Shared OKF (Open Knowledge Format) ingestion library: spec-based connectors, bundle inbox, and external-bundle import. Security delegated to llm-ingestion-guard.
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Kjell Tore Guttormsen 1215f985ae test(okf-v0.2): steps 1-3 -- the safety net before the gate is touched
Plan steps 1-3: characterization only, no production code, so the one part of
the v0.2 work we called risky -- `_is_ingest_owned`, the pre-mutation collision
gate -- is pinned before it moves.

Step 1. An inline flow mapping round-trips through the scalar
`parse_frontmatter` verbatim (V-A2); a block list does not, and the measured
key-space pollution (`- id`, `resource` arriving as frontmatter keys) is what
requirement 1 chose the flow form over. A v0.2 `generated` mapping never makes
a file ingest-owned (V-A3), with the v0.1 `generated: true` control alongside
so the refusal is attributable to `generated` and not to an unreadable
manifest reference -- and end to end, such a file is refused with
`collision_unstamped` rather than overwritten. Today's fail-safe becomes a
documented guarantee.

Step 2. Door C against the five OKF section 14 consumer MUST NOTs plus the
section 5.2 bare-`verified` mapping. Its tolerance is structural rather than
lenient: the door writes the guard's bytes verbatim and never parses the
sender's frontmatter, so a D1b reader that starts judging shape at this door
breaks these cases -- which is when we want to hear about it.

Step 3. No profile hard-codes an upstream version (V4/V-A5), walked
recursively through dataclasses and collections and falsified against a
planted literal; the key name is what a profile pins, and the root-frontmatter
policy accepts any value. The `okf_version` value is catalog's (E1), so a
constant here would be both a decision we do not own and the thing that would
have to be chased on every upstream release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A2aKJxLejT9S8jYwoZ9fut
2026-07-26 20:06:08 +02:00
docs docs(okf-v0.2): requirement 1 re-sized -- the emitter does not change at all 2026-07-26 19:57:29 +02:00
examples feat(examples): ship the §11 golden fixtures with byte-exact conformance 2026-07-16 20:09:03 +02:00
src/llm_ingestion_okf feat(phase-3): the index policy becomes configurable, with the reader that judges it 2026-07-25 20:30:54 +02:00
tests test(okf-v0.2): steps 1-3 -- the safety net before the gate is touched 2026-07-26 20:06:08 +02:00
.gitignore feat: initial commit — repo scaffold and v1 scope 2026-07-16 10:12:59 +02:00
CHANGELOG.md docs: two corrections from the convention owner and the spec owner 2026-07-25 12:32:21 +02:00
CLAUDE.md docs: every upstream OKF release runs a runbook, and this repo is a black box 2026-07-26 19:18:43 +02:00
LICENSE feat: initial commit — repo scaffold and v1 scope 2026-07-16 10:12:59 +02:00
pyproject.toml docs(install): correct how the guard reaches a consumer, measured both ways 2026-07-25 12:24:54 +02:00
README.md feat(phase-3): the index policy becomes configurable, with the reader that judges it 2026-07-25 20:30:54 +02:00
uv.lock chore(release): v0.4.0 2026-07-25 12:08:48 +02:00

llm-ingestion-okf

Shared ingestion library for OKF (Open Knowledge Format) bundles.

Status: phases 1 and 2 are implemented. Phase 1 (spec-based ingestion) covers manifest validation, the file/sql/http connectors, deterministic materialization, index generation, and the golden fixture suite under examples/. Phase 2 adds the bundle inbox (process_inbox) and external-bundle import (import_bundle), both against an injected persist gate, with llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter wiring that gate to the real guard (see below). One phase-2 item is deliberately outstanding: binary extraction (pdf/docx/xlsx behind the [extract] extra) is unimplemented, so those types are rejected fail-fast. Phases 34 are planned (see docs/plan/).

Planned scope (v1)

The library provides three entry points for getting content into an OKF bundle:

  1. Spec-based ingestion. An implementation of the normative ingest specification owned by portfolio-optimiser-commons: manifest → file/sql/http connector → deterministic materialization of ingest-{id}.md concept files → index generation. Zero model calls in the run path; output is reproducible byte-for-byte against golden fixtures.
  2. Bundle inbox. A drop directory where common file types are converted to OKF concept files. All file-type→text extraction lives in this library: md, txt, csv, json, and html are handled by the stdlib core; pdf, docx, and xlsx require the optional [extract] extra and are rejected fail-fast without it. Extracted text passes the security gate before anything is persisted.
  3. External bundle import. Import and merge of third-party OKF bundles: each concept is assessed via the security gate, and only concepts that pass are merged, materialized, and linked into the index.

Boundary: security is delegated

Security is owned by the sibling package llm-ingestion-guard (pinned >=0.2,<0.3). The division is strict:

  • guard answers "is this content safe to persist?" — scan, sanitize, quarantine, fail-secure, provenance stamping.
  • this library does the plumbing — connect a source, materialize a deterministic OKF bundle, generate the index.

No security functionality is reimplemented here.

What is gated today: read this before trusting a door

  • Door A (materialize_bundle) is ungated. It calls nothing before writing to disk and writes what it is given. A caller materializing untrusted content is responsible for gating it.
  • Doors B and C (process_inbox, import_bundle) gate through an adapter you pass in. Each takes a gate argument; the flow hands it the content and obeys the verdict, refusing to persist anything that does not clear the guard's non-blocking floor — including a disposition it does not recognise, and (at Door C) a concept the gate returned no verdict for. What it cannot do is check that your adapter is a real guard: a permissive stub approves everything, and the flow will believe it.

llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter is the adapter over the real guard, and the only module here that imports it — importing the package itself does not:

from llm_ingestion_okf import process_inbox
from llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter import inbox_gate

result = process_inbox(inbox_dir, bundle_dir, "2026-07-25T12:00:00Z",
                       okf_type="reference", gate=inbox_gate)

Two properties of that adapter are worth knowing before you rely on it. It screens the exact bytes it persists — the guard's prepare_input bookend prepares text for a model call, which this library never makes, so only screen_output is used and the screened string is the written string. And it refuses rather than repairs: a file carrying an invisible zero-width or bidi character is rejected, not silently stripped and written. Door B screens under the untrusted-upload policy, so any finding at all is held back rather than persisted.

This section is stated plainly because earlier wording ("calls the guard at every persist gate") described the intended end state in the present tense, and a consumer reasonably read it as safe-by-default.

Roadmap

The library is built in four phases so that every known OKF surface in the ecosystem is eventually covered. Each phase has a detailed plan with verification criteria:

  1. Spec-based ingestion (Python) with byte-exact golden fixtures — plan.
  2. Bundle inbox and external-bundle import (Python), guard-gated — plan.
  3. Configurable bundle contract (types, layers, frontmatter sets, index shape, and reserved-file policy as configuration), enabling stricter bundle profiles such as strict-v1plan.
  4. A node/ half: a zero-dependency Node/ESM package (importable and CLI-invokable, vendored per consumer) providing bundle checking, index generation, inbox processing, and document conversion for the OKF second-brain plugin ecosystem. The Python and Node halves share the OKF contract and fixture suite, not code — plan.

Non-goals

  • Verdict/feedback machinery from the method specification (stays in the consuming repositories).
  • Embedding- or retrieval-layer functionality.
  • Security functionality, in either runtime — that is always llm-ingestion-guard's domain.

Requirements

Python 3.10+, and exactly one runtime dependency — the security boundary, llm-ingestion-guard>=0.2,<0.3. Everything else is stdlib.

That guard is not on a package index yet, so with pip, install it first — otherwise installing this package fails with No matching distribution found for llm-ingestion-guard:

pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v0.2.0"
pip install "llm-ingestion-okf @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-okf.git@v0.4.0"

With uv, one command is enough — uv pip install "llm-ingestion-okf @ git+…@v0.4.0" resolves the guard from the tag on its own, because uv reads the [tool.uv.sources] entry in this project's pyproject.toml when it builds from the source tree. Both paths were measured on 2026-07-25.

A git URL is a PEP 508 direct reference and pins one exact tag, so it is an install-time channel, not the pin: the range above stays the declared dependency — the built wheel carries Requires-Dist: llm-ingestion-guard<0.3,>=0.2 — and resolves normally once the package index exists. The optional [extract] extra (pdf/docx/xlsx parsers) is not populated yet. The planned Node half targets Node/ESM with zero npm dependencies.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.