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1be961aab1
fix(gate): part 2 verifier findings — non-object findings, carried backed copy, rule_keys, marks, approval prose, brief_path, engine put-back once
1. plan-review-dedup skips only a null or undefined finding; any other
   entry that is not an object (a string, a number, an array) goes on as
   before E, a finding with no valid severity that the plan gate counts as
   a blocker (it was dropped, so a string blocker recorded PASS).
2. plan-gate --record: a previous finding that rule A carried as counted and
   whose id is backed this round leaves the counted set, the counts, the
   verdict and the stop rule's summary (it was counted and listed in
   known_outside at once: BLOCK, not-fewer, and --accept-open refused).
3. A known_outside entry keeps rule_keys; extractVerdict accepts it (a list
   of strings), and the bare gate re-checks with the same keys the recorder
   used, so a merged finding whose security key is only in rule_keys is a
   WARN, not a STOP.
4. plan-critic, scope-guardian and /trekplan Phase 9's round-2 sentences say
   the Critic Verdict also lists known_outside and each is marked by id in
   previous. Code already accepts such a mark (dedup passes it; countRound
   ignores ids it does not carry; --record removes the entry on true);
   pinned in diff mode and full count.
5. The approval prose names ## Threat Model where it named only ## Intent +
   ## Goal: skills/annotating/SKILL.md (description, step 4, guard list),
   docs/command-modes.md, Handover 1's intent_approved_hash row, README
   (approval, Approve row, intent approval gate) and CLAUDE.md's /trekbrief
   row.
6. threat-model.mjs gains usableInRepo (a brief path relative to the repo
   top level) and repoRelativeBrief; --record stores brief_path relative to
   the top level, never absolute, and both gates read it from there, so the
   gate run from a subdirectory reads the same brief. reviewThreatModel
   uses usableInRepo. Handover 4 and the gate header say so.
7. review-finalize's outside pass puts an entry back only when no finding
   carries its row yet (engine-compare rowOf): an engine finding listed in
   known_outside while its payload is saved went back twice.
8. A test runs scripts/release-check.mjs on a review whose known_outside
   entry the brief does not back: exit 2 (control: backed passes the review
   check).

Existing tests changed: plan-gate-threat-model's entry-keys assertion now
expects rule_keys (item 3), and its planted non-security entry drops the
security key from rule_keys too, since the gate reads rule_keys (item 3).

Part 2 fix round of the E plan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 10:50:20 +01:00
98171d7d3b
feat(gate): the brief's threat model on the plan side (decision 164, 218, 220)
plan-gate.mjs --record --brief <brief.md> (a known flag; its value is kept
out of the positional arguments, a missing value is a usage error) applies
the brief's threat model to the deduped findings before countRound when
threat-model.mjs usable() says it may: a backed finding (Voyage's own
security finding whose threat_model_ref equals an Outside: line's text)
leaves the counted set and the stop rule and goes to the new optional
verdict field known_outside ({id, rule_key, text, line}), carried to later
rounds until a reviewer marks it resolved or it is reported again under its
id. The verdict stores brief_path (carried when a later round has none).
The --record line adds known_outside (a count) and threat_model
({applied, why}): a threat model that is not usable backs nothing, every
security finding counts, and the output says why. extractVerdict
shape-checks both new fields.

The bare gate re-reads the brief at brief_path each run: an entry still
backed is a warning, PLAN_GATE_KNOWN_OUTSIDE; one no longer backed (line
gone, approval stale or not logged, brief unreadable, no brief_path, or not
a Voyage security finding) stops the plan, PLAN_GATE_OUTSIDE_NOT_BACKED: it
counts in full. gatePlan takes an optional threatModel for tests.

plan-review-dedup keeps threat_model_ref on a merge only when every merged
copy carries the same one; the S160 known issue is fixed: a null in a
reviewer's findings list is skipped instead of crashing the CLI.

plan-critic and scope-guardian: a security finding needs a concrete attack
path and high confidence (Claude Code's threshold, 167), uses
SECURITY_INJECTION or SECURITY_RISK, and quotes the Outside: line's text in
threat_model_ref when one applies; the json template carries the field.
/trekplan Phase 9 passes the brief path to plan-critic and --brief to
--record. Handover 4 names the two fields, the two codes and the flag.

Part 2, step 2.4 of the E plan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 09:04:08 +01:00
5cb2918baa
feat(review): the critic's own security key SECURITY_RISK (decision 167)
lib/review/rule-catalogue.mjs gains SECURITY_RISK (BLOCKER, category
security, memory route rule): Voyage's own security key for a finding by
its own reviewers that SECURITY_INJECTION does not cover.
SECURITY_REVIEW_VULNERABILITY is described as the engines' key only.
plan-critic and scope-guardian name SECURITY_INJECTION or SECURITY_RISK
and no longer the engines' key.

The count moves from 17 to 18 in every pin: rule-catalogue.test,
claude-md-scope [CAT] (which now also refuses a stale 17), doc-consistency,
review-prose-pins, docs/architecture.md and the two reviewer agents.
critic-severity-rules pins three security keys; its "every security key
named" check leaves out the engines' key, and a new pin says the critic
never names it.

Existing tests changed for the planned rule: the four count pins above
(17 -> 18), and critic-severity-rules' two-key test (now three keys).
tests/lib/engine-findings.test.mjs: a comment naming the "(17 keys)" pin
now says 18.

Part 2, step 2.3 of the E plan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 08:55:34 +01:00
08e8aa1c66
docs(review): stop rule in the plan loop, review loop and critic prompts (decision 217, 220)
/trekplan Phase 9: when --record or the gate reports the stop rule there
is no new round; AskUserQuestion with the class and counts, "Known issue"
(--accept-open, a security finding refused) or "New mechanism" (stop, the
plan stays unapproved); the round-3 blocker path never offers
--extra-round after the stop rule. Phase 10 prints round of
max_rounds + extra_rounds.

/trekexecute Phase 7.2 step 4: after a round-2 BLOCK or fixed-pending,
before any R-step, review-rounds.mjs prepare --dry-run; review-stop-rule:
gives the same question ("Known issue" = /trekreview --answers, a BLOCKER
keeps the merge locked; "New mechanism" = stop). /trekreview Phase 3 tells
the stop rule's exit 1 from the cap's. plan-critic and scope-guardian:
rule_key names the class, never the instance.

New pins in review-loop-docs, critic-severity-rules and review-prose-pins.

Part 1, step 1.4 of the E plan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 07:16:05 +01:00
8295601965
chore(cleanup): remove the June trials, orchestrator docs, dormant agent, caller-less code and the fix-round chain
R4-R7 of the cleanup list (decision 188): the June trial docs and
fixtures, the three orchestrator reference docs, the dormant
synthesis-agent, code with no caller (project-discovery, bash-normalize,
fidelity-diff, test-census, the next-session prompt validator, arm B and
the --workflow flag) and the fix-round chain. Living docs repointed; the
reasons for in-session orchestration and the all-opus pin are now written
in docs/architecture.md and docs/profiles.md.

New tests/lib/living-paths.test.mjs: living tracked text names only
plugin paths that exist (seen red with 22 dead pointers before this
commit). docs/T1-cc26-delegated-orchestration.md and
lib/review/gold-scorer.mjs stay until R-b: the frozen end-state registry
names them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 12:51:54 +01:00
fb5afd0a98
fix(plan): plan-critic and scope-guardian state rule B, mark previous findings and tag security findings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 01:06:42 +02:00