitly: the external service must
be reachable WHILE the run works, not only when documents are ingested. Until now
the run path had one in-process tool against a local folder — and on the bundle
path the agents had no tools at all.
MAF already ships the client (MCPStdioTool / MCPStreamableHTTPTool, verified in
the pinned 1.9.0 with allowed_tools and request_timeout), so `mcp_tools.py` owns
only what MAF cannot decide for us: which servers a run may contact, which of
their tools it may call, how long it waits, and where the credential comes from.
This is a DIFFERENT seam from ingest_mcp.py on purpose — that one pulls source
documents before a run and speaks to null-argument tools. Same protocol, different
job.
Every refusal is a live hazard, not tidiness. An empty allowlist would let the far
end decide what the agents may call, so naming the tools is mandatory. A
non-positive timeout is an unbounded wait against a third party. An unknown field
is refused rather than ignored, which is also what keeps a literal secret from
being parked in the config — there is no field for one, only the NAME of an env
var. A named-but-unset credential refuses instead of calling anonymously, because
an anonymous call can succeed with the wrong scope.
Egress is declared, always. Every server and permitted tool is named in the run
announcement before the first call — including when no --mandate is given, which
was a real hole: the announcement only printed with a commission, so configuring
servers without one would have contacted third parties with nothing printed at
all. --live-dry-run still opens nothing, because the tools are entered after the
dry-run cut: the promise to stop before the first call now covers egress too.
Threaded through BOTH modes. A flag accepted in one mode and silently dropped in
the other is the defect class this CLI refuses by name.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole 744-test suite, four mutations all red:
build the tools but never hand them to the agents (2) · never enter the
AsyncExitStack, so they are constructed and useless (1) · never declare the egress
(2) · drop the allowlist on the built client (1).
Two live docs claimed MCP was unwired in the run path; both corrected rather than
left to rot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ULCqjLF61rehj5cZmdUoR3
Krav 2: a run must be clear about what it shall do and achieve. `--mandate`
makes both ends explicit. BEFORE the first (paid) model call the run prints what
it was commissioned to do — objective, every named approach, whether its own
proposals are allowed, the scope, the caps, and which external services it will
contact. AFTER the run it settles: one row per approach, validated with the
figure, rejected with the validator's reason, or not evaluated with why.
The announcement is placed with the other refusals and above the scripted
banner, for the reason the required-args guard was hoisted there: a refused run
must not first print a banner about work it never did. `--live-dry-run`
announces without contacting anything, so a commission can be inspected before
it costs money.
`settle` renders the goal verdict it is GIVEN and never decides it. `ledger.to_ore`
is the framework's one NOK->øre conversion and the goal comparison already runs on
quantised integers, but `mandate.py` cannot import it without dragging `verdicts`
— and therefore agent_framework — into a deliberately framework-neutral module,
while a private copy of a money conversion is exactly the (p) defect. So the
caller decides and this renders; a goal figure without a decided verdict makes no
claim at all.
The caps the announcement prints come from named constants shared with
`run_project`/`run_portfolio`'s defaults — a second copy could drift and make the
announcement describe a run that never happened.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole 717-test suite, four mutations all red:
detach the announcement (4) · detach the settlement print (2) · make the CLI
loader tolerant (2) · announce the commission but never hand it to the run (2).
The last one is the one that matters: without it, a run could print a commission
it had no intention of executing.
DEVIATION from the approved plan, stated rather than quietly dropped: --goals is
still refused outside portfolio mode. Accepting it in single-project mode would
have admitted a flag whose documented function (the goal-stop against the ledger)
still does nothing there — the same accepted-but-inert defect --embedder-config
was just fixed for. The mandate's success_criteria carries "what shall this run
achieve" in the expert's own words instead; the numeric target stays portfolio-level.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ULCqjLF61rehj5cZmdUoR3
Carrying an approach into the prompt only half-answers krav 1. The expert asked
for their approaches to be CONCRETELY EVALUATED, which means each must reach a
verdict and each verdict must be visible. `run_project(mandate=...)` evaluates
every commissioned approach in turn — the run's own proposal last, when allowed —
each under the SAME meter. No new loop: the caps already in force are the bound.
`RunResult.coverage` is the settlement, one row per approach: validated (with the
figure), rejected (with the validator's reason verbatim), or not_evaluated (with
why). `not_evaluated` is the row that earns the type its keep — an approach the
run never reached must be reported as unreached, because an omitted row is
indistinguishable from an approach nobody ordered. That silence is the defect
class krav 1 is asking us to remove.
Budget exhaustion mid-list is reported, not swallowed. But if the FIRST approach
exhausts it there is nothing honest to return, so BudgetExceeded propagates
exactly as before — a run that produced nothing must still fail loudly.
RunResult stays single-outcome (portfolio aggregation, outbox artefacts and HITL
keying all rest on that). The choice is deterministic: highest validated saving,
ties by mandate order — never whichever ran last.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole 702-test suite. FIVE mutations red:
evaluate only the first approach (5 red) · drop the rejected rows (3) · ignore
allow_own_proposals (1) · select produced[-1] (1) · select produced[0] (1).
The sixth measurement is why this commit exists in this shape: the ordering
mutation FIRST STAYED GREEN. The test had placed the bigger approach last, where
"highest saving" and "whichever ran last" give the same answer, so an
order-dependent implementation passed it. A scenario that cannot separate two
implementations proves nothing about either — the test now pins BOTH orderings,
and each mutation direction fails one of them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ULCqjLF61rehj5cZmdUoR3
Walked from a fresh clone: `--embedder-config` was accepted in every mode
without `--semantic-retrieval` and then had no effect whatsoever. MEASURED,
not inferred — an injected embedder is consulted ZERO times with the flag
off and once with it on, because the only consumer is the HybridRanker that
flag builds; the default StructuralRetriever takes no embedder at all.
That is the silent-ignore this CLI's flag contract exists to prevent, and
the same ground on which `--semantic-retrieval` itself is already refused
when it cannot take effect.
REFUSED, not wired — the opposite call from `--scripted-replies` in
portfolio mode, and for a stated reason: there the seam already existed, so
refusing would have left a whole mode without an offline door. Here there
is nothing to wire to.
Mode-independent (both modes gate the embedder on the same flag) and placed
ABOVE the scripted door, mirroring the required-args hoist: a refused run
must not first print a banner claiming a scripted loop closed.
Five mutations against the WHOLE suite, all red, each isolating one seam:
detach the refusal (3 red) · scope it to single-project mode (portfolio arm
red) · move it below the banner (banner arm red, rc intact) · build the
ranker unconditionally (the zero-consultation measurement red) · ignore the
injected embedder (its control red).
663 -> 668 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GyAbxJoyypnLLUDcMvnKh8
An independent reviewer found it and the claim was verified by measurement
before being accepted, not taken on trust.
test_portfolio_scripted_pass_makes_no_real_client raised from the patched
_default_factory to prove the scripted portfolio pass never builds a production
client. It cannot: the factory is called inside run_project's coroutine, and
run_portfolio gathers with return_exceptions=True, so the AssertionError was
collected into a RunFailure and never escaped. Measured directly -- with BOTH
the client_factory wiring and the rc rule detached, the blade stayed GREEN. It
was going red on rc alone, which means it was testing defect B while claiming
to test defect A. The original seven-mutation sweep did not catch this because
each mutation was applied singly, and dropping the wiring alone still flips rc.
Replaced with a call sentinel: a list appended inside the factory and asserted
in the test body, which the wave handler cannot swallow. Re-measured -- red on
the wiring detach alone, and red on both detaches together.
The docstring now also states what the sweep could not: blades 1 and 8 are
environment-conditional. The local profile points at loopback, so on a machine
running a local model server the wiring detach would make real calls and could
complete the pass. Their red was real on the machine it was measured on and is
not portable; blade 2's is.
Separately, the budget-stop print is marked as defensive and currently
unreachable from main(), because main() never constructs a PortfolioMeter and
every write to budget_stop is gated on one -- the strict=True precedent
directly above says untested future-proofing must be labelled as such. The
README claim that a portfolio pass reports a cap stop is corrected to say the
cap has no CLI flag yet. Noted for whoever wires that door: BudgetRefused is a
RuntimeError and the existing except clause would not catch it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118noV9rCfrdREH26XqZB5z
The operator is not a domain expert, so the domain content is mine to own --
and the one thing the loop asks a human for is exactly the thing no example
existed for. docs/ekspert-svar.md is written for whoever has to deliver the
verdict: the two forms a judgement can take (a --rationale string during the
run, a JSON file in the inbox for later runs), where each field comes from, and
four complete paste-ready answers.
Every command and every verdict in it was RUN from a fresh clone before it was
written. The `hitl pending` line quoted is verbatim output. The rejection
answers close the gap STATE has carried since the demo shipped: the README
shows the VALIDATOR refusing a number, but nothing showed an EXPERT refusing a
proposal whose numbers are fine -- the only judgement in the whole loop that a
machine cannot make. Two rejection shapes are given, because "not feasible
here" and "right measure, wrong cost base" teach the system different things.
Everything is marked AI-authored and not verified professional judgement.
Also corrects the --outbox-dir help text, which claimed sharing a folder with
--verdict-dir "re-ingests raw agent output past the Step-8 promotion gate".
Measured, by pointing both at one folder and running twice: it does not. The
outbox artefacts are named {run_id}-*.json and carry none of the verdict keys,
so the tolerant inbox loader skips them and the run is unaffected. The hazard is
real but latent -- a future verdict-shaped artefact in the outbox -- so the
warning stays and says what is actually true. This also answers STATE's open
question about enforcing the distinction in the CLI: no. There is no reachable
contamination to refuse, and a guard for an unreachable case is the kind of
error handling this repo declines to write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118noV9rCfrdREH26XqZB5z
Walking --portfolio end-to-end as a downloader would -- which no session had
done -- surfaced two defects of a class this repo already legislates against.
(A) --scripted-replies was silently DROPPED in portfolio mode. main()'s
portfolio dispatch returned before the block that builds the scripted client
factory, and the flag was absent from the single_only refusal set: neither
honoured nor refused. Measured against the shipped reference portfolio: no
banner, four real model calls attempted, four APIConnectionError. The previous
session joined this flag to the --report allowlist and missed the portfolio
partition. Resolved by WIRING rather than refusing -- run_portfolio already
exposes the same client_factory seam, and refusing would have left portfolio
mode with no offline door at all for an adopter without a model budget. The
scripted block is hoisted above the dispatch; the single-project required-arg
and semantic-retrieval refusals are hoisted with it so an incomplete argv is
still refused BEFORE the honesty banner could claim a scripted run happened,
and the refusal order within single-project mode is unchanged.
(B) A portfolio pass reported one of its four outcome channels. failures
(S3.3 collect-and-continue) and budget_stop (S3.4 global cap) never reached the
operator and rc was unconditionally 0, so the four-failure pass above printed
NOTHING and exited 0 -- silence read as success. BudgetStop is a separate field
precisely so exhaustion can be told from success; the CLI showed neither.
Failures now print to stderr with project id, error type and message; the
budget stop prints its four numbers; rc is 1 iff something raised. A budget
stop alone stays rc 0: exhaustion is a structured stop the operator asked for
by setting a cap, not a crash. Completed runs still print, so the non-zero rc
does not undo collect-and-continue.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole 662-test suite, seven mutations all
red, including both controls: detach the client_factory wiring - make the
banner a single-project courtesy again - detach the failure print - revert rc
to 0 - detach the budget-stop print - print the failure line unconditionally
(control) - print the budget-stop line unconditionally (control).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118noV9rCfrdREH26XqZB5z
An adopter without an API budget had two half-doors and no whole one.
`--live-dry-run` takes their own bundle but stops before the first model call
(`run_project` returns a DryRunReport), while `portfolio_optimiser.simulation`
runs the complete loop but only over ITS bundle with ITS scripted answers.
The seam for the missing third case -- the whole loop over your OWN data,
offline -- already existed as `run_project(client_factory=...)` and had zero
CLI exposure. This is the door onto that one seam, not a second implementation
of it (`scripted_factory` is imported lazily; `simulation` imports `run`, so a
module-level import would be circular).
The honesty banner is part of the feature, not decoration (maalbilde §1): a
scripted run that reads like a model run is worse than having no offline mode,
so every scripted invocation prints what is real (context navigation, debate
plumbing, deterministic validator, verdict) and what is not (the answers).
The two offline modes are mutually exclusive rather than one silently winning,
`--report` mode refuses the new flag by allowlist, and a replies file that
cannot serve the run is refused at the door rather than surfacing as a KeyError
mid-run.
Load-bearing MEASURED against the whole suite (645 -> 652), six mutations all
red: detach the wiring · detach the banner · detach the dry-run exclusivity ·
drop the flag from the --report allowlist · make the loader tolerant · control
(print the banner unconditionally).
The --report blade was measured GREEN first: with a non-existent ledger path
the load failure refused before the gate and masked it entirely. Rewritten
against a valid saved ledger, so rc 1 can only come from mode-exclusivity.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GWsexbQjPo9rsV3aUE54ZS
Two quantization orders existed and met at exactly one comparison.
SavingsLedger quantizes every realized candidate to integer øre and sums the
ints; run.py's goal baselines summed Project.total_cost FLOATS across items and
projects and quantized the total once. _goal_limit_if_reached compared the
former against a threshold derived from the latter — so whether a portfolio pass
stops early was decided by two differently-computed sides.
Measured divergence: three 60000.005 NOK lines are 18000003 øre quantized first
but 18000001 summed first (the float sum drifts to 180000.01499999998).
Decision: quantize per cost line, then sum integers. Each CostItem IS a money
amount — S4.0 made per-line quantity/unit_cost the validator's ground truth — and
integer addition is associative, keeping totals order-independent under the D-D
wave model, which the float fold is not.
ledger.to_ore is now the framework's one NOK->øre conversion; run.py imports it
rather than keeping a private copy (the S4.0 REPLIES precedent).
Measuring the mutations found two further gaps, both now closed: the per-project
baseline is a SECOND call site whose mutation survived the whole suite, and
realize bypassing to_ore with a raw float*100 was caught by nothing.
Load-bearing MEASURED (tests/test_money_quantization_loadbearing.py), five
mutations all red: detach the portfolio baseline · detach the per-project
baseline · reintroduce a private copy in run.py · change the rounding mode · let
realize bypass to_ore. 615 -> 621 tests.
Honesty boundary: sum_claimed_saving_nok (run.py:_aggregate) is deliberately
untouched — a float NOK reporting field that is never quantized and never
compared against the ledger, hence outside the ordering defect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WiY53sm8JFqk7NN75g5wRS
Every stage of validate_proposal reasoned only about numbers the proposal itself
supplied, so an internally-consistent hallucination cleared the whole gate (F3).
A new stage 0 reconciles each affected_item against the project's CostBaseline
before the CBC solve: an unknown cost code is rejected, and a real code carrying
a quantity/unit_cost outside the configured tolerance (5% default, relative to
the baseline value) is rejected. Validation, never repair.
The baseline argument is OPTIONAL (None = pre-S4.0 behaviour), but both run
paths set it: the road path projects project.cost_items, the bundle path loads
cost-baseline.json when the bundle ships one. Bundles written before the
amendment stay un-anchored, so the commons-owned goldens run byte-identically;
a baseline that exists but is malformed still raises on both loaders.
F8: the method-specific cap now comes from the METHOD_CAPS registry (measure
type -> fraction, injectable) instead of an energy_efficiency string comparison.
The baseline format and tolerance semantics were decided locally — the commons
amendment (D-A pt. 2) never arrived, exactly as in S3.2. D7 mirroring stays open.
Three portfolio fixtures quoted cost codes belonging to OTHER projects; the new
gate caught them. They now quote each project's own lines, and the two copied
REPLIES tables import the single source instead of drifting from it.
Load-bearing measured (tests/test_s40_cost_baseline_loadbearing.py), six
mutations all red: detach the reconciliation stage; detach the magnitude
tolerance; detach the road wiring; detach the bundle wiring; ignore the injected
cap registry; make the optional loader tolerant of malformed content. Control:
with the road wiring detached the repaired portfolio fixtures still pass, so
they are not masking the seam. 597 -> 612 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JdwK7bQ4BZkWH4t8MRDKb4
Three items on one seam — what a FAILED project does to the wave loop — plus the
snapshot copy they sit next to.
(v) The catch is BaseException, not Exception, and that width was ungated. The
existing collect-and-continue test raises RuntimeError, so it stays green when
the handler is narrowed: measured, the whole of test_portfolio_concurrent_
loadbearing.py (13 tests) passes under the narrowing. asyncio.CancelledError is
the one realistic vector that separates the two — probed first, gather(
return_exceptions=True) COLLECTS it, while KeyboardInterrupt propagates
regardless and could never be helped by a wider catch. Narrowed, a cancelled
member is cast into runs as a fake RunResult and the pass dies in _aggregate,
pointing away from its cause. RED measured.
(t) sum_token_usage excludes a failed project's spend, and that is the honest
answer, not a bug: a run that died before producing a stamp has no provenance,
and inventing one is the fabrication RunFailure exists to avoid. What needed
gating is that those tokens still reach the ledger the global cap is enforced
against — otherwise a repeatedly-failing project burns budget while the meter
reads clean. Pins meter.spent as the pass's real cost, sum_token_usage as the
completed-run subtotal, and their difference as exactly the failed spend. RED
measured against the likely "fix" (sourcing sum_token_usage from the meter),
which is wrong because a seeded meter also carries EARLIER passes' spend; 21
existing budget/portfolio tests stay green under it.
(s) _wave_snapshot uses dataclasses.replace, so a field added later is carried
without touching the function. Not cosmetic: measured, dropping retriever by
hand-enumerating left all 585 tests green — the Step-2 coverage its docstring
credited no longer existed, so the S3.1 retriever seam could be downgraded
mid-pass in silence. Now gated by a property test derived from
dataclasses.fields (not a field count, the shape rejected earlier). The explicit
verdicts copy is retained and separately gated: replace(store) alone shares the
caller's list and takes the byte-identical determinism test RED.
strict=True on the zip is documented as deliberately untested — measured green
when dropped, since gather is built from exactly snapshots, so a test could only
go red by manufacturing a mismatch and would exercise zip rather than this pass.
The new double is registered in the S2.5 consolidation guard's delegating-
overrides list rather than the guard being weakened; it already delegates via
super()._inner_get_response, which test_delegating_overrides_call_super now
enforces on it.
583 -> 586 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MbgTCEZma764i1rHTrzceU
PortfolioBudget + PortfolioMeter carry ONE token ledger over a whole portfolio
pass -- and, seeded from a persisted spend file, across passes -- while the
per-run Budget/TokenMeter pair is untouched. Three enforcement points, each
doing a different job:
- startup: a remainder that cannot fund one run raises BudgetRefused before
anything loads (a pass that can afford zero projects is a caller mistake,
not a result);
- wave assembly: an unfundable project is NEVER STARTED and the pass stops
structurally (budget_stop + stopped_early, completed runs preserved).
Because every member of a wave is funded against the SAME pre-wave
remainder, admission RESERVES each member's requirement -- otherwise a wave
of k over-commits the cap by up to k runs;
- pre-call: BudgetMiddleware refuses a call the remainder cannot pay for
instead of making it. The post-charge check stays: real usage is only
knowable after the response, so the guard stops the NEXT call, never the
one in flight.
budget_stop is its own field rather than a widened stop_reason -- a goal-stop
is success, this is resource exhaustion, and fusing them would make "we
stopped" unreadable. PortfolioMeter splits record/check so tokens the provider
already billed reach the ledger even when the same charge breaks the run's own
cap. read_spend raises on corrupt content (our own accounting state, unlike
the tolerant RAW inbox layer); write_spend takes a REQUIRED stamp with no
wall-clock default, mirroring promote_verdict.
Load-bearing MEASURED, not asserted -- 6 mutations, all red: detach the wave
check; detach the pre-call guard; detach the wave reservation; check the run
cap before crediting the global ledger; detach the startup refusal; make
read_spend tolerant. Files restored from shasum-verified copies after each.
Two findings worth keeping: the pre-call guard MASKS a detached wave check if
the test asserts on overspend (spend stays under the cap either way), so the
load-bearing assertion had to become failures == () plus never-started; and
the token arithmetic is probed (32 tokens/run at tokens=8), not guessed.
537 -> 553 tests, ruff + mypy green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015EaxFnaDAbMQkmTeX4u7sd
Closes OQ1 (SC8). At k>1 every project in a wave reads the WAVE-START store,
so a verdict captured by project A does not reach project B's hypothesis
prompt inside the same wave — sequentially it would. Deliberate: the snapshot
is what removes the append race, and restoring intra-wave visibility would
restore the completion-order dependence the barrier exists to eliminate.
Learning flows ACROSS wave boundaries, not within them; concurrency trades
learning granularity for wall-clock.
The shipped fixture cannot show this (the fold is bundle_dir-gated and no
reference project sets bundle_dir), which is a property of the fixture and not
of the design — so it is pinned on the road-k + bundle-k+1 pair via the
existing load_reference_projects monkeypatch seam, no new production seam.
k=1 (two waves) carries the sentinel; k=2 (one wave) does not; store content
stays identical across k. Each half is the other's control.
Detach measured: remove _wave_snapshot -> RED on three tests including this one.
Also corrects two stale docstrings that outlived Session 1's finding: the
module header and the Step-2 test still named a sorted() in _merge_wave as the
detach point. There is no sorted() there, and a project_id sort would BREAK
the k=1-identity contract rather than protect it. A docstring naming a detach
point that does not exist is the green-but-dead defect this file exists to
prevent, so both now name the snapshot and mark the plan's claim as measured
wrong.
_wave_snapshot gains the honesty line about copying exactly two fields, with
the reason no field-count guard was added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015vYbqW4MppACRvPhEMDpvF
Documents the wave-model reading of the existing Step-8 goal semantics (a
reading, not a redesign — Session 1 already moved the checks to wave assembly
because the executor required it) and pins it with three tests.
Goal checks run at WAVE ASSEMBLY, per member: a HARD per-project goal removes
the pid before the wave starts, so an excluded project is never STARTED and
leaves no verdict behind; a HARD portfolio goal stops the pass with the
assembled wave still crossing its barrier; SOFT flags and continues.
Detach points measured:
per-project goal keyed per WAVE, not per member -> RED (membership diverges
at k=3, unaffected at k=1)
import threading under src/ -> RED (AST guard)
promote_verdict called on the run path -> RED (tripwire)
Corrects one claim the plan and my first docstring both implied: checking the
goal MID-WAVE does NOT make membership completion-order dependent.
_goal_limit_if_reached reads only the ledger, contract and baseline, all
invariant during a pass, so a later check reaches the same decision.
Determinism of membership is the ONE-WRITER rule's (C3, now a tripwire test),
not the check's placement; placement buys the never-started property. The
docstrings say this rather than claiming a detach point that does not exist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015vYbqW4MppACRvPhEMDpvF
One project's exception no longer cancels its siblings: the wave's gather
runs with return_exceptions=True and each raised project becomes a frozen
RunFailure(project_id, error, error_type) in the defaulted
PortfolioResult.failures, while every completed project keeps its full
RunResult. RunFailure is a distinct type rather than an error field on
RunResult (six required non-defaulted fields -> dummies would be fabricated
provenance); the deviation from the spec's wording is stated in both
docstrings. TaskGroup is rejected: it cancels siblings on first exception.
snapshots reaches _merge_wave unfiltered, and results are paired back to pids
by POSITION (gather resolves in argument order) so a mid-wave failure cannot
disturb store order or misattribute the failure.
Detach points measured, not asserted:
drop return_exceptions=True -> RED (both new tests)
reorder snapshots before merge -> RED (+ Session 1's determinism test)
pair results by sorted(), not position -> RED (failure misattributed)
filter failed members before merge -> GREEN, measured
The last one corrects the plan: its carried-forward requirement implied
filtering before the merge was the hazard. Filtering preserves relative order,
which is all _merge_wave consumes, so the variant is undetectable AND harmless.
The docstring now names the reorder as the detach point and records the
filter asymmetry, rather than claiming a detach point that does not exist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015vYbqW4MppACRvPhEMDpvF
Replaces run_portfolio's sequential loop with a wave loop over _waves(ids, k):
each wave takes a per-project snapshot of the shared store, runs the wave under
one asyncio.gather in a single event loop, then crosses a merge barrier that
folds each project's NEW verdicts back in wave-submission order. Step 2's
contract goes GREEN; runs stays in project_ids order because gather resolves in
argument order, not completion order.
TWO PLAN CORRECTIONS, both found by the RED-first test rather than by reading:
1. The plan specified sorting the merged verdicts on `project_id`. Measured, that
produces a deterministic order which is the WRONG one: lexicographic gives
BRU/FV42/RV13 while the sequential pass gives FV42/RV13/BRU. It satisfies
"deterministic" while breaking "identical to concurrency=1" — and the second is
the actual contract. The merge preserves submission order instead.
2. The plan named the barrier's sort as the load-bearing seam. It is not — with
per-project snapshots the wave list is never reordered by completion, so a
sorted() there would re-sort an already-ordered list and read as a guard while
guarding nothing. The SNAPSHOT is the half that carries the load. Rather than
ship a decorative sort, both halves were measured (scratchpad-restore, never
git checkout):
detach _wave_snapshot -> RED (store lands in completion order)
detach merge ordering -> RED (reversed wave order diverges)
Both restored byte-identical (sha 42b01d46).
The snapshot carries `retriever` across deliberately: dropping it would silently
downgrade a caller-owned store's S3.1 semantic-retrieval opt-in mid-pass.
Also strengthens the scripted-client consolidation guard, which the probe broke by
being a legitimate third _inner_get_response def-site. It pinned a literal count
of 2 — the wrong shape: it failed on any new legitimate subclass while still
passing if someone pasted a duplicated body into an already-listed file. It now
pins the property (registered sites, scripted-lineage overrides must delegate via
super(), foreign-lineage doubles must genuinely be foreign). Verified load-bearing:
removing both delegation sites turns it RED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LQapztREtC2mkr5oU811pr
Add keyword-only `concurrency: int = 1` to `run_portfolio`, a module-level
`_waves` partitioner, and a fail-fast on k < 1 that precedes any project load.
The execution loop is deliberately NOT changed here. At the default k=1 every
wave holds a single project, so the wave partition reproduces the existing
`for pid in ids` order by construction — the parameter is inert until Step 3
wires the executor. The 5 tests pin exactly that: order preservation across
every k, nothing dropped or duplicated, and the k<1 raise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LQapztREtC2mkr5oU811pr
