S2 of the 2.1.181 upgrade. Schemas verified verbatim against the official
slash-commands and hooks docs before editing (a first-pass camelCase
'disallowedTools' claim was caught and corrected to kebab-case against the doc).
- CC-14 (SHIP): migrate all 7 hooks in hooks/hooks.json to exec-form
{command:"node", args:["${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/scripts/X.mjs"]}. Doc
recommends exec-form whenever a hook references a path placeholder; protects
consumers installing under a path with spaces. ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}
interpolates inside args (verified). hooks-json-stop-wired test made
form-agnostic (normalizes command+args to one invocation string).
- CC-11 (SHIP): add `disallowed-tools: Agent, TeamCreate` to trekexecute
frontmatter, enforcing its documented "No Agent tool, no TeamCreate" rule.
allowed-tools grants auto-approval but does NOT remove tools from the pool,
so the prior omission left Agent callable; disallowed-tools removes it.
trekexecute is the only command with a documented exclusion.
- CC-15 (DECIDE: keep universal): re-affirm F2 deferral. pre-bash/pre-write
executors stay universal -- session-agnostic safety (rm -rf /, ~/.ssh, .env)
that narrowing to execute-only would only weaken. Header comments corrected.
- CC-10 (DECIDE: design note, no code): no blanket Agent(model:opus) deny rule
-- would break balanced/economy profiles; any model-enforcement must be
profile-aware, deferred into W2. Folded into open question #3.
Matrix updated with S2 resolutions section. Tests 578 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip;
claude plugin validate passes (only pre-existing root-CLAUDE.md warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LqBYc8Ltrk7LipyJmGxXiB
Step 13 of v4.1 — adds Stop hook entry pointing to
hooks/scripts/otel-export.mjs (added in Step 12 / commit cced21b).
Mounts the orchestrator on Claude Code's Stop event so OTel/Prometheus
export runs at session-end when VOYAGE_EXPORT_MODE is set.
HIGH-risk-mitigering: tests/hooks/hooks-json-stop-wired.test.mjs
asserter at Stop-key finnes, refererer otel-export.mjs, bruker
\${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}-substitusjon, og har type:command.
Tests: 464 → 468 (4 new). All green.
New hooks/scripts/post-compact-flush.mjs (PostCompact event, CC v2.1.105+):
auto-discovers <cwd>/.claude/projects/*/.session-state.local.json (most
recently modified), validates it via session-state-validator, emits
additionalContext via stdout so the post-compact assistant turn has
Handover 7 resume context loaded immediately.
Read-only — never writes. Always exits 0; never blocks compaction. Uses
only node:fs sync APIs available since Node 12 (no glob dependency).
Companion to the existing pre-compact-flush.mjs:
- PreCompact: refresh progress.json + .session-state.local.json
- PostCompact: re-inject .session-state.local.json into context
Wired in hooks/hooks.json under a new PostCompact matcher block.
Both files staged via /tmp/claude-* and copied into hooks/* via Bash to
respect the llm-security plugin path-guard (which blocks direct Write to
hooks/scripts/*.mjs and hooks*.json).
Test: tests/hooks/post-compact-flush.test.mjs (4 tests) covers no-state,
malformed-state, valid-state, and multi-project mtime selection.
Four-layer security model for ultraexecute-local and headless sessions:
Layer 1 — Plugin hooks: pre-bash-executor.mjs (13 BLOCK + 8 WARN rules
with bash evasion normalization) and pre-write-executor.mjs (8 path guard
rules blocking .git/hooks, .claude/settings, shell configs, .env, SSH/AWS).
Layer 2 — Prompt-level security rules: denylist in ultraexecute-local.md
Sub-step D and session-spec-template.md Security Constraints section.
These are the only rules that work in headless child sessions.
Layer 3 — Pre-execution plan validation: new Phase 2.4 scans all Verify
and Checkpoint commands against denylist before execution begins.
Layer 4 — Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with scoped
--allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep" --permission-mode
bypassPermissions in ultraexecute-local.md, headless-launch-template.md,
and session-decomposer.md. Blocks Agent, MCP, WebSearch in child sessions.
Also adds Hard Rules 14-16: verify command security check, no writing
outside repository root, no writing to security-sensitive paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
