Round 7 (516dffa..45aa9e1, WARN: 12 MAJOR, 0 BLOCKER) and the fence defect
found while writing its review.md. Each fix began with a test that failed on
0f400d3 (v6.3.0); suite 2208 (2206/0/2), 14 tests more.
- Tests-only (operator 2026-10-11): the plan's Files: alone decides, and the
text says so (red-proof, trekexecute Sub-step B, step-implementer,
HANDOVER-CONTRACTS). red-proof no longer reads the step's diff, so a change
already in the tree when the step began no longer counts against it, and a
plan placed outside .claude/ reads the same. The round-6 test that had the
diff overrule the plan is rewritten to the new rule.
- The Files: reader keeps a plain file beside a backticked path
(", Dockerfile", "the CLI entry src/cli.mjs", "and Makefile"). Measured on
the 520 Files: fields in 182 plans: no field reads differently.
- Red proof reports a command its timeout killed as killed after the timeout,
not "could not start"; the release check tells a timeout from output past
its buffer and from another signal. One reading of a stop
(criteria-runner stoppedBy) for red proof, the criteria runner and the
release check.
- A trailing `# comment` is dropped in a backticked check too, and in a
command passed as written, so the words screened are the words run.
- The release check reads a relative --review in --repo.
- The 15-minute timeout is defined once (criteria-runner.mjs).
- The findings check reads each cited file once per validation.
- One isMain helper (lib/util/is-main.mjs) for every CLI: the 31 copies of
the realpath guard and the 20 modules still on the file:// guard, which
exited 0 having done nothing under a symlink or a path with a space.
- The Bash guard writes its no-one-to-ask refusal once, on a direct condition.
- The findings check ends a ```json block only at a fence on its own line, so
three backticks inside a JSON string no longer end it (also in 6.2.0).
- Brief-conformance notes: a test for test-lock green on exit 127 (it
passed at once; it fails when 127 is read as could-not-run); the prose now
names the git revision `@~1` as the one leading-@ exception.
Not changed: the example plan's steps 1-2 keep their tests-only warning
(operator decision 2026-10-09; the r5 test records it). Brief note 4 (a
Regression: whose runner is not installed goes to the fix rounds) is a
routing question for the operator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 6 (v6.2.0..c3641ff, WARN: 11 MAJOR, 3 MINOR; 0 BLOCKER). The round-5
fixes hold (code-correctness-reviewer); three of the new MAJOR were side
effects of running checks with no shell. Each fixed behind a test that
failed first on c3641ff.
- git checks stay in the repo too: no path that climbs out with .., starts
at / or reads <rev>:../x, and no --no-index (both reviewers).
- A trailing `# comment` on a shell-fence line is dropped: with no shell,
its words made an honest check NOT RUN, among them the first check of the
shipped example plan.
- A glob reaches `node --test` only on Node 21 and later, which expands it
itself; on an older Node it is refused with that reason (engines >=18).
- With no shell, exit 126/127 is the test program's own: red proof reads it
as a red (the control run still tells an environment fault apart), the
done line and the test lock as a failure.
- A runner that could not start (not installed) is NOT RUN in the criteria
runner and not-run (exit 2) in regression-check, as red-proof and
done-line already said; never a red suite.
- Tests-only: a backticked `Makefile` alone in its entry is a path, and red
proof confirms the plan's tests-only reading against the step's own diff
(the altitude finding: the diff is a fact, the Files: prose is not).
- release-check stops a suite that never ends (15 minutes) and reads it as
not measured (exit 2).
- The two lines this release added to pre-bash-executor.mjs are ASCII.
- MINOR: git and the other runners share one plain-word pattern.
Not in this round: MINOR f00a2eb8 (shared norm/ticked-path and isMain
helpers) and MINOR on plan-review-dedup's repeated tokenizing.
Suite 2194 (2192/0/2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review of v6.2.0..f669b87 (BLOCK: 1 BLOCKER, 12 MAJOR, 1 MINOR), each
fixed behind a test that failed first, or, for the two missing tests, a test
shown to fail on a stub of the branch it covers.
- Review steps appended by /trekexecute Phase 7.2 are held to the step rules
on any plan version: plan-validator --steps-from <N> (on a plan below 1.8 a
template review step validated and was executed).
- The guard refuses where no one can be asked also when its rules will not
load; the wave merge path names that refusal instead of MERGE_REFUSED.
Tests for the classifier-error refusal and post-approval-log's own check.
- release-check: the version files may change only in their version after
the review (JSON compared without it), README diff lines are read inside
hunks only, an unreadable diff is exit 2, and npm test runs without
NODE_TEST_CONTEXT.
- What counts as a step of only tests: a note in parentheses is not a path,
and a data file under specs/ is not a test. End-to-end: rides on the last
step that builds behaviour (validator hint, trekplan, template).
- A removed line is cited as <rev>:<path>:<line> (findings-schema hint,
trekreview re-ask).
- skill-lint counts a trailing newline as no line; regression-check takes
commandEnv from lib/util/command-env.mjs; CLAUDE.md names four mode-read
exemptions.
- /security-review, older than v6.2.0: the criteria runner refuses git
--output, which writes a file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the permission mode that shows no prompts, pre-bash-executor refused only a
merge into main and a push. A tag, a package publish and destructive git still
went through unattended, which is what the approval guard exists to stop. Now
every call it would ask about, and a command it could not read, is refused
there with the way forward (operator decision 2026-10-09). No new exemption:
the mode is still read in one place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave 2, order 6. /trekexecute now:
- refuses a plan whose logged approval does not cover its current sha256
(K2, approval-log verify --kind plan), before step 1;
- runs the step check (K9) and the step's optional Regression: (K10, new
lib/verification/regression-check.mjs through the criteria runner) at step
end, before the checkpoint; exit 2 is "not measured", never green;
- runs the architecture rules (K5) and the plan-file sweep (K6) after the last
step; a violation or a file outside the plan turns completed into partial;
- reviews by itself in the closing run (Phase 7.2): run the thing, /simplify,
/trekreview, verdict-gate; a BLOCK adds the review's remediation steps after
the plan validator accepts them and the operator re-approves the plan, capped
at TREKEXECUTE_MAX_REVIEW_ROUNDS (3);
- makes the main-merge gate a lock on the verdict: BLOCK or undecided keeps
the merge closed; when open, the executor merges and the guard's question is
the one question (operator decision 2026-10-08). The --gates pause before
the wave merge-back is gone for the same reason.
The guard refuses a merge into main and a push in the permission mode that
shows no prompts, since no one can be asked (operator decision 2026-10-09; two
mode-read exemptions approved by the operator).
progress.json gains optional coupling fields (Handover 5); the validator
rejects the runner's exitCode in plan_verification.failed_criteria (C15).
Pointer lines name the skills test-first and debugging (S2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave-1 order 4 (P7, P12, the P9 test lock, the P3 plan-approval guard).
All command hooks; none runs a model.
- P12: pre-bash-executor answers permissionDecision "ask" before merge
into main, push, tag/publish and destructive git (holds in auto mode).
post-approval-log writes exactly what the person was asked to the K2
approval log: merge/push to main as `merge`, tag/publish as `release`,
with a one-hour expiry; nothing when no person was asked.
- P3: pre-plan-gate runs the K3 plan gate on a Voyage plan leaving plan
mode and sends a refused plan back; "not measured" asks, never passes.
- P9: lib/util/test-lock.mjs (K8). pre-write-executor refuses edits to
locked test files; stop-test-lock refuses "done" for the locking
session (stop_hook_active guarded).
- P7: post-edit-check runs the target repo's own formatter/linter per
edit, only during a Voyage plan run or after opt-in
(.claude/voyage-guards.json); lib/verification/step-check.mjs (K9) fails
the step on findings; no tool reads "not measured", never green.
- STORM cap matcher also names `Agent` (the tool's name since 2.1.63).
- Mod precondition stated in README, SECURITY.md and every PreToolUse stop
guard: Voyage's guards are deterministic only when no installed mod
handles `tool.check`.
K2, K3 and K5 are stubbed in tests until orders 2 and 3 are merged.
Two independent review rounds; every finding has a regression test.
Suite 1600 (1598 pass / 0 fail / 2 skipped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review finding 4638fea9 (MAJOR emitted, catalogue tier BLOCKER). Live in every
session regardless of the STORM flag, so it is not deferrable to the measurement
decision.
Anchoring the rule to command position (S75-S78) was right in intent - the
unanchored word match blocked quoted grep patterns, heredoc data and commit
messages - but it ran against the whitespace-collapsed string. Measured against
normalizeCommand() output, five forms that the previous rule blocked were
allowed:
- newline separator: \s+ -> ' ' collapsed the newline BEFORE the pattern ran,
making the \n branch of the separator class dead code
- `&` background separator: absent from the class entirely
- `bash -c` / `sh -c`: the wrapped command sits inside quotes, never at
command position
- `xargs <cmd>`: no separator in front of the command at all
And it missed its own motivating case: `grep "a|b" f` stayed blocked, because
the `|` inside the quotes still read as a separator.
Fix: the rule now runs against a command-position view (`commandView: true`,
per-rule input selection) instead of the collapsed string. The view keeps
newlines, adds `&` to the separator class, and classifies each span:
- quoted spans -> data (one space), so a grep alternation, echoed prose and a
commit message pass
- EXCEPT the argument of a shell wrapper (`sh -c`, `bash -c`, with optional
sudo and absolute path) -> spliced back in at command position
- heredoc bodies -> data, keeping the operator line. Restoring the newline
separator without this would newly block every heredoc line starting with a
matched word - the exact friction anchoring existed to remove
- `xargs [flags]` -> separator inserted after the flags
Two defects found while verifying, both the same regression class and both
fixed here rather than left:
- `\name` runs name (the backslash only suppresses alias expansion). The old
unanchored rule blocked it; the anchored one allowed it.
- heredoc bodies, as above - a false positive this change would otherwise have
introduced.
Known limit, stated rather than implied: `xargs -I {} <cmd>` is not parsed, so
the inserted separator lands before the argument, not the command.
Other BLOCK rules are untouched and still run against the collapsed string.
Verified by a 37-case adversarial probe through the real hook (all five bypass
forms, both wrapper forms, backslash, heredoc, quoted alternation, ordinary
commands, and the unrelated rules): 37/37 as expected. 9 new tests.
Suite 952 (950/0/2, baseline 937 + 15 across both Track A fixes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013zNqxP8qTWgJhn3wMYUFEh
S2 of the 2.1.181 upgrade. Schemas verified verbatim against the official
slash-commands and hooks docs before editing (a first-pass camelCase
'disallowedTools' claim was caught and corrected to kebab-case against the doc).
- CC-14 (SHIP): migrate all 7 hooks in hooks/hooks.json to exec-form
{command:"node", args:["${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/scripts/X.mjs"]}. Doc
recommends exec-form whenever a hook references a path placeholder; protects
consumers installing under a path with spaces. ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}
interpolates inside args (verified). hooks-json-stop-wired test made
form-agnostic (normalizes command+args to one invocation string).
- CC-11 (SHIP): add `disallowed-tools: Agent, TeamCreate` to trekexecute
frontmatter, enforcing its documented "No Agent tool, no TeamCreate" rule.
allowed-tools grants auto-approval but does NOT remove tools from the pool,
so the prior omission left Agent callable; disallowed-tools removes it.
trekexecute is the only command with a documented exclusion.
- CC-15 (DECIDE: keep universal): re-affirm F2 deferral. pre-bash/pre-write
executors stay universal -- session-agnostic safety (rm -rf /, ~/.ssh, .env)
that narrowing to execute-only would only weaken. Header comments corrected.
- CC-10 (DECIDE: design note, no code): no blanket Agent(model:opus) deny rule
-- would break balanced/economy profiles; any model-enforcement must be
profile-aware, deferred into W2. Folded into open question #3.
Matrix updated with S2 resolutions section. Tests 578 pass / 0 fail / 2 skip;
claude plugin validate passes (only pre-existing root-CLAUDE.md warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LqBYc8Ltrk7LipyJmGxXiB
Four-layer security model for ultraexecute-local and headless sessions:
Layer 1 — Plugin hooks: pre-bash-executor.mjs (13 BLOCK + 8 WARN rules
with bash evasion normalization) and pre-write-executor.mjs (8 path guard
rules blocking .git/hooks, .claude/settings, shell configs, .env, SSH/AWS).
Layer 2 — Prompt-level security rules: denylist in ultraexecute-local.md
Sub-step D and session-spec-template.md Security Constraints section.
These are the only rules that work in headless child sessions.
Layer 3 — Pre-execution plan validation: new Phase 2.4 scans all Verify
and Checkpoint commands against denylist before execution begins.
Layer 4 — Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with scoped
--allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep" --permission-mode
bypassPermissions in ultraexecute-local.md, headless-launch-template.md,
and session-decomposer.md. Blocks Agent, MCP, WebSearch in child sessions.
Also adds Hard Rules 14-16: verify command security check, no writing
outside repository root, no writing to security-sensitive paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
