ktg-plugin-marketplace/plugins/voyage/tests/fixtures/trekreview/review-run-B.md

type	review_version	created	task	slug	project_dir	brief_path	scope_sha_start	scope_sha_end	reviewed_files_count	verdict	findings
trekreview	1.0	2026-05-01	Add JWT authentication with refresh-token rotation	jwt-auth	.claude/projects/2026-05-01-jwt-auth/	.claude/projects/2026-05-01-jwt-auth/brief.md	0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567	fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba98	3	WARN	d2d0e27875ae9ef0d818cb08bb6f14e6d33c4232 7861519c326c207aabf17072db51c469bebc217b 400dfcff81e0e219eb04a7123c68ae870696f121 763d174e6c519fafbadcba5d1706708479e36e61 7a3d7d0a668f6431ef3877ceeb106023b0f6295e bf3e8b347cf4269ad005a9cf64dab6f601345704

Review: Add JWT authentication with refresh-token rotation (Run B)

Executive Summary

Same diff as Run A, re-reviewed independently to test determinism. This run found the same 5 findings plus one extra (a placeholder TODO in logout.mjs that Run A missed). Verdict: WARN — same as Run A; the extra finding is MAJOR but does not change the merge gate.

This is a SYNTHETIC v1.0 fixture for testing the Jaccard determinism pipeline. Run A's set is a strict subset of Run B's set, giving Jaccard = 5/6 = 0.833.

Coverage

File	Treatment	Reason
lib/auth/jwt.mjs	deep-review	Security-critical (token signing/verification)
lib/handlers/login.mjs	deep-review	Auth surface
lib/handlers/logout.mjs	deep-review	Auth surface
package-lock.json	skip	Lockfile
dist/**	skip	Build output

Findings (BLOCKER)

763d174e6c519fafbadcba5d1706708479e36e61

• Location: lib/handlers/login.mjs:23
• Rule: UNIMPLEMENTED_CRITERION
• Brief ref: SC-2 ("login endpoint MUST return 401 on invalid credentials")
• Evidence: Handler returns 200 with empty body when password mismatch occurs.
• Fix: Return 401 with WWW-Authenticate header per brief SC-2.

Findings (MAJOR)

d2d0e27875ae9ef0d818cb08bb6f14e6d33c4232

• Location: lib/auth/jwt.mjs:42
• Rule: SECURITY_INJECTION
• Brief ref: Non-Goal #3 ("must not accept user-supplied algorithm header")
• Evidence: jwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: req.body.alg }) — algorithm taken from request body.
• Fix: Hard-code algorithms: ['RS256']; reject any token claiming a different alg.

7861519c326c207aabf17072db51c469bebc217b

• Location: lib/auth/jwt.mjs:88
• Rule: MISSING_TEST
• Brief ref: SC-4 ("refresh-token rotation must be tested under concurrent refresh")
• Evidence: No test in tests/ covers the concurrent-refresh path; only happy-path is exercised.
• Fix: Add tests/auth/concurrent-refresh.test.mjs covering the race window.

7a3d7d0a668f6431ef3877ceeb106023b0f6295e

• Location: lib/handlers/login.mjs:56
• Rule: PLAN_EXECUTE_DRIFT
• Brief ref: Plan Step 4 ("login.mjs uses bcrypt.compare()")
• Evidence: Plan said bcrypt.compare; implementation uses crypto.timingSafeEqual over plaintext-derived buffers.
• Fix: Either update plan + brief to record the deviation or refactor to bcrypt.compare per plan.

bf3e8b347cf4269ad005a9cf64dab6f601345704

• Location: lib/handlers/logout.mjs:14
• Rule: PLACEHOLDER_IN_CODE
• Brief ref: none (Rule 7a violation)
• Evidence: // TODO: invalidate refresh-token cookie before responding — left in committed code.
• Fix: Implement the cookie invalidation or remove the comment with an issue link.

Findings (MINOR)

400dfcff81e0e219eb04a7123c68ae870696f121

• Location: lib/auth/jwt.mjs:117
• Rule: MISSING_ERROR_HANDLING
• Brief ref: none (engineering hygiene)
• Evidence: await refreshTokenStore.delete(jti) is not wrapped — store-down throws bubble to top-level handler.
• Fix: Wrap in try/catch; log + 503 on store failure.

Remediation Summary

6 findings total: 1 BLOCKER, 4 MAJOR, 1 MINOR. Same merge gate as Run A; one extra MAJOR (PLACEHOLDER_IN_CODE) that Run A missed. Run a remediation plan via /trekplan --brief review.md.

{
  "fixture_kind": "synthetic-v1.0",
  "jaccard_with_run_A": "5/6 = 0.833",
  "findings": [
    {"id": "763d174e6c519fafbadcba5d1706708479e36e61", "severity": "BLOCKER", "rule": "UNIMPLEMENTED_CRITERION", "file": "lib/handlers/login.mjs", "line": 23},
    {"id": "d2d0e27875ae9ef0d818cb08bb6f14e6d33c4232", "severity": "MAJOR", "rule": "SECURITY_INJECTION", "file": "lib/auth/jwt.mjs", "line": 42},
    {"id": "7861519c326c207aabf17072db51c469bebc217b", "severity": "MAJOR", "rule": "MISSING_TEST", "file": "lib/auth/jwt.mjs", "line": 88},
    {"id": "7a3d7d0a668f6431ef3877ceeb106023b0f6295e", "severity": "MAJOR", "rule": "PLAN_EXECUTE_DRIFT", "file": "lib/handlers/login.mjs", "line": 56},
    {"id": "bf3e8b347cf4269ad005a9cf64dab6f601345704", "severity": "MAJOR", "rule": "PLACEHOLDER_IN_CODE", "file": "lib/handlers/logout.mjs", "line": 14},
    {"id": "400dfcff81e0e219eb04a7123c68ae870696f121", "severity": "MINOR", "rule": "MISSING_ERROR_HANDLING", "file": "lib/auth/jwt.mjs", "line": 117}
  ]
}