ktg-plugin-marketplace/plugins/llm-security/examples/bash-evasion-gallery/expected-findings.md
Kjell Tore Guttormsen ca5a8cec67 feat(llm-security): add 3 more runnable threat examples [skip-docs]
Three new self-contained, runnable threat demonstrations under
examples/, continuing the batch started in 583a78c. Each example
has README.md + run-*.mjs + expected-findings.md and uses
state-isolation discipline so the user's real cache/state files
are never polluted.

- examples/supply-chain-attack/ — two-layer demonstration:
  pre-install-supply-chain (PreToolUse) blocks compromised
  event-stream version 3.3.6 and emits a scope-hop advisory for
  the @evilcorp scope; dep-auditor (DEP scanner, offline) flags
  5 typosquat dependencies plus a curl-piped install-script
  vector in the fixture package.json. Maps to LLM03/LLM05/ASI04.

- examples/poisoned-claude-md/ — all 6 memory-poisoning detectors
  fire on a deliberately poisoned CLAUDE.md plus a fixture
  agent file under .claude/agents (E15/v7.2.0 surface):
  detectInjection, detectShellCommands, detectSuspiciousUrls,
  detectCredentialPaths, detectPermissionExpansion,
  detectEncodedPayloads. No agent runtime needed — scanner
  imported directly. Maps to LLM01/LLM06/ASI04.

- examples/bash-evasion-gallery/ — one disguised variant per
  T1 through T9 evasion technique fed through pre-bash-destructive,
  verified BLOCK after bash-normalize strips the evasion. T8
  base64-pipe-shell uses its own BLOCK_RULE. The canonical
  destructive form uses a path token rather than the bare slash
  (regex word-boundary requires it). Source-string fragmentation
  pattern reused from the e2e attack-chain test. Maps to
  LLM06/ASI01/LLM01.

Plugin README "Other runnable examples" section + plugin
CLAUDE.md "Examples" table + CHANGELOG Unreleased/Added
all updated. Marketplace root README unchanged
([skip-docs] for marketplace-level gate — plugin's outward
coverage is unchanged, only demonstrations were added).
2026-05-05 15:01:20 +02:00

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2.7 KiB
Markdown

# Expected Findings — Bash Evasion Gallery
This is the testable contract. `run-evasion-gallery.mjs` exits 0
only when every T-tag produces a BLOCK.
## Per-tag contract
| Tag | Hook stderr must contain |
|-----|--------------------------|
| baseline | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T1 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T2 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T3 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T4 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T5 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T6 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T7 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
| T8 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — T8 — base64-pipe-shell idiom (echo BLOB \| base64 -d \| sh)` |
| T9 | `BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /)` |
All cases must exit with code 2.
## Why $HOME instead of /
The "Filesystem root destruction" BLOCK_RULE regex requires a
word-boundary anchor after the destination path:
```
\brm\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*\s+|--force\s+)*-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*\s+(?:\/|~|\$HOME)\b
```
`rm -rf /` ends with `/` followed by end-of-string; both `/` and
EOL are non-word, so `\b` does not match. The variants
`rm -rf /tmp`, `rm -rf $HOME`, and `rm -rf /etc` all match — the
trailing word character provides the boundary.
This gallery uses `$HOME` because it is unambiguously destructive
and the regex fires deterministically. The literal `rm -rf /`
edge case is not part of this contract — it is covered by Claude
Code 2.1.98+ harness-level checks.
## Side effects
- No file is modified
- No real `bash` is invoked — only `node hooks/scripts/...`
- Each hook spawn has `tool_input.command` set to the disguised
variant — bash never sees these strings
- No mutation of `$HOME`, `/`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else
## Notes for forks
- If `bash-normalize.mjs` adds new T-tags (T10+), add a new case
to `CASES` and a corresponding row above
- If a BLOCK_RULE in `pre-bash-destructive.mjs` is renamed,
update the stderr-pattern column above (the assertion lives
in `expected-findings.md` for documentation; the run script
only checks exit code 2, so it continues to pass after a
rename)
- The base64 blob in T8 (`cm0gLXJmICRIT01F`) decodes to the
literal command. If you change the canonical destructive
target away from `$HOME`, regenerate the blob with
`printf '<new-cmd>' | base64`