Two follow-up fixes after E16 + E17 landed:
1. foldHomoglyphs ASCII fast-path
- scanForInjection calls foldHomoglyphs on every scan (raw + normalized).
- Pre-fix: NFKC normalization runs unconditionally, even on pure
ASCII inputs where it's a no-op.
- Result: benchmark.test.mjs timed out at 120s on the full suite.
- Fix: charCodeAt sweep for >=128, short-circuit return s when
all ASCII. NFKC and HOMOGLYPH_MAP iteration only run when
non-ASCII chars are present (the actual attack case).
- Verified: benchmark.test.mjs passes within timeout.
2. Attack-scenario UNI-003 expectation
- Pre-E16: "Homoglyph Cyrillic-Latin mixing" payload triggered only
a MEDIUM "obfuscation present" advisory (exit 0, stdout match
"MEDIUM").
- Post-E16: the same payload is folded to Latin BEFORE pattern
matching, so it now matches CRITICAL "ignore previous instructions"
and blocks (exit 2).
- This is the intended v7.2.0 behavior — not a regression. Updated
expectation: exit_code 2, stdout_match "block". Renamed scenario
to "now blocked via E16 fold, v7.2.0".
Suite: pre-compact-scan flake remains (perf-budget under load,
passes isolated). All other tests green.
Closes A3 of v7.1.0 critical-review patch. Each rewrite preserves the underlying
claim where it is accurate but removes hype/overreach language. Historical
CHANGELOG/README version-table rows are intentionally left as-is (they document
what was claimed at the time of release, not what is true today).
Changes (CLAUDE.md, commands/ide-scan.md, knowledge/mitigation-matrix.md,
docs/security-hardening-guide.md):
- "Trustworthy scoring (BREAKING)" → "Severity-dominated risk scoring
(v2 model, BREAKING)". Removes hype framing; describes the actual mechanism.
- "Context-aware entropy scanner" → "Rule-based entropy scanner with
file-extension skip, 8 line-level suppression rules, and configurable policy".
No ML/context inference; just rules.
- "1487 tests" → "1511 unit and integration tests; mutation-testing coverage
not published". Updated count after A1+A2 (+24) and added qualifier.
- "Fully Schrems II compatible" → "Schrems II compatible in default offline
mode. Optional OSV.dev enrichment (`supply-chain-recheck --online`)
transmits package identifiers to a Google-operated API and is a separate
compliance consideration." Acknowledges the OSV.dev opt-in caveat.
- "Rule of Two enforcement" → "Rule of Two detection (configurable; default
warn; blocks on high-confidence trifectas in opt-in `block` mode; distributed
trifectas detected but not blocked by default)". "Enforcement" implied
block; default is warn.
- "Hardened ZIP extractor" → suffix " — no fuzz-testing results published
to date". Caps and class-of-attacks rejected are accurate; absence of
formal fuzz coverage now stated.
- "defense-in-depth" — preserved as framing, but quantified in
security-hardening-guide §4: "three independent detection layers with
documented bypass classes". Each layer named, each layer's known bypasses
pointed to (critical-review §4 evasion arsenal).
Tests: 1511/1511 green (no behavioural change).
Hyperframes scan flagged knip vs knex, oxlint vs eslint, tsx vs nx,
rimraf vs trim as HIGH typosquats. All four are legitimate top-1000 npm
packages; short names just happen to be within Levenshtein ≤2 of other
top packages. These shouldn't generate HIGH severity on a clean install.
Added to npm allowlist: knip, oxlint, tsx, nx, rimraf, glob, tar, zod,
ky, ow, esm, ip, qs, url, prettier, vitest, vite, rollup, swc, turbo,
bun, deno. Added to pypi allowlist: uv, ruff, rich, typer, anyio.
Dep-auditor normalization (lowercase + [_.-] → -) already applied at
load time. dep.test.mjs: 11/11 still green — lodsah→lodash detection
preserved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 1/17 of ultraplan-2026-04-17-jetbrains-ide-scan.
- Populate top-jetbrains-plugins.json with 56 canonical xmlIds (bundled +
popular third-party): com.intellij.java, org.jetbrains.kotlin,
com.jetbrains.python.community, org.rust.lang, com.github.copilot,
mobi.hsz.idea.gitignore, the legitimate-typo 'Lombook Plugin', etc.
- Add loadJetBrainsBlocklist() export mirroring loadVSCodeBlocklist shape.
Blocklist is empty by design — no public confirmed-malicious JetBrains
Marketplace plugins as of 2026-04-17.
- Add tests/scanners/ide-extension-data.test.mjs (9 tests, all pass).
- Fix cache bug in loadTopJetBrains: map normalizeId on cache-hit path too
(was previously unnormalized on second call).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-installation verification of VS Code extensions via URL — fetch a remote
VSIX, extract it in a hardened sandbox, and run the existing IDE scanner
pipeline against it. No npm dependencies.
Sources:
- VS Code Marketplace (publisher.gallery.vsassets.io direct download)
- OpenVSX (open-vsx.org official API)
- Direct .vsix HTTPS URLs
Defenses:
- HTTPS-only, TLS verified, manual redirect with per-source host whitelist
- 30s total timeout via AbortController
- 50MB compressed cap, 500MB uncompressed, 100x expansion ratio
- Zero-dep ZIP extractor: zip-slip, absolute paths, drive letters, NUL bytes,
symlinks (Unix mode 0xA000), depth limits, ZIP64 rejected, encrypted rejected
- SHA-256 streamed during fetch, surfaced in meta.source
- Temp dir cleanup in all paths (try/finally)
Files:
- scanners/lib/vsix-fetch.mjs (HTTPS fetcher, host whitelist, streaming SHA-256)
- scanners/lib/zip-extract.mjs (zero-dep parser with hardening caps)
- knowledge/marketplace-api-notes.md (endpoint reference)
- 3 test files (48 tests added: vsix-fetch, zip-extract, ide-extension-url)
Tests: 1296 → 1344 (all green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
