Follow-up defect in the reviewer accounting added by e2aec01, found by review
and confirmed by probe before fixing.
validateFindings only WARNS on a missing `reviewer` field, so a payload can
fail schema while carrying no name. ingest then records `reviewer: null`, and
runContract turned that null into the literal reviewer name "unnamed reviewer".
MEASURED before the fix:
runContract([{findings:[{file:'x.mjs',line:1,rule_key:'NOPE',severity:'MAJOR'}]}],
{expectedReviewers:['code-correctness-reviewer']})
-> missing_reviewers = ["unnamed reviewer", "code-correctness-reviewer"]
One failure, two entries, one of them an agent nobody launched. The
`reported.delete(s.reviewer)` line was also inert for that case, since a null
name was never in the set to begin with.
Fix: skipped payloads are split by whether they carry a name. Named ones go to
missing_reviewers as before; anonymous ones increment the new
`unattributable_payloads` count, which forbids ALLOW on its own - so stripping
a reviewer name from a payload cannot restore ALLOW, and the floor does not
depend on the caller passing expectedReviewers. `allow_blocked_by` reports the
two facts separately: `missing-reviewer:<name>` and `unattributable-payload (n)`.
The old behaviour never produced a false ALLOW - it failed in the safe
direction - but it named a reviewer that did not exist, which is the kind of
output an operator would chase.
Iron Law: two failing tests first (double entry; anonymous-payload-alone must
forbid ALLOW), then the fix.
Also verified in this pass, by temporarily adding a fake reason to
UNVERIFIED_REASONS: the prose-vocabulary pin does go red when a reason is
declared in the lib but missing from agents/review-coordinator.md. A pin that
cannot fail is not a pin.
Suite 1034 (1032/0/2) -> 1036 (1034/0/2), 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
computeVerdict counted only the findings handed to it (reasoned.kept), so a
finding removed by Pass 2 or Pass 3, and a reviewer whose payload was thrown
away or never arrived, were arithmetically identical to a finding that never
existed. All three pushed the verdict toward ALLOW.
Measured before the fix (probes, 2026-09-01):
- a BLOCKER with a 101-character title -> ALLOW (Pass 2 succinctness)
- a payload with one ad-hoc rule_key is skipped WHOLE at ingest, taking a
valid BLOCKER sibling with it -> ALLOW
- a reviewer that never reported -> ALLOW
Pass 3's own no-citation / unknown-rule_key branches turned out unreachable
through runContract (validateFindings rejects those payloads first), so the
reachable exposure was Pass 2 plus the skipped/absent reviewer.
THE OPEN DESIGN DECISION, and why it went against the order's default.
The order proposed: indeterminate file-existence YES, plain succinctness NO
("a too-long finding is not an uncertain finding"). I kept the first and
overrode the second, on one principle:
A removal is `dropped` only when the test REFUTED the finding as a claim
about this codebase. Every other removal is `unverified`.
Succinctness and actionability read a `.length`. They never examine the claim,
so they cannot establish the finding is unreal - and dropping a BLOCKER for a
101-character title is precisely the fail-open shape being fixed. Three things
settled it:
1. Under the order's default the fix would have been almost inert. Pass 3's
drop branches are unreachable via runContract, so leaving Pass 2 out would
have left the only reachable finding-level exposure open.
2. Cost asymmetry, priced rather than asserted: the verdict is not a gate.
Handover 6 feeds `findings` filtered to BLOCKER+MAJOR into /trekplan
(commands/trekplan.md:218); `verdict` is optional metadata
(docs/HANDOVER-CONTRACTS.md:353). Nothing loops or re-plans on WARN. So a
false `unverified` costs WARN plus a printed reason; a false drop costs a
silent ALLOW over a live BLOCKER.
3. unknown-rule_key joins them for the same reason: an ad-hoc key is a real
defect wearing the wrong label, and v5.1.1 high-effort mode already KEEPS
those, normalised to PLAN_EXECUTE_DRIFT. Refuting them at normal effort
while keeping them at high effort would be incoherent.
no-citation stays a drop: a finding whose file is empty or whose line is
negative names no location, so it makes no checkable claim at all - the one
deterministic refutation, and what the Pass 3 prose already said it was.
Iron Law: tests/lib/coordinator-contract.test.mjs first, red (missing export +
the three measured ALLOWs), then production code. Two existing assertions were
updated AFTER implementation as contract changes, not to make the red pass.
A known-positive control pins that ALLOW is still reachable - without it,
"no ALLOW" is not a fail-closed contract, only a broken one.
lib/review/coordinator-contract.mjs
+ classifySuppression / REFUTING_REASONS / UNVERIFIED_REASONS - one
vocabulary owned by the lib, including the tokens only the LLM
coordinator emits (accuracy:refuted, file-existence:refuted/indeterminate),
so prose and lib cannot drift. Unclassified reasons default to unverified:
the default fails closed.
~ judgeFilter / reasonablenessFilter return {kept, dropped, unverified}
~ computeVerdict(findings, {unverified, missingReviewers}) -> + allow_blocked_by.
Never raises a verdict, only withholds ALLOW. Unverified findings are NOT
counted into a severity tier: their severity was never substantiated, and
counting it would be invention.
~ runContract(payloads, {expectedReviewers}) -> + unverified,
missing_reviewers, allow_blocked_by. `suppressed` stays the union of
dropped + unverified, so existing consumers (gold-eval) keep their meaning.
agents/review-coordinator.md - Pass 2/3 tables gain a fate column, new
"Suppression is two-valued" section, Pass 4 threshold table gains the two
fail-closed rows, Executive Summary must state a withheld ALLOW, Suppressed
Findings tags each line [dropped]/[unverified]. Pass 3's unknown-rule_key
bullet explicitly says high-effort does not reach that branch, so the same
input never has two documented fates.
commands/trekreview.md - Phase 5 "Reviewer accounting": the expected set is
written down before the spawn, a silent reviewer gets one re-ask and then
STOP. That extends the pattern already in the file (schema failure -> 2
bounded re-asks -> "do not feed unvalidated findings to the coordinator") to
the other two ways a reviewer goes missing, rather than softening it to WARN.
The lib's missing_reviewers stays as belt-and-braces for direct callers.
docs/agent-return-channel-defect.md - the "inferred, not observed" caveat on
the unnamed arm above 66 lines is struck: akashic-intelligence S27
(f168630) measured 2/2 unnamed agents returning against a 4370-line plan,
30449 B and 10989 B, both valid JSON. Recorded with akashic's own two
caveats intact - the measurer owns the finding, and byte-identity between
the returned string and the file on disk was not proven. The separate S25
named-arm figures are left standing; these are two measurements, not a
correction of one by the other.
No release, no version bump, no tag, no catalogue ref, no Workflow port.
Suite 1025 (1023/0/2) -> 1034 (1032/0/2), 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S4 of the 2.1.181 upgrade — implementation, not a gate. TDD: failing test
written first for the resolver gate, then the fix; suite green throughout.
- Resolver MAJOR (FIX): lib/profiles/phase-signal-resolver.mjs now imports
BASE_ALLOWED_MODELS from profile-validator and gates `model`
(if 'model' in entry && BASE_ALLOWED_MODELS.includes(entry.model)),
mirroring the EFFORT_LEVELS gate one line up. Out-of-allowlist models
(gpt-4, haiku) are dropped instead of handed to an agent spawn —
defense-in-depth behind brief-validator's validation-time check. No
circular import (brief-validator already imports the same symbol).
+2 tests (drops-invalid / keeps-valid).
- Native effort: (SHIP, static additive): effort: frontmatter on 8 agents —
retrieval (task-finder, git-historian, dependency-tracer,
architecture-mapper) = medium; adversarial-reasoning (plan-critic,
risk-assessor, contrarian-researcher, review-coordinator) = high. The
other 15 stay unset -> inherit Opus-4.8 default (high). This per-spawn
REASONING effort is a different axis from brief phase_signals.effort
(ORCHESTRATION shape) per the S3 decision.
- Doc-truth + axis distinction: new canonical docs/profiles.md
§Model & effort axes (opus->Opus 4.8 default-high; orchestration vs
reasoning effort table; native-effort precedence; per-agent levels).
Short notes in CLAUDE.md (after Agents table) and README.md (Cost
profile), both pointing to profiles.md.
- Open (non-blocking, unchanged): only STATIC effort shipped — the
verified-safe minimum. Profile-driven DYNAMIC effort still needs
verification of the per-spawn effort param or env-var injection.
Matrix: new "S4 resolutions" section. Tests 582 total / 580 pass / 0 fail /
2 skip (was 578 pass; +2). claude plugin validate passes (only pre-existing
root-CLAUDE.md warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LqBYc8Ltrk7LipyJmGxXiB
Flip model: sonnet → model: opus across 20 agent files, 4 prose references
in commands (trekplan, trekresearch), trekendsession command frontmatter,
and CLAUDE.md tables. Aligns CLAUDE.md premium-profile row to actual
premium.yaml content (all-opus, which has been the case since v4.1.0 but
the doc was drift). Companion to VOYAGE_PROFILE=premium env-var (set in
~/.zshenv same day) — env-var governs orchestrator phase model; this
commit governs sub-agent models which are frontmatter-pinned and not
reachable by the profile resolver.
npm test: 516 pass, 0 fail, 2 skipped (unchanged from baseline).
Operator rationale: complete Opus coverage across all Voyage activity,
including the 20 sub-agents that the profile system does not control
(architecture-mapper, task-finder, plan-critic, scope-guardian,
brief-reviewer, code-correctness-reviewer, brief-conformance-reviewer,
review-coordinator, session-decomposer, plus the 6 researcher agents,
plus the 5 codebase-analysis agents).
Cost implication: sub-agent runs ~5x more expensive vs sonnet. Accepted.
