~/.claude/CLAUDE.md specifies English for code and documentation, Norwegian for dialog only. Norwegian had crept into surface text across v7.5-v7.7. Translated to English in eight surfaces. No scanner, hook, or behavior changes — purely surface text. - 18 skill commands: the HTML Report-step now reads "HTML report: [Open in browser]" instead of "HTML-rapport: [Åpne i nettleser]" - scripts/lib/report-renderers.mjs: key-stat labels, lede defaults, table headers, maturity-ladder descriptions, action-tier labels, clean buckets, dry-run/apply copy, and JS comments. Regex alternations /^high|^høy/ and /resolution|løsning/i preserved. - playground/llm-security-playground.html: same renderer changes mirrored bit-identical, plus playground-only UI strings (catalog, breadcrumb aria-label, theme toggle, builder-modal hint, guide-panel "no projects yet", delete confirmation, alert/copy). Demo-state fixture content for dft-komplett-demo preserved (intentional Norwegian persona). - agents/skill-scanner-agent.md + agents/mcp-scanner-agent.md: Generaliseringsgrense + Parallell Read-strategi sections translated to Generalization boundary + Parallel Read strategy. - README.md: playground architecture prose + Recent versions table (v7.5.0 — v7.7.1). - CLAUDE.md: v7.7.1 highlights translated, new v7.7.2 highlights added. - ../../README.md: llm-security v7.5.0 — v7.7.1 bullets. - ../../CLAUDE.md: llm-security catalog entry. - docs/scanner-reference.md: six runnable-examples table cells. - docs/version-history.md: new v7.7.2 entry. v7.5-v7.7 narrative sections left in original language (deferred per operator). - Version bumped 7.7.1 → 7.7.2 in package.json, .claude-plugin/plugin.json, README badge + Recent versions, CLAUDE.md header + state, docs/version-history.md, playground renderHome hardcoded string, root README + CLAUDE.md llm-security entries. Tests: 1820/1820 green. CLI smoke-test: 18/18 commandIds produce >138 KB self-contained HTML. Browser-dogfood verified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.2 KiB
| name | description | allowed-tools | model |
|---|---|---|---|
| llm-security:red-team | Attack simulation — test hook defenses with crafted payloads | Bash, Read | sonnet |
Red Team — Attack Simulation
Run crafted attack payloads against the plugin's own hooks to verify defenses.
What was requested
The user ran /security red-team to test their hook defenses.
Arguments
Parse $ARGUMENTS for:
--category <name>— filter: secrets, destructive, supply-chain, prompt-injection, pathguard, mcp-output, session-trifecta, hybrid, unicode-evasion, bash-evasion, hitl-traps, long-horizon, all--json— raw JSON output--adaptive— mutation-based evasion testing (5 mutation rounds per passing scenario)
Default: all categories, fixed mode.
Steps
- Run the attack simulator:
node scanners/attack-simulator.mjs [--category <name>] [--verbose] [--adaptive]
The simulator runs 64 attack scenarios across 12 categories against the plugin's hooks. Each scenario sends a crafted payload and verifies the hook blocks or detects it.
In adaptive mode (--adaptive), for each scenario that passes (attack blocked), the simulator applies 5 mutation rounds:
- Homoglyph substitution (Latin chars replaced with Cyrillic lookalikes)
- Encoding wrapping (URL-encoded keywords)
- Zero-width character injection (ZW chars inserted between keyword letters)
- Case alternation (aLtErNaTiNg case)
- Synonym substitution (keyword replacement from synonym table)
Bypasses are reported as findings but not auto-fixed.
- Present the results as a narrative report:
For each category, explain:
- What was tested (the attack type)
- How many attacks were blocked
- Whether defenses are adequate
If any scenarios fail, explain the gap and what hook needs attention.
In adaptive mode, also explain:
- How many mutations were tested
- Which mutations found bypasses
- That bypasses are expected for synonym and encoding mutations (deterministic hooks cannot catch all evasions)
- Defense Score interpretation:
- 100% — All hooks functioning correctly. No defense gaps.
- 90-99% — Minor gaps. Review failed scenarios.
- Below 90% — Significant gaps. Hooks may be misconfigured or missing.
Categories
| Category | Hook Tested | Scenarios |
|---|---|---|
| secrets | pre-edit-secrets.mjs | 7 secret types (AWS, GitHub, PEM, DB, Bearer, Azure, Slack) |
| destructive | pre-bash-destructive.mjs | 8 commands (rm -rf, chmod 777, curl|bash, fork bomb, mkfs, dd, eval) |
| supply-chain | pre-install-supply-chain.mjs | 4 managers (npm, pip, cargo, gem) |
| prompt-injection | pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs | 6 patterns (override, spoofed headers, identity, evasion) |
| pathguard | pre-write-pathguard.mjs | 6 paths (.env, .ssh, .aws, .npmrc, /etc, hooks) |
| mcp-output | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 4 threats (injection, secrets, HTML traps, MCP injection) |
| session-trifecta | post-session-guard.mjs | 3 patterns (classic trifecta, MCP-concentrated, volume) |
| hybrid | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 8 patterns (P2SQL, recursive injection, XSS variants) |
| unicode-evasion | pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs | 6 patterns (Unicode Tags, ZW chars, homoglyphs, BIDI, HTML entities, multi-lang) |
| bash-evasion | pre-bash-destructive.mjs | 5 patterns (empty quotes, dollar expansion, backslash splitting, supply chain) |
| hitl-traps | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 4 patterns (approval urgency, summary suppression, scope minimization, cognitive load) |
| long-horizon | post-session-guard.mjs | 3 patterns (delegation-after-input, sensitive path, MCP-concentrated trifecta) |
Mutation Types (Adaptive Mode)
| Mutation | Technique | Expected Bypass Rate |
|---|---|---|
| homoglyph | Cyrillic/Latin lookalike substitution | Low (MEDIUM patterns detect) |
| encoding | URL-encode keywords | High (hooks normalize some, not all) |
| zero_width | Insert zero-width chars in keywords | Low (normalizer strips these) |
| case_alternation | aLtErNaTiNg case | Low (regex uses /i flag) |
| synonym | Replace with semantic equivalents | Medium (novel synonyms evade patterns) |
Important
- This tests the plugin's OWN hooks — it does not perform real exploits
- No network calls, no file modifications, no LLM invocations
- Safe to run repeatedly — all state is cleaned up after each run
- Adaptive mode bypasses are expected — they document evasion resistance limits
HTML Report
After producing the markdown red-team narrative report above:
-
Compute a temp markdown path:
node -p "require('path').join(require('os').tmpdir(), 'sec-red-team-' + Date.now() + '.md')" -
Use the Write tool to save the entire markdown report you just produced (per-category narrative + scenario pass/fail + defense score + adaptive-mode bypasses if
--adaptive) to that temp path. Verbatim. -
Run the renderer:
node <plugin-root>/scripts/render-report.mjs red-team --in "<temp-md-path>"The CLI writes
reports/red-team-<YYYYMMDD-HHmmss>.htmlrelative to CWD and printsfile:///abs/path.htmlon stdout. -
Append to your response (markdown link, no bare URL):
HTML report: Open in browser
If the CLI exits non-zero, mention the error but do not block — the markdown report above is the primary deliverable.