`PLAN-v1.md`'s Session H block ended with "Neste: Session G", and that line is
a trap two ways over. "Session G" is a WRITTEN section at :231 — and it is
*v1.0 freeze + release*, not the axis separation. No plan section for the axis
separation ever existed; the pointer resolved to this one forward-reference
line. A session following it designs against the wrong section, which is
exactly what this session started doing before measuring the file.
The number was wrong too: 0.4.0 went to the input cap by operator choice, so
the axis separation landed under 0.5.0 instead.
STATE.md is LOCAL-ONLY and gets overwritten every session, so the plan file and
the CHANGELOG are the only durable record. Leaving the line meant the next
session would re-derive the same wrong pointer from the same text.
Also corrects a citation this session nearly propagated: the locked 0.3.1
grading table is at :288-290. `:246-252` is the okf pin discussion, and the
table at :302-309 is the *broken* v0.3.0 one — the row it asserts for an
ordinary image is `fail_secure`, the regression 0.3.1 exists to fix. Citing it
as the baseline would have inverted the check.
Adds the partial-action-map test: every level a caller leaves unnamed must fall
back rather than raise. The existing test passed a complete map, so the
fallback branch had no coverage — and a KeyError there would have been caught
by `guard` and rendered as a fail-closed with a useless reason.
716 passed; matrix 128/128 + 6/6.
Note on the one red seen while landing this: test_output.py's ReDoS wall-clock
budget failed on a loaded run (suite 37s vs 13.9s), then passed alone and in a
clean full run. It asserts `scan_output` under 2.0s, and `output.py` neither
imports `disposition` nor references it in code — its three mentions are
docstring prose — so this change cannot reach that timing. Load, as STATE
documents, not a regression.
`decide` returned a `Disposition` — WARN / QUARANTINE_REVIEW / FAIL_SECURE —
which names an ACTION. But BRIEF design principle 4 says the library reports
and the pipeline decides, and disposition.py admitted the gap in its own
docstring: "It imposes no blocking of its own." So we returned an action we
cannot enforce, having discarded the judgement that produced it. A consumer
wanting different behaviour had to reinterpret the action itself — which is
why a consumer ends up pinning our GRADING: the action was all they got.
`Risk` (NONE/LOW/ELEVATED/SEVERE) now carries that judgement, and
`Policy.action_map` lets a caller map it to their own action. Both overlays
move the assessment rather than the action, so a custom map cannot silently
drop the compound escalation or the quarantine floor. `guard`'s fail-closed
path pins both axes and deliberately bypasses the map: downgrading SEVERE
means "I accept this class of finding", never "I accept a crashed scanner".
`DispositionResult.assessment` is required with no default. `Risk.NONE` is the
natural-looking default and the wrong one — a site that forgot the field would
report clean, and the axis would fail open.
MEASURED ADDITIVE, not assumed:
- 703 -> 715 tests, no existing test changed
- coverage matrix 128/128 recall, 6/6 documented gaps still hold
- the PRESET_USER_UPLOAD grading table locked in 0.3.1 re-measured row by
row: ordinary link/image/autolink/refdef -> warn on BOTH doors, unchanged
Both locked consumer promises in docs/PLAN-v1.md were checked against that
measurement and neither fires: the grading is untouched (linkedin-studio), and
the relative-target asymmetry is untouched (llm-ingestion-okf).
Scope held to disposition, per PLAN-v1.md:380. Version stays 0.4.0; the 0.5.0
bump lands in its release commit with all five version surfaces at once —
that is the fix for the defect where the v0.4.0 tag carried a 0.3.4 README.
Records limitation 32: `Severity` still carries disposition intent on the
DETECTION side, which this change does not address and cannot without moving
the grading.
v0.3.0 made the untrusted upload path unusable: measured on both doors, an
ordinary remote image fail_secure'd and an ordinary link/autolink/refdef
quarantined, so only documents without external references persisted.
Two independent defects compounded; neither fix works alone:
1. `markdown-image: HIGH` fired on any external image. The exfil primitive is a
URL that moves bytes outward, not an image. `is_ordinary_url` now grades on
shape - http(s)/protocol-relative, no query, no userinfo, no percent-escape,
no opaque host label or path segment -> LOW; anything data-carrying keeps the
carrier's severity. raw-html and data: URIs stay HIGH unconditionally.
Opacity reuses entropy's primitives; floors calibrated against real doc URLs
(worst legit token H=4.08, exfil segments 4.36-4.54) and frozen in
calibration.
2. The quarantine_default floor fired on ANY finding, a premise that broke when
every ordinary link became a finding. It now fires at MEDIUM+ - a no-op for
every detector that shipped before 0.3.0 (no LOW/INFO exists), which is what
makes this a patch rather than a minor.
The corpus blind spot that let this pass 522 green tests is closed: the FP
corpus carries realistic markdown and is asserted on the OUTPUT gate under
PRESET_USER_UPLOAD, with a counter-corpus of exfil-shaped URLs that must still
block. Beaconing and short opaque segments are conceded in LIMITATIONS and
asserted by the coverage matrix rather than papered over.
No new public API; no new preset (0.4.0 work); allow_reserved default unchanged.
Pre-release hardening from an independent adversarial review; each fixed
test-first (failing test -> fix -> green). 214 tests pass.
- entropy (M1): decode-and-rescan now runs BEFORE false-positive suppression,
so an SRI/media-prefixed injection blob is still decoded and lexicon-rescanned.
Suppression gates only the entropy finding, never the decode.
- output/disposition (M3): the invisible-carrier invariant now holds on the
persist gate. scan_output flags zero-width/BIDI presence and disposition
treats those + lexicon:unicode-tags-present as any-tier carriers, so a carrier
in model output fails secure even under a trusted policy.
- contract (M2): assert_credential_allowlist catches a bare <PROVIDER>_KEY
(e.g. STRIPE_KEY) that the old regex silently missed (fail-open). Deliberately
broad: also flags PARTITION_KEY/SORT_KEY as loud, allowlistable FPs -- fail-loud
beats fail-silent for an isolation control.
- disposition (m6): guard runs decide inside its guarded block -> total
fail-closed even on a malformed report.
- output (m4): egress placeholder suppression anchors word markers (example,
todo, ...) to a word boundary, closing a fail-open where a real secret merely
containing such a word was suppressed.
Docs: CHANGELOG Security subsection; README honest-limit for lexicon dedup (m5,
documented tradeoff, not fixed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HyRCQMocjZ6SmSQ6JidJ2k
