# Security Policy — trekplan

## Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately to <security@fromaitochitta.com> — do not open a public
issue. There is no SLA — this is a solo-maintained plugin — but
acknowledged reports are usually triaged within 7 days.

If you already have an account on the Forgejo instance, you may instead
open a **private** issue on the repo, tagged `security`:

> https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/voyage

## Supported versions

Only the **current minor version** receives security fixes. When v3.2.0
ships, v3.1.x stops receiving patches. Pin to the latest minor and
update on the next bump.

| Version | Supported |
|---------|-----------|
| 3.1.x   | Yes       |
| 3.0.x   | No (upgrade to 3.1.x) |
| < 3.0   | No        |

## Scope

The plugin's security posture covers:

### Plugin-owned hooks (`hooks/scripts/`)

| Hook | Trigger | Purpose |
|------|---------|---------|
| `pre-bash-executor.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for Bash | BLOCKs known-dangerous shell patterns; WARNs on suspicious ones; answers `ask` before merge into `main`, push, tag/publish and destructive git (P12); fails open on parse errors |
| `pre-write-executor.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for Write, Edit, NotebookEdit | BLOCKs writes to `.git/hooks/`, `~/.ssh/`, `.env`, and other sensitive paths, to Voyage's own state in the git directory (`voyage/`), and to test files a step has locked (P9); fails closed when it cannot read the target path or the lock, or cannot load the lock code |
| `pre-plan-gate.mjs` | `PreToolUse` for ExitPlanMode | Runs Voyage's plan gate on a Voyage plan (it carries `plan_version`) and denies one the gate refuses; asks with "not measured" when the gate cannot run; other plans pass (P3) |
| `post-approval-log.mjs` | `PostToolUse` for Bash, ExitPlanMode | Writes an approved merge/push to `main`, tag/publish, or Voyage plan to the approval log; says "not logged" when it cannot |
| `post-edit-check.mjs` | `PostToolUse` for Edit, Write | Runs the target repo's own formatter and linter on the edited file, check-only, while Voyage executes a plan there or the repo has switched it on (P7) |
| `stop-test-lock.mjs` | `Stop` | Refuses "done" while the session's step holds its test lock; lets the stop through when `stop_hook_active` is set (P9) |
| `pre-compact-flush.mjs` | `PreCompact` | Flushes `progress.json` from git history before compaction (P0 drift fix); read-only beyond `progress.json` |
| `session-title.mjs` *(planned, F9)* | `UserPromptSubmit` | Sets session title `voyage:<command>:<slug>` for telling parallel sessions apart |

All hooks are zero-dependency Node.js (`.mjs`) scripts. Most are designed
to **fail open** — a hook crash never blocks the user's work. The
exceptions are stated per hook above: the write guard fails closed when it
cannot read a path or a test lock, and the plan gate asks rather than
passes when it cannot run. No hook runs a model. Hooks never write to user
files outside their declared scope; the test lock and the post-edit log
live in the repository's git directory (`<git dir>/voyage/`), where they
cannot be committed.

### Precondition: mods

Voyage's guards are deterministic only when no installed mod handles `tool.check`.
A Claude Code mod that handles `tool.check` answers after the permission
rules and the `PreToolUse` hooks have decided, and its answer can replace
theirs: it can approve a call a plugin hook blocked or asked about, and
outside managed settings and Team/Enterprise plans it can approve a call a
deny rule refuses (code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions, § Extend
permissions with hooks). Voyage's hooks cannot tell whether such a mod is installed:
no hook input names the loaded mods. `/plugin` shows them to a person
(`N mods active · …`). Voyage itself ships no mods.

### Prompt-level denylist (`commands/trekexecute.md`)

The execute command embeds a denylist that takes effect even in a session
where a hook does not fire. This is layer 2 of the three-layer
defense-in-depth model (README, Security hardening) and protects against
plan-injected destructive commands.

### Validators (`lib/validators/*.mjs`)

Read-only. Never write to user files. Used both by hooks and by command
phases to detect malformed artifacts before they propagate.

## Out of scope

- **Opt-in upstream architect step.** Any external producer of
  `architecture/overview.md` ships its own security posture. The
  architecture-discovery validator in this plugin treats
  `architecture/overview.md` as an external contract (drift-WARN, never
  drift-FAIL).
- **LLM output content.** The plugin validates artifact *shape*, not
  artifact *truthfulness*. A plan that passes `plan-validator --strict`
  may still contain hallucinated file paths or unsafe commands; that is
  why `pre-bash-executor` exists.
- **The Claude Code CLI itself.** Report Claude Code vulnerabilities to
  Anthropic via https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues.

## Hardening recommendations

For fork-ers handling untrusted task briefs or plans:

1. **Set `disableSkillShellExecution: true`** in `~/.claude/settings.json`
   (CC v2.1.91+) to prevent Skills from invoking arbitrary shell.
2. **Run plan validation in `--strict` mode** before any execute:
   ```bash
   node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/lib/validators/plan-validator.mjs --strict plan.md
   ```
3. **Review the plan-critic adversarial output** before approving plans
   from external sources — semantic rubric (rule #7) catches deferred
   decisions that an attacker could exploit.
4. **Pin a CC version floor.** v3.1.0 of this plugin assumes CC ≥
   2.1.85 for the `if`-field on hooks; older CC silently ignores the
   field, weakening the scoping.

## Past advisories

None as of v3.1.0. This section will list CVE-style entries if any are
discovered.