2 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Kjell Tore Guttormsen	c407d3451d	feat(voyage)!: rename stats filenames, settings keys, hook prefixes [skip-docs] ... - lib/stats/event-emit.mjs: STATS_FILENAME -> trekexecute-stats.jsonl + comment - hooks/scripts/post-bash-stats.mjs: stats target + comment -> trekexecute-stats.jsonl - lib/stats/cache-analyzer.mjs: help-text + comment -> trekexecute-stats.jsonl - tests/lib/stats-event-emit.test.mjs (lines 104, 117): fixture assertions - settings.json: ultraplan/ultraresearch -> trekplan/trekresearch keys + statsFile values - tests/lib/doc-consistency.test.mjs: allowlist (line 83) + accessor cfg.ultraplan?.* -> cfg.trekplan?.* (lines 91, 93) — atomic-pair, prevents vacuous undefined assertions - scripts/q3-cache-prefix-experiment.mjs: STATS_JSONL hardcoded path -> voyage data dir + trekexecute filename - hooks/scripts/pre-bash-executor.mjs (2 lines), pre-compact-flush.mjs (2 lines), pre-write-executor.mjs (1 line): [ultraplan]/[ultraplan-local] stderr prefix -> [voyage] - commands + agents/review-orchestrator.md + CLAUDE.md: prose stats filename literals -> trek* equivalents Atomic per session-spec: settings.json scope keys + doc-consistency.test.mjs allowlist + property accessors committed together to prevent silent vacuous undefined-equals-undefined assertions. Part of voyage-rebrand session 2 (W3.7 / Step 9). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-05 14:49:03 +02:00
Kjell Tore Guttormsen	aa21e59ac2	feat(ultraplan-local): defense-in-depth security hardening for executor ... Four-layer security model for ultraexecute-local and headless sessions: Layer 1 — Plugin hooks: pre-bash-executor.mjs (13 BLOCK + 8 WARN rules with bash evasion normalization) and pre-write-executor.mjs (8 path guard rules blocking .git/hooks, .claude/settings, shell configs, .env, SSH/AWS). Layer 2 — Prompt-level security rules: denylist in ultraexecute-local.md Sub-step D and session-spec-template.md Security Constraints section. These are the only rules that work in headless child sessions. Layer 3 — Pre-execution plan validation: new Phase 2.4 scans all Verify and Checkpoint commands against denylist before execution begins. Layer 4 — Replace --dangerously-skip-permissions with scoped --allowedTools "Read,Write,Edit,Bash,Glob,Grep" --permission-mode bypassPermissions in ultraexecute-local.md, headless-launch-template.md, and session-decomposer.md. Blocks Agent, MCP, WebSearch in child sessions. Also adds Hard Rules 14-16: verify command security check, no writing outside repository root, no writing to security-sensitive paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-08 18:33:15 +02:00