Eight tests for the two findings of the 18.09 PM checkpoint of `0f308c1`.
Seven are RED here and one is green-but-uncovered; the fix is the next commit.
BLOCKER -- `_check_inflated` read `filters[0]`, measured that one link and
returned, so a stream decoded through `/Filter [/FlateDecode /FlateDecode]`
was bounded by nothing. Reproduced here in its own interpreter, same commit:
links=1 408 516 B file -> 77 971 456 B peak RSS (bounded, 0.10.1)
links=2 1 636 B file -> 889 573 376 B peak RSS (unbounded)
links=3 1 070 B file -> 888 401 920 B peak RSS (unbounded)
543 000x the file size at two links, and the image IS refused at the end --
by `check_payload`, after the memory has been spent. PM measured the same
shape at 1 606 B -> 835 MB and 2 839 B -> 2 439 MB.
The chain is not a hypothetical. Over the 5 092 image objects of the 78 PDFs
on this machine (measured 2026-09-18): 1 625 `[/DCTDecode]`, 2 215
`[/FlateDecode]`, 596 `[/FlateDecode /DCTDecode]`, 580 `[/FlateDecode
/ASCII85Decode]`, 40 unfiltered, 16 `[/ASCII85Decode /FlateDecode]`, 16
`[/JPXDecode]`, 4 `[/CCITTFaxDecode]`. So refusing every chain would cost
1 192 real pictures, and bounding only the first link leaves those 16
unmeasured -- `filters[0]` is not `FlateDecode` there, so nothing ran at all.
Two of the cheap tests assert WHICH check fired ("decompresses to more than"),
because the backstop refuses the same document by code and a test reading only
the code is green on the defect.
MAJOR -- `check_payload(len(data), name=name)` after `get_data()` is the
counted refusal that four documentation surfaces point at, and deleting
exactly that line passed all 2 132 tests. The path that reaches it is a stream
pdfminer has ALREADY decoded (`decode()` sets `rawdata` to `None`), so there is
no raw stream left to measure. That test is green here and RED under the
deletion, measured before this commit: `asset_too_large` -> `asset_pdf_unsupported`.
Each red test carries a known-positive beside it: the two chains the corpora
hold still deliver their 64x64 picture, and an already-decoded stream under
the bound is still read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A second independent review read `230d1cb` -- the commit that closed the
`v0.10.0` review's two MAJOR findings -- and found one of them open. The
bound read `/Width` and `/Height`, which an untrusted document writes, while
`get_data()` pays for the stream beside them; `/Length` is the COMPRESSED
length and the two numbers are independent.
Re-measured here on `ed8d9d7` before anything changed, in its own
interpreter: a 408 516-byte PDF declaring 1x1 and carrying 400 MB of deflated
zeros was CARRIED, no rejection, 891 904 000 B peak RSS. After: 0 carried,
`asset_too_large`, 57 065 472 B. At 1,2 GB of zeros, 2 436 MB -> 64 569 344 B
-- the cost no longer scales with the bomb. End to end through the CLI with
the shipped defaults: 838 000 640 B and an asset written -> exit 0,
79 650 816 B, `0 carried of 1 found`, no `assets/`.
Three numbers are bounded now, not one: what a container DECLARES, what a
carried FILE measures (`read_image`, so a 49 MP PNG of 47 705 bytes is not
passed on to a consumer), and what a PDF stream DECOMPRESSES to
(`assets.inflated_size`, a chunk at a time, output discarded, before
`get_data()`). The limit is stated rather than implied: the stream
measurement runs where `FlateDecode` is the first filter and the document is
not encrypted; every other chain is a check on the decoded length AFTER the
decode, a counted refusal and not a bounded one.
A non-positive declared dimension is `asset_size_invalid`, its own code,
raised before the stream is read. `-1 x 40000000000` is a NEGATIVE pixel
count, under which every `>` bound read as satisfied, so the check returned
silently and the refusal arrived from `encode_png` as
`asset_samples_invalid`. Its own code because a publisher shipping a picture
bigger than this package carries and a dictionary written to be read wrong
are different facts about a document.
Two smaller findings in the line that says what is missing, both introduced
by the first fix: the address was written twice, once bare, and a linkifying
renderer autolinks a bare URL -- written once now, in one code span; and
`label` became a dead parameter, so the figure's caption was dropped, a
regression against 0.10.0. It is written again in the `-- <label>` form a
carried pointer uses.
Version bumped to 0.10.1 across all ten places. Nine were unbound and stale:
four README install lines naming the previous release, two prose lines, the
"current tag" entry, `uv.lock`, and a CHANGELOG whose 0.10.1 content sat
under `[Unreleased]`. Two new packaging tests bind them to `__version__`, and
the README's guard tag to `[tool.uv.sources]`.
Every test was red first. The fate of every image is identical with and
without the new bound on three K2 PDFs carrying 800 images (464/464, 311/311
with the same 12 rejections, 25/25), and the second inflate is below the
noise floor there. 0 shipped artifacts move: no bundle under `examples/`,
`skills/` or `tests/fixtures/` carries an image pointer at all, measured
against a known-positive control.
`asset_too_large` was undocumented in the error registry; both codes are
there now. `tools/okf_accounting_gate.py` gains the new code in its closed
list -- one string, no behaviour change, stated because that file belongs to
another order.
Suite 2141 passed / 1 skipped, ruff + format + mypy --strict clean.
Report: docs/2026-09-18-bildestien-holder-0-10-1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two MAJOR findings of the independent v0.10.0 review, both with the
shipped defaults, both new in 0.10.0. Repros rebuilt as tests first.
- A remote <img src>/xlink:href became a LIVE markdown image link in the
persisted concept, with the address and query string chosen by whoever
wrote the document. Extraction opens no socket; a consumer rendering
the bundle does. Now inert text with the address in a code span,
pinned by a property over the readers rather than by one string. The
tier asymmetry (user-upload refuses, trusted-source persisted) went to
the guard repo with the repro.
- Nothing bounded a declared image size: 9.6 KB of PDF declaring
3000x3000 grayscale zeros took 83 MB peak RSS, linear in pixels.
MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS (40 000 000) and MAX_IMAGE_BYTES (256 MiB) are read
off the corpora (largest measured 18.6 MP on K2, 1.4 MP on R761) and
checked on what the container declares, before any decompression;
over them is asset_too_large, counted. The same bound closes the
inline data: URI, which the review flagged and did not measure.
Also fixed, added by PM to this order: an inline PDF image was named
from id() of a Python object, so two concept files of the reference
corpus differed between builds. It is now named from its position.
R761 unchanged: 50 carried of 50 found, assets diff -rq clean.
Report: docs/2026-09-17-bildestien-0-10-1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
