PM decision B6 asked for a list-taking _render_sources so a concept can record
more than one source, and prescribed the block list as the emitted form. The
list is delivered; the block form is not.
Three measurements, not an argument. Our own parse_frontmatter skips indented
lines, so a block list round-trips to an empty value with every entry silently
gone -- and _is_ingest_owned reads through that same parser. The consumer B6
was written for accepts the multi-entry flow sequence and classifies a block
sequence as unreadable provenance, so block would hand it exactly the state it
cannot read. And B6's own acceptance test asks for a round trip through this
parser, which no block form can pass.
A single source renders byte-identically, so all six goldens are unmoved. The
unquotable-value gate now runs on every entry, not just the first. New code
sources_empty refuses an empty list.
1023 -> 1034 tests, including the negative control that pins the block form's
silent data loss.
The line-oriented frontmatter grammar exists in three copies, each with the
duplication documented at its site: `materialize` reads a path, `structure`
needs a character offset, `profiles` returns body lines. All three keyed on
`key.strip()`, which discards the indentation that is the only thing telling
a nested key from a top-level one. An indented `title:` under a `sources:`
block therefore landed in the same flat namespace as the document's own
`title:` and, arriving later, won.
The failure is substitution, not omission. A dropped value is visible to
whoever reads the concept; a substituted one is not -- the document carries a
title that looks entirely right and belongs to something else. Because
`number` derives from `title` and `parent` derives from `number`, one
substitution walks the hierarchy. Measured, not inferred: a document titled
`N100.2` with a nested source titled `N200.7` came back as N200.7 with parent
N200 instead of N100.2 with parent N100.
Measured incidence across the two corpora, denominators stated:
`_okf-canonical` @ ad30107, 54 documents with parsable frontmatter, 49 carry
a nested key colliding with a top-level name (90.7%); `_okf-upstream` @
9a15b13, 66 documents, 58 collide (87.9%). The colliding key is `title`, and
often `resource` with it -- in `acme_retail/tables/orders.md` the concept's
own BigQuery resource pointer was replaced by a nested one. This is a fix
that clears observed damage, not a hardening without a witness.
The fix refuses indented lines; it does not read them. Block form stays
unreadable -- `sources` and `verified` still come back empty -- so D4's
flow-form emission rule is untouched and the structured reader is still D1b.
Two characterization tests that pinned the old behaviour now pin the new: the
block-list family still DROPS its value, and only the key-space pollution is
gone. That family is not otherwise addressed here.
Test first, red before the code was touched, with known-positive controls for
all three parsers so that a parser returning nothing could not pass.
Order: 20260830T000740Z-4733930312-from-.claude
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5>
vegnormal-okf measured the gap on 2026-08-27: the arm reading DEFAULT's
index.md scored 0 hits of 8, the arm reading a faceted index of the same
frontmatter scored 25 of 29. Same bundle, same concepts, same model. The
DEFAULT arm did not answer wrongly, it abstained -- the metadata is in the
bundle and the index throws it away (30 974 characters over 269
requirements, 0 occurrences of any of the eight facts).
FacetPolicy and STRUCTURED_V1 already did this. They did not reach Door C.
`import_bundle` now takes a keyword-only `profile` defaulting to DEFAULT, so
every existing call site emits the bytes it always did, and `link_in_index`
takes the facets to render.
Door C PROJECTS and never DERIVES, which is the answer to the objection this
work opened with: deriving structure for a document a third party wrote would
put our inference into an index entry ABOUT their bytes, where it reads as
their claim. The concept file was already verbatim; the entry describing it
now is too. Where the sender carries `derived`, THEIR list travels unchanged,
so a reader can still see which of the sender's facts the sender inferred.
The projection asks the policy which keys to carry and never what a key
means. That is what makes it work for a meeting note as well as a numbered
norm -- nothing in it can key off a numbering scheme -- and it is why a
consumer whose concepts are named by UUID can get `title` into the index by
naming the key, with no change here.
Two things measured during the work rather than assumed:
- A value carrying the policy's own joiner cannot be rendered. Door C's
tolerance is structural and it refuses no sender on form, so the FACET is
dropped and the concept still merges -- reported per concept and key in
`ImportResult.unrendered_facets`, never dropped silently.
- A faceted entry can go stale where a flat one never could: the collision
gate refuses an updated concept, so the operator's only route is to remove
the merged file and re-import, after which the file said `gjeldende` while
the index still said `utkast`. A faceted entry for a present target is now
refreshed in place instead of skipped. Unfaceted callers keep the early
return byte for byte.
Suite 695 -> 707; ruff and mypy --strict clean.
Order 20260826T224500Z-873805419-from-vegnormal-okf.
The measured defect, as data: the 2026-08-26 bake-off had every arm retrieve
40/40, so quality could not separate them. The only axis that did was trap
exposure -- 18/20 for the OKF-index arm against 8/20 for a frontmatter
head-scan -- and both sides measured the reason independently: the flat index
carries title/date/status/supersedes 0 times while its own documents carry them
55/55/55/5. The metadata is in the bundle; the index throws it away.
FacetPolicy lets an index entry keep it. The grammar is thin on purpose (one
separator, then key: value joined by '; ') because index lines are read by
regex on both sides of this library, and a value carrying either delimiter is
REFUSED rather than escaped -- validation, not repair, as everywhere else here.
Additive by construction, not by caution. entry_pattern IS link_pattern when a
policy carries no facets, so DEFAULT and STRICT_V1 match the same lines and
emit the same bytes; the goldens are the proof. Facets arrive as STRUCTURED_V1,
a new profile, because DEFAULT states commons' ingest-spec index layer and
changing its bytes from here would be this repo editing a contract it does not
own.
17 new tests; suite 660 -> 677.
Commons ratified V1 2026-08-02 and executed it at `54e0ec7`; verified
against their tree rather than taken on report. ingest-spec.md:217 now
defines `generated` as `{ by: process:okf-ingest, at: <ingested_at> }`,
unquoted, `at` repeating `ingested_at` verbatim. `generated: true` no
longer appears in the spec.
`DEFAULT` states commons' §5 layer, so its stamp is theirs to decide.
`DEFAULT.ownership` gains the actor; the four goldens this repo's plan
named in advance were regenerated by RUNNING the materializer, each on
its own case's `ingested-at.txt`. The v0.2 golden was untouched, as
predicted -- it has carried the O2 form since D5.
Not a migration onto OKF v0.2: `DEFAULT` stays v0.1 on every axis
upstream owns and still emits no `sources`. Commons' spec and the Google
version are independent axes, and comments that narrated them as one
were rewritten rather than left to mislead. README and CLAUDE.md said
the additive rule without that boundary, which would have told a
consumer their DEFAULT bytes can never move; both now state it.
V-A3 is amended, not dropped. `DEFAULT` must OWN the mapping it now
writes -- a profile refusing its own output fires the collision gate on
files its own previous run wrote -- while a mapping naming a foreign
actor, or §7's `human:` actor on curated content, stays unowned. That
half is what carried the safety and it is asserted directly.
§11's stamp-integrity condition moved with the value: the forgeable
stamp was `true` and is now the mapping naming the ingest actor. The
defence was never the value -- the §3 scan globs `ingest-*.md`, so a
Door C import is unreachable however well it forges. Second spoof test
added; both were hand-mutated (glob widened to `*.md`) to confirm they
can fail.
The characterization test derived its foreign-stamp fixture from the
literal `generated: true`, which V1 leaves without a referent -- a
silent no-op waiting to happen. It now derives the needle from the
profile and asserts the substitution occurred.
Door B is deliberately untouched: not the ingest-spec's, marker is
`generated` + `source_file`, disjoint from Door A's `ingest_manifest`,
and the divergence predates V1.
Nothing released or notified. The pilot set pins `v0.5.0a2`, not `main`,
so this is invisible to portfolio-optimiser's freeze and demo; the
consumer exposure report is owed at the release that carries this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwcjUXbKySLbEG5WqTNkta
The §3 ownership scan globbed every *.md file regardless of which door
wrote it, then unconditionally unlinked whatever _is_ingest_owned agreed
to. Because _is_ingest_owned reads through the line-oriented parser that
flattens nested blocks (pinned in
test_two_nested_block_mappings_sharing_a_key_collide_in_the_scalar_parser),
a Door B/C file whose nested content happened to share a key name with
the ownership markers (generated, ingest_manifest) could get promoted to
top level and spoof ownership -- silently deleting content this door
never wrote.
Scoping the glob to ingest_prefix closes this by construction: a Door
B/C file is never even a candidate for the scan, regardless of what its
frontmatter parses to. Traced from a coordination tip from
portfolio-optimiser-claude about the same flattening mechanism hitting
their `type` field.
Placement settled by catalog's own reading of upstream at the pinned commit
3fcbb9f: SS8:509-510 and SS12:773-775 both put `okf_version` in a bundle-root
`index.md` frontmatter block, and SS12 calls it the only place frontmatter is
permitted in an index. Catalog's spec says the opposite about the same file;
that divergence is theirs against upstream, and we conform to upstream.
The value never touches a profile. `OKF_V0_2.index.root_frontmatter` names the
key; the caller supplies the value through a new keyword-only
`root_frontmatter_values` mapping. That keeps V4/V-A5 intact - `okf_version`'s
value tracks the upstream Google version and belongs to catalog (E1), so a
constant here would claim a decision we do not own and would have to be chased
on every upstream release. In the fixture the value is fixture DATA
(`okf-version.txt`), not a literal in our source.
Ordering comes from the policy, not the caller's mapping: a dict preserves
insertion order, so two callers passing the same keys would otherwise emit
different bytes. A key the policy does not name is refused fail-fast, before
any disk mutation. Omitting the argument emits no block at all - SS12 is a MAY
and none of upstream's four reference bundles declares the key.
The block is written only when the index is CREATED, so a re-run into an
existing bundle stays byte-identical (A-E5).
Raw-byte assertions rather than parsed ones, on the committed fixture as well
as on fresh runs: catalog measured that a quoted value fails their shape regex
with exit 1 and that a BOM hides the marker while still exiting 0.
`yaml.safe_load` returns "0.2" either way and strips a BOM first, so a parsed
assertion masks exactly those two defects. Asserting the frozen fixture catches
what a self-comparison cannot - regenerating from a broken emitter moves both
sides together.
A-E6 is now placement-explicit (promised catalog in 99cf987), and separates the
two byte properties: BOM-free is a property of the file, unquoted is a property
of CATALOG'S GATE and not of OKF v0.2 - upstream's own SS12 example is quoted,
so their gate rejects the spec's canonical form.
README gains the upstream-version section it was missing; CLAUDE.md gains the
mechanism behind "no profile hard-codes an upstream version": a profile names a
key, a caller owns its value.
550 -> 559 tests. test_profile_threading's `OKF_V0_2.index is DEFAULT.index`
assertion is replaced rather than deleted: object identity was a proxy for "the
shipped profiles differ in no NAME-bearing field", which is what makes the
synthetic test profile necessary, so the guard now asserts that directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013dgkSPjkLpACjMayd9R5jx
`OKF_V0_2` landed in D2 but was unreachable from outside: no door took a
profile. This threads one through, keyword-only behind the `*` the signature
already carried, so every three-positional call site stays source-compatible —
which is what po-claude asked for, and what makes additivity a property of the
signature rather than something a consumer measures.
Nine sites, not the ~6 STATE claimed. The load-bearing one is the call at
materialize.py:378: the CONTENT phase has accepted `profile` since D2, but the
call site never passed one, so A-E3/A-E4/A-E5 were all unreachable. The other
eight are the disk phase (ownership glob, index name, index maintenance,
concept filenames) plus `generated_filename` in manifest.py.
`link_in_index` is public and called from all three doors, so it gets
`*, profile=DEFAULT` rather than having the lookup moved to the call site:
doors B and C keep exactly the behaviour they had, and which profile THEY own
stays an open question instead of being decided silently by a signature change.
Byte-neutrality is proven, not asserted: `OKF_V0_2.paths is DEFAULT.paths` and
`.index is DEFAULT.index`, and the golden suite is green. That identity is also
why six of the nine sites cannot be proven reachable by any shipped-profile
test — no assertion distinguishes two names for one object. A synthetic
test-only profile renaming the index and the concept files closes that gap, so
a site left on `DEFAULT` fails by name rather than passing quietly.
Scope stated rather than glossed: the profile does NOT reach manifest type
validation (`manifest.py:198` still reads `DEFAULT.types`; measured equal to
`OKF_V0_2.types`, so nothing is hidden today), and `STRICT_V1` is not supported
here — its index policy sets three judging fields the materializer does not
honour. Both are named in the docstring.
No `okf_version` anywhere: that lands once, at D5, when the §12 placement
question closes.
550 tests pass (was 542).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tf2BbC8uSRVU4ApQ9NL7QR
The v0.2 profile lands additively: DEFAULT keeps stating commons' §5 layer
byte for byte (the golden suite is the proof, not the claim), and OKF_V0_2
adds the families v0.2 introduces on top of DEFAULT's key order.
Two questions the plan left open were the operator's, and both were decided
before code rather than discovered during it:
- `generated.by` is `process:llm-ingestion-okf` — plan V1's option (d), the
§7 process actor form. The value carries no version, which is what keeps a
byte-compared fixture stable across releases and leaves a shared
cross-implementation fixture possible. A-E3 was written against the
`<producer>/<version>` form and is now STALE in the pilot specification; the
correction is owed to portfolio-optimiser-claude before they run.
- `sources[].resource` is the manifest source's locator verbatim: the file
root, the sql connection_ref (an env-var NAME, never its value), or the http
base_url. `credential_ref` is not a locator and is never emitted.
Ownership becomes a policy on the profile rather than a literal in the gate.
The emitter and `_is_ingest_owned` are coupled through the stamp value, so
OwnershipPolicy is where they meet and can only change together. Recognition
is one-way by decision: OKF_V0_2 owns the v0.1 stamp too, so a DEFAULT-written
bundle re-runs IN PLACE (operator, 2026-07-27), while DEFAULT still refuses a
v0.2 file rather than replacing it — V-A3's fail-safe is preserved.
An unquotable locator is refused rather than emitted. Measured with PyYAML
rather than reasoned: `[{ id: a, resource: data, backup }]` raises nothing and
parses to a mapping with a `backup` key nobody wrote, so the failure mode is a
silently wrong provenance record. Validation, not repair.
Deliberately NOT here: the `okf_version` declaration. §12 makes it a MAY and
none of upstream's four reference bundles exercises it; WHERE it goes is open
between upstream's root-index frontmatter and catalog's body-line convention,
and catalog verifies against upstream first. It is declared once, at D5.
V-A5 is extended to the new profile — the one whose NAME is the place a
version literal would look natural, and it carries none.
542 tests, mypy --strict clean.
Phase 3 step 1. What Phases 1 and 2 hard-coded about a valid bundle now
lives on one frozen `BundleProfile`, and `DEFAULT` states exactly the
ingest-spec v1 + Phase 2 contract. Nothing observable changes: the 425
existing tests are unmodified and green, and `git diff --stat examples/`
is empty, which is assumption C1's whole proof. Both oracles are real
rather than nominal — the golden suite compares `read_bytes()`, and Door
B pins its frontmatter block as an exact string.
Moved onto the profile, each one previously a constant with a reader:
the index name and its managed-link shape (template plus pattern, kept
honest by a round-trip test), the three filename namespaces
(`ingest-`/`inbox-`/`import-` and `.md`), the reserved `verdict` layer
(duplicated in `manifest` and `inbox` before this), the frontmatter key
order, and the `source_query` whitespace collapse.
Two details are worth naming. The DEFAULT key order spans both doors:
Door A's seven keys and Door B's six are subsequences of one nine-key
order, so a single canonical order reproduces both doors byte-for-byte.
And emission follows commons decision D1 — ordered prefix, then any
remaining keys sorted — which is the mechanism the proving consumer's
hash registry needs; under DEFAULT the tail is always empty.
`TypePolicy` refuses the reserved layer at CONSTRUCTION (assumption C3),
so a profile admitting `verdict` cannot be built, let alone passed to a
door. It reports refusals rather than raising them, because Door A
refuses with `ManifestError` and Door B with `MaterializationError` for
the same type — the wording and the stable code come from the policy,
the exception class stays each door's own.
Deliberately NOT moved, each for a stated reason: the required and
allowlisted key sets the proving consumer needs (no code reads them
until the STRICT_V1 validator exists, and a field nothing reads is a
claim nothing tests), the id grammar (a pattern the slugger derives a
separator class from, not a flat name), `NAME_MAX_BYTES` (a filesystem
fact, not a contract choice), and every disposition/origin/channel
vocabulary (guard territory, always). The profile is also not exported
from the package root yet — the optional `profile` argument on the
flows is step 3's plumbing change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2aKJxLejT9S8jYwoZ9fut
Reads an external OKF bundle as {bundle-relative path -> document text},
hands it WHOLE to an injected gate over the guard's okf.import_bundle (a
bundle-level call: it resolves the cross-link graph across concepts), and
merges only concepts clearing the non-blocking floor. Same injection pattern
as Door B, so the core stays dependency-free while the CI channel for the
real guard is settled.
Two constraints shaped the design and are pinned by tests:
- A merged concept is written VERBATIM. Stamping provenance into it would
require round-tripping its frontmatter through this library's line-oriented
parser, which cannot represent the block lists the guard's parser accepts --
silent data loss -- and would persist bytes the guard never screened.
- Ownership is therefore proven by content identity: identical bytes at the
target name are a no-op re-merge (re-import of an unchanged bundle is
idempotent), and anything else at the name is refused. Curated content and
an updated concept are refused alike; refusing is what never destroys.
The floor is fail-closed beyond the plan's "no error" wording: an error, an
unrecognised disposition, and a concept the gate returned no verdict for are
all refusals. quarantine_review stays its own bucket, as at Door B.
origin/channel are validated against the guard's pinned vocabulary -- it
derives trust from origin by enum identity, so an unrecognised string would be
silently downgraded rather than caught.
Three primitives promoted for reuse rather than duplicated:
reduce_to_id_grammar and check_filename_length to materialize.py, and
extract.decode_text. Door C slugs the WHOLE concept path, so tables/users.md
and views/users.md stay distinct. Concept discovery folds case explicitly
rather than globbing *.md, whose case-sensitivity follows the filesystem and
would import the same bundle differently on APFS and ext4.
README's "what is gated today" section corrected: it claimed nothing is gated,
which is no longer true, but the honest statement is narrower than "the doors
are gated" -- the library cannot verify that an injected adapter is a real
guard, and a permissive stub is believed.
405 tests green; ruff, ruff format and mypy --strict clean.
`process_inbox(inbox_dir, bundle_dir, ingested_at, *, okf_type, gate)`:
per dropped file, bytes -> extract_text -> guard gate -> render -> collision
gate -> write -> index link. Returns an InboxResult whose four buckets
(persisted / quarantined / rejected / failed) are disjoint and complete, so a
file that vanished shows up as a missing entry rather than as nothing.
The guard is INJECTED rather than imported. The library calls no guard
function and makes no security decision: the Gate adapter returns a
GateDecision carrying the guard's own disposition value and the sanitized
text, and the flow only branches on it. That keeps the core dependency-free
while B2 (the guard's CI channel) is still open, and lets the persist and
refuse branches run deterministically against a test double.
Decisions taken with the operator this session:
- What is persisted is the gate's SANITIZED text, not the extracted text.
Screening one string and writing another would make the verdict a statement
about bytes nobody kept. `sanitize` is exported by the guard precisely for
callers composing the checklist themselves, so this is sanctioned API, not
a reimplementation. Door B has no model call, so the fenced text the
bookends produce for a transform is never persisted.
- Quarantine is reported apart from rejection. QUARANTINE_REVIEW means "hold
for human review" — an operator queue — where FAIL_SECURE is a decision.
No quarantine directory in v1; that stays an extension point.
Fails closed by construction: only the guard's non-blocking floor (`warn`)
persists, so a renamed member, a future disposition or an adapter typo lands
in `rejected` rather than being guessed safe.
One bad file never aborts the run. Only three conditions fail the whole run,
and each is wrong for every file at once: an invalid `ingested_at`, a reserved
`okf_type`, and a missing inbox directory.
New code `inbox_slug_collision`: two dropped files reducing to one generated
name are BOTH refused. Persisting one would let iteration order decide the
winner, and overwriting would lose the other's content.
Phase 1 primitives are reused, never duplicated, so four helpers become
package-internal names (write_bytes, link_in_index, parse_frontmatter,
INDEX_NAME) and link_in_index learns to append to an empty index — Door A
always seeds its index with bundle_summary, but Door B has no summary to
invent and must not open with a blank line.
Second guard-independent step of Phase 2: the pure functions that turn a
dropped file's name and extracted text into an OKF concept file, with the
§7-analogous honesty marker. No runtime dependency, no guard call, no model
call — the persist gate is still steps 4–5.
- `inbox_slug(filename)` reduces a name to the Phase 1 id grammar
(`[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`): drop the final extension, lowercase, collapse every
run of non-grammar characters to one `-`, strip the ends. A name that
reduces to nothing fails fast rather than inventing an `untitled` fallback
that would silently collide across unrelated files.
- `inbox_filename(slug)` namespaces it `inbox-{slug}.md`, disjoint from
`index.md`, Door A's `ingest-*`, and `promoted-verdict-*` for every slug the
grammar admits (asserted over a hostile-name table, not one example).
- `render_inbox_concept(...)` emits the six-key layer in fixed order — `type`,
`title`, `source_file`, `source_sha256`, `ingested_at`, `generated: true` —
with the digest taken over the ORIGINAL dropped bytes, never the extracted
text, so provenance stays re-verifiable against the operator's file. Body is
normalised to LF-only with exactly one trailing newline (dropped files
legitimately arrive with CRLF; Door A can validate instead because it renders
its own bodies).
Slugging normalises to NFC first. macOS (APFS) hands filenames over
decomposed, so `é` arrives as `e` + combining acute: without normalising, the
combining mark alone becomes a separator and the base letter survives
(`cafe`), where the composed form is one non-grammar character (`caf`) — one
visual filename, two slugs, depending on where the string came from. The test
pins both forms with explicit escapes so it cannot depend on the test file's
own encoding. No transliteration, deliberately: mapping non-ASCII to ASCII is
a semantic claim the slugger cannot make (Norwegian `møte`/meeting would
become `mote`/fashion). The readable name survives verbatim in `title`.
Fail-fast gates, all typed: reserved `verdict` layer refused at this door too
(the promotion gate stays the only path in); a title that is multi-line or
contains `[`/`]` refused, matching Door A's manifest rule, because it renders
verbatim into `- [title](target)`; a multi-line `source_file` refused because
line-oriented frontmatter would take the injected lines. Four new stable
MaterializationError codes, each with its entry in the test_error_codes.py
registry: `inbox_slug_empty`, `inbox_title_invalid`,
`inbox_source_file_invalid`, `okf_type_reserved`.
`ingested_at` validation moves to a shared `validate_ingested_at` in
materialize.py and is called by both doors — one rule in one place is what
keeps the determinism contract from drifting apart per door.
TDD: tests/test_inbox.py precedes the implementation. 325 tests green;
mypy --strict, ruff check/format, and the sanitize|quarantine|lexicon
boundary grep-gate clean; runtime dependencies still exactly none; the Phase 1
golden suite still passes byte-for-byte.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2aKJxLejT9S8jYwoZ9fut
The §3 ownership scan classified every ingest-stamped file as replaceable,
so materializing one manifest into a bundle deleted the ingest files another
manifest had stamped there — and removed their index links too.
Narrow ownership to files whose stamp names the running manifest by stem.
The stamp is `{stem}@{sha256[:16]}`; matching on the stem, not the whole
stamp, lets an edited manifest still reclaim the files a prior run of the
same manifest wrote (the stem is stable across content edits), while a
different manifest sharing the bundle keeps its own files. Implements the
trinn-e §10.2 decision. This does not close the operator-copy restriction
(a generated file copied into curated content), which stays documented in
ingest-spec.md:69-72, not enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HBbjgS5A55RVavoyjJC4FX
a7e1bc8 unified title rendering at both sites and routed the open question
to commons, the spec owner: does §5's whitespace collapse apply to `title`,
or only to `source_query`? The ruling is source_query only. §5 mandates the
collapse for that one field — where a multi-line SQL SELECT must render on
one line — while every other value is validated single-line at manifest load
and emitted as-is: validation, not repair.
_single_line is renamed _collapse_whitespace and now runs for source_query
alone. Frontmatter values, the index link label, and the labels_by_target
map all pass through verbatim. A title carrying an internal whitespace run
(or any other operator-supplied bytes) now survives byte-for-byte at both
the frontmatter and the index-label site, instead of being silently altered.
No golden bytes change: no title in the shipped fixtures or either consumer
carries a collapsible whitespace run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HBbjgS5A55RVavoyjJC4FX
ingest-spec §4 makes the extraction title BOTH the `title` frontmatter and
the index link label — one value, two sites. The frontmatter renderer
single-lined its values while the index label was written raw, so a title
carrying a whitespace run rendered two different ways from one input:
title: Energiforbruk 2024
- [Energiforbruk 2024](ingest-orders.md)
Single-lining is now one named rule applied at every site that renders the
title, instead of a detail of frontmatter rendering that the index path did
not share.
No golden bytes change: no title in this repo, portfolio-optimiser or
portfolio-optimiser-claude carries a whitespace run.
Open question routed to commons, the spec owner: §5 mandates collapsing
whitespace runs in `source_query` only, while `title` is separately required
to be single-line and is already validated as such at manifest load. So
collapsing the title may be over-application — the alternative reading is
that both sites should emit it verbatim. Either reading keeps the two sites
in agreement, which is what this commit establishes; which of the two is
correct is a spec question, not ours.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WdVgowYC4LARgvNdNMiuvz
Consumer tests were binding message wording (pytest.raises(match=...)) to
distinguish sub-causes within one error type. Every raise site now carries
a documented, stable code attribute; the registry lives in the errors.py
class docstrings. Codes are stable API; message text is explicitly not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The stamp ({stem}@{sha256(raw)[:16]}) was computed internally but only
written into frontmatter, forcing consumers to recompute it from the
manifest bytes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TDD step 7: read_http executes the optional http extension point behind
an injectable transport seam (urllib_get is the only socket path; the
suite runs socket-free against a mock). credential_ref resolves from the
environment at run time, fail-fast before any transport call; the secret
rides in the Authorization header only. Explicit single-slash URL join,
CRLF-to-LF normalization, LF line-count cap (missing trailing newline
still counts), and code-fence-marker rejection. materialize_bundle
renders the body as a verbatim fenced block; the §8 gate test asserts
zero transport calls without the opt-in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QeqhJpYQyghASjiJo5EhGg
TDD step 6: on an existing index, managed lines whose target is an
ingest-owned file removed this run are dropped, a managed label is
refreshed in place when the extraction title changes, and every other
line — curated links, promoted-verdict links, foreign line endings — is
preserved byte for byte. Load-bearing test: a promoted verdict and its
index link survive re-ingest unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QeqhJpYQyghASjiJo5EhGg
TDD step 5: materialize_bundle takes three explicit inputs (manifest,
bundle dir, regex-validated ingested_at — no wall-clock default) and
stages every extraction in memory before the first disk mutation. The
§3 collision gate refuses to overwrite any file without the ingest
stamp, before any mutation; replacement removes exactly the stamped
set. Frontmatter is the seven §5 keys in spec order with whitespace
collapse; output is LF-only raw bytes with one trailing newline; the
provenance stamp hashes the same bytes that are parsed. Fresh index.md
gets bundle_summary plus idempotent links in extraction order (§6
creation path; preserve/removal rules come next). The §8 network gate
refuses http fail-fast without the per-run opt-in; the http transport
itself lands in step 7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QeqhJpYQyghASjiJo5EhGg
