An adversarial read of d88245c reproduced 15 problems; all fixed here, each
with a test that fails on the old code.
- verdict-gate: a greener verdict must be backed by the LAST fence being a
`json` block of the right shape, with no BLOCKER in the JSON (any case),
in `## Findings (BLOCKER)`, or a differing finding-id list; two verdict
lines and more than one file argument are exit 2. ({}, null, lowercase
"blocker", a trailing ```jsonc and a later json fence all gave exit 0.)
- engine-findings: a transcribed "narrower" key can no longer lower an
engine tier; absolute paths under --repo-root match the scope; "12" lines
parse; an empty scope is an error; out-of-scope engine findings are
unverified (`engine:out-of-scope`) and forbid ALLOW.
- recurrence: the catch-all engine keys and keys normalised from unknown
ones are never proposed; the same unfixed finding in two iterations is not
a recurrence; proposals are validated before they are offered; \r/U+2028
and damaged markers are refused; writes go through a symlinked CLAUDE.md.
Prose points --repo at the session directory, not the git toplevel.
- Workflow substrate: engines are counted from what arrived, and the
verdict's floor is recomputed from the coordinator's findings; now tested
by running the script with stubbed Workflow globals. Two literal NUL bytes
written as \u0000 (git saw the file as binary).
- Trimming keeps Pass 1's "Also flagged by" provenance; `## Declined to
Judge` and remediation steps are required from review_version 1.1 only
(N-1); the zero-diff review now carries the JSON block the gate needs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
477 lines
20 KiB
JavaScript
477 lines
20 KiB
JavaScript
// lib/review/coordinator-contract.mjs
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// SKAL-1·4a — deterministic reference implementation of the review-coordinator
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// 4-pass contract (agents/review-coordinator.md §"Your 4-pass process").
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//
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// This is a DETERMINISTIC SUBSET, not a full mirror of the LLM coordinator.
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// It implements the pure, hermetic passes and DELIBERATELY EXCLUDES the parts
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// that need a live filesystem or LLM judgement (which belong to the 4c
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// LLM-in-the-loop eval, not this all-agree foundation tier):
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// - Pass 2 "Accuracy" file-existence / line-plausibility glob (fs I/O).
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// - Pass 2 "Actionability" imperative-verb heuristic — the real coordinator
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// uses LLM judgement here; a verb-list approximation would DIVERGE from the
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// contract being mirrored, so only the deterministic "recommended_action is
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// present-and-non-empty when supplied" half is kept.
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// - The doc's 4-tuple `(file,line,rule_key,title)` id recompute — the shipped
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// `computeFindingId` is 3-arg `(file,line,rule_key)`; this module follows
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// the shipped code and flags the doc divergence (the 4-tuple id is not
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// producible by the current helper).
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//
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// What IS implemented, purely: Pass 1 (triplet dedup → highest-severity-wins
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// survivor + conformance tiebreak + detail concat + raised_by provenance),
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// Pass 2 succinctness (trims MINOR/SUGGESTION text, never removes) +
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// actionability-presence, Pass 3 reasonableness
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// (citation / unknown-rule_key suppression, severity-mismatch correction),
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// Pass 4 verdict thresholds — fail-closed: a suppression that did not REFUTE
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// the finding, and a reviewer that never reported, forbid ALLOW (see
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// classifySuppression). No LLM, no network, no time, no randomness.
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//
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// Reuses: SEVERITY_VALUES / RULE_KEYS / getRule (rule-catalogue.mjs),
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// computeFindingId (finding-id.mjs, triplet), validateFindings
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// (findings-schema.mjs). Triplet key format mirrors
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// scripts/bakeoff-armA-merge.mjs:33; raised_by provenance mirrors
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// lib/review/plan-review-dedup.mjs.
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import { SEVERITY_VALUES, RULE_KEYS, getRule } from './rule-catalogue.mjs';
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import { computeFindingId } from '../parsers/finding-id.mjs';
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import { validateFindings } from './findings-schema.mjs';
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import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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export const JUDGE_TITLE_MAX = 100;
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export const JUDGE_DETAIL_MAX = 800;
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// ---- Suppression classification (fail-closed) --------------------------------
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//
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// A removal is `dropped` ONLY when the test refuted the finding as a claim
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// about this codebase. Every other removal is `unverified`: the coordinator
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// took the finding out of the count without ever establishing it was unreal,
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// so it may not be spent as evidence of a clean review.
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/**
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* Reasons that REFUTE. `no-citation` is the only one this deterministic subset
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* can emit: a finding whose `file` is empty or whose `line` is negative names
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* no location, so it makes no checkable claim at all
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* (agents/review-coordinator.md Pass 3 — "Speculative 'code might break
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* somewhere' findings have no anchor").
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*
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* `accuracy:refuted` (Pass 2 Accuracy — a citation escaping the repo root) and
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* `file-existence:refuted` (Pass 3 — absent from both working tree and diff)
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* are emitted by the LLM coordinator, whose fs/judgement branches this module
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* excludes. They are declared here anyway: the vocabulary is owned in one
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* place so prose and lib cannot drift.
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*/
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export const REFUTING_REASONS = Object.freeze(new Set([
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'no-citation',
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'accuracy:refuted',
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'file-existence:refuted',
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]));
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/**
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* The reason vocabulary on the unverified side. Length is not in it: since
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* ordre 5 (P11) succinctness trims MINOR/SUGGESTION text and never removes a
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* finding, so `succinctness:*` is no longer emitted (a stray one still fails
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* closed through `classifySuppression`). `file-existence:indeterminate`
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* is emitted by the LLM coordinator's Pass 3 (which runs the fs Glob this
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* module deliberately excludes); the vocabulary is owned here so prose and lib
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* cannot drift.
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*/
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export const UNVERIFIED_REASONS = Object.freeze([
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'actionability:empty',
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'engine:out-of-scope',
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'unknown-rule_key',
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'file-existence:indeterminate',
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]);
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/**
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* Classify a suppression reason. Anything not declared refuting is
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* `unverified` — the default is fail-CLOSED, so a reason introduced later
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* without a decision cannot silently move the verdict toward ALLOW.
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* @param {string} reason
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* @returns {'refuted'|'unverified'}
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*/
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export function classifySuppression(reason) {
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return REFUTING_REASONS.has(reason) ? 'refuted' : 'unverified';
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}
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/**
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* Tag a finding with its suppression reason and route it to the refuted
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* (`dropped`) or the `unverified` bucket.
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* @param {object} finding
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* @param {string} reason
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* @param {object[]} dropped
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* @param {object[]} unverified
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*/
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function suppress(finding, reason, dropped, unverified) {
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const tagged = { ...finding, suppressed_reason: reason };
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if (classifySuppression(reason) === 'refuted') dropped.push(tagged);
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else unverified.push(tagged);
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}
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/**
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* Catalogue-tier rank of a severity: lower number = higher severity.
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* BLOCKER=0 … SUGGESTION=3; an unknown severity ranks last.
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* @param {string} severity
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* @returns {number}
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*/
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export function severityRank(severity) {
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const i = SEVERITY_VALUES.indexOf(severity);
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return i === -1 ? SEVERITY_VALUES.length : i;
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}
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function isConformance(reviewer) {
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return typeof reviewer === 'string' && reviewer.toLowerCase().includes('conformance');
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}
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function tripletKey(f) {
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return `${f.file} ${f.line} ${f.rule_key}`;
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}
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/**
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* Validate each reviewer payload and collect findings from the VALID ones,
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* tagging each finding with its source reviewer (mirrors mergeArmA — invalid
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* payloads are skipped, not crashed-on).
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* @param {Array<{reviewer?: string, findings: object[]}>} reviewerPayloads
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* @returns {{ findings: object[], skipped: Array<{reviewer: string|null, error_codes: string[]}> }}
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*/
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export function ingest(reviewerPayloads) {
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const findings = [];
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const skipped = [];
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for (const payload of reviewerPayloads) {
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const r = validateFindings(payload);
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if (!r.valid) {
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skipped.push({ reviewer: payload?.reviewer ?? null, error_codes: r.errors.map((e) => e.code) });
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continue;
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}
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for (const f of payload.findings) {
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findings.push({ ...f, reviewer: f.reviewer ?? payload.reviewer ?? f.owner_reviewer ?? null });
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}
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}
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return { findings, skipped };
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}
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/**
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* Pass 1 — dedup by (file, line, rule_key) triplet. Survivor = highest
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* catalogue severity; severity tie → prefer the conformance reviewer; carries
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* raised_by provenance, concatenates other reviewers' attribution into detail,
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* and recomputes the id over the triplet.
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* @param {object[]} findings
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* @returns {object[]}
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*/
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export function dedupByTriplet(findings) {
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const groups = new Map();
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for (const f of findings) {
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const key = tripletKey(f);
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if (!groups.has(key)) groups.set(key, []);
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groups.get(key).push(f);
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}
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const out = [];
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for (const group of groups.values()) {
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let survivor = group[0];
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for (const f of group.slice(1)) {
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const higher = severityRank(f.severity) < severityRank(survivor.severity);
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const tieToConformance =
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severityRank(f.severity) === severityRank(survivor.severity) &&
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isConformance(f.reviewer) && !isConformance(survivor.reviewer);
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if (higher || tieToConformance) survivor = f;
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}
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const raised_by = [...new Set(group.map((f) => f.reviewer).filter(Boolean))];
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const others = group.filter((f) => f !== survivor);
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let detail = survivor.detail;
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if (others.length > 0) {
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detail = survivor.detail ?? '';
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for (const o of others) {
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detail += `\nAlso flagged by ${o.reviewer ?? 'unknown'}: ${o.title ?? o.rule_key}.`;
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}
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}
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const id = computeFindingId(survivor.file, survivor.line, survivor.rule_key);
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out.push({ ...survivor, id, ...(detail !== undefined ? { detail } : {}), raised_by });
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}
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return out;
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}
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/**
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* The tiers whose over-long text may be trimmed. Length is packaging, never a
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* claim: a BLOCKER or MAJOR keeps every character, and nothing is ever removed
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* for length. Borrowed: "cap only the nits, and count what was cut"
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* (ai-native-sdlc `assets/REVIEW.md:7-23`, MIT).
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*/
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export const TRIMMABLE_SEVERITIES = Object.freeze(['MINOR', 'SUGGESTION']);
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export const TRIM_MARKER = ' […trimmed]';
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/**
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* The tier a finding will be judged at: the catalogue tier when the rule_key is
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* known (Pass 3 resets to it anyway), else the reviewer-asserted severity. The
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* trim decision reads this, so a reviewer cannot get a MAJOR trimmed by
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* mislabelling it MINOR.
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* @param {object} f
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* @returns {string}
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*/
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function effectiveSeverity(f) {
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return getRule(f.rule_key)?.severity ?? f.severity;
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}
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function trimText(text, max) {
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return text.slice(0, max - TRIM_MARKER.length) + TRIM_MARKER;
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}
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/**
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* Trim a detail but keep Pass 1's "Also flagged by …" provenance lines: the
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* reviewer's own text is what gets cut. When the provenance alone is too long
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* it is cut too — `raised_by` still names every reviewer.
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*/
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function trimDetail(detail, max) {
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const at = detail.indexOf('\nAlso flagged by ');
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if (at === -1) return trimText(detail, max);
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const head = detail.slice(0, at);
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const tail = detail.slice(at);
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const room = max - tail.length - TRIM_MARKER.length;
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if (room < 40) return trimText(detail, max);
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return head.slice(0, room) + TRIM_MARKER + tail;
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}
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/**
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* Pass 2 — HubSpot Judge (deterministic subset): succinctness and
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* actionability (recommended_action, when present, must be a non-empty
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* string). The imperative-verb test is excluded (LLM judgement).
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*
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* Succinctness never removes a finding (ordre 5, P11 — S118's most serious
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* finding was struck for a long `detail`). A MINOR/SUGGESTION whose title is
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* over 100 or detail over 800 characters is TRIMMED, kept, and returned in
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* `trimmed` so the count is visible; a BLOCKER/MAJOR keeps its full text.
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*
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* Actionability reads a `.length`, never the claim, so it cannot establish the
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* finding is unreal: it routes to `unverified`. `dropped` stays in the
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* signature for the refuting Pass-2 filter this subset excludes (Accuracy: a
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* path-traversal escape IS a refutation).
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* @param {object[]} findings
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* @returns {{ kept: object[], dropped: object[], unverified: object[], trimmed: object[] }}
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*/
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export function judgeFilter(findings) {
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const kept = [];
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const dropped = [];
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const unverified = [];
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const trimmed = [];
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for (const f of findings) {
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if ('recommended_action' in f &&
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(typeof f.recommended_action !== 'string' || f.recommended_action.trim().length === 0)) {
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suppress(f, 'actionability:empty', dropped, unverified);
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continue;
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}
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const title = f.title ?? '';
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const detail = f.detail ?? '';
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const longTitle = title.length > JUDGE_TITLE_MAX;
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const longDetail = detail.length > JUDGE_DETAIL_MAX;
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if ((longTitle || longDetail) && TRIMMABLE_SEVERITIES.includes(effectiveSeverity(f))) {
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const out = { ...f };
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const fields = [];
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if (longTitle) { out.title = trimText(title, JUDGE_TITLE_MAX); fields.push('title'); }
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if (longDetail) { out.detail = trimDetail(detail, JUDGE_DETAIL_MAX); fields.push('detail'); }
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out.trimmed_fields = fields;
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kept.push(out);
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trimmed.push(out);
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} else {
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kept.push(f);
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}
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}
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return { kept, dropped, unverified, trimmed };
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}
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/**
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* Pass 3 — Cloudflare reasonableness (deterministic subset): drop findings
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* with no citation (empty file / line < 0) or an unknown rule_key; CORRECT a
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* severity that does not match the catalogue tier (a correction, not a drop).
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* The fs file-existence glob is excluded (I/O) — its indeterminate branch is
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* prose-side, tokenised as `file-existence:indeterminate`.
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*
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* `no-citation` REFUTES (the finding names no location, so it makes no
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* checkable claim) and is dropped. `unknown-rule_key` does not: an ad-hoc key
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* is a real defect wearing the wrong label — v5.1.1 high-effort mode already
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* KEEPS these, normalised to PLAN_EXECUTE_DRIFT — so it routes to `unverified`.
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* @param {object[]} findings
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* @returns {{ kept: object[], dropped: object[], unverified: object[] }}
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*/
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export function reasonablenessFilter(findings) {
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const kept = [];
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const dropped = [];
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const unverified = [];
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for (const f of findings) {
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if (typeof f.file !== 'string' || f.file.length === 0 ||
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(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line < 0)) {
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suppress(f, 'no-citation', dropped, unverified);
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continue;
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}
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if (!RULE_KEYS.has(f.rule_key)) {
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suppress(f, 'unknown-rule_key', dropped, unverified);
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continue;
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}
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const rule = getRule(f.rule_key);
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if (rule && f.severity !== rule.severity) {
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kept.push({ ...f, severity: rule.severity, original_severity: f.severity });
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} else {
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kept.push(f);
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}
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}
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return { kept, dropped, unverified };
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}
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/**
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* Pass 4 — compute the verdict from severity counts (after dedup + filtering).
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* BLOCKER ≥ 1 → BLOCK; else MAJOR ≥ 1 → WARN; else ALLOW.
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*
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* FAIL-CLOSED: ALLOW additionally requires that nothing is `unverified` and
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* that every expected reviewer reported. Neither ever RAISES a verdict — the
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* severity thresholds are untouched — they only forbid the clean one, so the
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* worst case of a false unverified is WARN plus a stated reason, never a
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* silent pass. Unverified findings are NOT counted into a severity tier: their
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* severity is reviewer-asserted and was never substantiated.
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*
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* @param {object[]} findings
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* @param {{ unverified?: object[], missingReviewers?: string[], unattributablePayloads?: number }} [options]
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* @returns {{ verdict: 'BLOCK'|'WARN'|'ALLOW', counts: Record<string, number>, allow_blocked_by: string[] }}
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*/
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export function computeVerdict(findings, options = {}) {
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const counts = { BLOCKER: 0, MAJOR: 0, MINOR: 0, SUGGESTION: 0 };
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for (const f of findings) {
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if (counts[f.severity] !== undefined) counts[f.severity] += 1;
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}
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const unverified = options.unverified ?? [];
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const missingReviewers = options.missingReviewers ?? [];
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const unattributablePayloads = options.unattributablePayloads ?? 0;
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const allow_blocked_by = [];
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const byReason = new Map();
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for (const f of unverified) {
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const reason = f?.suppressed_reason ?? 'unspecified';
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byReason.set(reason, (byReason.get(reason) ?? 0) + 1);
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}
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for (const [reason, n] of byReason) allow_blocked_by.push(`unverified:${reason} (${n})`);
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for (const r of missingReviewers) allow_blocked_by.push(`missing-reviewer:${r}`);
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if (unattributablePayloads > 0) allow_blocked_by.push(`unattributable-payload (${unattributablePayloads})`);
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let verdict;
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if (counts.BLOCKER >= 1) verdict = 'BLOCK';
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else if (counts.MAJOR >= 1) verdict = 'WARN';
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else if (allow_blocked_by.length > 0) verdict = 'WARN';
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else verdict = 'ALLOW';
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return { verdict, counts, allow_blocked_by };
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}
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/**
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* Run the full deterministic contract: ingest → Pass 1 → Pass 2 → Pass 3 → Pass 4.
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*
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* `options.expectedReviewers` names the reviewers this review was supposed to
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* hear from. A reviewer that is absent from the payloads, or whose named
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* payload failed schema validation and was thrown away at ingest, lands in
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* `missing_reviewers`; a payload that failed schema WITHOUT a reviewer name is
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* counted in `unattributable_payloads` instead. Either forbids ALLOW: an
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* unread reviewer is an absent one, and zero findings from a silent reviewer
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* must not read like zero findings from a clean diff.
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*
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* `suppressed` stays the UNION of `dropped` (refuted) and `unverified` so
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* existing consumers keep their meaning; `unverified` is the subset that
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* forbids ALLOW. Do not iterate both and count twice.
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*
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* @param {Array<{reviewer?: string, findings: object[]}>} reviewerPayloads
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* @param {{ expectedReviewers?: string[], engineOutOfScope?: object[] }} [options]
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* `declined_to_judge` lists every unverified finding with its reason, and
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* `trimmed_count` counts the MINOR/SUGGESTION findings whose text was trimmed
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* (kept, judged, and counted — never removed for length).
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*
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* @returns {{ verdict: string, counts: Record<string, number>, findings: object[], suppressed: object[], unverified: object[], skipped: object[], missing_reviewers: string[], unattributable_payloads: number, allow_blocked_by: string[], declined_to_judge: object[], trimmed_count: number }}
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*/
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export function runContract(reviewerPayloads, options = {}) {
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const { findings: ingested, skipped } = ingest(reviewerPayloads);
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const deduped = dedupByTriplet(ingested);
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const judged = judgeFilter(deduped);
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const reasoned = reasonablenessFilter(judged.kept);
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// Engine findings on files outside the review's SHA range (engine-findings.mjs
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// `out_of_scope`): real claims nobody here judged, so they forbid ALLOW.
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const outOfScope = (options.engineOutOfScope ?? [])
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.map((f) => ({ ...f, suppressed_reason: 'engine:out-of-scope' }));
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const unverified = [...judged.unverified, ...reasoned.unverified, ...outOfScope];
|
|
// What the coordinator set aside without ruling on it, one line each, so a
|
|
// reader sees every finding that did not reach a verdict tier. Borrowed:
|
|
// "Declined to judge … nothing you set aside is dropped silently"
|
|
// (Superpowers `skills/requesting-code-review/code-reviewer.md:43-48`, MIT).
|
|
const declined_to_judge = unverified.map((f) => ({
|
|
file: f.file ?? null,
|
|
line: f.line ?? null,
|
|
rule_key: f.rule_key ?? null,
|
|
severity: f.severity ?? null,
|
|
title: f.title ?? null,
|
|
reason: f.suppressed_reason,
|
|
}));
|
|
// A trimmed finding that Pass 3 later removed is accounted for there, not here.
|
|
const keptSet = new Set(reasoned.kept.map((f) => tripletKey(f)));
|
|
const trimmed_count = judged.trimmed.filter((f) => keptSet.has(tripletKey(f))).length;
|
|
|
|
// A reviewer counts as REPORTED only when a payload carrying its name
|
|
// validated. `validateFindings` merely warns on a missing `reviewer`, so a
|
|
// payload can fail schema anonymously: that is an unattributable payload, not
|
|
// a reviewer called "unnamed reviewer". Naming one would invent an agent
|
|
// nobody launched, and would double-count with expectedReviewers when the two
|
|
// are in fact the same failure.
|
|
const skippedNames = new Set();
|
|
let unattributable_payloads = 0;
|
|
for (const s of skipped) {
|
|
if (typeof s.reviewer === 'string' && s.reviewer.length > 0) skippedNames.add(s.reviewer);
|
|
else unattributable_payloads += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
const reported = new Set();
|
|
for (const payload of reviewerPayloads) {
|
|
const name = payload?.reviewer;
|
|
if (typeof name === 'string' && name.length > 0 && !skippedNames.has(name)) reported.add(name);
|
|
}
|
|
const missing_reviewers = [...skippedNames];
|
|
for (const r of options.expectedReviewers ?? []) {
|
|
if (!reported.has(r) && !missing_reviewers.includes(r)) missing_reviewers.push(r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { verdict, counts, allow_blocked_by } = computeVerdict(reasoned.kept, {
|
|
unverified,
|
|
missingReviewers: missing_reviewers,
|
|
unattributablePayloads: unattributable_payloads,
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
verdict,
|
|
counts,
|
|
findings: reasoned.kept,
|
|
suppressed: [...judged.dropped, ...judged.unverified, ...reasoned.dropped, ...reasoned.unverified],
|
|
unverified,
|
|
skipped,
|
|
missing_reviewers,
|
|
unattributable_payloads,
|
|
allow_blocked_by,
|
|
declined_to_judge,
|
|
trimmed_count,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---- CLI shim ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
function isMain() {
|
|
try {
|
|
return realpathSync(process.argv[1]) === realpathSync(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (isMain()) {
|
|
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
|
|
const filePath = args.find((a) => !a.startsWith('--'));
|
|
if (!filePath) {
|
|
process.stderr.write('Usage: coordinator-contract.mjs [--json] <reviewer-payloads.json>\n');
|
|
process.exit(2);
|
|
}
|
|
const { readFileSync } = await import('node:fs');
|
|
const payloads = JSON.parse(readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8'));
|
|
const result = runContract(Array.isArray(payloads) ? payloads : [payloads]);
|
|
if (args.includes('--json')) {
|
|
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + '\n');
|
|
} else {
|
|
process.stdout.write(`coordinator-contract: ${result.verdict} (${result.findings.length} findings, ${result.suppressed.length} suppressed)\n`);
|
|
}
|
|
process.exit(0);
|
|
}
|