llm-ingestion-okf

Shared ingestion library for OKF (Open Knowledge Format) bundles.

Status: phases 1 and 2 are implemented. Phase 1 (spec-based ingestion) covers manifest validation, the file/sql/http connectors, deterministic materialization, index generation, and the golden fixture suite under examples/. Phase 2 adds the bundle inbox (process_inbox) and external-bundle import (import_bundle), both against an injected persist gate, with llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter wiring that gate to the real guard (see below). One phase-2 item is deliberately outstanding: binary extraction (pdf/docx/xlsx behind the [extract] extra) is unimplemented, so those types are rejected fail-fast. Phases 3–4 are planned (see docs/plan/).

Planned scope (v1)

The library provides three entry points for getting content into an OKF bundle:

1. Spec-based ingestion. An implementation of the normative ingest specification owned by portfolio-optimiser-commons: manifest → file/sql/http connector → deterministic materialization of ingest-{id}.md concept files → index generation. Zero model calls in the run path; output is reproducible byte-for-byte against golden fixtures.
2. Bundle inbox. A drop directory where common file types are converted to OKF concept files. All file-type→text extraction lives in this library: md, txt, csv, json, and html are handled by the stdlib core; pdf, docx, and xlsx require the optional [extract] extra and are rejected fail-fast without it. Extracted text passes the security gate before anything is persisted.
3. External bundle import. Import and merge of third-party OKF bundles: each concept is assessed via the security gate, and only concepts that pass are merged, materialized, and linked into the index.

Boundary: security is delegated

Security is owned by the sibling package llm-ingestion-guard (pinned >=0.2,<0.3). The division is strict:

• guard answers "is this content safe to persist?" — scan, sanitize, quarantine, fail-secure, provenance stamping.
• this library does the plumbing — connect a source, materialize a deterministic OKF bundle, generate the index.

No security functionality is reimplemented here.

What is gated today: read this before trusting a door

• Door A (materialize_bundle) is ungated. It calls nothing before writing to disk and writes what it is given. A caller materializing untrusted content is responsible for gating it.
• Doors B and C (process_inbox, import_bundle) gate through an adapter you pass in. Each takes a gate argument; the flow hands it the content and obeys the verdict, refusing to persist anything that does not clear the guard's non-blocking floor — including a disposition it does not recognise, and (at Door C) a concept the gate returned no verdict for. What it cannot do is check that your adapter is a real guard: a permissive stub approves everything, and the flow will believe it.

llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter is the adapter over the real guard, and the only module here that imports it — importing the package itself does not:

from llm_ingestion_okf import process_inbox
from llm_ingestion_okf.guard_adapter import inbox_gate

result = process_inbox(inbox_dir, bundle_dir, "2026-07-25T12:00:00Z",
                       okf_type="reference", gate=inbox_gate)

Two properties of that adapter are worth knowing before you rely on it. It screens the exact bytes it persists — the guard's prepare_input bookend prepares text for a model call, which this library never makes, so only screen_output is used and the screened string is the written string. And it refuses rather than repairs: a file carrying an invisible zero-width or bidi character is rejected, not silently stripped and written. Door B screens under the untrusted-upload policy, so any finding at all is held back rather than persisted.

This section is stated plainly because earlier wording ("calls the guard at every persist gate") described the intended end state in the present tense, and a consumer reasonably read it as safe-by-default.

Roadmap

The library is built in four phases so that every known OKF surface in the ecosystem is eventually covered. Each phase has a detailed plan with verification criteria:

1. Spec-based ingestion (Python) with byte-exact golden fixtures — plan.
2. Bundle inbox and external-bundle import (Python), guard-gated — plan.
3. Configurable bundle contract (types, layers, frontmatter sets, and reserved-file policy as configuration), enabling stricter bundle profiles such as strict-v1 — plan.
4. A node/ half: a zero-dependency Node/ESM package (importable and CLI-invokable, vendored per consumer) providing bundle checking, index generation, inbox processing, and document conversion for the OKF second-brain plugin ecosystem. The Python and Node halves share the OKF contract and fixture suite, not code — plan.

Non-goals

• Verdict/feedback machinery from the method specification (stays in the consuming repositories).
• Embedding- or retrieval-layer functionality.
• Security functionality, in either runtime — that is always llm-ingestion-guard's domain.

Requirements

Python 3.10+, and exactly one runtime dependency — the security boundary, llm-ingestion-guard>=0.2,<0.3. Everything else is stdlib. Until that package is published to an index, install it from its tag:

pip install "llm-ingestion-guard @ git+https://git.fromaitochitta.com/open/llm-ingestion-pipeline-security.git@v0.2.0"

A git URL is a PEP 508 direct reference and pins one exact tag, so it is an install-time channel, not the pin: the range above stays the declared dependency and resolves normally once the package index exists. The optional [extract] extra (pdf/docx/xlsx parsers) is not populated yet. The planned Node half targets Node/ESM with zero npm dependencies.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.