hooks.json wired pre-write-executor.mjs to the Write tool only, so Edit and
NotebookEdit reached .git/hooks/, .env, shell configs and the other protected
paths unguarded. The matcher is now Write|Edit|NotebookEdit.
The guard reads the target path per tool: file_path for Write and Edit (hooks
reference, PreToolUse tool_input tables), notebook_path for NotebookEdit (the
tool's input schema). When it cannot read a path (unparseable input, unknown
tool, missing field) it now blocks instead of allowing.
New tests resolve hooks.json with Claude Code's matcher semantics and run the
hooks that would fire per tool: 9 failed on the old code, all pass now. The two
fail-open pins in path-guard.test.mjs are flipped to fail closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S2 of the 2.1.181 upgrade. Schemas verified verbatim against the official
slash-commands and hooks docs before editing (a first-pass camelCase
'disallowedTools' claim was caught and corrected to kebab-case against the doc).
- CC-14 (SHIP): migrate all 7 hooks in hooks/hooks.json to exec-form
{command:"node", args:["${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/scripts/X.mjs"]}. Doc
recommends exec-form whenever a hook references a path placeholder; protects
consumers installing under a path with spaces. ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}
interpolates inside args (verified). hooks-json-stop-wired test made
form-agnostic (normalizes command+args to one invocation string).
- CC-11 (SHIP): add `disallowed-tools: Agent, TeamCreate` to trekexecute
frontmatter, enforcing its documented "No Agent tool, no TeamCreate" rule.
allowed-tools grants auto-approval but does NOT remove tools from the pool,
so the prior omission left Agent callable; disallowed-tools removes it.
trekexecute is the only command with a documented exclusion.
- CC-15 (DECIDE: keep universal): re-affirm F2 deferral. pre-bash/pre-write
executors stay universal -- session-agnostic safety (rm -rf /, ~/.ssh, .env)
that narrowing to execute-only would only weaken. Header comments corrected.
- CC-10 (DECIDE: design note, no code): no blanket Agent(model:opus) deny rule
-- would break balanced/economy profiles; any model-enforcement must be
profile-aware, deferred into W2. Folded into open question #3.
Matrix updated with S2 resolutions section. Tests 578 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip;
claude plugin validate passes (only pre-existing root-CLAUDE.md warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LqBYc8Ltrk7LipyJmGxXiB
Four-layer security model for ultraexecute-local and headless sessions:
Layer 1 — Plugin hooks: pre-bash-executor.mjs (13 BLOCK + 8 WARN rules
with bash evasion normalization) and pre-write-executor.mjs (8 path guard
rules blocking .git/hooks, .claude/settings, shell configs, .env, SSH/AWS).
Layer 2 — Prompt-level security rules: denylist in ultraexecute-local.md
Sub-step D and session-spec-template.md Security Constraints section.
These are the only rules that work in headless child sessions.
Layer 3 — Pre-execution plan validation: new Phase 2.4 scans all Verify
and Checkpoint commands against denylist before execution begins.
Layer 4 — Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with scoped
--allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep" --permission-mode
bypassPermissions in ultraexecute-local.md, headless-launch-template.md,
and session-decomposer.md. Blocks Agent, MCP, WebSearch in child sessions.
Also adds Hard Rules 14-16: verify command security check, no writing
outside repository root, no writing to security-sensitive paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
