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docs: no user doc promises a launched session, a launch script or a fourth security layer

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README claimed four security layers including scoped per-child tool
access (gone with the launched children), an auto-dispatched Phase 7.6
recovery session and a launch template; architecture.md still pointed at
launch.sh. They now describe what 6.0.0 does: session specs plus
orders.md, a recovery order for a session the user opens, three layers.
operations.md gets a status note instead of a rewrite (decision record).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kjell Tore Guttormsen 2026-10-02 12:00:08 +02:00
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9
SECURITY.md
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@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The plugin's security posture covers:
| `pre-bash-executor.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for Bash | BLOCKs known-dangerous shell patterns; WARNs on suspicious ones; fails open on parse errors |
| `pre-write-executor.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for Write | BLOCKs writes to `.git/hooks/`, `~/.ssh/`, `.env`, and other sensitive paths |
| `pre-compact-flush.mjs` | `PreCompact` | Flushes `progress.json` from git history before compaction (P0 drift fix); read-only beyond `progress.json` |
| `session-title.mjs` *(planned, F9)* | `UserPromptSubmit` | Sets session title `voyage:<command>:<slug>` for headless multiplexing |
| `session-title.mjs` *(planned, F9)* | `UserPromptSubmit` | Sets session title `voyage:<command>:<slug>` for telling parallel sessions apart |
All hooks are zero-dependency Node.js (`.mjs`) scripts and are designed
to **fail open** — a hook crash never blocks the user's work. Hooks log
@ -43,9 +43,10 @@ scope.
### Prompt-level denylist (`commands/trekexecute.md`)
The execute command embeds a denylist that takes effect even in headless
sessions where hooks may not fire. This is layer 4 of the defense-in-depth
model and protects against plan-injected destructive commands.
The execute command embeds a denylist that takes effect even in a session
where a hook does not fire. This is layer 2 of the three-layer
defense-in-depth model (README, Security hardening) and protects against
plan-injected destructive commands.
### Validators (`lib/validators/*.mjs`)