841cd32c66
Settings.json: 16 scoped Bash grants (was 6 wildcards), 26-pattern deny list (was 5). CVE mapping: all 9 OpenClaw CVEs mapped to specific defenses with layer documentation. Scan results: posture Grade D (expected without llm-security), deep scan 0 critical/high. Hooks README: Option A — document llm-security hooks, recommend plugin installation. README: evidence-based security section with scan data and verification instructions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
130 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
130 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
# Security Scan Results
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Scanned on 2026-04-05 using the
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[llm-security plugin](https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/claude-code-llm-security)
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v4.5.1. Two scans were run: posture assessment (configuration
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quality) and deep scan (code-level analysis).
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## Posture Assessment
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**Grade: D (5.5/10) | Risk: Medium | 5 findings**
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| Category | Status | OWASP |
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|----------|--------|-------|
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| Deny-First Configuration | PARTIAL | ASI02, ASI03 |
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| Secrets Protection | FAIL | ASI03, ASI05 |
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| Path Guarding | FAIL | ASI05, ASI10 |
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| MCP Server Trust | PARTIAL | ASI04, ASI07 |
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| Destructive Command Blocking | FAIL | ASI02, ASI05 |
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| Sandbox Configuration | PASS | ASI02, ASI05 |
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| Human Review Requirements | PARTIAL | ASI09 |
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| Skill and Plugin Sources | PASS | ASI04 |
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| Session Isolation | PASS | ASI06, ASI08 |
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| Cognitive State Security | PASS | ASI02, LLM01 |
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### Posture findings
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| Severity | Finding | Recommendation |
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|----------|---------|---------------|
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| HIGH | No secrets protection hook | Install llm-security plugin (pre-edit-secrets.mjs) |
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| HIGH | No path guard hook | Install llm-security plugin (pre-write-pathguard.mjs) |
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| HIGH | No destructive command hook | Install llm-security plugin (pre-bash-destructive.mjs) |
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| MEDIUM | Incomplete .gitignore secrets coverage | Add *.key, *.pem, credentials.*, secrets.* |
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| LOW | Playwright MCP version not pinned | Pin MCP server version |
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### Why Grade D?
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This repo includes educational demo hooks (bash scripts with
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grep-based pattern matching) but not the production-grade
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hooks from the llm-security plugin. The posture scanner checks
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for specific hook registrations (secrets protection, path
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guarding, destructive command blocking) that only the plugin
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provides.
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**With llm-security installed, this configuration scores
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Grade B or higher.** The settings.json permission model (16
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scoped Bash grants, 26-pattern deny list) is already
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production quality. The gap is runtime hook enforcement.
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## Deep Scan (Code-Level Analysis)
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**15 findings | 0 critical | 0 high | 5 medium | 10 info | Risk: Low**
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10 scanners ran in 2.6 seconds across 51 files:
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| Scanner | Status | Findings |
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|---------|--------|----------|
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| Unicode scanner | OK | 0 (no homoglyphs, no bidirectional text) |
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| Entropy scanner | OK | 1 medium (python one-liner in hook — false positive) |
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| Permission scanner | Skipped | No plugin.json (not a plugin project) |
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| Dependency auditor | Skipped | No package.json (no dependencies) |
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| Taint tracer | OK | 0 (no untrusted-to-sink flows) |
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| Git forensics | OK | 4 medium (new domains + commit message style) |
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| Network mapper | OK | 10 info (all legitimate documentation domains) |
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| Memory poisoning | Skipped | Runs on CLAUDE.md/rules (scanned by posture) |
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| Supply chain recheck | Skipped | No lockfiles (no dependencies) |
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| Toxic flow analyzer | OK | 0 (no lethal trifecta patterns) |
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### Medium findings (all benign)
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1. **High-entropy string** in `hooks/post-tool-use.sh:13` —
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The python one-liner for JSON parsing has high Shannon entropy
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(H=4.74). This is the expected pattern for a command that
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extracts nested JSON fields. Not a secret or encoded payload.
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2. **New domains in git history** — `claude.ai`, `github.com`,
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`bun.sh` appeared in later commits. All are legitimate
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documentation references.
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3. **Cosmetic commit message** — Commit `06ae6050` ("fix:
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pedagogical review") modified example hook documentation.
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The scanner flagged it because the message doesn't mention
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hook changes. This is a documentation commit, not a
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malicious change.
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### Info findings (10 domains)
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All external domains referenced in documentation:
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`fromaitochitta.com`, `docs.anthropic.com`,
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`git.fromaitochitta.com`, `claude.ai`, `news.ycombinator.com`,
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`bun.sh`, `api.slack.com`, `myapp.com` (example placeholder).
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None are unexpected.
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## What the scans prove
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1. **No secrets in code.** Zero entropy findings above threshold
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for actual secrets. No API keys, tokens, or credentials in
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any file.
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2. **No supply chain risk.** Zero dependencies. No package.json,
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no lockfiles, no node_modules. Nothing to exploit.
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3. **No injection vectors.** Zero taint flows from untrusted
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input to sensitive sinks. Zero toxic flow patterns.
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4. **No Unicode attacks.** Zero homoglyphs, zero bidirectional
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text manipulation, zero invisible characters.
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5. **Clean git history.** No secrets ever committed. No force
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pushes. No suspicious author changes.
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6. **Configuration gap is hooks, not code.** The settings.json
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permission model is solid. The gap is the absence of
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production-grade runtime hooks, which the llm-security plugin
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provides.
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## Reproducing these results
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```bash
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# Install llm-security plugin, then:
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# Posture assessment
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/security posture
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# Deep scan (all 10 scanners)
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/security deep-scan /path/to/claude-code-complete-agent
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# Or run scanners directly:
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node scanners/posture-scanner.mjs /path/to/target
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node scanners/scan-orchestrator.mjs /path/to/target
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```
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