P1 (order 2, wave 1). /trekbrief puts the task in a size class
(ceremony: small|bounded|architectural, K1; heaviest in doubt, said
aloud, overridable, only moved up) that sets the question budget and the
review cap, and asks one round of questions: facts looked up, never
asked; recommendation first; ranked by impact x uncertainty with a
visible Deferred list; stop when the next three answers can be predicted.
"høres bra ut", "gjør som du vil" and an empty answer are not approval.
K2: lib/util/approval-log.mjs, an append-only hash-chained log in the
target repo (.claude/voyage/approvals.jsonl) bound to the approved
content's sha256; append/verify (0/1/2), answer, digest. Committed by
lib/util/artifact-commit.mjs: the log always, the brief and plan only
with artifact_store: git (operator decision 2026-10-06). /trekplan
Phase 1 halts on a broken, diverged, missing or mismatched log entry;
Phase 11 logs and commits an explicit plan approval before any handoff.
Both new brief fields are optional: no brief_version bump. The
main-module guard in intent-approval.mjs and brief-validator.mjs now
compares real paths. Borrowings credited in the prose and module headers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/trekreview of 5680591..84a0621 (verdict WARN: 0 BLOCKER, 3 MAJOR, 1 MINOR,
1 MAJOR suppressed as unverified for length only). All closed red -> green:
- Suppressed MAJOR 1d0171a7 (verified live): Phase 8 spliced {plan-path}
into a single-quoted --payload. A lone quote broke the shell parse (event
lost, no written:false to report); a quoted pair ran a command
substitution and still reported written:true. event-emit now reads
`--payload -` from stdin and the three Phase 8 blocks pass the payload
through a quoted heredoc. Checked under bash and zsh.
- 570ba19b: the SC5 set-step extractor read line by line and never saw the
wrapped Step 0 sentinel (`blocked`); it now matches across the break and
the test asserts `blocked` is read.
- c69a865a: the Phase 9 line_ref in jsonl-schemas.md was 9 lines off. Both
trekexecute rows are now pinned to the exact span by a test.
- 0004fa23 (MINOR): the gates_mode_flag_override block says what to do on
written:false (print the reason, continue).
- emit() docstring no longer says failures are swallowed silently.
- 7ffaede5: chosen to KEEP the prose-only legacy `passed` tolerance, because
a public-plugin run started under the 6.1.0 prose would otherwise re-run
every finished step on resume; recorded as an accepted deviation in the
(local-only) brief. No code change.
Suite 1400 (1398/0/2), was 1393.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
event-emit returned {written:false, reason:'CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA unset'} whenever the harness did not export the variable - the normal case for the Bash tool - so /trekexecute's Phase 8 events never landed. It now resolves the directory through stats-append's resolveStatsDir (one resolver; opts.path still wins, so intent-approval is unchanged). The CLI uses the realpath isMain() guard (the file:// guard was a silent no-op under a symlink or a path with a space) and exits 1 on every written:false - usage error, payload-not-json, failed write - instead of always 0. KNOWN_EVENTS gains main-merge-approved, main-merge-declined and gates_mode_flag_override, which /trekexecute emits by design. Header, intent-approval docstring (comment only), docs/operations.md and the README autonomy sentence (wrong state names, 'records each transition') updated.
Red: 10 of 20 tests fail on the pre-fix code - 7 new (CLI lands with CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA empty / absent, unwritable target exit 1, usage error exit 1, symlink, space path, known events) and 3 inverted contracts. Regression guards (green on arrival): never throws when unwritable; no second copy of the fallback directory name.
Inverted (the contract this changes, not deleted): emit with no CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA (silent skip) -> lands under a pinned HOME; never throws when unwritable -> a genuinely unwritable target (env {} now resolves to the real home); resolveStatsPath({}) === null -> the fallback path; malformed --payload exit 0 -> exit 1.
Readers checked: otel-export keys on 'event', yardstick counts only user_input, cache-analyzer and research-loop-cap name event-emit only in comments. Verify 268/268 (stats-event-emit, intent-approval, doc-consistency, otel-export-validators, yardstick). Suite 1376 (1374/0/2); non-hook lines in the real trekexecute-stats.jsonl 60 before and after.
Voyage order 20261005T104513Z-1250514346, plan step 2/5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/trekexecute writes run status stopped (dirty-tree stop, entry-condition stop, escalation) and step status blocked (Step 0 sandbox sentinel); the validator rejected the first and warned on the second. Both are real states lib/util/session-orders.mjs already reads (ENDED_BAD), so the validator learns them. The step-status list is exported as PROGRESS_STEP_STATUSES (was an inline literal) so tests check prose against it instead of keeping a copy. docs/HANDOVER-CONTRACTS.md Handover 5 rows updated.
Red: 3 of 4 new tests fail on the pre-fix code (stopped run status, PROGRESS_STEP_STATUSES export, blocked step status). Regression guard (green on arrival): every run status but completed stays resumable.
progress-validator 16/16. Suite 1368 (1366/0/2).
Voyage order 20261005T104513Z-1250514346, plan step 1/5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/trekbrief Phase 7 says the writer adds order_id / order_claimed_at /
order_reason (never typed by the model) and that the yardstick joins use on
order_id; the fixture row lists them in `fields`, EXPORT_DENYLIST names them,
and its stale line_ref (657-672) now reads 961-976; the allowlist header
names them as dropped; docs/architecture.md Stats explains them.
/trekbrief --approve now runs Phase 7 after a successful stamp, with fixed
values (mode "approve", 0 turns, brief_quality/research_topics/auto_research
from the brief's frontmatter, auto_result "manual", intent_approved true).
Valgt fordi PM 04.10 (point 3): fix the code, not the criterion - the
approval must leave the trekbrief record. Measured hole: okf-wiki v1-k has
brief-approved 04.10 17:12Z and trekplan 17:29Z, but only a 03.10 trekbrief
record with intent_approved false. CLAUDE.md, README.md and
docs/command-modes.md say so. The manual path is unchanged.
npm test 1309 -> 1362 (1360 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
appendStatsRecord(kind, record, env, { cwd }): for kind trekbrief it drops
every order_* key the record came with and adds attributeOrder()'s three
keys (lib/stats/claimed-order.mjs), resolving the mailbox from the record's
project_dir when that lies inside cwd. Other kinds are written untouched.
The CLI guard compares real paths (realpathSync on argv[1] and on
import.meta.url). The old `import.meta.url === file://${argv[1]}` was a
silent no-op - exit 0, nothing written - under a symlink and under a path
with a space (measured 04.10). Valgt realpath fordi `resolve()` alone fixes
only the space.
stats-landing 15/15; intent-approval, claimed-order, proevesett green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
lib/stats/claimed-order.mjs reads <coord>/<mailbox>/orders/claimed/ the way
repo-mailbox's claim verb writes it (read, never called): the stem is the id,
the .claim sidecar gives claimed-at, every .md counts toward "several".
Mailboxes come from two independent git calls (toplevel basename, the claim
script's rule; and the main repo behind a linked worktree), with GIT_DIR /
GIT_WORK_TREE dropped and a 5 s timeout. A project_dir outside cwd cannot
steer the lookup. Never throws, never guesses, starts nothing.
Valgt: identity = file stem, not frontmatter, fordi the claim script moves
<id>.md and never reads the frontmatter; a quoted order-id would otherwise
never join.
claimed-order.test.mjs 20/20.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. Step 6 cleared the orders dir before Phase 8's main-merge gate asked,
so a declined gate lost the merged-waves record and the next run
prepared wave 1 again on merged code. The clear now sits only under
the gate's "On confirm" (wave path, next-wave none, Step 4 passed);
Step 6 and a declined gate keep the record, so a re-run goes
next-wave none -> Step 4 -> back to the gate.
2. The gate's Decline row and Recovery surface now say what holds on the
wave path: the waves are already merged on the current branch,
nothing is finalized, the record is kept, and re-running the same
command (not --resume, which Phase 2.5 runs as a single session)
re-runs master verification and returns to the gate. The branch name
is trek/{slug}/session-N; the push-before-cleanup note now holds only
where the push succeeded. The single-session --resume line stays.
3. The report footer adds the multi-session way to continue.
4. wave.json stores the branch the wave was prepared on (write
--branch); Step 3's status call passes the current branch and stops,
touching nothing, when the main checkout is on another branch.
npm test: 1277 tests, 1275 pass, 0 fail, 2 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One invariant closes the data-loss class: Phase 2.55, 2.6 and 7.6 remove
worktrees only with `git worktree remove` without force and branches only
with `git branch -d`. Whatever git refuses (a worktree with changes, an
unmerged or checked-out branch) is kept, reported with what the user can
do, and never retried with force; every unmerged trek/{slug}/* branch
survives every failure path. Step 1 stops on a branch or worktree left
by an earlier attempt instead of deleting it. After a merged wave, a
progress file is dropped from its worktree only when untracked and
byte-identical to its archived copy, so the happy path still cleans up.
B1: Step 3 refuses to merge into a dirty main checkout, and tells a
refused merge (no MERGE_HEAD: stop, keep wave.json) from a real conflict
(abort, Step 5 keeps the branches).
B2: Phase 2.5, Check 4 and Step 0 take the main checkout from the first
`git worktree list` entry and refuse to run from a linked worktree.
B3: wave.json and merged-waves.json carry the plan's sha256 and refuse
another plan or version, naming the run that holds the orders dir and
the clear command; Step 0 stops on that. Step 6 clears the orders dir
when every wave is merged AND Step 4 passed, no longer keyed on the
Phase 8 label the wave path cannot reach.
Also: every session-orders.mjs call runs from the main checkout with a
main-relative plan path; Check 1 no longer counts .claude/trekplan-sessions/
as a dirty tree (it blocked every re-run after a failed wave); a stuck
wave has a documented non-force way out; Hard rule 12 states the
invariant. The test file only narrows one call-site filter that also
matched Step 0's plugin-root existence check.
npm test: 1273 tests, 1271 pass, 0 fail, 2 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven defects from an independent review of the 6.0 session-order flow,
all verified against the text before fixing:
1. Step 3 branched only on pending/failed/stopped/unreadable, so a session
still writing in-progress (or in_progress) next to a failed one had its
live worktree force-removed. status now classifies each session as
completed, running (no file, pending, in-progress, in_progress, or any
unknown status) or ended-bad (failed, stopped, partial, blocked,
unreadable), keeping the raw status; Step 3 stops on any running FIRST
and touches no worktree, branch or wave.json.
2. The Phase 2.5 wave-in-flight guard was cwd-relative; from a subdirectory
it missed wave.json and Check 4 force-removed the wave. The guard is now
anchored at the git toplevel, and Check 4 opens with a block that refuses
to clean while wave.json exists.
3. Step 6 read progress files from worktrees that Step 3/5 had removed. A
new archive subcommand copies each to orders/wave-W-session-N.progress.json
before any worktree goes; Step 6 and Phase 8 read the copies.
4. NO_WAVE always prepared the lowest wave, so a re-run after a wave-2
failure re-ran wave 1. record-merged writes orders/merged-waves.json
after each merged wave (Step 5 keeps it); next-wave returns the lowest
unmerged wave or none (then Step 4). Phase 8 clears the orders dir only
after a completed report; the record refuses another plan's path.
5. Phase 7.6 named a deleted worktree and promised an unwired re-run. The
order now names the main checkout and says the recovery session's own
audit is the check.
6. (test side, previous commit) progress paths are asserted literally.
7. Hard rule 12 now carries the awaiting-sessions exception.
npm test: 1262 tests, 1260 pass, 0 fail, 2 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator decision 27.09.2026: Voyage works the PM way, so nothing in it
starts Claude Code. Work that needs another session becomes an order plus
a starter line the user gives a session they open themselves; Voyage
never starts the session.
/trekexecute's multi-session path (Phase 2.6) now prepares one wave at a
time: worktree per session, then lib/util/session-orders.mjs writes one
order per session (worktree, steps, done-condition, starter) plus
orders/wave.json, and the run stops. Running the same command again reads
each session's progress file (status mode), merges sequentially with
push-before-cleanup as before, and prepares the next wave. Phase 2.5 skips
the destructive pre-flight while a wave is in flight. Phase 7.6 recovery is
handed over the same way. Hard rule 21: never start Claude Code.
Removed with it, because they existed only for launched children: the
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY billing check (and its dry-run line and Hard rule 1
exception), the hooks-fire version precheck, the safety preamble, the
scoped-tool/turn/budget flags, templates/headless-launch-template.md, the
decomposer's launch.sh (now orders.md), /trekplan's "launch", the README
billing and MCP tuning sections, and scripts/q3-cache-prefix-experiment.mjs
(an experiment that spawned the binary; its results stay in docs/).
/trekresearch's deep-research pre-gate no longer runs the binary for its
version; the post-hoc check was already the authoritative guard.
Chose orders + starters over in-session subagents because the order's done
criterion asks for exactly that, and because /trekexecute disallows the
Agent tool on purpose (Hard rule 10); reopening that is a separate change.
Gate: 54 -> 0 hit lines outside EXEMPT. npm test 1250 (1245 pass, 0 fail,
5 skipped: 3 are the retired-reference scan without its local list).
verify.sh 7/0. The fixture run (tests/lib/session-orders.test.mjs) writes
two orders and wave.json for wave 1 and leaves a trap binary untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New case plan-halts-without-intent-approval (expectation committed before
its first run): a 2.1 brief WITH phase_signals and no intent marker.
Graders: intent-approval.mjs --check ran; the trace carries the gate's own
JSON code for BRIEF_INTENT_NOT_APPROVED; no Agent; no plan.md.
review-requires-project: the arg parser now has a CLI that checks the
required flag and prints 'Error: --project <dir> is required.' + usage
(exit 1, code ARG_REQUIRED_MISSING). trekreview.md runs it with
$ARGUMENTS (it passed "$@", which the Bash tool never has, so the parser
never ran — 0 Bash calls in the PM's case-5 traces) and relays its stderr
instead of composing the line. The grader project-required (reply regex,
unstable on backticks) is replaced by parser-ran + names-missing-project
(trace, the parser's JSON code), the same form as names-rule.
Graders: no-error-code is bound to the validator's JSON output form and
covers every REVIEW_* code (WRONG_TYPE and VERSION_FORMAT were missing);
says-pass/says-fail reject a preceding NOT and a longer word; every case
with no-write also gets no-bash-write (redirect, tee, touch, cp, mv, rm,
sed -i in the Bash command). Checked on the PM's 10 recorded traces: no
false positive; known-positive/negative still split.
Red 348aa95 6/7 → green 7/7. Suite 1231: 1229 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M3: the header claimed "reflowing a paragraph keeps the approval"; joining
lines gives STALE (PM probe iii-c). It now says what keeps the approval
(indentation, in-line spacing, blank lines, CRLF) and that joining or
splitting lines makes it stale — erring safe. Also states the one-section
and code-block/comment rules from M1.
M7: the trekreview exemption is read from the brief's own frontmatter, so a
relabelled brief walks past the gate — the same trust class as self-stamping.
Now said in the module header, HANDOVER-CONTRACTS and /trekplan's gate prose.
HANDOVER-CONTRACTS also names both brief modes the --approve path reaches.
Red 097bae8 (M3, M7) → green. Suite 1224: 1222 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M1: headings inside fenced code blocks and HTML comments are text, not
headings, and ## Intent / ## Goal must each appear exactly once. A second
section, an example section in a code block or comment, or a '## ' line in
a code block inside Intent no longer carries the old approval: check gives
INVALID (duplicate) or STALE, stamp refuses a duplicate. A plain brief
hashes exactly as before (pinned), so no stamped brief goes stale.
Re-run of the PM's 29 probes: vi-a, vi-b, vii-a, vii-b now stop; the rest
unchanged. The PM's p7c probe was a no-op (its replace string is not in the
base brief); vii-c is covered by its own test, red on 66e1fa1.
M2: /trekbrief --approve takes <project-dir | brief-file>. New
intent-approval.mjs --resolve decides: a directory → <dir>/brief.md and
/trekplan --project; a file → itself and /trekplan --brief. Phase 4h and the
stamp line use {BRIEF_PATH}; /trekplan's halt table names
/trekbrief --approve {brief_path}, which works on both brief modes, and so
does the gate's hint. HANDOVER-CONTRACTS' "open to every producer's brief"
is now true. Chose fixing the path over rewording the contract because two
real briefs (docs/*-brief.md) had no approval path at all.
Red ff760ed 9/29 → green 29/29. Suite 1219: 1217 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New lib/stats/stats-append.mjs: one record on stdin, appended to
<data dir>/<kind>-stats.jsonl. The data dir is CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA, else
~/.claude/plugins/data/voyage-ktg-plugin-marketplace (the yardstick's
default). A failed write exits 1 with a reason: reported, never silent.
/trekbrief Phase 7 and /trekplan Phase 12 now run it instead of
"append to ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA}/…; skip silently". intent-approval's
resolveApprovalDataDir delegates to the same resolver.
Chose a stdin heredoc over a --json argument because a JSON record in a
shell argument breaks on quotes in task text. Only trekbrief and trekplan
are rewired (økt 2's countable form needs exactly those two); the other
commands' stats prose is unchanged and docs/architecture.md says so.
Red a358059 7/7 → green 7/7. Suite 1208: 1206 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The trekbrief-stats record gained intent_approved in f5dc08f (prose +
jsonl-schemas row) but not lib/exporters/field-allowlist.mjs, so the
exporter would drop it silently. Boolean, low-cardinality — safe label.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Veikart steg 1, økt 1 av 2. The three holes measured in the grounds:
(1) ## Intent / ## Goal were only checked for existence, (2) no approval
marker existed, (3) brief-approved was emitted only on the auto path.
- lib/validators/intent-approval.mjs: --check / --stamp. The marker is
intent_approved_hash (sha256 over normalized ## Intent + ## Goal) +
intent_approved_at. Editing either section after approval → STALE.
- /trekplan Phase 1 (Read the brief, both --brief and --project): runs
--check and HALTS on BRIEF_INTENT_NOT_APPROVED / _STALE / _INVALID with
the remedy spelled out; an unrunnable check halts too.
- /trekbrief Phase 4h (before the Phase 5 fork, asked even in --quick):
shows Intent + Goal verbatim, AskUserQuestion Approve / Revise / Leave;
only "Approve" runs --stamp. --stamp emits brief-approved, so the manual
(default) path records it; the auto path's own emission is removed.
New mode /trekbrief --approve <project-dir> = Phase 4h alone.
- README, CLAUDE.md, command-modes, HANDOVER-CONTRACTS §Handover 1,
jsonl-schemas (trekbrief-stats gains intent_approved).
Valgt ingen brief_version-bump fordi skjemaendringen er rent additiv (to
valgfrie felt) og kravet sitter i /trekplan — enhver produsents brief kan
godkjennes via /trekbrief --approve uten produsentendring. Valgt eget
--check-kall i stedet for et flagg på brief-validator fordi --brief-stien
i dag ikke kjører validatoren i det hele tatt; et nytt validatorkall der
ville også stoppe på andre feil. Valgt fallback-datamappe = målestokkens
(plugins/data/voyage-…) fordi CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA er tom i Bash-miljøet og
event-emits egen fallback er stille skip — slik ble brief-approved 0 records.
What the marker does NOT prove (module header, command prose, contract):
same user, same machine — any session can stamp. A trace, not a signature.
Suite 1183 → 1201 (1199/0/2). Mutants M1–M5 (stale check off, check
always valid, gate line removed, stamp emits nothing, no normalization)
each fell ≥ 1 test. yardstick unchanged: RED, 1 of 3 countable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Measured 2026-09-18: nine ordinary shapes of a plan's `## Verification`
section parsed to zero criteria - an untagged fence, a ```text fence, a
markdown table, `## Verification (acceptance)`, `## Verification:`,
`### Verification`, an unclosed fence earlier in the document. Every one came
out as `0 of 0`, NOT OK, exit 1, and Phase 7 then forbade `result: completed`
without anyone being told that the FORMAT, not the code, was the problem.
"The section is empty" and "I cannot read this format" are different facts.
Three changes, one hole:
- The runner reports `NO_CRITERIA` with a source line (`plan.md:NN`) when the
section is there and nothing in it parsed, and names the two forms it does
read. Same for a brief's `## Success Criteria`, so the evidence block the
conformance reviewer gets says which of the two it is looking at rather than
showing an empty table.
- Phase 7 says it out loud instead of failing silently: report the source line
and the two forms, and say that the plan is what failed there, not the run.
- `/trekplan` now pins what it produces to what the runner reads: the heading
is exactly `## Verification`, the criteria are a bullet whose first
backticked span is the command or a shell-tagged fence, and the command must
be one the allowlist runs. A doc-consistency test holds the writer and the
reader together, so a runner that learns a new form must update the source.
Honest about the round trip: the two round-trip tests were GREEN on arrival -
the template already writes the bullet form the runner reads. What was missing
was not the format but the PIN: `/trekplan` mandated neither the heading string
nor the format, so a plan could satisfy the command's own instructions and
still parse to nothing. The tests now hold that.
Red first: 5 of the 7 new tests failed before the change (3 NO_CRITERIA, 2
doc-consistency); the 2 round-trip tests are guards, and said so above.
Suite 1161 (1159/0/2). Gate unchanged: defects 0 of 7, intact, exit 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A denylist in front of /bin/sh is whack-a-mole. Measured 2026-09-18, end to
end through both screens: 5 of 11 named evasions ran with real effect - a
`command` prefix reached git, an escaped `rm` inside a shell fence deleted a
directory, `find -delete` deleted a file, `>|` and `tee` wrote outside the
working tree, a python one-liner deleted the whole tree - and 19 of 28 got
past the refusal list on its own. Every quoting, aliasing and indirection form
of the shell is another mole.
So the screen is now an ALLOWLIST. A criterion runs only when its first word
is a known test runner (npm test, npm run <script package.json declares>,
node --test, vitest, jest, pytest, python -m pytest, uv run pytest,
cargo test, go test, make test, bash <script under tests/>, a read-only git
subcommand) AND the command carries no shell operator and no newline.
Everything else is NOT RUN with the reason said out loud: never run, and never
reported as a failure either - an absent measurement is not a finding. That
also closes the smaller hole in the same file: a bare word a sentence merely
names (`whoami`, `login`, `package.json`) is no longer executed, because it is
not a runner.
REFUSED_BY_POLICY is gone with the list that produced it; a command outside
the allowlist is `unrunnable`, which in plan mode still fells the run and in
brief mode is reported to the reviewer as an absent measurement.
What the allowlist deliberately does NOT do, said in the file and in the
reviewer's rubric: it is not a sandbox. `npm test`, `npm run <script>` and
`make test` run whatever the repo's own package.json/Makefile says they run,
including a script that pushes - that is the repo's responsibility. And it
rejects honest commands too: an env prefix, a project's own binary, anything
piped. A check that needs one of those is declared through
`bash tests/<script>.sh`, the documented way in.
Red first: 6 of the new tests fail against the previous runner (measured with
an always-allow shim so the module still loads), including the end-to-end one
where the canary directory was deleted and files were written outside the
tree. The fixtures move from `true`/`false` to two allowlisted shell fixtures,
because `false` is no longer a runner - the fail case must still be a real
non-zero exit, not an unrun criterion.
Suite 1148 (1146/0/2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/trekreview now runs the commands a BRIEF declares, and a brief is an artifact
that can arrive from outside the repo. Measured 2026-09-18 on 6cafb4c: the
executor denylist stopped a download piped into a shell, but the remote-writing
git subcommand and a recursive delete of a path both RAN. The denylist screens
catastrophe (root deletion, fork bombs, mkfs); it was never meant to screen an
artifact under review.
A second screen, in the runner and ahead of the denylist, refuses four classes:
- a remote-writing git subcommand. The subcommand is found by walking git's own
options (`-C`, `-c`, `--git-dir`, ... take a value), so `git status` and
`git log` still run and `git -C sub push` does not.
- a recursive delete: any `rm` carrying `-r`/`-rf`/`--recursive`. A plain
`rm build/artifact.txt` still runs.
- a download piped straight into a shell (also caught by the denylist; pinned
here so the runner does not depend on another file for it).
- a write outside the working tree. `/dev/null`-class devices are fine, and so
is anything under the working tree; `~/...`, an absolute path elsewhere, and
a target carrying an unexpanded `$VAR` are refused - the runner cannot know
where a variable points, and guessing is how a screen stops screening.
A refusal is its own outcome, REFUSED_BY_POLICY: the command never reaches a
shell, and `summary.ok` is false in both plan and brief mode. For the reviewer,
REFUSED is like NOT RUN - the absence of a measurement, never on its own a
finding - and the rubric and the evidence block both say so.
Chosen deliberately, and it is stricter than today's habit: writing scratch to
/tmp is refused too. The repo's own example plan does `> /tmp/out`. Verification
output belongs in the working tree; exempting the whole system temp dir would
have made the rule unstatable, since a working tree created under /tmp then
contains its own escape hatch.
NOT covered, stated rather than implied:
- other writing git subcommands (tag, remote, config, gc) - only push is listed
- writes through a wrapper: `sh -c '...'`, `xargs`, `find -exec`, a Makefile
target, a script the criterion invokes. The screen reads the command it is
given, not what that command goes on to do.
- `>` inside a quoted string reads as a redirect, so a criterion echoing a
literal `>` is refused. Fail-closed, on purpose.
- the whole surface still runs with the invoking process's permissions; this is
a refusal list, not a sandbox.
The denylist-layer test now uses a stand-in command with a screen double: the
refusal list catches a recursive delete first, so naming one there would have
stopped exercising the denylist layer at all.
Red first: the 6 new tests failed before this change (`refuseCommand` did not
exist), and the fixture brief's four writes ran.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"The first backtick span is the command" is right for a plan, whose template
puts the command first, and wrong for a brief, whose criterion usually opens
by NAMING the thing under discussion. Measured 2026-09-18 on the repo's own
example brief: 5 of 6 criteria FAILED, 3 of them parse artifacts - `--verbose`
run as a command gave exit 2 ("invalid option"), `tests/` gave exit 126 ("is a
directory"). The rubric reads a FAILED result as decisive, so each one became
a BROKEN_SUCCESS_CRITERION BLOCKER about prose.
looksLikeCommand() screens the span by SHAPE only - no filesystem lookup, so a
span parses the same everywhere. Refused: a leading flag, a directory, a token
carrying quotes/braces/prose, and a lone relative path with a slash (an
explicit ./, ../, / or ~/ still runs, as do env-var prefixes). A refused span
is `unrunnable` with reason `not-a-command` - its own outcome, never FAILED,
and it never reaches a shell.
It deliberately does NOT scan on to a later span. "The first span that LOOKS
like a command" invents commands out of prose: in that same example brief it
would have run `whoami` and `login`, two real binaries a sentence happens to
name. An absent measurement is honest; a guessed one is not.
The shape check applies to prose spans only. Inside a shell-tagged fence the
author has already declared shell, so `[ -f x ] || exit 1` still runs.
The rubric follows: a NOT RUN result is never on its own a finding. The
Partial row now describes half-built DELIVERED CODE, and the reviewer gets a
table of the three reason strings - no-command, placeholder, not-a-command -
with what each says about the sentence rather than about the code.
Not covered, stated for the record: a multi-token span whose first token is a
non-executable file (`tests/golden/login.stdout --check`) still runs, and a
criterion whose command is real but whose binary is absent still reports the
shell's exit 127 - that is a true measurement of a missing binary, not a
parse artifact.
Red first: 4 runner tests + 1 doc-consistency pin failed before this change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The runner read bullet lines only. The repo's own example plan writes its
whole acceptance run as a fenced bash block, so `## Verification` parsed to
ZERO criteria, the runner exited 1, and Phase 7 forbade `result: completed`
- a correct plan felled every single-session run. Measured 2026-09-18 on
6cafb4c: none of the repo's plan artifacts exited 0.
Fences are now read twice over, for two opposite reasons:
- a `## ` heading INSIDE a fence is quoted text and no longer opens a
section. examples/02-real-cli/REGENERATED.md is a report that quotes a
plan outline inside one fence; it used to yield an empty section that
read as "0 of 0", and now yields the honest NO_VERIFICATION_SECTION.
- a shell-tagged fence inside the section holds the commands. The tag list
is closed (bash/sh/shell/zsh/console/shell-session): an untagged fence is
more often expected OUTPUT than input, and inventing a criterion from
output is the failure this file exists to prevent.
Blank and comment-only lines inside the block declare nothing. A `$`/`>`
console prompt is stripped; a `#` root prompt is NOT, because it cannot be
told from a comment and running a comment is the worse mistake.
Measured after the fix (parse only - one example names a fictional CLI):
examples/01 6 criteria, plan-template 2 (both placeholders, correctly NOT
RUN), the two runner fixtures 2 each, plan-run-C 1, REGENERATED.md 0 with
NO_VERIFICATION_SECTION.
Divergence from the order's premise, stated for the record: it said 2 of 3
example plans write `## Verification` as a fenced bash block. Ground truth
is 1 of 3 - REGENERATED.md has no section of its own at all - and the
example plan's block holds 6 command lines, not 5.
Red first: 4 of the 6 new tests failed before this change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rubric required `brief-conformance-reviewer` to classify a Success
Criterion as Full only when "its verification command/test exists and passes".
Its tools are `Read`, `Glob`, `Grep`. It cannot run anything, so "passes" was
either guessed from the command's mere existence or quietly downgraded to
"exists" — a BLOCKER-tier rule key resting on an impression.
The reviewer stays read-only — a reviewer that executes the code it reviews is
not an independent reviewer. The command does the running instead:
- `/trekreview` Phase 4.5 runs the brief's `## Success Criteria` commands
through `lib/verification/criteria-runner.mjs --brief --evidence` and captures
the block as `sc_evidence_block`, pasted verbatim into the reviewer prompt in
Phase 5. The exit code does not stop the review — a failing criterion is
exactly what the review exists to find.
- `formatCriteriaEvidence` builds that block in code: one row per criterion with
the command, the exit code and the first output line. Chose a code-built block
over an orchestrator-written summary so the orchestrator cannot narrate a pass
that never happened.
- The rubric now judges the supplied result: `PASS` supports Full, `FAILED` /
`BLOCKED` is `Broken` with the exit code cited, and `NOT RUN` is the absence
of a measurement — never evidence in either direction.
- Phase 4.5 is skipped in `quick` mode: that mode does not launch the
conformance reviewer, so there is nobody to hand the result to.
Red first: seven tests in `tests/lib/criteria-runner.test.mjs` against a
committed brief fixture whose three criteria pass, fail, and are prose-only.
The two doc pins were verified red against the pre-fix files (rubric asked
"exists and passes"; no Phase 4.5; the block reached nobody).
Suite: 1117 (1115/0/2), up 9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A trekplan's `## Verification` section is where the brief's success criteria
land. Phase 7 opened with "**Skip for trekplans.**", and only the multi-session
wave path (Phase 2.6 Step 3) ran master verification. A plan executed in ONE
session therefore reported `completed` without ever running the criteria it was
measured against — the executor's own belief was the only evidence.
The check now exists as code, not as an instruction:
- `lib/verification/criteria-runner.mjs` parses the criteria an artifact
DECLARES (a plan's `## Verification`, a brief's `## Success Criteria`), runs
each command, and returns a verdict built from exit codes. Fail-closed
throughout: a placeholder, a prose-only criterion, or an unavailable screen
is `unrunnable`/`blocked`, never `passed`. A plan with no `## Verification`
section exits 1 — a plan that promises no end-to-end check cannot be reported
as verified.
- Every command is screened through the plugin's own PreToolUse denylist
(`hooks/scripts/pre-bash-executor.mjs`) before it reaches a shell. Chose
invoking that hook over its documented stdin protocol rather than copying its
rules, because a command spawned from node never passes through the Bash tool
and so the hook cannot fire by itself — this keeps exactly one denylist.
- Phase 7 is now "Exit / verification check": session specs run the exit
condition, trekplans run the criteria runner. Phase 4's entry-condition skip
for trekplans stands — a plan carries no entry condition; the exit side is
not symmetrical.
- A failing criterion FELLS the run: `plan_verification.status != "passed"`
forbids `result: completed`. That is clause 2 of the stop-signal contract,
now enforced on the single-session path too.
Red first: `tests/lib/criteria-runner.test.mjs` (26 tests) against two committed
fixture plans, one of which declares a criterion that fails on purpose. The
doc pin in `tests/lib/doc-consistency.test.mjs` guards the wiring — a capability
no phase calls is the same defect wearing a lib/ file; verified red against the
pre-fix Phase 7 (skip present, runner absent, no fell-the-run clause).
Suite: 1108 (1106/0/2), up 27 from 1081.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
lib/review/gold-scorer.mjs held its (file, rule_key) separator as a literal NUL byte
inside a string literal. Git's binary heuristic therefore classed the whole file as
binary. Every diff of the scorer read "Binary files differ", `--numstat` printed "- -",
and plain grep matched nothing in it. The separator is now written as the escape
sequence '\x00', which is the same one-character string at runtime.
Proof that the change is behaviour-neutral:
- A snapshot script recorded every number the scorer produces, before and after:
- the committed run-perfect fixture through the coordinator contract;
- empty, half, spurious (keys containing spaces and colons), duplicated and empty-gold
runs;
- all 9 verdict pairs.
`diff` of the two outputs is empty (141 lines each).
- tests/lib/gold-scorer.test.mjs + tests/lib/gold-eval.test.mjs: 13/13 before and after.
- `git diff --no-index --numstat /dev/null <file>`: the new file reads "89 0" (text); the
old blob, as a control, reads "- -" (binary).
End-state gate D-06: open -> closed (defects 4 -> 3 of 7). Suite 1059 (1057/0/2), run
on a clean export of the index.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up defect in the reviewer accounting added by e2aec01, found by review
and confirmed by probe before fixing.
validateFindings only WARNS on a missing `reviewer` field, so a payload can
fail schema while carrying no name. ingest then records `reviewer: null`, and
runContract turned that null into the literal reviewer name "unnamed reviewer".
MEASURED before the fix:
runContract([{findings:[{file:'x.mjs',line:1,rule_key:'NOPE',severity:'MAJOR'}]}],
{expectedReviewers:['code-correctness-reviewer']})
-> missing_reviewers = ["unnamed reviewer", "code-correctness-reviewer"]
One failure, two entries, one of them an agent nobody launched. The
`reported.delete(s.reviewer)` line was also inert for that case, since a null
name was never in the set to begin with.
Fix: skipped payloads are split by whether they carry a name. Named ones go to
missing_reviewers as before; anonymous ones increment the new
`unattributable_payloads` count, which forbids ALLOW on its own - so stripping
a reviewer name from a payload cannot restore ALLOW, and the floor does not
depend on the caller passing expectedReviewers. `allow_blocked_by` reports the
two facts separately: `missing-reviewer:<name>` and `unattributable-payload (n)`.
The old behaviour never produced a false ALLOW - it failed in the safe
direction - but it named a reviewer that did not exist, which is the kind of
output an operator would chase.
Iron Law: two failing tests first (double entry; anonymous-payload-alone must
forbid ALLOW), then the fix.
Also verified in this pass, by temporarily adding a fake reason to
UNVERIFIED_REASONS: the prose-vocabulary pin does go red when a reason is
declared in the lib but missing from agents/review-coordinator.md. A pin that
cannot fail is not a pin.
Suite 1034 (1032/0/2) -> 1036 (1034/0/2), 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
computeVerdict counted only the findings handed to it (reasoned.kept), so a
finding removed by Pass 2 or Pass 3, and a reviewer whose payload was thrown
away or never arrived, were arithmetically identical to a finding that never
existed. All three pushed the verdict toward ALLOW.
Measured before the fix (probes, 2026-09-01):
- a BLOCKER with a 101-character title -> ALLOW (Pass 2 succinctness)
- a payload with one ad-hoc rule_key is skipped WHOLE at ingest, taking a
valid BLOCKER sibling with it -> ALLOW
- a reviewer that never reported -> ALLOW
Pass 3's own no-citation / unknown-rule_key branches turned out unreachable
through runContract (validateFindings rejects those payloads first), so the
reachable exposure was Pass 2 plus the skipped/absent reviewer.
THE OPEN DESIGN DECISION, and why it went against the order's default.
The order proposed: indeterminate file-existence YES, plain succinctness NO
("a too-long finding is not an uncertain finding"). I kept the first and
overrode the second, on one principle:
A removal is `dropped` only when the test REFUTED the finding as a claim
about this codebase. Every other removal is `unverified`.
Succinctness and actionability read a `.length`. They never examine the claim,
so they cannot establish the finding is unreal - and dropping a BLOCKER for a
101-character title is precisely the fail-open shape being fixed. Three things
settled it:
1. Under the order's default the fix would have been almost inert. Pass 3's
drop branches are unreachable via runContract, so leaving Pass 2 out would
have left the only reachable finding-level exposure open.
2. Cost asymmetry, priced rather than asserted: the verdict is not a gate.
Handover 6 feeds `findings` filtered to BLOCKER+MAJOR into /trekplan
(commands/trekplan.md:218); `verdict` is optional metadata
(docs/HANDOVER-CONTRACTS.md:353). Nothing loops or re-plans on WARN. So a
false `unverified` costs WARN plus a printed reason; a false drop costs a
silent ALLOW over a live BLOCKER.
3. unknown-rule_key joins them for the same reason: an ad-hoc key is a real
defect wearing the wrong label, and v5.1.1 high-effort mode already KEEPS
those, normalised to PLAN_EXECUTE_DRIFT. Refuting them at normal effort
while keeping them at high effort would be incoherent.
no-citation stays a drop: a finding whose file is empty or whose line is
negative names no location, so it makes no checkable claim at all - the one
deterministic refutation, and what the Pass 3 prose already said it was.
Iron Law: tests/lib/coordinator-contract.test.mjs first, red (missing export +
the three measured ALLOWs), then production code. Two existing assertions were
updated AFTER implementation as contract changes, not to make the red pass.
A known-positive control pins that ALLOW is still reachable - without it,
"no ALLOW" is not a fail-closed contract, only a broken one.
lib/review/coordinator-contract.mjs
+ classifySuppression / REFUTING_REASONS / UNVERIFIED_REASONS - one
vocabulary owned by the lib, including the tokens only the LLM
coordinator emits (accuracy:refuted, file-existence:refuted/indeterminate),
so prose and lib cannot drift. Unclassified reasons default to unverified:
the default fails closed.
~ judgeFilter / reasonablenessFilter return {kept, dropped, unverified}
~ computeVerdict(findings, {unverified, missingReviewers}) -> + allow_blocked_by.
Never raises a verdict, only withholds ALLOW. Unverified findings are NOT
counted into a severity tier: their severity was never substantiated, and
counting it would be invention.
~ runContract(payloads, {expectedReviewers}) -> + unverified,
missing_reviewers, allow_blocked_by. `suppressed` stays the union of
dropped + unverified, so existing consumers (gold-eval) keep their meaning.
agents/review-coordinator.md - Pass 2/3 tables gain a fate column, new
"Suppression is two-valued" section, Pass 4 threshold table gains the two
fail-closed rows, Executive Summary must state a withheld ALLOW, Suppressed
Findings tags each line [dropped]/[unverified]. Pass 3's unknown-rule_key
bullet explicitly says high-effort does not reach that branch, so the same
input never has two documented fates.
commands/trekreview.md - Phase 5 "Reviewer accounting": the expected set is
written down before the spawn, a silent reviewer gets one re-ask and then
STOP. That extends the pattern already in the file (schema failure -> 2
bounded re-asks -> "do not feed unvalidated findings to the coordinator") to
the other two ways a reviewer goes missing, rather than softening it to WARN.
The lib's missing_reviewers stays as belt-and-braces for direct callers.
docs/agent-return-channel-defect.md - the "inferred, not observed" caveat on
the unnamed arm above 66 lines is struck: akashic-intelligence S27
(f168630) measured 2/2 unnamed agents returning against a 4370-line plan,
30449 B and 10989 B, both valid JSON. Recorded with akashic's own two
caveats intact - the measurer owns the finding, and byte-identity between
the returned string and the file on disk was not proven. The separate S25
named-arm figures are left standing; these are two measurements, not a
correction of one by the other.
No release, no version bump, no tag, no catalogue ref, no Workflow port.
Suite 1025 (1023/0/2) -> 1034 (1032/0/2), 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bounded-cost NFR asks for explicit ceilings on BOTH axes - max
conversation turns and max discovered dimensions. The turn axis got
MAX_CONV_TURNS, a ledger-backed reader and a PreToolUse enforcer. The
discovery axis got one sentence in Phase 4.5 prose ("append candidates only
while the whole list stays at or below maxDimensions: 8") with no constant
of its own, no reader, and no test that a run exceeding it is caught. That
is the brief_reviewer_iter_cap shape the operator decision warned about: a
cap nothing reads.
checkDimensionCeiling() is the reader, exposed on the CLI as
--check-dimensions N (exit 0 within, exit 1 rejected), and Phase 4.5 step 3
now calls it once the final list is settled instead of merely describing the
bound.
Three deliberate choices:
- The ceiling IS MAX_TOTAL_DIMENSIONS, the constant that sizes the turn
budget. Both axes read one settings.json:16 value, so they cannot end up
enforcing different numbers - a second constant is how that drift starts.
- An unreadable count is REJECTED ('abc', null, undefined, {}, -1, NaN,
non-integers). A cost ceiling that waves through what it cannot measure is
not a ceiling.
- --check-dimensions requires no run id, effort or VOYAGE_STORM_ENABLED.
Phase 4.5 never calls the budget gate - that is why its skip-guard reads
the flag directly - so the ceiling check must not inherit the gate's
preconditions.
The mitigation the review already verified still holds and is unchanged:
MAX_TOTAL_DIMENSIONS bounds actual retrieval cost regardless of how many
dimensions discovery appends. What was missing was anything that FAILS on a
list over the bound, and now a run over it is rejected by exit code.
Review finding 96a3ee51152dfe72aca703f771843f2f3639e7b6 (MINOR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
The SC asks two things of an effort: high run: that it discovered at least
one dimension AND that the dimension list in the output brief is a TRUE
SUPERSET of the interview-derived ones. activationCheck computed
dimensions - dimensions_baseline >= 1 and returned ok on that alone. A
count delta says nothing about membership: a run that dropped two
interview dimensions and appended three discovered ones is +1 and passed
the check while violating the second half outright. Supersetness was
asserted only by Phase 4.5's prose contract that discovery appends -
nothing read it.
The stats record cannot carry the dimension names that would show it
directly: names are free prose, and lib/exporters/field-allowlist.mjs
denies prose by omission (question, project_dir, brief_path are already
excluded for that reason). So the run attests membership with
dimensions_baseline_preserved, a boolean set in a new Phase 4.5 step 5,
and the gate refuses to call activation OK without it. An ABSENT
attestation fails rather than falling back to the old count-only rule -
otherwise legacy rows would keep passing on the defect.
Producer side wired end to end: the record format, the measurement-fields
prose (five fields -> six), the exporter allowlist, the jsonl-schemas
fixture row, and the --activation-check comment in
docs/storm-measurement.md.
Review finding d2786604458207a5a73478cdcb6a54bbdb92141d (MINOR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
allowTurn() appends BEFORE the turn runs, so during granted turn N the
ledger holds N records. The hook denied at `used >= budget`, which blocked
every tool call of the FINAL granted turn: the primitive granted B turns
and the harness permitted B-1. Worse, an exhausted run therefore always
terminated through an exit-2 tool denial instead of the graceful "cap
exhausted" exit at commands/trekresearch.md - and the prose says in as
many words that exit 2 is not exit 1, so the model was pushed out through
the one exit it is told NOT to treat as a cap.
The review recommended denying at `used > budget`. Taken alone that fixes
the count and breaks the hook: once the O_EXCL claim (previous commit)
makes a breached ledger impossible, `granted > budget` can no longer fire,
and the case this hook exists for - the loop consults the gate, is denied,
and issues the tool call anyway - would be allowed. A deny branch that
cannot be reached is a dead security claim, which is the same thing S82
removed two of rather than leave standing.
So the denial itself became a record. allowTurn() appends a tombstone
{runId, exhausted: true} when it denies for budget, and the hook denies on
the tombstone. Both properties now hold at once:
granted == budget, no tombstone -> turn B is in flight -> ALLOW
tombstone present -> the gate already said no -> DENY
granted > budget -> breached, any cause -> DENY
A tombstone is not a turn: readLedger reports {granted, exhausted}
separately so it can never consume budget. allowTurn short-circuits on an
existing tombstone, so a hammered gate neither re-walks every slot nor
grows the ledger. The tombstone write is best effort on purpose - the
denial is already the correct answer, so a ledger that cannot take the
record must not turn a denial into a grant.
The parallel-boundary test now asserts GRANTED turns rather than raw
ledger lines, because the denied callers legitimately add tombstones.
Review finding 8eb53458ac3efec778094f9f03b09e1cc1077a09 (MINOR).
Operator decision: tombstone over the literal recommended_action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
countTurns-then-appendFileSync is read-then-write. N callers that all
observe used == budget-1 all decide to grant, and the bound is exceeded
by N-1. The comment above allowTurn asserted "Append-only: never
read-modify-write" and named the concurrent case - Phase 4.5/5 may spawn
several agents in a single message - as the reason it had to be. The
decision path was exactly what the comment denied, so the concurrency
claim had nothing under it.
Each grant now creates <data root>/trekresearch-loop-claims/<runId>-<slot>.claim
with flag 'wx' (O_CREAT|O_EXCL) before appending. The kernel picks the
winner per slot, slot numbers are bounded by the budget, and each can be
created exactly once - so total grants for a run cannot exceed the budget
however many callers arrive together. The ledger count now only says
where to start looking for a free slot.
Two of the three tests are deterministic and do not race anything: they
assert the invariant directly by pre-creating claims, including the state
a mid-append competitor leaves behind (ledger 7, slots 1-8 claimed, budget
8 -> deny). That matters because the third test - six real concurrent shim
processes at the boundary - passed even BEFORE the fix, since process
startup jitter serialised them. A race test that passes by luck is not
evidence, so it ships as a real-world regression guard next to the two
that are.
Stated rather than left to be discovered: claim files are empty, at most
budget per run, and never cleaned - the same standing as the ledger, which
also grows for the life of the data root. Reusing a runId across runs, or
two runIds colliding after filename sanitisation, both deny a turn, which
is the safe direction for a budget control.
Review finding 3994491ef1fdba6e0e3645b5b713cbdbdeb2b328 (MINOR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
An unreadable ledger returned 0 from countTurns in BOTH the primitive and
the hook, so a run whose ledger existed but could not be read (EISDIR,
EACCES, EIO) was handed the full budget again on every call - unbounded.
research-loop-cap.mjs argues against exactly that three lines above the
code that did it, and its missing-DIRECTORY case already failed closed.
The unreadable-FILE case now agrees with it.
Only ENOENT still counts as zero turns spent: that is the legitimate
first-turn state, and the reason this cannot just throw on any read
failure.
The hook no longer carries its own countTurns. It imports the primitive's
exported readLedger(), the same way it already resolves the data root
through resolveDataRoot() - a reader and a writer with private copies of
the counting rule is how a hook ends up enforcing a different bound than
the gate it backs. In scope + cannot count now exits 2 with a message
that says counting failed, not that the budget is spent.
Fail-closed stays scoped to the loop: a test pins that an unreadable
ledger in an OUT-of-scope session still exits 0, because a PreToolUse
hook that over-blocks bricks every session on the box.
Also dropped the existsSync pre-check before the read - readFileSync's
own ENOENT carries the same information without a second syscall that
can disagree with the read that follows it.
Review finding 5e1c6230f48ead38fa77cd8f4b06bfdc2b5b7bbf (MINOR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
A fractional TREKRESEARCH_MAX_CONV_TURNS below 1 cleared the `n <= 0`
guard on its raw value and only then floored, so '0.5' and '0.9' became
0 and the budget became 0 x MAX_TOTAL_DIMENSIONS = 0: every turn denied,
the loop silently dead rather than bounded.
README.md:229 and docs/architecture.md:15 both promise that invalid
values fall back to 3. docs/command-modes.md:42 enumerated "empty,
non-numeric, zero, or negative" and happened to sidestep the case; the
enumeration is now exhaustive about it.
Measured before: '0.5' -> 0, '0.9' -> 0, '2.7' -> 2, '' / 'abc' / '-2'
/ '0' -> 3. Measured after: '0.5' -> 3, '0.9' -> 3, '2.7' -> 2, and
'Infinity' -> 3 (it is not a cap either).
A cap of 0 is not a narrower cap, it is an off switch. The tests pin
both directions: the fraction falls back, and allowTurn cannot report a
budget of 0 under it.
Review finding fc516799e6042e246a4b62d81903ac27c2efab84 (MINOR).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LuGhWAbWyRFBFeemfhxoVv
CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA is empty in the Bash tool's process env, and the Phase 5
bash snippet is the cap's only caller. resolveLedgerPath() returned null there
and allowTurn() failed closed, so the budget gate denied turn 1 of every real
run: the loop this delivery exists to bound could never spend a turn, and the
pre-registered measurement could not be run at all.
resolveDataRoot() is now the single root for everything the loop writes --
CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA when the harness sets it, ~/.claude/voyage when it does
not. Three consumers resolve through it, which is the point: the cap ledger,
the PreToolUse hook's scope-marker lookup, and the command's bash snippets.
A writer and a reader that resolved the root separately are what made the
enforcement hook allow unconditionally in every real run while CLAUDE.md and
docs/architecture.md called it enforcing.
Same root cause, same commit:
- Marker write and remove now share ONE absolute-path guard and one root; the
write requires a non-empty CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID before composing the path
(unset, the marker was named `.json`, which no lookup matches and no TTL
sweep cleans up).
- The per-turn gates resolve VOYAGE_ROOT with a plugin-cache fallback and
reserve exit 2 for "gate could not run". Interpolating an empty
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} ran `node /lib/...` -> exit 1, which the contract read
as "privacy gate says no" -- an unsatisfiable rewrite loop no query could
clear.
Two now-unreachable deny branches are removed rather than left as dead safety
claims (allowTurn's no_plugin_data_dir; the hook's uncountable-ledger deny).
The fail-closed stance stays where it is still real: a ledger that cannot be
WRITTEN denies the turn.
Verified end-to-end through the real bash snippets and the real hook with both
variables stripped and HOME sandboxed: marker written under the fallback root,
8 turns spent, 9th denied, hook exits 2, and exits 0 again after removal.
Note: the fallback exit-2 branch fires against the installed v5.9.1 cache,
which predates lib/util/research-loop-cap.mjs -- correct behaviour, and it
clears when the plugin is reinstalled.
Review findings 2670c10a, fbd6d534, 93550dfb.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011vPSXe88qp5aqWUqbDNWoF
Review finding 91e21c1f (MAJOR emitted, catalogue tier BLOCKER). Live in every
session regardless of the STORM flag.
The hard-block tier is the one thing no operator flag unlocks - not `strict`,
not `--soft`, not VOYAGE_QUERY_PRIVACY_ALLOW=1 - so a format it misses is a
secret leaving the machine in an outbound query with no second gate behind it.
Two patterns keyed on a run of consecutive alphanumerics, which a `-` or `_`
inside the token body breaks:
- /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/ was commented "OpenAI/Anthropic-style" but the run
ends after `api03` (3 chars) in an Anthropic Console key, so
sk-ant-api03-<~95> passed through. Measured by execution, not read.
- /\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b/ covered only the classic prefix: github_pat_<...>
and gho_<36> passed through; ghp_<36> was blocked.
Widened with one pattern per real-world format rather than one loose pattern,
so each stays readable and its length floor stays honest:
- sk-ant-<scheme>-<20+ base64url> (covers api03 and oat01)
- gh[pousr]_<36+> (classic PAT, OAuth, user, server, refresh)
- github_pat_<20+ incl. underscore> (fine-grained, real format is <22>_<59>)
Patterns whose body class includes `-`/`_` carry no trailing \b - it would not
fire on a non-word final character. The existing sk-/AKIA/xox/PEM patterns are
unchanged; the AWS comment is accurate as written, so it was left alone.
Formats verified against GitHub's token-format documentation and Anthropic key
anatomy before the patterns were written, not from memory:
- github.blog/engineering/platform-security/behind-githubs-new-authentication-token-formats/
- gh[pousr]_ + 36 chars; github_pat_ + <22>_<59> = 93 total
- sk-ant-api03- + ~95 base64url chars (base64url includes _ and -)
6 new tests: three table rows for the missed formats, and three that pin each
one blocked with `strict: false` AND the opt-in env var set at once - the
property that makes this tier meaningful.
Suite 952 (950/0/2, baseline 937 + 15 across both Track A fixes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013zNqxP8qTWgJhn3wMYUFEh
The documented `brief-validator.mjs <brief.md>` invocation (no flags) always
bailed to Usage/exit 2. Root cause: when --min-version is absent, minIdx is -1,
so the skip index minIdx+1 was 0 — excluding argv index 0, exactly where the
file positional sits in the no-flag case. Any leading flag (--soft, --json)
pushed the file to index >=1 and masked the bug, so the function-level tests
never caught it.
Guard the skip index to -1 when --min-version is absent. Add two CLI regression
tests (execFileSync, matching the next-session-prompt-validator pattern):
no-flag invocation reaches validation, and --min-version still skips its value
token to find the file. Suite 822 -> 824 (822/0/2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WH1krHamUehZh6JqVqs85t
Scores committed agent-run fixtures against the golden corpus at
(file, rule_key) granularity, building on the deterministic coordinator
contract (4a). Offline: committed reviewer payloads, no live agent spawn,
no LLM, no network (the LLM-in-the-loop grading is the separate 4c tier).
- lib/review/gold-scorer.mjs: scoreFindings (precision/recall/f1 at
(file,rule_key) granularity, line+severity ignored) + scoreVerdict; pure,
with documented vacuous-set conventions.
- tests/fixtures/bakeoff-rich/runs/run-perfect.json: committed run that
reproduces all 5 seeded gold findings through runContract.
- tests/lib/gold-eval.test.mjs: the scoring RUN (precision/recall/f1 = 1.0,
verdict == expected_verdict BLOCK, nothing suppressed/skipped).
- lib/util/test-census.mjs: third census category (goldEval) — a scoring run
is neither behavior coverage nor a doc-pin; honest-count invariant now 3-way.
- docs/eval-corpus/README.md: 4b moved from Future hardening to implemented.
Suite 809 -> 822 (820/0/2). gold-scorer covers TP+FP+FN+degenerate paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BJQYC5vpkJWxndS55vQQZ6
