Three new self-contained, runnable threat demonstrations under
examples/, continuing the batch started in 583a78c. Each example
has README.md + run-*.mjs + expected-findings.md and uses
state-isolation discipline so the user's real cache/state files
are never polluted.
- examples/supply-chain-attack/ — two-layer demonstration:
pre-install-supply-chain (PreToolUse) blocks compromised
event-stream version 3.3.6 and emits a scope-hop advisory for
the @evilcorp scope; dep-auditor (DEP scanner, offline) flags
5 typosquat dependencies plus a curl-piped install-script
vector in the fixture package.json. Maps to LLM03/LLM05/ASI04.
- examples/poisoned-claude-md/ — all 6 memory-poisoning detectors
fire on a deliberately poisoned CLAUDE.md plus a fixture
agent file under .claude/agents (E15/v7.2.0 surface):
detectInjection, detectShellCommands, detectSuspiciousUrls,
detectCredentialPaths, detectPermissionExpansion,
detectEncodedPayloads. No agent runtime needed — scanner
imported directly. Maps to LLM01/LLM06/ASI04.
- examples/bash-evasion-gallery/ — one disguised variant per
T1 through T9 evasion technique fed through pre-bash-destructive,
verified BLOCK after bash-normalize strips the evasion. T8
base64-pipe-shell uses its own BLOCK_RULE. The canonical
destructive form uses a path token rather than the bare slash
(regex word-boundary requires it). Source-string fragmentation
pattern reused from the e2e attack-chain test. Maps to
LLM06/ASI01/LLM01.
Plugin README "Other runnable examples" section + plugin
CLAUDE.md "Examples" table + CHANGELOG Unreleased/Added
all updated. Marketplace root README unchanged
([skip-docs] for marketplace-level gate — plugin's outward
coverage is unchanged, only demonstrations were added).
2.7 KiB
2.7 KiB
Expected Findings — Bash Evasion Gallery
This is the testable contract. run-evasion-gallery.mjs exits 0
only when every T-tag produces a BLOCK.
Per-tag contract
| Tag | Hook stderr must contain |
|---|---|
| baseline | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T1 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T2 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T3 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T4 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T5 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T6 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T7 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
| T8 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — T8 — base64-pipe-shell idiom (echo BLOB | base64 -d | sh) |
| T9 | BLOCKED: Destructive command detected — Filesystem root destruction (rm -rf /) |
All cases must exit with code 2.
Why $HOME instead of /
The "Filesystem root destruction" BLOCK_RULE regex requires a word-boundary anchor after the destination path:
\brm\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*\s+|--force\s+)*-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*\s+(?:\/|~|\$HOME)\b
rm -rf / ends with / followed by end-of-string; both / and
EOL are non-word, so \b does not match. The variants
rm -rf /tmp, rm -rf $HOME, and rm -rf /etc all match — the
trailing word character provides the boundary.
This gallery uses $HOME because it is unambiguously destructive
and the regex fires deterministically. The literal rm -rf /
edge case is not part of this contract — it is covered by Claude
Code 2.1.98+ harness-level checks.
Side effects
- No file is modified
- No real
bashis invoked — onlynode hooks/scripts/... - Each hook spawn has
tool_input.commandset to the disguised variant — bash never sees these strings - No mutation of
$HOME,/,/tmp, or anywhere else
Notes for forks
- If
bash-normalize.mjsadds new T-tags (T10+), add a new case toCASESand a corresponding row above - If a BLOCK_RULE in
pre-bash-destructive.mjsis renamed, update the stderr-pattern column above (the assertion lives inexpected-findings.mdfor documentation; the run script only checks exit code 2, so it continues to pass after a rename) - The base64 blob in T8 (
cm0gLXJmICRIT01F) decodes to the literal command. If you change the canonical destructive target away from$HOME, regenerate the blob withprintf '<new-cmd>' | base64