Session 5 of the 2026 threat plan (attack row 3): A04 and A15 were red.
- html-obfuscation:tiny-font (HIGH): font below 4px. ShadowLeak's 1px passed
because the commons zero-font row only matches a leading 0.
- html-obfuscation:invisible-colour (HIGH): text within 8 per channel of the
background in the same style attribute, or transparent. White alone is not
a signal (email buttons); measured residual in LIMITATIONS.
- output:html-comment-present (MEDIUM): a comment in the artifact outside
fenced code and inline code. 253/254 comments in the reference corpus sit
in code.
Local to output.py; the vendored lexicon stays byte-equal with commons.
Guard rule before/after: FP 106/198, 196/2918, 108/389 identical; OKF 6/53
and 47/31 identical. Matrix 139/139, ReDoS 161 patterns 0 flagged, suite
1142 passed + 6 xfailed. Row 3: 12 caught, 1 gap, 6 open.
Variation-selector smuggling (A01) and Sneaky Bits (A02) gave 0 findings
on 1.4.1 and stayed in the sanitized text. The denominator is now the
frozen Unicode 18.0 set (DICP | Cf | Co, 141 674 codepoints); each one is
stripped and flagged unless a known legitimate use exempts it on context:
one VS15/16 after an emoji base, one ideographic selector after a CJK
ideograph, ZWNJ/ZWJ beside Arabic-script or Indic letters, LRM/RLM/ALM
in a document with RTL text, an Arabic number sign before a digit. A run
is always a carrier; private use is caught in full (operator decisions
2026-10-28). One predicate serves sanitize, the output gate and the
lexicon's word-split row, whose regex stays byte-identical with commons.
A01 and A02 are green; the FP populations and the pinned OKF corpus are
identical before and after.
Nineteen attacks that can reach an ingestion pipeline, verified against
primary sources, with four out of scope and their reasons. Each arrival
runs through the canonical wiring; twelve of 31 arrivals are red today
and marked strict xfail, so a fix fails until its marker is removed.
PoisonedRAG asserts that its documented gap still stands.
