fix(gate): part 2 verifier findings — non-object findings, carried backed copy, rule_keys, marks, approval prose, brief_path, engine put-back once

1. plan-review-dedup skips only a null or undefined finding; any other
   entry that is not an object (a string, a number, an array) goes on as
   before E, a finding with no valid severity that the plan gate counts as
   a blocker (it was dropped, so a string blocker recorded PASS).
2. plan-gate --record: a previous finding that rule A carried as counted and
   whose id is backed this round leaves the counted set, the counts, the
   verdict and the stop rule's summary (it was counted and listed in
   known_outside at once: BLOCK, not-fewer, and --accept-open refused).
3. A known_outside entry keeps rule_keys; extractVerdict accepts it (a list
   of strings), and the bare gate re-checks with the same keys the recorder
   used, so a merged finding whose security key is only in rule_keys is a
   WARN, not a STOP.
4. plan-critic, scope-guardian and /trekplan Phase 9's round-2 sentences say
   the Critic Verdict also lists known_outside and each is marked by id in
   previous. Code already accepts such a mark (dedup passes it; countRound
   ignores ids it does not carry; --record removes the entry on true);
   pinned in diff mode and full count.
5. The approval prose names ## Threat Model where it named only ## Intent +
   ## Goal: skills/annotating/SKILL.md (description, step 4, guard list),
   docs/command-modes.md, Handover 1's intent_approved_hash row, README
   (approval, Approve row, intent approval gate) and CLAUDE.md's /trekbrief
   row.
6. threat-model.mjs gains usableInRepo (a brief path relative to the repo
   top level) and repoRelativeBrief; --record stores brief_path relative to
   the top level, never absolute, and both gates read it from there, so the
   gate run from a subdirectory reads the same brief. reviewThreatModel
   uses usableInRepo. Handover 4 and the gate header say so.
7. review-finalize's outside pass puts an entry back only when no finding
   carries its row yet (engine-compare rowOf): an engine finding listed in
   known_outside while its payload is saved went back twice.
8. A test runs scripts/release-check.mjs on a review whose known_outside
   entry the brief does not back: exit 2 (control: backed passes the review
   check).

Existing tests changed: plan-gate-threat-model's entry-keys assertion now
expects rule_keys (item 3), and its planted non-security entry drops the
security key from rule_keys too, since the gate reads rule_keys (item 3).

Part 2 fix round of the E plan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/HANDOVER-CONTRACTS.md

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Every validator exposes a CLI: `node lib/validators/<name>.mjs --json <path>` re
 | `source` | string | optional | `interview \| manual` | |
 | `brief_quality` | string | optional | `complete \| partial` | Set when iteration cap is hit |
 | `framing` | string | **required at ≥ 2.2** (v5.5) | `preserve \| refine \| replace \| new-direction` | How this brief relates to prior operator intent. Enum-checked on any version when present; missing → `BRIEF_MISSING_FRAMING` at `brief_version ≥ 2.2`. Layer 1 of the framing-alignment defense. |
-| `intent_approved_hash` | string | optional in the schema; **required by `/trekplan`** (veikart steg 1) | `"sha256:<64 hex>"` | Hash over the normalized `## Intent` + `## Goal`. Written only by `lib/validators/intent-approval.mjs --stamp`, which `/trekbrief` runs on the operator's explicit "Approve" (Phase 4h, or `--approve <project-dir \| brief-file>`). |
+| `intent_approved_hash` | string | optional in the schema; **required by `/trekplan`** (veikart steg 1) | `"sha256:<64 hex>"` | Hash over the normalized `## Intent` + `## Goal` (+ `## Threat Model` when present). Written only by `lib/validators/intent-approval.mjs --stamp`, which `/trekbrief` runs on the operator's explicit "Approve" (Phase 4h, or `--approve <project-dir \| brief-file>`). |
 | `intent_approved_at` | string | optional | ISO-8601 | When the stamp was written. Informational; the gate reads the hash. |
 | `brief_reviewed_hash` / `brief_reviewed_at` | string | optional, additive (no `brief_version` bump) | `"sha256:<64 hex>"` / ISO-8601 | Hash over the brief's body and the frontmatter the reviewer judges (everything but this stamp and the intent marker), written by `lib/validators/brief-review-stamp.mjs --stamp` when `/trekbrief`'s brief-reviewer gate passes. `/trekplan` Phase 4b skips its own brief review only while the hash is current; absent (any other producer) or stale (body or reviewed frontmatter such as `framing` changed) means it reviews. A trace, not a signature. |
 | `ceremony` | string | optional (K1) | `small \| bounded \| architectural` | The brief's size class: sets `/trekbrief`'s question budget and review cap, and what downstream phases scale to. **Absent (or unreadable) = `architectural`**, the heaviest, so another producer's brief is never treated lighter by accident. Enum-checked when present (`BRIEF_INVALID_CEREMONY`). Read it through `briefCeremony(fm)` in `brief-validator.mjs`. |
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ prose form (relaxed in S26 so the template's prose emission parses).
    - at least one step has `End-to-end:` with a backticked command — the "run the thing" step;
    - the optional step fields `Interface in:`, `Interface out:`, `Review focus:` are never empty when present (consumers tolerate their absence);
    - `ceremony` is one of the three classes; an `architectural` plan has `## Design` with the subsections Architecture, Data Flow, Interfaces, Data Models, Error Handling, Module Map, Architecture Rules, Requirements Check, plus `## Test Strategy`; the module map (mermaid) has no cycle; every architecture rule says "checked by `<command>`" (with a Proof column naming an existing step) or "advisory — `.claude/rules/<file>.md`".
-6. **`## Critic Verdict`** (written by `lib/validators/plan-gate.mjs --record`, never by hand): one fenced `json` block, schema `voyage.plan-verdict/1` — `round`, `max_rounds` (3), `extra_rounds`, `plan_sha256`, `verdict` (`BLOCK` | `REVISE` | `PASS`), `counts`, `findings` (deduplicated, each with `severity`). `plan_sha256` hashes the plan minus its review log (the `> **Plan quality:` line and the sections Critic Verdict, Revisions, Plan Quality Score; an old Adversarial Pass 2 section is plan text and hashed), with CRLF and line-end whitespace normalized. The verdict sits inside the plan because Claude Code's plan approval hands a hook the plan file's text and nothing beside it. **Optional rule-A fields** (decision 43; `DIFF_FIELDS` in `lib/review/critic-diff.mjs`): each one is optional, and absent means round-1 behaviour, so an older block gives the same exit codes. Top level: `diff_base` (the sha256 the round was counted against), `diff_note` (one line: why a round from round 2 on was counted fully), `resolved` (the ids of previous findings that left the count). Per finding: `op_line` and `op_line_end` (the cited lines in the operative text), `line_end`, `rule_keys` (the union of the keys dedup merged), `original_severity` (what a reviewer rated, set whenever the counted `severity` differs), `lowered_by` (`rule A: outside the diff since round <P>` or `rule B: <caught_by>`), `caught_by` (the test, `Regression:` command or gate a rule-B lowering names), `lowering_refused` (why a rule-B lowering was refused) and `carried_from` (the round a carried finding first appeared). `severity` is always the counted severity. `recordVerdict` called without `base`, `baseNote` and `planPaths` records as before, plus the rule-B record, and a per-finding `rule_keys` from dedup is always passed through (an optional field). **Optional stop-rule fields** (decisions 217, 220; `lib/review/stop-rule.mjs`): `rounds` (one `{round, blocking, newByClass}` per recorded round, carried from the previous verdict; `newByClass` is `null` for a round counted in full) and `stop_rule` (`{fired, reason: same-class | not-fewer | null, classes, perRound}`); a verdict without them starts its history at the next round. `accepted_open.under` is `"stop-rule"` for an acceptance made after the stop rule fired. **Optional threat-model fields** (E 2.4, decisions 164, 218; `lib/review/threat-model.mjs`): `known_outside` (one `{id, rule_key, text, line}` per security finding of plan-critic or scope-guardian whose `threat_model_ref` equals the text of an `Outside:` line of the brief's `## Threat Model`, `line` being that text; it left the counted findings and the stop rule, and stays listed in later rounds until a reviewer marks it resolved or it is reported again under its id) and `brief_path` (the brief `--record --brief` read, carried when a later round has none); a verdict without them lists no known issue.
+6. **`## Critic Verdict`** (written by `lib/validators/plan-gate.mjs --record`, never by hand): one fenced `json` block, schema `voyage.plan-verdict/1` — `round`, `max_rounds` (3), `extra_rounds`, `plan_sha256`, `verdict` (`BLOCK` | `REVISE` | `PASS`), `counts`, `findings` (deduplicated, each with `severity`). `plan_sha256` hashes the plan minus its review log (the `> **Plan quality:` line and the sections Critic Verdict, Revisions, Plan Quality Score; an old Adversarial Pass 2 section is plan text and hashed), with CRLF and line-end whitespace normalized. The verdict sits inside the plan because Claude Code's plan approval hands a hook the plan file's text and nothing beside it. **Optional rule-A fields** (decision 43; `DIFF_FIELDS` in `lib/review/critic-diff.mjs`): each one is optional, and absent means round-1 behaviour, so an older block gives the same exit codes. Top level: `diff_base` (the sha256 the round was counted against), `diff_note` (one line: why a round from round 2 on was counted fully), `resolved` (the ids of previous findings that left the count). Per finding: `op_line` and `op_line_end` (the cited lines in the operative text), `line_end`, `rule_keys` (the union of the keys dedup merged), `original_severity` (what a reviewer rated, set whenever the counted `severity` differs), `lowered_by` (`rule A: outside the diff since round <P>` or `rule B: <caught_by>`), `caught_by` (the test, `Regression:` command or gate a rule-B lowering names), `lowering_refused` (why a rule-B lowering was refused) and `carried_from` (the round a carried finding first appeared). `severity` is always the counted severity. `recordVerdict` called without `base`, `baseNote` and `planPaths` records as before, plus the rule-B record, and a per-finding `rule_keys` from dedup is always passed through (an optional field). **Optional stop-rule fields** (decisions 217, 220; `lib/review/stop-rule.mjs`): `rounds` (one `{round, blocking, newByClass}` per recorded round, carried from the previous verdict; `newByClass` is `null` for a round counted in full) and `stop_rule` (`{fired, reason: same-class | not-fewer | null, classes, perRound}`); a verdict without them starts its history at the next round. `accepted_open.under` is `"stop-rule"` for an acceptance made after the stop rule fired. **Optional threat-model fields** (E 2.4, decisions 164, 218; `lib/review/threat-model.mjs`): `known_outside` (one `{id, rule_key, rule_keys, text, line}` per security finding of plan-critic or scope-guardian whose `threat_model_ref` equals the text of an `Outside:` line of the brief's `## Threat Model`, `line` being that text; it left the counted findings and the stop rule, and stays listed in later rounds until a reviewer marks it resolved or it is reported again under its id) and `brief_path` (the brief `--record --brief` read, stored relative to the repo's top level and read from there whatever the working directory, carried when a later round has none); a verdict without them lists no known issue.
 7. **Every plan_version, no version bump** (a plan without the field validates unchanged; voyage-lekerepo trial 2, 2026-10-08):
    - **K10 — `Regression:`** (optional step field): ONE backticked command the criteria runner's allowlist runs, with no pipe and no `&&` (first backticked span, as for `Verify:`). The executor runs it green before the step's checkpoint; a step without it runs nothing new. `Verify:` stays the step's own red-first test. One that can never run is `PLAN_STEP_REGRESSION_NOT_RUNNABLE` (an error; a warning under `--soft`).
    - **K11 — `On failure:`** opens with one of `revert`, `retry`, `skip`, `escalate` (case-insensitive; a leading `**`, `_`, backtick or `-` is ignored, other leading characters are not; `onFailureAction` in `lib/parsers/plan-schema.mjs`), the words `/trekexecute` reads; any other opening is the warning `PLAN_STEP_ON_FAILURE_UNKNOWN`. A missing `On failure:` is unchanged (the executor defaults to `escalate`).

docs/command-modes.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Per-command flag tables, imported from `CLAUDE.md` via pointer.
 | _(default)_ | Question round sized by class (`small` / `bounded` / `architectural`), brief-review gate, approval → brief.md with research plan |
 | `--quick` | Proposes `small` as the class (still said aloud, overridable, raised when the task proves bigger) → brief.md with research plan |
 | `--gates [true\|false\|closed\|open]` | (v3.4.0) Autonomy flag: bare, `true` or `closed` = on; `false` or `open` = off; any other next token is not its value. See `## Autonomy mode` in `docs/operations.md`. |
-| `--approve <project-dir \| brief-file>` | (veikart steg 1) No interview: show the existing brief's `## Intent` + `## Goal` verbatim, ask the operator to approve, and on "Approve" stamp `intent_approved_hash` + `intent_approved_at`. The remedy `/trekplan` names when it halts on `BRIEF_INTENT_NOT_APPROVED` / `BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_STALE`. |
+| `--approve <project-dir \| brief-file>` | (veikart steg 1) No interview: show the existing brief's `## Intent` + `## Goal` (+ `## Threat Model` when present) verbatim, ask the operator to approve, and on "Approve" stamp `intent_approved_hash` + `intent_approved_at`. The remedy `/trekplan` names when it halts on `BRIEF_INTENT_NOT_APPROVED` / `BRIEF_INTENT_APPROVAL_STALE`. |
 
 Always interactive. Phase 3 puts the task in a size class (`ceremony:`, K1; heaviest in doubt, said aloud, overridable, only moved up) and asks one round of questions within the class budget (`small` 4, `bounded` 8, `architectural` 12 per round), recommendation first, facts looked up instead of asked, a visible Deferred list; it also asks where the brief is stored (`artifact_store: git | local`). Phase 4 runs a `brief-reviewer` stop-gate with 1 / 2 / 3 review iterations by class. Phase 4h takes only an explicit "Approve" («høres bra ut» and an empty answer are refused by `lib/util/approval-log.mjs answer`), stamps the brief, appends the approval to the target repo's log (`approval-log.mjs append`, K2) and commits it (`lib/util/artifact-commit.mjs`: the log always, the brief when `git`). After that, asks the user to choose manual (print commands) or auto (Claude runs research + plan in foreground).