Session 5 of voyage-rebrand (V6). Operator-authorized cross-plugin scope. - git mv plugins/ultraplan-local plugins/voyage (rename detected, history preserved) - .claude-plugin/marketplace.json: voyage entry replaces ultraplan-local - CLAUDE.md: voyage row in plugin list, voyage in design-system consumer list - README.md: bulk rename ultra*-local commands -> trek* commands; ultraplan-local refs -> voyage; type discriminators (type: trekbrief/trekreview); session-title pattern (voyage:<command>:<slug>); v4.0.0 release-note paragraph - plugins/voyage/.claude-plugin/plugin.json: homepage/repository URLs point to monorepo voyage path - plugins/voyage/verify.sh: drop URL whitelist exception (no longer needed) Closes voyage-rebrand. bash plugins/voyage/verify.sh PASS 7/7. npm test 361/361.
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Security Policy — trekplan
Reporting a vulnerability
Open a private issue on Forgejo:
Tag it security and mark it private. Do not file public issues for
unpatched vulnerabilities. There is no SLA — this is a solo-maintained
plugin — but acknowledged reports are usually triaged within 7 days.
Supported versions
Only the current minor version receives security fixes. When v3.2.0 ships, v3.1.x stops receiving patches. Pin to the latest minor and update on the next bump.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 3.1.x | Yes |
| 3.0.x | No (upgrade to 3.1.x) |
| < 3.0 | No |
Scope
The plugin's security posture covers:
Plugin-owned hooks (hooks/scripts/)
| Hook | Trigger | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
pre-bash-executor.mjs |
PreToolUse for Bash |
BLOCKs known-dangerous shell patterns; WARNs on suspicious ones; fails open on parse errors |
pre-write-executor.mjs |
PreToolUse for Write |
BLOCKs writes to .git/hooks/, ~/.ssh/, .env, and other sensitive paths |
pre-compact-flush.mjs |
PreCompact |
Flushes progress.json from git history before compaction (P0 drift fix); read-only beyond progress.json |
session-title.mjs (planned, F9) |
UserPromptSubmit |
Sets session title voyage:<command>:<slug> for headless multiplexing |
All hooks are zero-dependency Node.js (.mjs) scripts and are designed
to fail open — a hook crash never blocks the user's work. Hooks log
to stderr only; they never write to user files outside their declared
scope.
Prompt-level denylist (commands/trekexecute.md)
The execute command embeds a denylist that takes effect even in headless sessions where hooks may not fire. This is layer 4 of the defense-in-depth model and protects against plan-injected destructive commands.
Validators (lib/validators/*.mjs)
Read-only. Never write to user files. Used both by hooks and by command phases to detect malformed artifacts before they propagate.
Out of scope
- Opt-in upstream architect step. Any external producer of
architecture/overview.mdships its own security posture. The architecture-discovery validator in this plugin treatsarchitecture/overview.mdas an external contract (drift-WARN, never drift-FAIL). - LLM output content. The plugin validates artifact shape, not
artifact truthfulness. A plan that passes
plan-validator --strictmay still contain hallucinated file paths or unsafe commands; that is whypre-bash-executorexists. - The Claude Code CLI itself. Report Claude Code vulnerabilities to Anthropic via https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues.
Hardening recommendations
For fork-ers handling untrusted task briefs or plans:
- Set
disableSkillShellExecution: truein~/.claude/settings.json(CC v2.1.91+) to prevent Skills from invoking arbitrary shell. - Run plan validation in
--strictmode before any execute:node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/lib/validators/plan-validator.mjs --strict plan.md - Review the plan-critic adversarial output before approving plans from external sources — semantic rubric (rule #7) catches deferred decisions that an attacker could exploit.
- Pin a CC version floor. v3.1.0 of this plugin assumes CC ≥
2.1.85 for the
if-field on hooks; older CC silently ignores the field, weakening the scoping.
Past advisories
None as of v3.1.0. This section will list CVE-style entries if any are discovered.