docs(changelog): E's Claude Security scan ran - 0 findings

The known issue "E's own review has no Claude Security scan" no longer
holds: with the operator's consent (S214) Claude Security 0.12.0 scanned
the branch against main at e6c6a54 (scan changes, effort high, 64 changed
files, 10 of 10 researchers returned): 0 findings, verification status
verified. The bullet now says that, and that the scan ran by hand outside
/trekreview, so no review verdict holds it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ Fix round 4.5a (decisions 57, 67 and 68): the round's 30 findings, where a Voyag
 - **Smaller rests of the threat model's plan side** (E, part 2). A `known_outside` engine finding whose title the coordinator rewrote, or cut at `JUDGE_TITLE_MAX`, can be put back twice (the row matches on title); a brief outside the repo or behind a symlink is not tested; the plan-gate hook is not run end to end with `known_outside`; a covered finding that shares its id with a counted one drops out of the list in the next round (the count never gets smaller).
 - **`--brief` next to `--hash` or `--diff` is still ignored** (E, the check of its review's fix round). The plan gate refuses `--brief` without `--record`, but `--hash`, `--diff` and `--accept-open` are handled before `--record` is read, so `--hash <plan> --record --brief <brief>` exits 0 without reading the brief. No shipped command passes such a line; whether the gate should refuse two mode flags together is left open.
 - **Test gaps of the review's fix round** (E). No test covers the verdict gate's fallback to the review file's own work tree (when it is lost, nothing is backed: the safe side), the engines' key matched whatever its case and spaces, or `--hash`/`--diff` with `--brief`; one test's reason pattern matches every not-backed reason, so its exit code is what catches a revert.
-- **E's own review has no Claude Security scan** (E). Claude Security's cost question for the scan of the branch went unanswered, so no scan was started and the security of E's own diff is not measured by an engine; `/code-review high` and the check of its fix round read it.
+- **E's own Claude Security scan ran outside its review** (E). Claude Security 0.12.0 scanned E's branch against `main` after `/code-review high` and the fix round (`scan changes`, effort `high`, 64 changed files, 10 of 10 researchers returned, no memory-safety lens): 0 findings, stamped verified. It ran by hand, not through `/trekreview`, so no review verdict holds it, and a scan only reads the code; it runs nothing.
 - **Copies and repeated work in E's code** (E, its own review). `review-rounds.mjs` and `review-answers.mjs` each keep a `payloadOf` (they differ in one check); `plan-gate.mjs` imports two functions named `resolveRepo` (one aliased) and the `--record --brief` path still resolves the top level more than once; a verdict-gate run on a review with `known_outside` verifies the approval log twice and parses `review.md` more than once.
 - **`tests/fixtures/bakeoff-rich/` has no reader** (cleanup R-b). It stays for V3 (decision 202); with `gold-eval` gone nothing reads `gold.json`, and its README still describes the removed bakeoff harness as current.
 - **The query guard has no caller** (cleanup R-b). `lib/validators/query-privacy-gate.mjs` and its tests stay, but its callers were the removed STORM steps, so no research query passes through it; its header and `skills/researching-sources/` say so. Left for the design (187).