Round 7 (516dffa..45aa9e1, WARN: 12 MAJOR, 0 BLOCKER) and the fence defect
found while writing its review.md. Each fix began with a test that failed on
0f400d3 (v6.3.0); suite 2208 (2206/0/2), 14 tests more.
- Tests-only (operator 2026-10-11): the plan's Files: alone decides, and the
text says so (red-proof, trekexecute Sub-step B, step-implementer,
HANDOVER-CONTRACTS). red-proof no longer reads the step's diff, so a change
already in the tree when the step began no longer counts against it, and a
plan placed outside .claude/ reads the same. The round-6 test that had the
diff overrule the plan is rewritten to the new rule.
- The Files: reader keeps a plain file beside a backticked path
(", Dockerfile", "the CLI entry src/cli.mjs", "and Makefile"). Measured on
the 520 Files: fields in 182 plans: no field reads differently.
- Red proof reports a command its timeout killed as killed after the timeout,
not "could not start"; the release check tells a timeout from output past
its buffer and from another signal. One reading of a stop
(criteria-runner stoppedBy) for red proof, the criteria runner and the
release check.
- A trailing `# comment` is dropped in a backticked check too, and in a
command passed as written, so the words screened are the words run.
- The release check reads a relative --review in --repo.
- The 15-minute timeout is defined once (criteria-runner.mjs).
- The findings check reads each cited file once per validation.
- One isMain helper (lib/util/is-main.mjs) for every CLI: the 31 copies of
the realpath guard and the 20 modules still on the file:// guard, which
exited 0 having done nothing under a symlink or a path with a space.
- The Bash guard writes its no-one-to-ask refusal once, on a direct condition.
- The findings check ends a ```json block only at a fence on its own line, so
three backticks inside a JSON string no longer end it (also in 6.2.0).
- Brief-conformance notes: a test for test-lock green on exit 127 (it
passed at once; it fails when 127 is read as could-not-run); the prose now
names the git revision `@~1` as the one leading-@ exception.
Not changed: the example plan's steps 1-2 keep their tests-only warning
(operator decision 2026-10-09; the r5 test records it). Brief note 4 (a
Regression: whose runner is not installed goes to the fix rounds) is a
routing question for the operator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 6 (v6.2.0..c3641ff, WARN: 11 MAJOR, 3 MINOR; 0 BLOCKER). The round-5
fixes hold (code-correctness-reviewer); three of the new MAJOR were side
effects of running checks with no shell. Each fixed behind a test that
failed first on c3641ff.
- git checks stay in the repo too: no path that climbs out with .., starts
at / or reads <rev>:../x, and no --no-index (both reviewers).
- A trailing `# comment` on a shell-fence line is dropped: with no shell,
its words made an honest check NOT RUN, among them the first check of the
shipped example plan.
- A glob reaches `node --test` only on Node 21 and later, which expands it
itself; on an older Node it is refused with that reason (engines >=18).
- With no shell, exit 126/127 is the test program's own: red proof reads it
as a red (the control run still tells an environment fault apart), the
done line and the test lock as a failure.
- A runner that could not start (not installed) is NOT RUN in the criteria
runner and not-run (exit 2) in regression-check, as red-proof and
done-line already said; never a red suite.
- Tests-only: a backticked `Makefile` alone in its entry is a path, and red
proof confirms the plan's tests-only reading against the step's own diff
(the altitude finding: the diff is a fact, the Files: prose is not).
- release-check stops a suite that never ends (15 minutes) and reads it as
not measured (exit 2).
- The two lines this release added to pre-bash-executor.mjs are ASCII.
- MINOR: git and the other runners share one plain-word pattern.
Not in this round: MINOR f00a2eb8 (shared norm/ticked-path and isMain
helpers) and MINOR on plan-review-dedup's repeated tokenizing.
Suite 2194 (2192/0/2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review of v6.2.0..f669b87 (BLOCK: 1 BLOCKER, 12 MAJOR, 1 MINOR), each
fixed behind a test that failed first, or, for the two missing tests, a test
shown to fail on a stub of the branch it covers.
- Review steps appended by /trekexecute Phase 7.2 are held to the step rules
on any plan version: plan-validator --steps-from <N> (on a plan below 1.8 a
template review step validated and was executed).
- The guard refuses where no one can be asked also when its rules will not
load; the wave merge path names that refusal instead of MERGE_REFUSED.
Tests for the classifier-error refusal and post-approval-log's own check.
- release-check: the version files may change only in their version after
the review (JSON compared without it), README diff lines are read inside
hunks only, an unreadable diff is exit 2, and npm test runs without
NODE_TEST_CONTEXT.
- What counts as a step of only tests: a note in parentheses is not a path,
and a data file under specs/ is not a test. End-to-end: rides on the last
step that builds behaviour (validator hint, trekplan, template).
- A removed line is cited as <rev>:<path>:<line> (findings-schema hint,
trekreview re-ask).
- skill-lint counts a trailing newline as no line; regression-check takes
commandEnv from lib/util/command-env.mjs; CLAUDE.md names four mode-read
exemptions.
- /security-review, older than v6.2.0: the criteria runner refuses git
--output, which writes a file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the permission mode that shows no prompts, pre-bash-executor refused only a
merge into main and a push. A tag, a package publish and destructive git still
went through unattended, which is what the approval guard exists to stop. Now
every call it would ask about, and a command it could not read, is refused
there with the way forward (operator decision 2026-10-09). No new exemption:
the mode is still read in one place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave 2, order 6. /trekexecute now:
- refuses a plan whose logged approval does not cover its current sha256
(K2, approval-log verify --kind plan), before step 1;
- runs the step check (K9) and the step's optional Regression: (K10, new
lib/verification/regression-check.mjs through the criteria runner) at step
end, before the checkpoint; exit 2 is "not measured", never green;
- runs the architecture rules (K5) and the plan-file sweep (K6) after the last
step; a violation or a file outside the plan turns completed into partial;
- reviews by itself in the closing run (Phase 7.2): run the thing, /simplify,
/trekreview, verdict-gate; a BLOCK adds the review's remediation steps after
the plan validator accepts them and the operator re-approves the plan, capped
at TREKEXECUTE_MAX_REVIEW_ROUNDS (3);
- makes the main-merge gate a lock on the verdict: BLOCK or undecided keeps
the merge closed; when open, the executor merges and the guard's question is
the one question (operator decision 2026-10-08). The --gates pause before
the wave merge-back is gone for the same reason.
The guard refuses a merge into main and a push in the permission mode that
shows no prompts, since no one can be asked (operator decision 2026-10-09; two
mode-read exemptions approved by the operator).
progress.json gains optional coupling fields (Handover 5); the validator
rejects the runner's exitCode in plan_verification.failed_criteria (C15).
Pointer lines name the skills test-first and debugging (S2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- The pre-compact hook read only a checkpoint that started with `git commit`,
so every plan in the new `git add … && git commit` form rebuilt nothing, and
an empty match also skipped the session-state refresh. It now finds the
commit anywhere in the span and always refreshes; first test for the hook.
- A sub-bullet that carries its own command stays a criterion (folding it
left the command unrun); the shallowest bullet sets the base indent.
- Only a MINOR/SUGGESTION /code-review finding outside the range is released
from forbidding ALLOW: a MAJOR one may be a break cited at an unchanged
caller.
- `reuse` is an improvement category; the session-spec template stages too;
a negated bash 3.2 constraint, an env prefix and `bash -c` are handled.
- Stale comment, Declined-to-Judge wording and rule-key counts brought in line.
Tests fail on 7c11c2a first (9 of 24).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
voyage-lekerepo trial (2026-10-06) point 7, operator decision 2026-10-08
(«grønt merke på låsen»): the stop guard blocked Stop three times while the
executor waited for the controller, with the step's test already green.
- test-lock.mjs green --cmd "<Verify>" runs the step's test command (same
allowlist + denylist as done-line) and records green_at only on exit 0;
pending clears it; a new lock starts without it.
- stop-test-lock lets a green-marked lock stop; the write guard still
refuses the locked test files.
- trekexecute: D1 marks green after a PASS; each fix round marks pending.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave-1 order 4 (P7, P12, the P9 test lock, the P3 plan-approval guard).
All command hooks; none runs a model.
- P12: pre-bash-executor answers permissionDecision "ask" before merge
into main, push, tag/publish and destructive git (holds in auto mode).
post-approval-log writes exactly what the person was asked to the K2
approval log: merge/push to main as `merge`, tag/publish as `release`,
with a one-hour expiry; nothing when no person was asked.
- P3: pre-plan-gate runs the K3 plan gate on a Voyage plan leaving plan
mode and sends a refused plan back; "not measured" asks, never passes.
- P9: lib/util/test-lock.mjs (K8). pre-write-executor refuses edits to
locked test files; stop-test-lock refuses "done" for the locking
session (stop_hook_active guarded).
- P7: post-edit-check runs the target repo's own formatter/linter per
edit, only during a Voyage plan run or after opt-in
(.claude/voyage-guards.json); lib/verification/step-check.mjs (K9) fails
the step on findings; no tool reads "not measured", never green.
- STORM cap matcher also names `Agent` (the tool's name since 2.1.63).
- Mod precondition stated in README, SECURITY.md and every PreToolUse stop
guard: Voyage's guards are deterministic only when no installed mod
handles `tool.check`.
K2, K3 and K5 are stubbed in tests until orders 2 and 3 are merged.
Two independent review rounds; every finding has a regression test.
Suite 1600 (1598 pass / 0 fail / 2 skipped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hooks.json wired pre-write-executor.mjs to the Write tool only, so Edit and
NotebookEdit reached .git/hooks/, .env, shell configs and the other protected
paths unguarded. The matcher is now Write|Edit|NotebookEdit.
The guard reads the target path per tool: file_path for Write and Edit (hooks
reference, PreToolUse tool_input tables), notebook_path for NotebookEdit (the
tool's input schema). When it cannot read a path (unparseable input, unknown
tool, missing field) it now blocks instead of allowing.
New tests resolve hooks.json with Claude Code's matcher semantics and run the
hooks that would fire per tool: 9 failed on the old code, all pass now. The two
fail-open pins in path-guard.test.mjs are flipped to fail closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator decision 27.09.2026: Voyage works the PM way, so nothing in it
starts Claude Code. Work that needs another session becomes an order plus
a starter line the user gives a session they open themselves; Voyage
never starts the session.
/trekexecute's multi-session path (Phase 2.6) now prepares one wave at a
time: worktree per session, then lib/util/session-orders.mjs writes one
order per session (worktree, steps, done-condition, starter) plus
orders/wave.json, and the run stops. Running the same command again reads
each session's progress file (status mode), merges sequentially with
push-before-cleanup as before, and prepares the next wave. Phase 2.5 skips
the destructive pre-flight while a wave is in flight. Phase 7.6 recovery is
handed over the same way. Hard rule 21: never start Claude Code.
Removed with it, because they existed only for launched children: the
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY billing check (and its dry-run line and Hard rule 1
exception), the hooks-fire version precheck, the safety preamble, the
scoped-tool/turn/budget flags, templates/headless-launch-template.md, the
decomposer's launch.sh (now orders.md), /trekplan's "launch", the README
billing and MCP tuning sections, and scripts/q3-cache-prefix-experiment.mjs
(an experiment that spawned the binary; its results stay in docs/).
/trekresearch's deep-research pre-gate no longer runs the binary for its
version; the post-hoc check was already the authoritative guard.
Chose orders + starters over in-session subagents because the order's done
criterion asks for exactly that, and because /trekexecute disallows the
Agent tool on purpose (Hard rule 10); reopening that is a separate change.
Gate: 54 -> 0 hit lines outside EXEMPT. npm test 1250 (1245 pass, 0 fail,
5 skipped: 3 are the retired-reference scan without its local list).
verify.sh 7/0. The fixture run (tests/lib/session-orders.test.mjs) writes
two orders and wave.json for wave 1 and leaves a trap binary untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEFAULT_TTL_MS was 6h, measured from marker.startedAt rather than last
activity, and `claude --resume` keeps the same session_id - so a run that
died holding its marker handed the resumed session the remainder of that
window, denying every WebSearch/WebFetch/Task including work unrelated to
research. The header's design goal ("An unrelated session must never be
denied") held across sessions and read as broader than it was: by this
scope key a resume IS the same session.
Three changes, none of which pretends to close it:
- The tombstone boundary (32e20fc) already removed the common case. A run
that crashed MID-loop leaves no denial record, so the resume is allowed;
only a crash AFTER the cap denied a turn opens a window at all. Pinned by
a test with a part-spent ledger and no tombstone.
- TTL 6h -> 2h. A 24-turn loop at a couple of minutes per turn is under an
hour, so nothing needed six, and debris no longer owns the rest of the
working day.
- Every denial now prints the marker path with "if this loop is not
running, delete it", plus the auto-reset horizon. The window existed
before with no stated remedy, which is what made it expensive.
A liveness check would close it properly. This hook has nothing
trustworthy to check liveness against - the marker's writer is a shell
snippet whose $$ is a subshell, not the session - so the limit is written
into the header as a limit instead of being papered over.
Review finding d913d1b655012fe206ea925b9fc77b401566a39e (MINOR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
allowTurn() appends BEFORE the turn runs, so during granted turn N the
ledger holds N records. The hook denied at `used >= budget`, which blocked
every tool call of the FINAL granted turn: the primitive granted B turns
and the harness permitted B-1. Worse, an exhausted run therefore always
terminated through an exit-2 tool denial instead of the graceful "cap
exhausted" exit at commands/trekresearch.md - and the prose says in as
many words that exit 2 is not exit 1, so the model was pushed out through
the one exit it is told NOT to treat as a cap.
The review recommended denying at `used > budget`. Taken alone that fixes
the count and breaks the hook: once the O_EXCL claim (previous commit)
makes a breached ledger impossible, `granted > budget` can no longer fire,
and the case this hook exists for - the loop consults the gate, is denied,
and issues the tool call anyway - would be allowed. A deny branch that
cannot be reached is a dead security claim, which is the same thing S82
removed two of rather than leave standing.
So the denial itself became a record. allowTurn() appends a tombstone
{runId, exhausted: true} when it denies for budget, and the hook denies on
the tombstone. Both properties now hold at once:
granted == budget, no tombstone -> turn B is in flight -> ALLOW
tombstone present -> the gate already said no -> DENY
granted > budget -> breached, any cause -> DENY
A tombstone is not a turn: readLedger reports {granted, exhausted}
separately so it can never consume budget. allowTurn short-circuits on an
existing tombstone, so a hammered gate neither re-walks every slot nor
grows the ledger. The tombstone write is best effort on purpose - the
denial is already the correct answer, so a ledger that cannot take the
record must not turn a denial into a grant.
The parallel-boundary test now asserts GRANTED turns rather than raw
ledger lines, because the denied callers legitimately add tombstones.
Review finding 8eb53458ac3efec778094f9f03b09e1cc1077a09 (MINOR).
Operator decision: tombstone over the literal recommended_action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
An unreadable ledger returned 0 from countTurns in BOTH the primitive and
the hook, so a run whose ledger existed but could not be read (EISDIR,
EACCES, EIO) was handed the full budget again on every call - unbounded.
research-loop-cap.mjs argues against exactly that three lines above the
code that did it, and its missing-DIRECTORY case already failed closed.
The unreadable-FILE case now agrees with it.
Only ENOENT still counts as zero turns spent: that is the legitimate
first-turn state, and the reason this cannot just throw on any read
failure.
The hook no longer carries its own countTurns. It imports the primitive's
exported readLedger(), the same way it already resolves the data root
through resolveDataRoot() - a reader and a writer with private copies of
the counting rule is how a hook ends up enforcing a different bound than
the gate it backs. In scope + cannot count now exits 2 with a message
that says counting failed, not that the budget is spent.
Fail-closed stays scoped to the loop: a test pins that an unreadable
ledger in an OUT-of-scope session still exits 0, because a PreToolUse
hook that over-blocks bricks every session on the box.
Also dropped the existsSync pre-check before the read - readFileSync's
own ENOENT carries the same information without a second syscall that
can disagree with the read that follows it.
Review finding 5e1c6230f48ead38fa77cd8f4b06bfdc2b5b7bbf (MINOR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA is empty in the Bash tool's process env, and the Phase 5
bash snippet is the cap's only caller. resolveLedgerPath() returned null there
and allowTurn() failed closed, so the budget gate denied turn 1 of every real
run: the loop this delivery exists to bound could never spend a turn, and the
pre-registered measurement could not be run at all.
resolveDataRoot() is now the single root for everything the loop writes --
CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA when the harness sets it, ~/.claude/voyage when it does
not. Three consumers resolve through it, which is the point: the cap ledger,
the PreToolUse hook's scope-marker lookup, and the command's bash snippets.
A writer and a reader that resolved the root separately are what made the
enforcement hook allow unconditionally in every real run while CLAUDE.md and
docs/architecture.md called it enforcing.
Same root cause, same commit:
- Marker write and remove now share ONE absolute-path guard and one root; the
write requires a non-empty CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID before composing the path
(unset, the marker was named `.json`, which no lookup matches and no TTL
sweep cleans up).
- The per-turn gates resolve VOYAGE_ROOT with a plugin-cache fallback and
reserve exit 2 for "gate could not run". Interpolating an empty
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} ran `node /lib/...` -> exit 1, which the contract read
as "privacy gate says no" -- an unsatisfiable rewrite loop no query could
clear.
Two now-unreachable deny branches are removed rather than left as dead safety
claims (allowTurn's no_plugin_data_dir; the hook's uncountable-ledger deny).
The fail-closed stance stays where it is still real: a ledger that cannot be
WRITTEN denies the turn.
Verified end-to-end through the real bash snippets and the real hook with both
variables stripped and HOME sandboxed: marker written under the fallback root,
8 turns spent, 9th denied, hook exits 2, and exits 0 again after removal.
Note: the fallback exit-2 branch fires against the installed v5.9.1 cache,
which predates lib/util/research-loop-cap.mjs -- correct behaviour, and it
clears when the plugin is reinstalled.
Review findings 2670c10a, fbd6d534, 93550dfb.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011vPSXe88qp5aqWUqbDNWoF
Review finding 4638fea9 (MAJOR emitted, catalogue tier BLOCKER). Live in every
session regardless of the STORM flag, so it is not deferrable to the measurement
decision.
Anchoring the rule to command position (S75-S78) was right in intent - the
unanchored word match blocked quoted grep patterns, heredoc data and commit
messages - but it ran against the whitespace-collapsed string. Measured against
normalizeCommand() output, five forms that the previous rule blocked were
allowed:
- newline separator: \s+ -> ' ' collapsed the newline BEFORE the pattern ran,
making the \n branch of the separator class dead code
- `&` background separator: absent from the class entirely
- `bash -c` / `sh -c`: the wrapped command sits inside quotes, never at
command position
- `xargs <cmd>`: no separator in front of the command at all
And it missed its own motivating case: `grep "a|b" f` stayed blocked, because
the `|` inside the quotes still read as a separator.
Fix: the rule now runs against a command-position view (`commandView: true`,
per-rule input selection) instead of the collapsed string. The view keeps
newlines, adds `&` to the separator class, and classifies each span:
- quoted spans -> data (one space), so a grep alternation, echoed prose and a
commit message pass
- EXCEPT the argument of a shell wrapper (`sh -c`, `bash -c`, with optional
sudo and absolute path) -> spliced back in at command position
- heredoc bodies -> data, keeping the operator line. Restoring the newline
separator without this would newly block every heredoc line starting with a
matched word - the exact friction anchoring existed to remove
- `xargs [flags]` -> separator inserted after the flags
Two defects found while verifying, both the same regression class and both
fixed here rather than left:
- `\name` runs name (the backslash only suppresses alias expansion). The old
unanchored rule blocked it; the anchored one allowed it.
- heredoc bodies, as above - a false positive this change would otherwise have
introduced.
Known limit, stated rather than implied: `xargs -I {} <cmd>` is not parsed, so
the inserted separator lands before the argument, not the command.
Other BLOCK rules are untouched and still run against the collapsed string.
Verified by a 37-case adversarial probe through the real hook (all five bypass
forms, both wrapper forms, backslash, heredoc, quoted alternation, ordinary
commands, and the unrelated rules): 37/37 as expected. 9 new tests.
Suite 952 (950/0/2, baseline 937 + 15 across both Track A fixes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013zNqxP8qTWgJhn3wMYUFEh
S2 of the 2.1.181 upgrade. Schemas verified verbatim against the official
slash-commands and hooks docs before editing (a first-pass camelCase
'disallowedTools' claim was caught and corrected to kebab-case against the doc).
- CC-14 (SHIP): migrate all 7 hooks in hooks/hooks.json to exec-form
{command:"node", args:["${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/scripts/X.mjs"]}. Doc
recommends exec-form whenever a hook references a path placeholder; protects
consumers installing under a path with spaces. ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}
interpolates inside args (verified). hooks-json-stop-wired test made
form-agnostic (normalizes command+args to one invocation string).
- CC-11 (SHIP): add `disallowed-tools: Agent, TeamCreate` to trekexecute
frontmatter, enforcing its documented "No Agent tool, no TeamCreate" rule.
allowed-tools grants auto-approval but does NOT remove tools from the pool,
so the prior omission left Agent callable; disallowed-tools removes it.
trekexecute is the only command with a documented exclusion.
- CC-15 (DECIDE: keep universal): re-affirm F2 deferral. pre-bash/pre-write
executors stay universal -- session-agnostic safety (rm -rf /, ~/.ssh, .env)
that narrowing to execute-only would only weaken. Header comments corrected.
- CC-10 (DECIDE: design note, no code): no blanket Agent(model:opus) deny rule
-- would break balanced/economy profiles; any model-enforcement must be
profile-aware, deferred into W2. Folded into open question #3.
Matrix updated with S2 resolutions section. Tests 578 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip;
claude plugin validate passes (only pre-existing root-CLAUDE.md warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LqBYc8Ltrk7LipyJmGxXiB
New hooks/scripts/post-compact-flush.mjs (PostCompact event, CC v2.1.105+):
auto-discovers <cwd>/.claude/projects/*/.session-state.local.json (most
recently modified), validates it via session-state-validator, emits
additionalContext via stdout so the post-compact assistant turn has
Handover 7 resume context loaded immediately.
Read-only — never writes. Always exits 0; never blocks compaction. Uses
only node:fs sync APIs available since Node 12 (no glob dependency).
Companion to the existing pre-compact-flush.mjs:
- PreCompact: refresh progress.json + .session-state.local.json
- PostCompact: re-inject .session-state.local.json into context
Wired in hooks/hooks.json under a new PostCompact matcher block.
Both files staged via /tmp/claude-* and copied into hooks/* via Bash to
respect the llm-security plugin path-guard (which blocks direct Write to
hooks/scripts/*.mjs and hooks*.json).
Test: tests/hooks/post-compact-flush.test.mjs (4 tests) covers no-state,
malformed-state, valid-state, and multi-project mtime selection.
Extends the PreCompact hook with a sibling block that refreshes
.session-state.local.json's updated_at when status is in_progress or
partial. Per-project: runs after the existing progress.json mutation,
inside the same loop iteration.
Design:
- Only refreshes existing state files; creation is the writer's job
(ultraexecute Phase 8 / 2.55 / 4 + future helper command).
- Monotonic guard: only updated_at is touched. project, status,
next_session_brief_path, next_session_label remain owned by the writer.
- Skips status in {completed, failed, stopped} — the latter two are
operator-action-required and silently bumping updated_at would mask
alert state.
- Always exit 0; never blocks compaction.
[skip-docs] rationale: README + CLAUDE.md updates land in Step 11.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three changes in one commit:
1. NEW lib/util/atomic-write.mjs — exports atomicWriteJson(path, obj),
the canonical tmp+rename pattern. Reused by pre-compact-flush.mjs and
(in subsequent steps) by the new session-state writer.
2. NEW tests/lib/atomic-write.test.mjs — 4 unit tests covering
round-trip, no-orphan-tmp, overwrite-atomic, pretty-print formatting.
3. REFACTOR hooks/scripts/pre-compact-flush.mjs — replace the inline
atomicWrite() with the imported atomicWriteJson(). Also fixes a
pre-existing syntax error (leading whitespace + stray --resume token
outside the comment block) that silently broke the hook from v3.1.0
onward — PreCompact runtime is fail-open and swallowed the error.
File reformatted with standard zero-indent JS.
163 → 167 tests, 0 fail.
Step 2 of /ultracontinue v3.3.0 (project 2026-05-01-ultracontinue).
Four-layer security model for ultraexecute-local and headless sessions:
Layer 1 — Plugin hooks: pre-bash-executor.mjs (13 BLOCK + 8 WARN rules
with bash evasion normalization) and pre-write-executor.mjs (8 path guard
rules blocking .git/hooks, .claude/settings, shell configs, .env, SSH/AWS).
Layer 2 — Prompt-level security rules: denylist in ultraexecute-local.md
Sub-step D and session-spec-template.md Security Constraints section.
These are the only rules that work in headless child sessions.
Layer 3 — Pre-execution plan validation: new Phase 2.4 scans all Verify
and Checkpoint commands against denylist before execution begins.
Layer 4 — Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with scoped
--allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep" --permission-mode
bypassPermissions in ultraexecute-local.md, headless-launch-template.md,
and session-decomposer.md. Blocks Agent, MCP, WebSearch in child sessions.
Also adds Hard Rules 14-16: verify command security check, no writing
outside repository root, no writing to security-sensitive paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
