Kjell Tore Guttormsen
ce3891bdd0
Single-file SPA playground har nå parser + renderer for alle 18 produces_report=true-kommandoer (Fase 2: 10 høy-prio + Fase 3: 8 gjenstående: mcp-inspect, supply-check, pre-deploy, diff, watch, registry, clean, threat-model). 18 markdown test-fixtures fungerer som kontrakt-anker for parser-utvikling. Komplett demo-prosjekt `dft-komplett-demo` har alle 18 rapporter ferdig parsed inline — klikk-gjennom uten "parser ikke implementert"- paneler. 2 nye archetypes i KEY_STATS_CONFIG: kanban-buckets (clean) og matrix-risk (threat-model). Bug-fix: normalizeVerdictText sjekker nå GO-WITH-CONDITIONS / CONDITIONAL / BETINGET FØR plain GO så betinget verdict (pre-deploy med åpne vilkår) ikke kollapser til ALLOW. Eksponert 11 window-globaler for testing/automasjon (__store, __navigate, __loadDemoState, __PARSERS, __RENDERERS, __CATALOG, __inferVerdict, __inferKeyStats, __renderPageShell, __handlePasteImport, __scheduleRender). 12 Playwright-genererte screenshots i playground/screenshots/v7.5.0/. A11Y-rapport (WCAG 2.1 AA): 0 blokkerende, 3 mindre forbedringer flagget for v7.5.x patch (skip-link, heading-hierarki på project, aria-live toast). Versjonsbump 7.4.0 -> 7.5.0 i 10 filer (package.json, plugin.json, CLAUDE.md header, README badge, CHANGELOG-entry, 3 scanner VERSION- konstanter, ROADMAP, marketplace-rot README). Ingen scanner- eller hook-behavior-changes — purely additive surface. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
141 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
141 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# Full Security Audit — DFT marketplace
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---
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## Header
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| **Report type** | audit |
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| **Target** | ~/repos/dft-marketplace |
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| **Date** | 2026-05-05 |
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| **Version** | llm-security v7.4.0 |
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| **Scope** | 7 audit dimensions, 10 OWASP categories |
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| **Frameworks** | OWASP LLM Top 10, OWASP Agentic |
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| **Triggered by** | /security audit |
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---
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## Risk Dashboard
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| Metric | Value |
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|--------|-------|
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| **Risk Score** | 31/100 |
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| **Risk Band** | Medium |
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| **Grade** | C |
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| **Verdict** | WARNING |
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| Severity | Count |
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|----------|------:|
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| Critical | 0 |
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| High | 4 |
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| Medium | 8 |
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| Low | 7 |
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| Info | 9 |
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| **Total** | **28** |
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**Verdict rationale:** Posture base grade B downgraded to C after agent-level findings (4 high). No critical, but `Logging & Audit` and `Permission Hygiene` need attention.
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---
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## Executive Summary
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Full audit combined posture-scanner output with skill-scanner-agent and mcp-scanner-agent narratives. 28 findings across 14 files. Most concentrated in agent definitions (over-permissioned tool lists) and `.claude/settings.json` (missing audit log + wildcard Bash). Recommendation: address top 3 actions to reach Grade B; six more to reach Grade A.
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---
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## Radar Axes
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| Axis | Score |
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|------|------:|
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| Deny-First Configuration | 4 |
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| Hook Coverage | 5 |
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| MCP Trust | 3 |
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| Secrets Management | 5 |
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| Permission Hygiene | 2 |
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| Supply-Chain Defense | 4 |
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| Logging & Audit | 1 |
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---
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## Category Assessment
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### Category 1 — Deny-First Configuration
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| Status | PASS |
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**Evidence:** `.claude/settings.json` has `permissions.defaultMode: "deny"`. Explicit allow-list in place.
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**Recommendations:** None — Grade A on this axis.
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### Category 2 — Hook Coverage
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| Status | PASS |
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**Evidence:** 9 hooks active (PreToolUse: 4, PostToolUse: 2, UserPromptSubmit: 1, PreCompact: 1, others: 1).
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**Recommendations:** Consider adding PreCompact-poisoning detection if not already covered.
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### Category 5 — Permission Hygiene
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| Status | PARTIAL |
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**Evidence:** 3 agents have `Write` in tool list. 1 has `Bash` without sub-command restriction.
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**Recommendations:** Tighten tool lists to minimum-necessary set. Use `Bash(git:*)` instead of `Bash(*)`.
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### Category 11 — Logging & Audit
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| Status | FAIL |
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**Evidence:** No `audit.log_path` configured. No SIEM integration. No JSONL audit-trail.
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**Recommendations:** Enable `audit.log_path` immediately — closes 1 high + 3 medium findings.
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(Categories 3, 4, 6-10, 12-13 follow same format — see envelope JSON for full breakdown)
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---
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## Risk Matrix (Likelihood × Impact)
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| Category | Likelihood | Impact | Score |
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|----------|-----------:|-------:|------:|
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| Logging gap (PST-001) | 4 | 4 | 16 |
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| Permission sprawl | 3 | 4 | 12 |
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| MCP drift (airbnb-mcp) | 3 | 3 | 9 |
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| AI Act classification missing | 2 | 3 | 6 |
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---
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## Action Plan
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### IMMEDIATE (this week)
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1. Enable audit-trail: set `audit.log_path` in `.llm-security/policy.json`
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2. Tighten 3 over-permissioned agents (drop `Write` where unused)
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3. Investigate airbnb-mcp drift — reset baseline only after review
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### HIGH (this month)
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4. Document AI Act risk classification in `CLAUDE.md`
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5. Replace `Bash(*)` with `Bash(git:*, npm:*)` in `.claude/settings.json`
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6. Bump 2 dependencies to clear OSV advisories
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### MEDIUM (next quarter)
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7. Add SECURITY.md disclosure policy
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8. Trim verbose skill descriptions (3 files)
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9. Document hook rationale in plugin CLAUDE.md
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---
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## Positive Findings
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- All hooks active and non-bypassed
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- No critical findings
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- Posture scanner runtime < 2s (well-tuned)
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- Memory hygiene clean
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---
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*Audit complete. 28 findings, Grade C, 14.7 seconds.*
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