voyage/lib/verification/criteria-runner.mjs
Kjell Tore Guttormsen 52b87978cb
fix(verification): the runner refuses writes a brief may not perform
/trekreview now runs the commands a BRIEF declares, and a brief is an artifact
that can arrive from outside the repo. Measured 2026-09-18 on 6cafb4c: the
executor denylist stopped a download piped into a shell, but the remote-writing
git subcommand and a recursive delete of a path both RAN. The denylist screens
catastrophe (root deletion, fork bombs, mkfs); it was never meant to screen an
artifact under review.

A second screen, in the runner and ahead of the denylist, refuses four classes:

- a remote-writing git subcommand. The subcommand is found by walking git's own
  options (`-C`, `-c`, `--git-dir`, ... take a value), so `git status` and
  `git log` still run and `git -C sub push` does not.
- a recursive delete: any `rm` carrying `-r`/`-rf`/`--recursive`. A plain
  `rm build/artifact.txt` still runs.
- a download piped straight into a shell (also caught by the denylist; pinned
  here so the runner does not depend on another file for it).
- a write outside the working tree. `/dev/null`-class devices are fine, and so
  is anything under the working tree; `~/...`, an absolute path elsewhere, and
  a target carrying an unexpanded `$VAR` are refused - the runner cannot know
  where a variable points, and guessing is how a screen stops screening.

A refusal is its own outcome, REFUSED_BY_POLICY: the command never reaches a
shell, and `summary.ok` is false in both plan and brief mode. For the reviewer,
REFUSED is like NOT RUN - the absence of a measurement, never on its own a
finding - and the rubric and the evidence block both say so.

Chosen deliberately, and it is stricter than today's habit: writing scratch to
/tmp is refused too. The repo's own example plan does `> /tmp/out`. Verification
output belongs in the working tree; exempting the whole system temp dir would
have made the rule unstatable, since a working tree created under /tmp then
contains its own escape hatch.

NOT covered, stated rather than implied:
- other writing git subcommands (tag, remote, config, gc) - only push is listed
- writes through a wrapper: `sh -c '...'`, `xargs`, `find -exec`, a Makefile
  target, a script the criterion invokes. The screen reads the command it is
  given, not what that command goes on to do.
- `>` inside a quoted string reads as a redirect, so a criterion echoing a
  literal `>` is refused. Fail-closed, on purpose.
- the whole surface still runs with the invoking process's permissions; this is
  a refusal list, not a sandbox.

The denylist-layer test now uses a stand-in command with a screen double: the
refusal list catches a recursive delete first, so naming one there would have
stopped exercising the denylist layer at all.

Red first: the 6 new tests failed before this change (`refuseCommand` did not
exist), and the fixture brief's four writes ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 02:14:01 +02:00

580 lines
24 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
// lib/verification/criteria-runner.mjs
// Runs the falsifiable checks a pipeline artifact DECLARES, and reports a
// verdict built from exit codes rather than from a reader's impression.
//
// Two artifacts declare such checks:
// plan `## Verification` — `- [ ] `cmd` -> expected: ...` (V1..Vn)
// brief `## Success Criteria` — `- text: `cmd` ...` (SC1..SCn)
//
// Why this is code and not prose: `/trekexecute` must be able to FELL a
// single-session run on a criterion that does not hold, and `/trekreview` must
// hand `brief-conformance-reviewer` a real result instead of asking a
// Read/Glob/Grep agent to judge whether a command "passes". Neither is
// checkable while it lives only as an instruction.
//
// Fail-closed everywhere: a criterion that cannot run — placeholder text, no
// command, a screen that is unavailable — is NEVER reported as passed.
//
// Screening, two layers: every command is first screened against this file's
// own refusal list (writes — git push, recursive delete, pipe-to-shell,
// redirection outside the working tree), then through the plugin's own
// PreToolUse denylist (hooks/scripts/pre-bash-executor.mjs) — catastrophe —
// before it reaches a shell.
// Commands spawned from here do not pass through the Bash tool, so that hook
// would not otherwise fire; the hook is invoked over its documented stdin
// protocol rather than copied, so there is exactly one denylist.
//
// Usage:
// node lib/verification/criteria-runner.mjs --plan <plan.md> [--json] [--cwd D] [--timeout MS]
// node lib/verification/criteria-runner.mjs --brief <brief.md> [--json|--evidence] [--cwd D] [--timeout MS]
// --evidence emits the markdown block /trekreview hands to the conformance
// reviewer; --json emits the whole report. They are two shapes of one run.
// Exit: 0 = ok, 1 = a criterion failed / was refused / blocked / could not run, 2 = usage
// or read error (deliberately distinct from "a criterion failed").
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve, dirname, join, sep } from 'node:path';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
const REPO_ROOT = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..', '..');
export const PLAN_HEADING = '## Verification';
export const BRIEF_HEADING = '## Success Criteria';
export const DEFAULT_HOOK = join(REPO_ROOT, 'hooks', 'scripts', 'pre-bash-executor.mjs');
export const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 900_000;
export const DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT = 4000;
// --- parsing ----------------------------------------------------------------
// Fenced blocks are read TWICE over, for two opposite reasons: a `## ` heading
// inside a fence is quoted text and must not open a section (the repo's own
// examples/02-real-cli/REGENERATED.md quotes a whole plan outline inside one),
// while a shell-tagged fence INSIDE the section holds the commands themselves
// (examples/01-add-verbose-flag/plan.md writes its whole acceptance run that
// way). Reading only bullets made a correct plan parse to zero criteria, exit
// 1, and fell every single-session run — measured 2026-09-18.
const FENCE = /^\s*(?:```|~~~)(.*)$/;
// Languages whose fenced block is a run of commands. Deliberately a closed
// list: an untagged fence is far more often expected OUTPUT than input, and
// inventing a criterion from output is exactly the failure this file exists to
// prevent.
const SHELL_LANGS = new Set(['bash', 'sh', 'shell', 'zsh', 'console', 'shell-session']);
// One entry per line: its text, whether it sits inside a fence, that fence's
// info string, and whether it IS the fence marker.
function scanLines(markdown) {
const out = [];
let lang = null;
for (const text of markdown.split('\n')) {
const m = text.match(FENCE);
if (m) {
const open = lang === null;
if (open) lang = m[1].trim().toLowerCase().split(/\s+/)[0];
out.push({ text, fenced: true, lang: lang ?? '', marker: true });
if (!open) lang = null;
continue;
}
out.push({ text, fenced: lang !== null, lang: lang ?? '', marker: false });
}
return out;
}
// The lines from `heading` up to the next `## ` heading (exclusive). Headings
// inside a fence do not count on either end.
function sectionLines(markdown, heading) {
const lines = scanLines(markdown);
const start = lines.findIndex((l) => !l.fenced && l.text.trim() === heading);
if (start === -1) return null;
let end = lines.length;
for (let i = start + 1; i < lines.length; i++) {
if (!lines[i].fenced && lines[i].text.startsWith('## ')) { end = i; break; }
}
return lines.slice(start + 1, end);
}
// `- [ ] text`, `- [x] text`, `- text`, `* text`, `1. text` -> text
const BULLET = /^\s*(?:[-*]|\d+\.)\s+(?:\[[ xX]\]\s+)?(.*)$/;
const ENV_ASSIGN = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=\S*\s+/;
/**
* Whether a backticked span is a command to RUN or something the sentence
* merely NAMES. A plan's template puts the command first, but a brief's
* criterion usually opens with the thing under discussion — a flag
* (`--verbose`), a path (`tests/`) — and running those produced exit 2
* ("invalid option") and exit 126 ("is a directory"), which the review rubric
* reads as decisive: a BLOCKER invented out of prose. Measured 2026-09-18:
* 3 of the 6 criteria in the repo's own example brief.
*
* Shape only, no filesystem lookup, so a span parses the same way everywhere.
* And deliberately NO scanning on to a later span: "the first span that looks
* like a command" invents commands out of prose — in that same example brief
* it would have run `whoami` and `login`, two real binaries a sentence happens
* to name. An absent measurement is the honest answer; a guessed one is not.
*/
export function looksLikeCommand(span) {
let rest = String(span ?? '').trim();
while (ENV_ASSIGN.test(rest)) rest = rest.replace(ENV_ASSIGN, '');
const token = rest.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? '';
if (token === '') return false;
if (token.startsWith('-')) return false; // a flag
if (token.endsWith('/')) return false; // a directory
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_.@+~/-]+$/.test(token)) return false; // quotes, braces, prose
if (!/[A-Za-z0-9]/.test(token)) return false;
// A lone relative path with a slash is a file the sentence names. An explicit
// `./`, `../`, `/` or `~/` is an invocation and still runs.
if (rest === token && token.includes('/') && !/^(\.{1,2}\/|\/|~\/)/.test(token)) return false;
return true;
}
// The first backtick-delimited span on the line is the command by convention —
// both templates put it first and a second span holds the expected output.
function firstCommand(text) {
const m = text.match(/`([^`]+)`/);
if (!m) return { command: null, reason: 'no-command' };
const raw = m[1].trim();
// Template placeholders (`{exact command}`) are not commands.
if (raw === '' || /^\{.*\}$/.test(raw)) return { command: null, reason: 'placeholder' };
if (!looksLikeCommand(raw)) return { command: null, reason: 'not-a-command' };
return { command: raw, reason: '' };
}
// A command line inside a shell-tagged fence. A console block may prefix the
// line with a `$` or `>` prompt; blank and comment-only lines declare nothing.
// A `#` root prompt is NOT stripped: it is indistinguishable from a comment,
// and running a comment is the worse of the two mistakes.
function fencedCommand(text) {
const line = text.trim();
if (line === '' || line.startsWith('#')) return null;
return line.replace(/^[$>]\s+/, '');
}
function parseSection(markdown, heading, prefix) {
const lines = sectionLines(markdown, heading);
if (lines === null) return [];
const criteria = [];
const push = (text, command, reason) =>
criteria.push({ label: `${prefix}${criteria.length + 1}`, text, command, reason });
for (const line of lines) {
if (line.marker) continue;
if (line.fenced) {
if (!SHELL_LANGS.has(line.lang)) continue;
const command = fencedCommand(line.text);
if (command === null) continue;
push(command, command, '');
continue;
}
const bullet = line.text.match(BULLET);
if (!bullet) continue;
const text = bullet[1].trim();
if (text === '') continue;
const { command, reason } = firstCommand(text);
push(text, command, reason);
}
return criteria;
}
/** Criteria declared in a plan's `## Verification` section, labelled V1..Vn. */
export function parsePlanVerification(markdown) {
return parseSection(markdown, PLAN_HEADING, 'V');
}
/** Criteria declared in a brief's `## Success Criteria` section, labelled SC1..SCn. */
export function parseSuccessCriteria(markdown) {
return parseSection(markdown, BRIEF_HEADING, 'SC');
}
// --- screening --------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Screen one command through the plugin's PreToolUse denylist.
* Hook protocol: stdin JSON, exit 2 = block, exit 0 = allow. Any other exit
* means the screen did not render a verdict — that denies, it never allows.
*/
export function screenCommand(command, opts = {}) {
const hookPath = opts.hookPath ?? DEFAULT_HOOK;
const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [hookPath], {
input: JSON.stringify({ tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command } }),
encoding: 'utf8',
timeout: 30_000,
});
if (r.status === 0) return { allowed: true, rule: '' };
const first = String(r.stderr || '').split('\n')[0].trim();
if (r.status === 2) {
return { allowed: false, rule: first.replace(/^\[voyage\]\s*BLOCKED:\s*/, '') || 'blocked by the executor denylist' };
}
return {
allowed: false,
rule: `screen unavailable (${hookPath} exited ${r.status === null ? 'on signal' : r.status}) — denied, never assumed safe`,
};
}
// --- refusing ---------------------------------------------------------------
// The executor denylist screens CATASTROPHE (rm -rf /, fork bombs, mkfs). It
// was never meant to screen an artifact that arrives from outside the repo,
// and /trekreview now runs the commands a BRIEF declares. Measured 2026-09-18:
// `git push origin main` and `rm -rf <path>` both ran; only the pipe-to-shell
// was stopped. This list screens WRITES, and it is pinned by
// tests/lib/criteria-runner.test.mjs so it cannot quietly shrink.
//
// A refusal is its own outcome, REFUSED_BY_POLICY: the command never reaches a
// shell, and a refused criterion is never ok in either mode.
// Segments of a command that each start at command position.
const SEPARATORS = /(?:\|\||&&|[;|&\n])/;
const ENV_PREFIX = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=\S*$/;
// git's own options before the subcommand; these take a separate value.
const GIT_VALUE_OPTS = new Set(['-C', '-c', '--git-dir', '--work-tree', '--namespace', '--exec-path']);
// git subcommands that write somewhere this process does not own.
const WRITING_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set(['push']);
const RECURSIVE_FLAG = /^(?:-[A-Za-z]*r[A-Za-z]*|--recursive)$/;
const PIPE_TO_SHELL =
/\b(?:curl|wget|fetch)\b[^|]*\|\s*(?:sudo\s+)?(?:[\w./-]*\/)?(?:ba|z|k|da|a)?sh\b/;
// `>` / `>>` and their target. `2>&1` and `>&2` duplicate a descriptor rather
// than open a file, so `&` is excluded.
const REDIRECT = /(?:^|[^>&\w])\d?>>?\s*(?!&)(?:"([^"]*)"|'([^']*)'|([^\s;|&<>]+))/g;
const WRITABLE_DEVICES = new Set(['/dev/null', '/dev/stdout', '/dev/stderr', '/dev/tty']);
const basenameOf = (token) => token.split('/').pop();
function segments(command) {
return String(command).split(SEPARATORS).map((seg) => seg.trim()).filter(Boolean);
}
function tokensOf(segment) {
const t = segment.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
while (t.length > 0 && ENV_PREFIX.test(t[0])) t.shift();
return t;
}
function gitSubcommand(tokens) {
let i = 1;
while (i < tokens.length) {
const t = tokens[i];
if (!t.startsWith('-')) return t;
if (GIT_VALUE_OPTS.has(t)) { i += 2; continue; }
i += 1;
}
return null;
}
function redirectTargets(command) {
const out = [];
for (const m of String(command).matchAll(REDIRECT)) out.push(m[1] ?? m[2] ?? m[3]);
return out.filter(Boolean);
}
/**
* Whether a redirect target lands inside `cwd`. A target that cannot be
* resolved statically — one carrying an unexpanded `$VAR` — is treated as
* outside: the runner cannot know where it points, and guessing is how a
* screen stops screening.
*/
function writesOutside(target, cwd) {
if (WRITABLE_DEVICES.has(target)) return false;
if (target.includes('$') || target.includes('`')) return true;
const expanded = target.startsWith('~') ? join(homedir(), target.slice(1)) : target;
const abs = resolve(cwd, expanded);
return abs !== cwd && !abs.startsWith(cwd.endsWith(sep) ? cwd : cwd + sep);
}
/**
* Screen one command against the refusal list. Returns `{refused, rule}`.
* `cwd` is the working tree the criteria run in; writes outside it are refused.
*/
export function refuseCommand(command, opts = {}) {
const cwd = resolve(opts.cwd ?? process.cwd());
const text = String(command ?? '');
const refuse = (rule) => ({ refused: true, rule });
if (PIPE_TO_SHELL.test(text)) return refuse('a download piped straight into a shell');
for (const segment of segments(text)) {
const tokens = tokensOf(segment);
if (tokens.length === 0) continue;
const name = basenameOf(tokens[0]);
if (name === 'git') {
const sub = gitSubcommand(tokens);
if (sub && WRITING_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS.has(sub)) {
return refuse(`a remote-writing git subcommand (git ${sub})`);
}
}
if (name === 'rm' && tokens.slice(1).some((t) => RECURSIVE_FLAG.test(t))) {
return refuse('a recursive delete (rm -r)');
}
}
for (const target of redirectTargets(text)) {
if (writesOutside(target, cwd)) {
return refuse(`a write outside the working tree (${target})`);
}
}
return { refused: false, rule: '' };
}
// --- running ----------------------------------------------------------------
function defaultExec(command, { cwd, timeoutMs }) {
const r = spawnSync('/bin/sh', ['-c', command], { cwd, encoding: 'utf8', timeout: timeoutMs });
return { status: r.status, stdout: r.stdout ?? '', stderr: r.stderr ?? '' };
}
function cap(text, max) {
const t = String(text ?? '');
return t.length <= max ? t : `${t.slice(0, max)}\n… [truncated: ${t.length} chars total]`;
}
/**
* Run each criterion that has a command. Returns one result per criterion:
* passed the command exited 0
* failed the command exited non-zero (or was killed by the timeout)
* refused the refusal list denied it — it never reached a shell
* blocked the executor denylist denied it — it never reached a shell
* unrunnable there is no command to run (placeholder or prose-only criterion)
*/
export function runCriteria(criteria, opts = {}) {
const exec = opts.exec ?? defaultExec;
const screen = opts.screen ?? screenCommand;
const refuse = opts.refuse ?? refuseCommand;
const cwd = opts.cwd ?? process.cwd();
const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
const maxOutput = opts.maxOutput ?? DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT;
const hookPath = opts.hookPath ?? DEFAULT_HOOK;
return criteria.map((c) => {
const base = { label: c.label, text: c.text, command: c.command };
if (!c.command) {
return { ...base, status: 'unrunnable', exitCode: null, output: `not runnable: ${c.reason || 'no command'}` };
}
const refusal = refuse(c.command, { cwd });
if (refusal.refused) {
return { ...base, status: 'refused', exitCode: null, output: `REFUSED_BY_POLICY: ${refusal.rule}` };
}
const verdict = screen(c.command, { hookPath });
if (!verdict.allowed) {
return { ...base, status: 'blocked', exitCode: null, output: `blocked: ${verdict.rule}` };
}
const r = exec(c.command, { cwd, timeoutMs });
const output = cap(`${r.stdout ?? ''}${r.stderr ?? ''}`, maxOutput);
return {
...base,
status: r.status === 0 ? 'passed' : 'failed',
exitCode: r.status,
output,
};
});
}
/**
* The verdict. `requireCommand` distinguishes the two callers: a plan promises
* an exact command per criterion, so an unrunnable one is a defect in the plan;
* a brief may hold criteria a human judges by reading, so there an unrunnable
* criterion is reported and left to the reviewer.
*/
export function summarize(results, opts = {}) {
const requireCommand = opts.requireCommand ?? true;
const count = (s) => results.filter((r) => r.status === s).length;
const summary = {
total: results.length,
passed: count('passed'),
failed: count('failed'),
blocked: count('blocked'),
refused: count('refused'),
unrunnable: count('unrunnable'),
};
summary.ok =
summary.failed === 0 &&
summary.blocked === 0 &&
summary.refused === 0 &&
(!requireCommand || (summary.unrunnable === 0 && summary.total > 0));
return summary;
}
function report(kind, source, criteria, opts, error) {
const requireCommand = kind === 'plan';
const results = error ? [] : runCriteria(criteria, opts);
return {
kind,
source,
heading: kind === 'plan' ? PLAN_HEADING : BRIEF_HEADING,
results,
summary: summarize(results, { requireCommand }),
error: error ?? null,
};
}
function readOrThrow(path) {
try {
return readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
} catch (err) {
const e = new Error(`cannot read ${path}: ${err.message}`);
e.code = 'READ_ERROR';
throw e;
}
}
/**
* Run a plan's `## Verification` criteria. A plan with no such section is NOT
* ok: a plan that promises no end-to-end check cannot be verified, and that
* must read as red rather than as nothing to do.
*/
export function runPlanVerification(planPath, opts = {}) {
const md = readOrThrow(planPath);
if (sectionLines(md, PLAN_HEADING) === null) {
return report('plan', planPath, [], opts, {
code: 'NO_VERIFICATION_SECTION',
message: `${planPath} has no "${PLAN_HEADING}" section — nothing to verify, so the run cannot be called verified`,
});
}
return report('plan', planPath, parsePlanVerification(md), opts);
}
/**
* Run a brief's `## Success Criteria` commands. Used by /trekreview to hand the
* conformance reviewer a real result per criterion.
*/
export function runSuccessCriteriaChecks(briefPath, opts = {}) {
const md = readOrThrow(briefPath);
if (sectionLines(md, BRIEF_HEADING) === null) {
return report('brief', briefPath, [], opts, {
code: 'NO_SUCCESS_CRITERIA_SECTION',
message: `${briefPath} has no "${BRIEF_HEADING}" section`,
});
}
return report('brief', briefPath, parseSuccessCriteria(md), opts);
}
// --- rendering --------------------------------------------------------------
const MARK = { passed: 'PASS', failed: 'FAILED', blocked: 'BLOCKED', refused: 'REFUSED', unrunnable: 'NOT RUN' };
export function render(rep) {
const out = [];
const s = rep.summary;
out.push(`criteria-runner: ${s.ok ? 'OK' : 'NOT OK'} — ${rep.source} ${rep.heading}`);
if (rep.error) out.push(` error: ${rep.error.code} — ${rep.error.message}`);
out.push(
` ${s.passed} passed · ${s.failed} failed · ${s.blocked} blocked · ${s.refused} refused · ${s.unrunnable} not run (of ${s.total})`
);
for (const r of rep.results) {
const code = r.exitCode === null ? '' : ` (exit ${r.exitCode})`;
out.push(` [${MARK[r.status]}] ${r.label}: \`${r.command ?? r.text}\`${code}`);
if (r.status !== 'passed' && r.output) {
for (const line of r.output.split('\n').slice(0, 20)) out.push(` ${line}`);
}
}
return out.join('\n');
}
/**
* The evidence block /trekreview hands to `brief-conformance-reviewer`.
*
* The reviewer's tools are Read/Glob/Grep, so it cannot run a success
* criterion's verification command. Building this block in code (rather than
* letting the orchestrator narrate it) is what makes "passes" an exit code the
* reviewer READS instead of a judgement it cannot make.
*/
export function formatCriteriaEvidence(rep) {
const out = [];
out.push('### Success-criteria check results (run for you — you did not run these)');
out.push('');
out.push(`Source: \`${rep.source}\` ${rep.heading}`);
out.push('');
if (rep.error) {
out.push(`**${rep.error.code}** — ${rep.error.message}.`);
out.push('');
out.push('No criteria were run. Treat every criterion as NOT RUN.');
} else {
out.push('| Criterion | Command | Result | Exit | Evidence |');
out.push('|---|---|---|---|---|');
for (const r of rep.results) {
const cmd = r.command ? `\`${cell(r.command)}\`` : '(none)';
const exit = r.exitCode === null ? '—' : `exit ${r.exitCode}`;
const evidence = r.status === 'passed' ? '—' : cell(firstLine(r.output)) || '—';
out.push(`| ${r.label} | ${cmd} | ${MARK[r.status]} | ${exit} | ${evidence} |`);
}
const s = rep.summary;
out.push('');
out.push(
`${s.passed} passed · ${s.failed} failed · ${s.blocked} blocked · ${s.refused} refused · ${s.unrunnable} not run (of ${s.total}).`
);
}
out.push('');
out.push(
'**NOT RUN is not a pass.** You cannot run these commands yourself — never infer, assume or ' +
'reconstruct a result for a criterion that has none. A criterion whose result is FAILED or ' +
'BLOCKED is `Broken`; a criterion marked REFUSED was refused by policy before it reached a ' +
'shell, so like NOT RUN it is the ABSENCE of a measurement and never on its own a finding; ' +
'a criterion with no result is judged on delivered code alone, and you say so in the ' +
'Evidence column.'
);
return out.join('\n');
}
function firstLine(text) {
return String(text ?? '').split('\n').map((l) => l.trim()).find((l) => l !== '') ?? '';
}
// Markdown table cells: no pipes, no newlines, bounded length.
function cell(text) {
const t = String(text ?? '').replace(/\r?\n/g, ' ').replace(/\|/g, '\\|').trim();
return t.length <= 120 ? t : `${t.slice(0, 120)}…`;
}
// --- CLI --------------------------------------------------------------------
const USAGE =
'usage: criteria-runner.mjs (--plan <plan.md> | --brief <brief.md>) [--json | --evidence] [--cwd <dir>] [--timeout <ms>]';
export function main(argv) {
let mode = null;
let path = null;
let json = false;
let evidence = false;
const opts = {};
for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
const a = argv[i];
if ((a === '--plan' || a === '--brief') && argv[i + 1]) {
if (mode) { process.stderr.write(`criteria-runner: one mode at a time\n${USAGE}\n`); return 2; }
mode = a.slice(2);
path = argv[++i];
} else if (a === '--json') json = true;
else if (a === '--evidence') evidence = true;
else if (a === '--cwd' && argv[i + 1]) opts.cwd = resolve(argv[++i]);
else if (a === '--timeout' && argv[i + 1]) opts.timeoutMs = Number(argv[++i]);
else { process.stderr.write(`criteria-runner: unknown argument ${a}\n${USAGE}\n`); return 2; }
}
if (!mode) { process.stderr.write(`criteria-runner: no artifact given\n${USAGE}\n`); return 2; }
if (json && evidence) {
process.stderr.write(`criteria-runner: --json and --evidence are two output shapes; pick one\n${USAGE}\n`);
return 2;
}
if (opts.timeoutMs !== undefined && !Number.isFinite(opts.timeoutMs)) {
process.stderr.write(`criteria-runner: --timeout must be a number\n${USAGE}\n`);
return 2;
}
let rep;
try {
rep = mode === 'plan' ? runPlanVerification(path, opts) : runSuccessCriteriaChecks(path, opts);
} catch (err) {
process.stderr.write(`criteria-runner: ${err.message}\n`);
return 2;
}
const text = json ? JSON.stringify(rep, null, 2) : evidence ? formatCriteriaEvidence(rep) : render(rep);
process.stdout.write(text + '\n');
return rep.summary.ok ? 0 : 1;
}
if (process.argv[1] && resolve(process.argv[1]) === fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) {
process.exitCode = main(process.argv.slice(2));
}