Kjell Tore Guttormsen
1d62b073f8
Four defects that all reduce to the same thing: the engine trusted a name it had no business trusting. _broadcast is now a reserved namespace, not a repo. coord-send guarded retraction with a sender check, but that guard only covered the door it was nailed to: `coord-done --repo _broadcast <file>` walked in the side entrance and archived a broadcast out of the queue - a full unauthenticated retract of an announcement for every repo that had not read it yet. The rule reserves the whole `_` prefix rather than one literal, so a later `_seen` or `_config` cannot reopen the hole, and it is enforced in every CLI: a rule held in three of four places is not a rule. The pwd fallback is gone. It existed so the CLI would work anywhere, but "anywhere" includes every global surface: a session in ~/repos is not a repo, and basename(pwd) silently handed it the identity "repos". That is not hypothetical - mail was delivered under exactly that name. git toplevel or an explicit --from/--repo are now the only two sources. The write paths refuse and say so; the read path declines silently, because the hook runs it at every session start and must never fail a session. Two checkouts with the same directory name still share one mailbox - re-keying identity would break every existing mailbox and the readable `--to <repo>` addressing. Instead the first git-derived read records the claiming path in <repo>/.origin, and a read from elsewhere is warned about in the injection. A warning, not a refusal: the same repo moved or re-cloned is the ordinary case. The warning goes in the injection because the hook discards stderr, and a warning nobody can see is not a warning. The collision is live in this tree: claude-code-100x is nested inside a repo of the same name. Broadcast delivery is recorded only after the injection is written. Marking inside the read loop left a window where the seen set said "delivered" while the operator saw nothing, and the hook runs under `timeout: 10`, so the window was reachable. A lost broadcast is unrecoverable by design - the seen set is delivery history and retraction deliberately leaves it alone - so the failure mode has to be redelivery, never loss. The hook stops resolving identity altogether. It was the fourth copy of the rule and the only one that runs in production, so passing --repo bypassed the engine's guards exactly where they mattered and suppressed the collision check along with them. It is now the pure wrapper the boundary rule always claimed it was, pinned by two behavioral tests rather than by reading the source. Selftest 93 -> 116; three node tests cover the hook. BREAKING CHANGE: coord-send and coord-done exit 2 outside a git repo instead of naming themselves after the working directory. Pass --from/--repo to choose an identity explicitly. Repo names beginning with _ are refused everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U6EixQo6hpoRCVtiAXdnFs
40 lines
1.7 KiB
JavaScript
40 lines
1.7 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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// coord - SessionStart hook: inject this repo's pending coordination inbox
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// (directed messages + unseen broadcasts) as additionalContext.
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//
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// Thin Node wrapper (marketplace convention: hooks are .mjs) around the bash
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// engine scripts/coord-inbox.sh, which owns the mailbox semantics and is
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// covered by scripts/coord-selftest.sh. Zero dependencies. Always exits 0 -
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// a broken mailbox must never block a session.
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import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
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import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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function emit(context) {
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const out = { continue: true };
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if (context) {
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out.hookSpecificOutput = { hookEventName: 'SessionStart', additionalContext: context };
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}
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process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(out) + '\n');
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}
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try {
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const pluginRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT
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|| join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..', '..');
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// No --repo, and no identity resolution here. This used to resolve the repo
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// itself and fall back to process.cwd(), which made it a fourth independent
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// copy of the identity rule - and the only one that runs in production, so
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// the engine's guards were bypassed exactly where they mattered. The engine
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// runs in this same cwd and derives the identity from git alone; passing
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// --repo would also mark the read as an explicit override and suppress the
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// mailbox-collision check. Boundary rule: no mailbox logic lives in the hook.
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const inbox = execFileSync('bash',
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[join(pluginRoot, 'scripts', 'coord-inbox.sh')],
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{ stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'], encoding: 'utf8' });
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emit(inbox.trim() ? '== Repo coordination (unread messages) ==\n' + inbox : '');
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} catch {
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emit('');
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}
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