- park-attempt-files: parks in the git dir (outside the work tree, so Sub-step C.2 never registers a parked file again), reads a path with a space, names a new file under a header it cannot read, parks a symlink, never overwrites a parked file, and exits 1 while a file the attempt made is still in the tree; the upward diff is saved in one form whatever the git config.
- brief-validator: BRIEF_SC_NOT_RUNNABLE only when a later backticked span is a command; a criterion that only names a flag or a path stays prose (Handover 1 says so now).
- review ids: counted over the final list (runContract), as fill-finding-ids counts review.md; trimmed_count matches rows by id; engine-findings and fidelity-diff use computeFindingIds; the --workflow dedup keeps one source's different findings apart, the decision-23 put-back stays one copy per triplet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pass 1 merged two different /code-review findings on (bin/slug.mjs, 46, CODE_REVIEW_DEFECT) and the second lost its row and its action. A reviewer never duplicates itself: its second finding on a triplet under another title stays its own row, with the id over rule_key#2 (the form critic-diff already uses); fill-finding-ids counts the same way (voyage-lekerepo trial 5, finding 7).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An adversarial read of d88245c reproduced 15 problems; all fixed here, each
with a test that fails on the old code.
- verdict-gate: a greener verdict must be backed by the LAST fence being a
`json` block of the right shape, with no BLOCKER in the JSON (any case),
in `## Findings (BLOCKER)`, or a differing finding-id list; two verdict
lines and more than one file argument are exit 2. ({}, null, lowercase
"blocker", a trailing ```jsonc and a later json fence all gave exit 0.)
- engine-findings: a transcribed "narrower" key can no longer lower an
engine tier; absolute paths under --repo-root match the scope; "12" lines
parse; an empty scope is an error; out-of-scope engine findings are
unverified (`engine:out-of-scope`) and forbid ALLOW.
- recurrence: the catch-all engine keys and keys normalised from unknown
ones are never proposed; the same unfixed finding in two iterations is not
a recurrence; proposals are validated before they are offered; \r/U+2028
and damaged markers are refused; writes go through a symlinked CLAUDE.md.
Prose points --repo at the session directory, not the git toplevel.
- Workflow substrate: engines are counted from what arrived, and the
verdict's floor is recomputed from the coordinator's findings; now tested
by running the script with stubbed Workflow globals. Two literal NUL bytes
written as \u0000 (git saw the file as binary).
- Trimming keeps Pass 1's "Also flagged by" provenance; `## Declined to
Judge` and remediation steps are required from review_version 1.1 only
(N-1); the zero-diff review now carries the JSON block the gate needs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ordre 5 (wave 1, P11 + P5), review_version 1.1.
- K7: `verdict: ALLOW | WARN | BLOCK` is required in review.md (strict
error, soft warning for 1.0 reviews). New CLI lib/review/verdict-gate.mjs:
0 = ALLOW/WARN, 1 = BLOCK, 2 = could not decide (never green); a verdict
greener than the file's own BLOCKERs or JSON block is exit 2. Realpath
main guard (the old file:// guard exits 0 under a symlink - measured).
- No finding is struck for length: succinctness trims only MINOR/SUGGESTION
text (catalogue tier), keeps BLOCKER/MAJOR whole, counts trims; the
coordinator lists what it declined to judge.
- Claude Code's /code-review and /security-review run as the engine via the
Skill tool (never --fix/--comment/--post/ultra); lib/review/engine-findings.mjs
turns their findings into a reviewer payload; two catalogue keys
(CODE_REVIEW_DEFECT, SECURITY_REVIEW_VULNERABILITY), catalogue 12 -> 14.
An engine that did not run forbids ALLOW.
- Every BLOCKER is written as a numbered `### Step R<n>` with its source
finding (strict error REVIEW_MISSING_REMEDIATION_STEP).
- P5: lib/review/recurrence.mjs - a finding class in two review.md files
(current + git history, no new store) becomes one proposal, routed by the
catalogue's memory_route; written only between Voyage markers in
.claude/rules/voyage-review-lessons.md under a size budget, CLAUDE.md gets
a pointer only; the operator approves every line (Phase 8.7).
- Workflow substrate: catalogue enum in step; a missing reviewer or engine
forbids ALLOW there too (it returned ALLOW on zero findings before).
- Fixtures review-run-A/B said WARN over a BLOCKER; now BLOCK.
Borrowed and credited in code: Superpowers (declined-to-judge), ai-native-sdlc
(cap only nits; mistake/fix/check), Spec Kit (managed block; converge steps),
Pocock (retro routing), Kiro (verdict file + gate; evidence per lesson),
Cherny (engine -> brief control order; review -> memory; budget).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up defect in the reviewer accounting added by e2aec01, found by review
and confirmed by probe before fixing.
validateFindings only WARNS on a missing `reviewer` field, so a payload can
fail schema while carrying no name. ingest then records `reviewer: null`, and
runContract turned that null into the literal reviewer name "unnamed reviewer".
MEASURED before the fix:
runContract([{findings:[{file:'x.mjs',line:1,rule_key:'NOPE',severity:'MAJOR'}]}],
{expectedReviewers:['code-correctness-reviewer']})
-> missing_reviewers = ["unnamed reviewer", "code-correctness-reviewer"]
One failure, two entries, one of them an agent nobody launched. The
`reported.delete(s.reviewer)` line was also inert for that case, since a null
name was never in the set to begin with.
Fix: skipped payloads are split by whether they carry a name. Named ones go to
missing_reviewers as before; anonymous ones increment the new
`unattributable_payloads` count, which forbids ALLOW on its own - so stripping
a reviewer name from a payload cannot restore ALLOW, and the floor does not
depend on the caller passing expectedReviewers. `allow_blocked_by` reports the
two facts separately: `missing-reviewer:<name>` and `unattributable-payload (n)`.
The old behaviour never produced a false ALLOW - it failed in the safe
direction - but it named a reviewer that did not exist, which is the kind of
output an operator would chase.
Iron Law: two failing tests first (double entry; anonymous-payload-alone must
forbid ALLOW), then the fix.
Also verified in this pass, by temporarily adding a fake reason to
UNVERIFIED_REASONS: the prose-vocabulary pin does go red when a reason is
declared in the lib but missing from agents/review-coordinator.md. A pin that
cannot fail is not a pin.
Suite 1034 (1032/0/2) -> 1036 (1034/0/2), 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
computeVerdict counted only the findings handed to it (reasoned.kept), so a
finding removed by Pass 2 or Pass 3, and a reviewer whose payload was thrown
away or never arrived, were arithmetically identical to a finding that never
existed. All three pushed the verdict toward ALLOW.
Measured before the fix (probes, 2026-09-01):
- a BLOCKER with a 101-character title -> ALLOW (Pass 2 succinctness)
- a payload with one ad-hoc rule_key is skipped WHOLE at ingest, taking a
valid BLOCKER sibling with it -> ALLOW
- a reviewer that never reported -> ALLOW
Pass 3's own no-citation / unknown-rule_key branches turned out unreachable
through runContract (validateFindings rejects those payloads first), so the
reachable exposure was Pass 2 plus the skipped/absent reviewer.
THE OPEN DESIGN DECISION, and why it went against the order's default.
The order proposed: indeterminate file-existence YES, plain succinctness NO
("a too-long finding is not an uncertain finding"). I kept the first and
overrode the second, on one principle:
A removal is `dropped` only when the test REFUTED the finding as a claim
about this codebase. Every other removal is `unverified`.
Succinctness and actionability read a `.length`. They never examine the claim,
so they cannot establish the finding is unreal - and dropping a BLOCKER for a
101-character title is precisely the fail-open shape being fixed. Three things
settled it:
1. Under the order's default the fix would have been almost inert. Pass 3's
drop branches are unreachable via runContract, so leaving Pass 2 out would
have left the only reachable finding-level exposure open.
2. Cost asymmetry, priced rather than asserted: the verdict is not a gate.
Handover 6 feeds `findings` filtered to BLOCKER+MAJOR into /trekplan
(commands/trekplan.md:218); `verdict` is optional metadata
(docs/HANDOVER-CONTRACTS.md:353). Nothing loops or re-plans on WARN. So a
false `unverified` costs WARN plus a printed reason; a false drop costs a
silent ALLOW over a live BLOCKER.
3. unknown-rule_key joins them for the same reason: an ad-hoc key is a real
defect wearing the wrong label, and v5.1.1 high-effort mode already KEEPS
those, normalised to PLAN_EXECUTE_DRIFT. Refuting them at normal effort
while keeping them at high effort would be incoherent.
no-citation stays a drop: a finding whose file is empty or whose line is
negative names no location, so it makes no checkable claim at all - the one
deterministic refutation, and what the Pass 3 prose already said it was.
Iron Law: tests/lib/coordinator-contract.test.mjs first, red (missing export +
the three measured ALLOWs), then production code. Two existing assertions were
updated AFTER implementation as contract changes, not to make the red pass.
A known-positive control pins that ALLOW is still reachable - without it,
"no ALLOW" is not a fail-closed contract, only a broken one.
lib/review/coordinator-contract.mjs
+ classifySuppression / REFUTING_REASONS / UNVERIFIED_REASONS - one
vocabulary owned by the lib, including the tokens only the LLM
coordinator emits (accuracy:refuted, file-existence:refuted/indeterminate),
so prose and lib cannot drift. Unclassified reasons default to unverified:
the default fails closed.
~ judgeFilter / reasonablenessFilter return {kept, dropped, unverified}
~ computeVerdict(findings, {unverified, missingReviewers}) -> + allow_blocked_by.
Never raises a verdict, only withholds ALLOW. Unverified findings are NOT
counted into a severity tier: their severity was never substantiated, and
counting it would be invention.
~ runContract(payloads, {expectedReviewers}) -> + unverified,
missing_reviewers, allow_blocked_by. `suppressed` stays the union of
dropped + unverified, so existing consumers (gold-eval) keep their meaning.
agents/review-coordinator.md - Pass 2/3 tables gain a fate column, new
"Suppression is two-valued" section, Pass 4 threshold table gains the two
fail-closed rows, Executive Summary must state a withheld ALLOW, Suppressed
Findings tags each line [dropped]/[unverified]. Pass 3's unknown-rule_key
bullet explicitly says high-effort does not reach that branch, so the same
input never has two documented fates.
commands/trekreview.md - Phase 5 "Reviewer accounting": the expected set is
written down before the spawn, a silent reviewer gets one re-ask and then
STOP. That extends the pattern already in the file (schema failure -> 2
bounded re-asks -> "do not feed unvalidated findings to the coordinator") to
the other two ways a reviewer goes missing, rather than softening it to WARN.
The lib's missing_reviewers stays as belt-and-braces for direct callers.
docs/agent-return-channel-defect.md - the "inferred, not observed" caveat on
the unnamed arm above 66 lines is struck: akashic-intelligence S27
(f168630) measured 2/2 unnamed agents returning against a 4370-line plan,
30449 B and 10989 B, both valid JSON. Recorded with akashic's own two
caveats intact - the measurer owns the finding, and byte-identity between
the returned string and the file on disk was not proven. The separate S25
named-arm figures are left standing; these are two measurements, not a
correction of one by the other.
No release, no version bump, no tag, no catalogue ref, no Workflow port.
Suite 1025 (1023/0/2) -> 1034 (1032/0/2), 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
