"""``evidence_for``'s ``key`` parameter works for keys other than ``verified``.

Reported at the close of B4 (session 76, PM addendum 5 to order
``20260902T151931Z-250257273``) and NOT fixed there, because it was outside that order:

    evidence_for(path, key="sources")  ->  ValueError

``tier`` was derived UNCONDITIONALLY via ``trust_tier``, which refuses an entry that names no
``by`` actor — correctly, because deriving a trust level from an entry identifying nobody would
mint the provenance it claims to read. But ``by`` is required of a ``verified`` entry (SPEC §5.2),
not of every provenance key: the agreed segmented form carries ``segment_id``/``source_offset``,
and a ``sources`` list carries ``id``/``resource``. So the guard belonging to ONE key was applied
to ALL of them, and any other key whose value decoded cleanly crashed.

**It was never measured because it was never exercised:** all 11 call sites in the repo use the
default, so the parameter had no test of its own. A parameter no test drives is a parameter that
rots — the same class as a field no artefact carries.

The fix keeps the guard exactly where SPEC §5.3 puts it. ``trust_tier`` is UNCHANGED and still
refuses an actor-less ``verified`` entry; ``evidence_for`` derives a tier only for the key §5.3
tiers, and answers every other key with ``state`` / ``reason`` / ``items_seen`` / ``entries`` and
``tier=None``.

``admits_falsification`` had to move WITH it, and that is not scope creep — it is the same fact.
It read ``tier != "unverified"``, and ``None != "unverified"`` is true, so a present ``sources``
key would have admitted falsification: a document would have cleared the K5 threshold on evidence
that is not a verification at all. The threshold now names the tiers that clear it. For every
value reachable before this change the two spellings are identical, which is why the existing K5
arms stay green — the tightening is only for the state this change makes reachable.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

from pathlib import Path

import pytest

from portfolio_optimiser import okf

_TWO_SOURCES = (
    "---\n"
    "type: concept\n"
    "title: Tunnelbelysning\n"
    "sources: [{ id: n100, resource: vegnormal }, { id: ipmvp, resource: efficiency-valuation }]\n"
    "verified: { by: human:kjell, at: 2026-09-02 }\n"
    "---\n"
    "\nInnhold.\n"
)


def _concept(tmp_path: Path, text: str = _TWO_SOURCES) -> Path:
    path = tmp_path / "konsept.md"
    path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
    return path


def test_a_non_verified_key_is_read_instead_of_raising(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    """THE GOAL, in the reporter's own words: ``key="sources"`` on a concept with two sources
    returns, and says it saw two.

    Detach point: derive the tier unconditionally again → ``ValueError`` (RED).
    """
    evidence = okf.evidence_for(_concept(tmp_path), key="sources")

    assert evidence.state == "present"
    assert evidence.items_seen == 2
    assert [e["id"] for e in evidence.entries] == ["n100", "ipmvp"]


def test_a_non_verified_key_carries_no_tier(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    """SPEC §5.3 tiers ``verified``. A tier on anything else would be a trust level derived from
    a key that says nothing about trust — asserted, never inferred."""
    assert okf.evidence_for(_concept(tmp_path), key="sources").tier is None


def test_a_non_verified_key_does_not_clear_the_k5_threshold(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    """The consequence arm. ``tier != "unverified"`` is TRUE for ``None``, so without moving the
    threshold with the fix, a present ``sources`` list would admit falsification — a document
    clearing K5 on evidence that is not a verification.

    Detach point: revert the threshold to ``!= "unverified"`` → RED here, green everywhere else.
    """
    evidence = okf.evidence_for(_concept(tmp_path), key="sources")

    assert evidence.state == "present", (
        "the arm must run against a PRESENT key, or it proves nothing"
    )
    assert okf.admits_falsification(evidence) is False


def test_the_default_key_still_tiers_and_still_clears(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    """The CONTROL. A fix that stopped tiering ``verified`` would pass all three arms above and
    disable the whole falsification threshold."""
    evidence = okf.evidence_for(_concept(tmp_path))

    assert evidence.state == "present"
    assert evidence.tier == "human-reviewed"
    assert okf.admits_falsification(evidence) is True


def test_an_actorless_verified_entry_is_still_refused(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    """The guard stays exactly where SPEC §5.2 puts it. Loosening ``trust_tier`` itself would have
    fixed the crash by minting a trust tier for an entry that identifies nobody — the defect
    ``trust_tier``'s own docstring exists to refuse.

    **A premise of this arm was wrong when first written, and the measurement corrected it:** an
    actorless ``verified`` value never reaches ``trust_tier`` through ``evidence_for`` at all — the
    decoder refuses that shape first, as ``unreadable`` / ``unsupported-flow`` (measured). So BOTH
    guards are asserted where each actually lives, rather than one asserted where it is not.
    """
    path = _concept(
        tmp_path,
        "---\ntype: concept\nverified: { at: 2026-09-02 }\n---\n\nInnhold.\n",
    )

    evidence = okf.evidence_for(path)
    assert (evidence.state, evidence.reason, evidence.tier) == (
        "unreadable",
        "unsupported-flow",
        None,
    ), "the decoder refuses an actorless verified value before any tier is derived"
    assert okf.admits_falsification(evidence) is False

    # And the public guard one layer down is untouched: called DIRECTLY with the shape the decoder
    # would never hand it, ``trust_tier`` still refuses rather than tiering nobody.
    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
        okf.trust_tier(({"at": "2026-09-02"},))


def test_the_three_non_present_states_are_unchanged_for_any_key(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
    """Absent and unreadable never tiered anything, and must still not — the fix touches the
    PRESENT arm alone."""
    absent = okf.evidence_for(_concept(tmp_path), key="adjudication")
    assert (absent.state, absent.tier, absent.items_seen) == ("absent", None, 0)

    blocked = _concept(
        tmp_path,
        "---\ntype: concept\nsources:\n  - id: n100\n    resource: vegnormal\n---\n\nInnhold.\n",
    )
    unreadable = okf.evidence_for(blocked, key="sources")
    assert unreadable.state == "unreadable"
    assert unreadable.tier is None
    assert unreadable.reason == "block-sequence"