4.3 KiB
4.3 KiB
| name | description | allowed-tools | model |
|---|---|---|---|
| llm-security:red-team | Attack simulation — test hook defenses with crafted payloads | Bash, Read | sonnet |
Red Team — Attack Simulation
Run crafted attack payloads against the plugin's own hooks to verify defenses.
What was requested
The user ran /security red-team to test their hook defenses.
Arguments
Parse $ARGUMENTS for:
--category <name>— filter: secrets, destructive, supply-chain, prompt-injection, pathguard, mcp-output, session-trifecta, hybrid, unicode-evasion, bash-evasion, hitl-traps, long-horizon, all--json— raw JSON output--adaptive— mutation-based evasion testing (5 mutation rounds per passing scenario)
Default: all categories, fixed mode.
Steps
- Run the attack simulator:
node scanners/attack-simulator.mjs [--category <name>] [--verbose] [--adaptive]
The simulator runs 64 attack scenarios across 12 categories against the plugin's hooks. Each scenario sends a crafted payload and verifies the hook blocks or detects it.
In adaptive mode (--adaptive), for each scenario that passes (attack blocked), the simulator applies 5 mutation rounds:
- Homoglyph substitution (Latin chars replaced with Cyrillic lookalikes)
- Encoding wrapping (URL-encoded keywords)
- Zero-width character injection (ZW chars inserted between keyword letters)
- Case alternation (aLtErNaTiNg case)
- Synonym substitution (keyword replacement from synonym table)
Bypasses are reported as findings but not auto-fixed.
- Present the results as a narrative report:
For each category, explain:
- What was tested (the attack type)
- How many attacks were blocked
- Whether defenses are adequate
If any scenarios fail, explain the gap and what hook needs attention.
In adaptive mode, also explain:
- How many mutations were tested
- Which mutations found bypasses
- That bypasses are expected for synonym and encoding mutations (deterministic hooks cannot catch all evasions)
- Defense Score interpretation:
- 100% — All hooks functioning correctly. No defense gaps.
- 90-99% — Minor gaps. Review failed scenarios.
- Below 90% — Significant gaps. Hooks may be misconfigured or missing.
Categories
| Category | Hook Tested | Scenarios |
|---|---|---|
| secrets | pre-edit-secrets.mjs | 7 secret types (AWS, GitHub, PEM, DB, Bearer, Azure, Slack) |
| destructive | pre-bash-destructive.mjs | 8 commands (rm -rf, chmod 777, curl|bash, fork bomb, mkfs, dd, eval) |
| supply-chain | pre-install-supply-chain.mjs | 4 managers (npm, pip, cargo, gem) |
| prompt-injection | pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs | 6 patterns (override, spoofed headers, identity, evasion) |
| pathguard | pre-write-pathguard.mjs | 6 paths (.env, .ssh, .aws, .npmrc, /etc, hooks) |
| mcp-output | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 4 threats (injection, secrets, HTML traps, MCP injection) |
| session-trifecta | post-session-guard.mjs | 3 patterns (classic trifecta, MCP-concentrated, volume) |
| hybrid | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 8 patterns (P2SQL, recursive injection, XSS variants) |
| unicode-evasion | pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs | 6 patterns (Unicode Tags, ZW chars, homoglyphs, BIDI, HTML entities, multi-lang) |
| bash-evasion | pre-bash-destructive.mjs | 5 patterns (empty quotes, dollar expansion, backslash splitting, supply chain) |
| hitl-traps | post-mcp-verify.mjs | 4 patterns (approval urgency, summary suppression, scope minimization, cognitive load) |
| long-horizon | post-session-guard.mjs | 3 patterns (delegation-after-input, sensitive path, MCP-concentrated trifecta) |
Mutation Types (Adaptive Mode)
| Mutation | Technique | Expected Bypass Rate |
|---|---|---|
| homoglyph | Cyrillic/Latin lookalike substitution | Low (MEDIUM patterns detect) |
| encoding | URL-encode keywords | High (hooks normalize some, not all) |
| zero_width | Insert zero-width chars in keywords | Low (normalizer strips these) |
| case_alternation | aLtErNaTiNg case | Low (regex uses /i flag) |
| synonym | Replace with semantic equivalents | Medium (novel synonyms evade patterns) |
Important
- This tests the plugin's OWN hooks — it does not perform real exploits
- No network calls, no file modifications, no LLM invocations
- Safe to run repeatedly — all state is cleaned up after each run
- Adaptive mode bypasses are expected — they document evasion resistance limits