ktg-plugin-marketplace/plugins/llm-security/knowledge/mitigation-matrix.md

Mitigation Matrix

Maps OWASP LLM Top 10 threats to Claude Code-specific controls.

Used by posture-assessor-agent to evaluate which controls are in place and which are missing.

How to Read This Matrix

• Automated: Controls enforced by hooks (no human intervention required)
• Configured: Controls that require explicit setup in settings.json, CLAUDE.md, or plugin config
• Advisory: Controls provided by scanning/auditing commands — humans must act on findings
• External: Controls outside Claude Code's scope (network, IAM, model provider, OS)

Verification checks are concrete, machine-readable conditions the posture assessor can evaluate.

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Matrix

LLM01 — Prompt Injection (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0051)

Attacker injects instructions via external content (files, web pages, tool outputs) that override intended behavior.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Deny-first tool permissions	Configured	settings.json → deny Write/Edit/Bash by default; grant only what is needed	settings.json has "deny": ["Write", "Edit", "Bash"] or equivalent
Skill/command vetting	Advisory	/security scan before installing third-party skills or commands	Scan report exists and is clean for installed skills
CLAUDE.md anti-override guardrails	Configured	CLAUDE.md includes explicit anti-jailbreak instructions and scope boundaries	CLAUDE.md contains security or scope-guard section
Input sanitization hook	Automated	pre-edit-secrets.mjs scans file edits for injection patterns	Hook file exists and is registered in hooks.json
MCP output verification	Automated	post-mcp-verify.mjs checks MCP tool outputs for unexpected instruction content	Hook file exists and is registered in hooks.json
Minimal context exposure	Configured	CLAUDE.md and system prompts avoid embedding sensitive credentials or secrets	CLAUDE.md contains no secret patterns (run secrets-patterns check)
Prompt injection input scanning	Automated	pre-prompt-inject-scan.mjs detects CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM injection patterns in user prompts	Hook file exists; MEDIUM advisory enabled
Unicode Tag steganography detection	Automated	string-utils.mjs decodes U+E0000-E007F tags; injection-patterns.mjs escalates to CRITICAL/HIGH	decodeUnicodeTags() in normalization pipeline
Bash evasion normalization	Automated	bash-normalize.mjs strips parameter expansion before pattern matching	normalizeBashExpansion() called by both bash hooks
Rule of Two enforcement	Automated	post-session-guard.mjs detects trifecta (untrusted input + sensitive data + exfil)	LLM_SECURITY_TRIFECTA_MODE env var respected; block mode available
Long-horizon monitoring	Automated	post-session-guard.mjs 100-call window + behavioral drift detection	Long-horizon window active alongside 20-call window
HITL trap detection	Automated	injection-patterns.mjs HIGH patterns for approval urgency, summary suppression, scope minimization	HITL patterns present in HIGH_PATTERNS array
Hybrid attack detection	Automated	injection-patterns.mjs HYBRID_PATTERNS for P2SQL, recursive injection, XSS	Hybrid patterns checked in tool output scanning

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LLM02 — Sensitive Information Disclosure (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0024)

Model reveals sensitive data from training, context, or external sources in its outputs.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Secrets pattern detection (edit)	Automated	pre-edit-secrets.mjs blocks writes containing API keys, passwords, tokens	Hook exists; knowledge/secrets-patterns.md is present
Path guard for sensitive files	Automated	pre-write-pathguard.mjs blocks writes to .env, *.key, credentials.*, .aws/	Hook exists; sensitive path list is up to date
MCP output scanning	Automated	post-mcp-verify.mjs scans MCP responses for PII or secret patterns	Hook registered for PostToolUse/Bash
.gitignore discipline	Configured	.env, *.key, *.pem, secrets.* in .gitignore	Project .gitignore includes standard secret exclusions
No secrets in CLAUDE.md	Advisory	/security audit checks CLAUDE.md and agents for embedded secrets	Audit report shows no secret patterns in markdown files
Env-var pattern enforcement	Configured	Templates use .env/.template pattern; actual values never committed	No .env files tracked in git (git ls-files *.env empty)

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LLM03 — Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0010)

Compromised models, plugins, or MCP servers introduce malicious behavior.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
MCP server audit	Advisory	/security mcp-audit reviews all MCP configs for source, permissions, network exposure	MCP audit report exists and is current
Plugin source verification	Advisory	/security scan on skill/agent files before activation	Skill scanner report clean for all installed plugins
Dependency pinning	Configured	MCP server dependencies pinned to specific versions in package.json or requirements.txt	No unpinned latest or * versions in MCP server deps
Pre-deploy checklist	Advisory	/security pre-deploy includes supply chain verification step	Pre-deploy report completed before production deployment
Minimal MCP permissions	Configured	MCP servers granted only required scopes; no wildcard access	MCP configs do not use * scope grants

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LLM04 — Data and Model Poisoning (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0020)

Malicious training data or fine-tuning corrupts model behavior.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Use vetted base models only	External	Organizational policy: approved model list from provider (Anthropic, Azure OpenAI)	Model IDs in config match approved list
No untrusted fine-tuning	External	Fine-tuning pipelines gated by data review process	Fine-tuning dataset provenance documented
Knowledge base integrity	Advisory	/security audit checks knowledge files for injected malicious content	Audit covers knowledge/ directories
Prompt content review	Advisory	Skill scanner checks agent/command prompts for anomalous instructions	skill-scanner-agent run on all agents
Threat model coverage	Advisory	/security threat-model includes data pipeline as attack surface	Threat model document exists and covers data sources

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LLM05 — Improper Output Handling (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0043)

Model output treated as trusted without sanitization, leading to injection in downstream systems.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
MCP output verification	Automated	post-mcp-verify.mjs scans tool outputs before they reach downstream consumers	Hook registered and active
Destructive command blocking	Automated	pre-bash-destructive.mjs prevents shell injection from model-generated commands	Hook exists; blocklist includes rm -rf, DROP TABLE, curl | sh patterns
No direct shell execution of model output	Configured	CLAUDE.md explicitly prohibits passing raw model output to eval or shell	CLAUDE.md has output-handling guardrail
Output template enforcement	Advisory	Report templates in templates/ provide structured output that avoids raw passthrough	Templates used by scan/audit commands
Code review before execution	Advisory	/security pre-deploy requires human review of model-generated scripts	Pre-deploy checklist includes output review step

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LLM06 — Excessive Agency (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0061)

Model granted too many permissions or capabilities, enabling unintended high-impact actions.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Deny-first permissions	Configured	settings.json starts from deny-all; explicit allow-list per command	settings.json does not use broad "allow": ["*"]
Tool allowlist per command	Configured	Each command's frontmatter declares minimum required tools	All commands/*.md have explicit allowed-tools list
Agent tool restriction	Configured	Agent frontmatter limits tools to Read/Glob/Grep unless justified	Agents do not have Write/Bash without documented rationale
Over-permissioning scan	Advisory	skill-scanner-agent flags commands/agents with excessive tool grants	Skill scanner report shows no over-permissioning findings
No autonomous external calls	Configured	Agents restricted from making unapproved network calls via Bash	pre-bash-destructive.mjs blocks curl, wget without approval
Human-in-the-loop for destructive ops	Automated	Destructive bash commands blocked; require explicit user re-invocation	Hook blocks and logs; no auto-bypass mechanism

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LLM07 — System Prompt Leakage (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0024)

System prompt or CLAUDE.md exposed through adversarial extraction, revealing security controls.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Security-by-design (not obscurity)	Configured	Controls enforced by hooks and settings, not just prompt instructions	Hooks exist independently of CLAUDE.md instructions
No secrets in system prompt	Advisory	/security audit checks CLAUDE.md for embedded secrets or keys	Audit report clean for CLAUDE.md content
Minimal sensitive detail in prompts	Configured	CLAUDE.md describes policy intent, not implementation bypass paths	CLAUDE.md reviewed for info that aids bypass
Prompt disclosure awareness	Advisory	Threat model documents that CLAUDE.md may be readable by the model	Threat model includes system prompt as attack surface
Defense in depth	Configured	Multiple independent control layers so prompt leakage does not collapse security	Hooks + settings + CLAUDE.md all present (not sole reliance on one layer)

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LLM08 — Vector and Embedding Weaknesses (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0020)

Manipulated embeddings or vector store content used to inject malicious context into RAG pipelines.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Knowledge base content review	Advisory	/security audit scans knowledge/ files for injected instructions	Audit includes knowledge base scan
Source attribution in KB	Configured	Knowledge files include source and date metadata	KB files have provenance headers
RAG input sanitization	External	Vector store / RAG pipeline sanitizes retrieved chunks before injection	RAG pipeline has input validation (organizational control)
Embedding access control	External	Vector stores gated by IAM; not publicly writable	Access control documented for vector infrastructure
Retrieval result verification	Advisory	Agents instructed to verify retrieved content plausibility before use	Agent prompts include retrieval skepticism instruction

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LLM09 — Misinformation (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0031)

Model generates plausible but false information, leading to incorrect decisions.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Authoritative knowledge base	Configured	Plugin uses curated knowledge/ files as grounding for security recommendations	knowledge/ directory contains up-to-date OWASP and threat pattern files
Source citation in outputs	Configured	Commands instruct agents to cite knowledge file sources in reports	Report templates include source section
Human review gate	Advisory	All advisory reports require human review before action	CLAUDE.md and command docs state reports are advisory, not authoritative
Threat model validation	Advisory	/security threat-model output reviewed by security professional	Threat model review step documented in pre-deploy checklist
Confidence indicators	Advisory	Agents use hedged language for uncertain findings	Agent prompts instruct use of HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW confidence levels
Hallucination risk documentation	Configured	CLAUDE.md explicitly documents that AI outputs require validation	CLAUDE.md contains disclaimer on AI-generated security findings

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LLM10 — Unbounded Consumption (MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0029)

Model or agents consume excessive compute, tokens, or API calls, causing denial of service or cost overruns.

Control	Type	Implementation	Verification Check
Scoped scanning targets	Configured	Commands accept explicit file/directory targets; no default full-repo scan	scan.md and audit.md require explicit scope argument
Agent timeout discipline	Configured	Agents instructed to limit research depth and report within scope	Agent prompts include scope and depth constraints
No recursive agent spawning	Configured	Agents do not spawn additional agents without explicit command	Agent frontmatter and prompts prohibit autonomous subagent creation
MCP call limiting	Configured	MCP-using commands have documented call budgets	mcp-audit.md documents expected MCP call count
Cost-aware model selection	Configured	Expensive operations (threat modeling) use Opus; scanning uses Sonnet	Command frontmatter uses model: sonnet for scan/audit, model: opus for threat-model
Session scope guard	Configured	CLAUDE.md scope-guard prevents unbounded task escalation	CLAUDE.md has scope-guard section

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Coverage Summary

Category	Name	Automated	Configured	Advisory	External	Total Controls	Coverage
LLM01	Prompt Injection	9	3	1	0	13	92%
LLM02	Sensitive Info Disclosure	3	2	1	0	6	83%
LLM03	Supply Chain	0	2	3	0	5	60%
LLM04	Data & Model Poisoning	0	0	3	2	5	40%
LLM05	Improper Output Handling	2	2	1	0	5	80%
LLM06	Excessive Agency	3	3	0	0	6	100%
LLM07	System Prompt Leakage	0	3	2	0	5	60%
LLM08	Vector & Embedding Weaknesses	0	1	2	2	5	40%
LLM09	Misinformation	0	3	3	0	6	50%
LLM10	Unbounded Consumption	0	5	1	0	6	83%

Coverage scoring:

• 100% = All applicable controls implemented
• 80-99% = Strong coverage, minor gaps
• 60-79% = Moderate coverage, notable gaps
• 40-59% = Partial coverage, significant gaps
• <40% = Minimal coverage — high risk

Note: LLM04 and LLM08 score lower because their primary controls are external (model provider and infrastructure). For Claude Code projects, these categories require organizational controls beyond what the plugin can enforce.

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Posture Assessor Checklist

When posture-assessor-agent evaluates a project, verify the following in order:

Automated Controls (hooks) — Verify All Present

• hooks/scripts/pre-edit-secrets.mjs exists
• hooks/scripts/pre-write-pathguard.mjs exists
• hooks/scripts/pre-bash-destructive.mjs exists
• hooks/scripts/post-mcp-verify.mjs exists
• hooks/hooks.json registers all four hooks

Configured Controls — Verify in settings.json and CLAUDE.md

• settings.json has deny-first permissions (no broad "allow": ["*"])
• Command frontmatter has explicit allowed-tools lists
• Agent frontmatter restricts tools to minimum required
• CLAUDE.md has scope-guard / anti-override section
• .gitignore excludes .env, *.key, *.pem, credentials.*
• No secrets embedded in CLAUDE.md, agent prompts, or command files

Advisory Controls — Evidence of Use

• /security scan report present or run recently
• /security audit report present or run recently
• /security mcp-audit report if MCP servers are configured
• /security threat-model report present for production systems
• /security pre-deploy checklist completed before deployment

Scoring Guidance

Automated controls present	Configured controls present	Advisory evidence	Score Band
5/5	6/6	3/5	A (90+)
4/5	5/6	2/5	B (75-89)
3/5	4/6	1/5	C (60-74)
2/5	3/6	0/5	D (40-59)
<2/5	<3/6	0/5	F (<40)