voyage/tests/hooks/otel-export-validators.test.mjs

// tests/hooks/otel-export-validators.test.mjs
// Step 11 validators: path, endpoint, field-allowlist.
// CWE-22, CWE-918, CWE-212 mitigation.

import { test } from 'node:test';
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { validateTextfilePath, FORBIDDEN_PREFIXES } from '../../lib/exporters/path-validator.mjs';
import { validateOtlpEndpoint } from '../../lib/exporters/endpoint-validator.mjs';
import {
  applyFieldAllowlist,
  POST_BASH_STATS_ALLOWED,
  EVENT_EMIT_PAYLOAD_ALLOWED,
} from '../../lib/exporters/field-allowlist.mjs';

// ---- path-validator: CWE-22 mitigation -------------------------------------

test('path-validator: rejects ../etc/passwd traversal (CWE-22)', () => {
  const r = validateTextfilePath('../../etc/passwd');
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'PATH_TRAVERSAL'));
});

test('path-validator: rejects /etc/voyage.prom (forbidden system prefix)', () => {
  const r = validateTextfilePath('/etc/voyage.prom');
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  // Either forbidden-system or parent-missing (both are deny-paths)
  const denied = r.errors.find(e =>
    e.code === 'PATH_FORBIDDEN_SYSTEM' || e.code === 'PATH_PARENT_MISSING');
  assert.ok(denied, `expected deny, got: ${JSON.stringify(r.errors)}`);
});

test('path-validator: rejects ~ home shorthand', () => {
  const r = validateTextfilePath('~/voyage.prom');
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'PATH_HOME_SHORTHAND'));
});

test('path-validator: accepts path under allowedRoots', () => {
  const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'voyage-path-allow-'));
  try {
    const target = join(tmp, 'voyage.prom');
    const r = validateTextfilePath(target, { allowedRoots: [tmp] });
    assert.equal(r.valid, true, JSON.stringify(r.errors));
    assert.match(r.parsed.path, /voyage\.prom$/);
  } finally {
    rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
  }
});

test('path-validator: rejects path outside allowedRoots', () => {
  const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'voyage-path-deny-'));
  const otherTmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'voyage-path-other-'));
  try {
    const target = join(otherTmp, 'voyage.prom');
    const r = validateTextfilePath(target, { allowedRoots: [tmp] });
    assert.equal(r.valid, false);
    assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'PATH_OUT_OF_ALLOWLIST'));
  } finally {
    rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
    rmSync(otherTmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
  }
});

test('path-validator: FORBIDDEN_PREFIXES exports drift-pin', () => {
  // Ensure all the high-risk system paths are present
  for (const prefix of ['/etc/', '/proc/', '/sys/', '/var/', '/usr/']) {
    assert.ok(FORBIDDEN_PREFIXES.includes(prefix),
      `FORBIDDEN_PREFIXES missing critical path: ${prefix}`);
  }
});

// ---- endpoint-validator: CWE-918 mitigation -------------------------------

test('endpoint-validator: rejects http://169.254.169.254/ — PERMANENTLY blocked (CWE-918 cloud metadata)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://169.254.169.254/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_HARD_BLOCKED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: 169.254.169.254 stays blocked EVEN WITH VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1', () => {
  // Cloud metadata service is qualitatively different from RFC-1918 home-lab
  // access — operator-trust is NOT extended here. AWS/GCP/Azure metadata
  // exposes IAM credentials and can compromise the entire cloud account.
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://169.254.169.254/v1/metrics',
    { env: { VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE: '1' } });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false, 'cloud metadata MUST stay blocked even with opt-in');
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_HARD_BLOCKED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: AliCloud metadata 100.100.100.200 PERMANENTLY blocked', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data',
    { env: { VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE: '1' } });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_HARD_BLOCKED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: metadata.google.internal hostname PERMANENTLY blocked', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1',
    { env: { VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE: '1' } });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_HARD_BLOCKED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: rejects http://example.com/ (requires https)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://example.com/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_HTTPS_REQUIRED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: rejects http://localhost without VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://localhost:4318/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_LOOPBACK_REJECTED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: accepts http://localhost when VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 (home-lab opt-in)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://localhost:4318/v1/metrics',
    { env: { VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE: '1' } });
  assert.equal(r.valid, true, JSON.stringify(r.errors));
  assert.equal(r.parsed.isPrivate, true);
});

test('endpoint-validator: accepts https://example.com/v1/metrics (public)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('https://otel.example.com/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, true, JSON.stringify(r.errors));
  assert.equal(r.parsed.isPrivate, false);
});

test('endpoint-validator: rejects RFC-1918 192.168.1.1 without opt-in', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('http://192.168.1.1:4318/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false);
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_RFC1918_REJECTED'));
});

// IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass (S21): `::ffff:a.b.c.d` literals render as
// `::ffff:HHHH:HHHH` and route to the embedded IPv4. The host must be
// canonicalized to its embedded IPv4 BEFORE classification, or loopback /
// RFC-1918 / link-local / cloud-metadata guards are all bypassable over https.
test('endpoint-validator: rejects IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback [::ffff:127.0.0.1] (S21 bypass)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false, 'IPv4-mapped loopback must be rejected');
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_LOOPBACK_REJECTED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: rejects IPv4-mapped IPv6 RFC-1918 [::ffff:192.168.0.5] (S21 bypass)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('https://[::ffff:192.168.0.5]/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false, 'IPv4-mapped RFC-1918 must be rejected');
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_RFC1918_REJECTED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: IPv4-mapped metadata [::ffff:169.254.169.254] HARD_BLOCKED even with opt-in (S21 bypass)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data',
    { env: { VOYAGE_OTEL_ALLOW_PRIVATE: '1' } });
  assert.equal(r.valid, false, 'IPv4-mapped cloud-metadata MUST stay hard-blocked');
  assert.ok(r.errors.find(e => e.code === 'ENDPOINT_HARD_BLOCKED'));
});

test('endpoint-validator: accepts IPv4-mapped IPv6 public [::ffff:8.8.8.8] over https (no over-block)', () => {
  const r = validateOtlpEndpoint('https://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]/v1/metrics', { env: {} });
  assert.equal(r.valid, true, JSON.stringify(r.errors));
  assert.equal(r.parsed.isPrivate, false);
});

test('endpoint-validator: rejects empty / non-string', () => {
  assert.equal(validateOtlpEndpoint('').valid, false);
  assert.equal(validateOtlpEndpoint(null).valid, false);
  assert.equal(validateOtlpEndpoint(undefined).valid, false);
});

// ---- field-allowlist: CWE-212 mitigation -----------------------------------

test('field-allowlist: post-bash-stats DROPS command_excerpt + session_id (CWE-212)', () => {
  const record = {
    ts: '2026-05-09T08:00:00.000Z',
    session_id: 'uuid-12345',
    command_excerpt: 'git clone https://example.com/secret/repo',
    duration_ms: 152,
    success: true,
  };
  const out = applyFieldAllowlist(record, 'post-bash-stats');
  assert.equal('command_excerpt' in out, false, 'command_excerpt MUST be stripped');
  assert.equal('session_id' in out, false, 'session_id MUST be stripped');
  assert.equal(out.duration_ms, 152);
  assert.equal(out.success, true);
  assert.equal(out._schema_id, 'post-bash-stats');
});

test('field-allowlist: trekplan DROPS task / project_dir / brief_path (PII)', () => {
  const record = {
    ts: '2026-05-09T08:00:00.000Z',
    task: 'private user prose with PII',
    slug: 'add-auth',
    project_dir: '/home/user/secret/project',
    brief_path: '/home/user/secret/brief.md',
    codebase_files: 156,
    profile: 'premium',
  };
  const out = applyFieldAllowlist(record, 'trekplan');
  assert.equal('task' in out, false);
  assert.equal('project_dir' in out, false);
  assert.equal('brief_path' in out, false);
  assert.equal(out.slug, 'add-auth');
  assert.equal(out.codebase_files, 156);
  assert.equal(out.profile, 'premium');
});

test('field-allowlist: event-emit applies sub-allowlist to payload', () => {
  const record = {
    ts: '2026-05-09T08:00:00.000Z',
    event: 'main-merge-gate',
    known_event: true,
    payload: {
      profile: 'balanced',
      profile_source: 'inheritance',
      command_excerpt: 'should be stripped from payload',
      raw_user_prose: 'should be stripped',
    },
  };
  const out = applyFieldAllowlist(record, 'event-emit');
  assert.equal(out.event, 'main-merge-gate');
  assert.equal(out.payload.profile, 'balanced');
  assert.equal(out.payload.profile_source, 'inheritance');
  assert.equal('command_excerpt' in out.payload, false);
  assert.equal('raw_user_prose' in out.payload, false);
});

test('field-allowlist: unknown schema-type returns conservative {ts, _schema_id} only', () => {
  const out = applyFieldAllowlist(
    { ts: '2026-05-09T08:00:00.000Z', sensitive: 'secret' },
    'totally-unknown-schema',
  );
  assert.equal('sensitive' in out, false);
  assert.equal(out.ts, '2026-05-09T08:00:00.000Z');
  assert.equal(out._schema_id, 'totally-unknown-schema');
});

test('field-allowlist: Object.freeze on allowlists (drift-pin)', () => {
  assert.equal(Object.isFrozen(POST_BASH_STATS_ALLOWED), true,
    'POST_BASH_STATS_ALLOWED must be frozen — runtime mutation prevention');
  assert.equal(Object.isFrozen(EVENT_EMIT_PAYLOAD_ALLOWED), true);
});

test('field-allowlist: null/undefined record handled safely', () => {
  assert.deepEqual(applyFieldAllowlist(null, 'trekplan'), {});
  assert.deepEqual(applyFieldAllowlist(undefined, 'trekplan'), {});
});