Undone: item 2 of the Part 2 fix round (1be961a). recordVerdict no longer
drops a copy rule A carried as counted when a finding with the same id is
backed this round, and no longer recomputes the counts, `lowered` and the
stop-rule summary for it; the isLowered helper and the SEVERITIES import it
needed are gone. Why: the id is (file, line, rule_key), so a DIFFERENT
backed security finding at the same line and key knocked a counted security
finding inside the threat model out of the count (round 2 PASS, its text
gone), against decisions 218 and 220.
The rule now, as decided: the threat model applies only to this round's
new findings (the deduped findings, before countRound); a finding counted
in an earlier round stays counted, through rule A's carry, until a reviewer
marks it resolved. The gate never counts less. Items 1 and 3-8 of the fix
round are untouched.
Tests: the fix-round case for item 2 now asserts the decided rule (the
carried copy stays counted, BLOCK, the stop rule fires not-fewer, the gate
stops); a new case pins that a different backed finding at the same line
and key leaves the counted one, with its own text, in the count.
The plan-gate header and the known_outside comment, and Handover 4's
known_outside sentence, state the rule. CHANGELOG Unreleased, Known issues:
a finding counted earlier stays counted when an Outside: line approved
later puts it outside, or when it moves to another plan line; the way on is
the operator's choice at the stop rule.
Part 2 of the E plan, decision 221.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. plan-review-dedup skips only a null or undefined finding; any other
entry that is not an object (a string, a number, an array) goes on as
before E, a finding with no valid severity that the plan gate counts as
a blocker (it was dropped, so a string blocker recorded PASS).
2. plan-gate --record: a previous finding that rule A carried as counted and
whose id is backed this round leaves the counted set, the counts, the
verdict and the stop rule's summary (it was counted and listed in
known_outside at once: BLOCK, not-fewer, and --accept-open refused).
3. A known_outside entry keeps rule_keys; extractVerdict accepts it (a list
of strings), and the bare gate re-checks with the same keys the recorder
used, so a merged finding whose security key is only in rule_keys is a
WARN, not a STOP.
4. plan-critic, scope-guardian and /trekplan Phase 9's round-2 sentences say
the Critic Verdict also lists known_outside and each is marked by id in
previous. Code already accepts such a mark (dedup passes it; countRound
ignores ids it does not carry; --record removes the entry on true);
pinned in diff mode and full count.
5. The approval prose names ## Threat Model where it named only ## Intent +
## Goal: skills/annotating/SKILL.md (description, step 4, guard list),
docs/command-modes.md, Handover 1's intent_approved_hash row, README
(approval, Approve row, intent approval gate) and CLAUDE.md's /trekbrief
row.
6. threat-model.mjs gains usableInRepo (a brief path relative to the repo
top level) and repoRelativeBrief; --record stores brief_path relative to
the top level, never absolute, and both gates read it from there, so the
gate run from a subdirectory reads the same brief. reviewThreatModel
uses usableInRepo. Handover 4 and the gate header say so.
7. review-finalize's outside pass puts an entry back only when no finding
carries its row yet (engine-compare rowOf): an engine finding listed in
known_outside while its payload is saved went back twice.
8. A test runs scripts/release-check.mjs on a review whose known_outside
entry the brief does not back: exit 2 (control: backed passes the review
check).
Existing tests changed: plan-gate-threat-model's entry-keys assertion now
expects rule_keys (item 3), and its planted non-security entry drops the
security key from rule_keys too, since the gate reads rule_keys (item 3).
Part 2 fix round of the E plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
plan-gate.mjs --record --brief <brief.md> (a known flag; its value is kept
out of the positional arguments, a missing value is a usage error) applies
the brief's threat model to the deduped findings before countRound when
threat-model.mjs usable() says it may: a backed finding (Voyage's own
security finding whose threat_model_ref equals an Outside: line's text)
leaves the counted set and the stop rule and goes to the new optional
verdict field known_outside ({id, rule_key, text, line}), carried to later
rounds until a reviewer marks it resolved or it is reported again under its
id. The verdict stores brief_path (carried when a later round has none).
The --record line adds known_outside (a count) and threat_model
({applied, why}): a threat model that is not usable backs nothing, every
security finding counts, and the output says why. extractVerdict
shape-checks both new fields.
The bare gate re-reads the brief at brief_path each run: an entry still
backed is a warning, PLAN_GATE_KNOWN_OUTSIDE; one no longer backed (line
gone, approval stale or not logged, brief unreadable, no brief_path, or not
a Voyage security finding) stops the plan, PLAN_GATE_OUTSIDE_NOT_BACKED: it
counts in full. gatePlan takes an optional threatModel for tests.
plan-review-dedup keeps threat_model_ref on a merge only when every merged
copy carries the same one; the S160 known issue is fixed: a null in a
reviewer's findings list is skipped instead of crashing the CLI.
plan-critic and scope-guardian: a security finding needs a concrete attack
path and high confidence (Claude Code's threshold, 167), uses
SECURITY_INJECTION or SECURITY_RISK, and quotes the Outside: line's text in
threat_model_ref when one applies; the json template carries the field.
/trekplan Phase 9 passes the brief path to plan-critic and --brief to
--record. Handover 4 names the two fields, the two codes and the flag.
Part 2, step 2.4 of the E plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
