llm-ingestion-okf

Shared ingestion library for OKF (Open Knowledge Format) bundles.

Status: phases 1 and 2 are implemented. Phase 1 (spec-based ingestion) covers manifest validation, the file/sql/http connectors, deterministic materialization, index generation, and the golden fixture suite under examples/. Phase 2 adds the bundle inbox (process_inbox) and external-bundle import (import_bundle), both against an injected persist gate, with llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter wiring that gate to the real guard (see below). One phase-2 item is deliberately outstanding: binary extraction (pdf/docx/xlsx behind the [extract] extra) is unimplemented, so those types are rejected fail-fast. Phases 3–4 are planned (see docs/plan/).

Planned scope (v1)

The library provides three entry points for getting content into an OKF bundle:

1. Spec-based ingestion. An implementation of the normative ingest specification owned by portfolio-optimiser-commons: manifest → file/sql/http connector → deterministic materialization of ingest-{id}.md concept files → index generation. Zero model calls in the run path; output is reproducible byte-for-byte against golden fixtures.
2. Bundle inbox. A drop directory where common file types are converted to OKF concept files. All file-type→text extraction lives in this library: md, txt, csv, json, and html are handled by the stdlib core; pdf, docx, and xlsx require the optional [extract] extra and are rejected fail-fast without it. Extracted text passes the security gate before anything is persisted.
3. External bundle import. Import and merge of third-party OKF bundles: each concept is assessed via the security gate, and only concepts that pass are merged, materialized, and linked into the index.

Boundary: security is delegated

Security is owned by the sibling package llm-ingestion-guard (pinned >=0.2,<0.3). The division is strict:

• guard answers "is this content safe to persist?" — scan, sanitize, quarantine, fail-secure, provenance stamping.
• this library does the plumbing — connect a source, materialize a deterministic OKF bundle, generate the index.

No security functionality is reimplemented here.

What is gated today: read this before trusting a door

• Door A (materialize_bundle) is ungated. It calls nothing before writing to disk and writes what it is given. A caller materializing untrusted content is responsible for gating it.
• Doors B and C (process_inbox, import_bundle) gate through an adapter you pass in. Each takes a gate argument; the flow hands it the content and obeys the verdict, refusing to persist anything that does not clear the guard's non-blocking floor — including a disposition it does not recognise, and (at Door C) a concept the gate returned no verdict for. What it cannot do is check that your adapter is a real guard: a permissive stub approves everything, and the flow will believe it.

llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter is the adapter over the real guard, and the only module here that imports it — importing the package itself does not:

from llm_ingestion_okf import process_inbox
from llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter import inbox_gate

result = process_inbox(inbox_dir, bundle_dir, "2026-07-25T12:00:00Z",
                       okf_type="reference", gate=inbox_gate)

Two properties of that adapter are worth knowing before you rely on it. It screens the exact bytes it persists — the guard's prepare_input bookend prepares text for a model call, which this library never makes, so only screen_output is used and the screened string is the written string. And it refuses rather than repairs: a file carrying an invisible zero-width or bidi character is rejected, not silently stripped and written. Door B screens under the untrusted-upload policy, so any finding at all is held back rather than persisted.

This section is stated plainly because earlier wording ("calls the guard at every persist gate") described the intended end state in the present tense, and a consumer reasonably read it as safe-by-default.

Roadmap

The library is built in four phases so that every known OKF surface in the ecosystem is eventually covered. Each phase has a detailed plan with verification criteria:

1. Spec-based ingestion (Python) with byte-exact golden fixtures — plan.
2. Bundle inbox and external-bundle import (Python), guard-gated — plan.
3. Configurable bundle contract (types, layers, frontmatter sets, index shape, and reserved-file policy as configuration), enabling stricter bundle profiles such as strict-v1 — plan.
4. A node/ half: a zero-dependency Node/ESM package (importable and CLI-invokable, vendored per consumer) providing bundle checking, index generation, inbox processing, and document conversion for the OKF second-brain plugin ecosystem. The Python and Node halves share the OKF contract and fixture suite, not code — plan.

Upstream OKF versions

The library targets the current latest version of Google's OKF. Support is additive — a new upstream version arrives as a new profile, never as a migration of an existing one — so upgrading the library does not change the bytes an existing profile emits.

Profile	Contract	Status
DEFAULT	commons' ingest-spec §5 layer (OKF v0.1 semantics)	stable
STRICT_V1	a consumer's ratified v0.1 contract	stable
OKF_V0_2	OKF v0.2	provisional, pre-release only
OKF_LATEST	alias for the latest version supported as stable	currently DEFAULT

OKF_V0_2 ships first as a pre-release to a named pilot set and may change on their feedback without a deprecation cycle. Pin the versioned constant rather than OKF_LATEST unless you have explicitly opted into tracking; OKF_LATEST moves at general availability, which is a deliberate release event rather than a side effect of an upgrade.

Selecting a profile is keyword-only, so existing call sites are unaffected:

materialize_bundle(manifest, bundle_dir, ingested_at, profile=OKF_V0_2)

A bundle may declare the version it targets. OKF v0.2 §12 makes this a MAY, and puts the declaration in the bundle-root index.md's frontmatter block. The profile names the key; the caller supplies the value, because that value tracks the upstream version and is not this library's to decide:

materialize_bundle(
    manifest, bundle_dir, ingested_at,
    profile=OKF_V0_2,
    root_frontmatter_values={"okf_version": "0.2"},
)

Omit the argument and no frontmatter block is written. Offering a key the profile does not name is refused before anything is written to disk.

Attested computations (v0.2 §10)

OKF_V0_2 supports the Attested Computation type as a format: its five contract fields — runtime, parameters, computation, executor, attester — are emitted in canonical position, judged, and round-tripped. runtime is required for that type and for no other, which the profile expresses through FrontmatterSchema.required_by_type; a type the mapping does not name carries no extra requirement, because §14 forbids a consumer to reject on an unknown type.

Nothing here executes a computation or checks an attestation. Upstream defers the receipt and verdict wire formats, so there is no contract to implement, and the question an attestation answers — was this value produced the sanctioned way — is not this library's. It re-enters scope when upstream specifies the protocol.

On the import side, a third-party concept may name an executor or attester resource pointing at executable code. Door C imports the pointer and never the code — it writes concepts verbatim and skips every non-.md file — so such a reference may not resolve, or may resolve to a file the destination tree already holds under that path. Each one is reported in ImportResult.unverified_references; the concept still merges, because §14 forbids rejecting a bundle over a broken cross-link while §10.5 asks a consumer to surface rather than silently drop. The report names the pointer key, not the resource it points at: recovering the resource needs the structured reader.

One limit worth knowing before you write such a concept: §10.2 presents executor and attester as nested block mappings, and this library's frontmatter parser is line-oriented. It reads inline flow mappings (executor: { resource: …, receipt: [ … ] }) as opaque values that round-trip unchanged, but it cannot read the block form — two block mappings that both carry a resource collapse into one namespace and the first is lost. Write the flow form; both are valid YAML, and a real YAML consumer recovers the same structure from either.

Non-goals

• Verdict/feedback machinery from the method specification (stays in the consuming repositories).
• Embedding- or retrieval-layer functionality.
• Security functionality, in either runtime — that is always llm-ingestion-guard's domain.

Requirements

Python 3.10+, and exactly one runtime dependency — the security boundary, llm-ingestion-guard>=0.2,<0.3. Everything else is stdlib.

That guard is not on a package index yet, so with pip, install it first — otherwise installing this package fails with No matching distribution found for llm-ingestion-guard:

pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v0.2.0"
pip install "llm-ingestion-okf @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-okf.git@v0.4.0"

With uv, one command is enough — uv pip install "llm-ingestion-okf @ git+…@v0.4.0" resolves the guard from the tag on its own, because uv reads the [tool.uv.sources] entry in this project's pyproject.toml when it builds from the source tree. Both paths were measured on 2026-07-25.

A git URL is a PEP 508 direct reference and pins one exact tag, so it is an install-time channel, not the pin: the range above stays the declared dependency — the built wheel carries Requires-Dist: llm-ingestion-guard<0.3,>=0.2 — and resolves normally once the package index exists. The optional [extract] extra (pdf/docx/xlsx parsers) is not populated yet. The planned Node half targets Node/ESM with zero npm dependencies.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.