OWASP's Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 renumbered the list; only LLM01
and LLM02 kept their meaning. Every finding's `owasp` was written against
2025 with no year, so EchoLeak findings said LLM05, which in 2026 means
Data and Model Poisoning. Row 2 of the 2026 done-criterion counted 95
such sites at 6702d7a (82 old meaning, 13 wrong); it is now 0.
- Producers name the risk, never the number: one table (`_owasp.py`)
owns `LLMnn:2026`. The vendored lexicon stays byte-equal with commons
and gets its year where the finding is made; a commons number whose
meaning moved between editions raises instead of being guessed.
- Mechanical map from the 2025 meaning (verified against the publisher
in session 1): LLM05 -> LLM10:2026, LLM06 -> LLM03:2026,
LLM10 -> LLM06:2026, LLM08 -> LLM09:2026, LLM04 -> LLM05:2026.
The 13 wrong-meaning sites, judged:
- Factual poisoning (PoisonedRAG gap, and the test that follows it):
LLM05:2026. The 2026 text names "RAG Knowledge Base Poisoning" as its
example 6. It said LLM09, which was Misinformation.
- Fail-secure (README row, matrix row): no number. It is the guard's own
failure semantics; no edition describes it. Was LLM10.
- Parser-surface refusals (nested mapping, block scalar, quoted flow
element, off-allowlist key): no number. Refusing a shape the parser
would have to interpret is not resource consumption. Was LLM10. The
anchor and merge-key rows stay LLM06:2026 (alias expansion is DoS).
- `resource` URL and cross-link scheme validation (4): no number. They
validate received bundle metadata; LLM10:2026 is about model output
and says input validation belongs to LLM01. Was LLM05.
- `_raise_case` default (OKF path traversal, absolute path, reserved
name, non-.md, bundle escape): no number. None is prompt injection.
Was LLM01.
A doubtful number would be the misreading the year exists to prevent,
so `Case.owasp` is now Optional and the matrix prints "-".
Self-safety (input caps, ReDoS) keeps LLM06:2026: the 2026 text, read at
the publisher, covers "input flood ... exploiting processing
inefficiencies" and application-side rechunking. The README's LLM09
anchor (Misinformation) is dropped; it was the factual-poisoning row.
The permanent test (tests/test_catalog_numbers.py) fails on an old or
wrong number, on a number without the year outside the vendored
lexicon, and on any finding the coverage matrix drives whose `owasp`
lacks the newest year; "newest" is read from the catalog register. The
census holds its wrong-rules to their counts at the frozen revision
only, so the frozen listing (da1aa0fa...6f) is unchanged.
Close the EchoLeak wiring hole (CVE-2025-32711 class): markdown images/
links, reference definitions, autolinks, raw active HTML and data: URIs
now surface as report-only findings (active:*, OWASP LLM05) in
scan_output step 6, so screen_output and okf.import_bundle dispose of
them instead of admitting them with findings=[].
- new active_content.py: canonical home of the shared pattern table +
scan_active_content; neutralize refactored to import it (mutating API
and behavior unchanged, all neutralize tests pass as-is)
- images/links flagged only for absolute/protocol-relative URLs:
relative in-bundle links are legitimate wiki/OKF mechanism (principle 5)
- evidence carries defanged URLs only (hxxps://evil[.]example)
- EchoLeak vectors planted in both showcases; detach proofs cover them
- README export list + checklist step 6, CLAUDE.md context line updated
Suite: 321 -> 341 passed. Core invariant intact (dependencies=[]).
Module 11's final deliverable (BRIEF §9, PLAN §132), built last. Exercises the
full public toolkit as a consumer would compose it — the _ingest helper doubles
as the README worked example.
- test_showcase: ONE poisoned artifact planting a vulnerability per detection
channel — 5 invisible carriers (zero-width/BIDI/unicode-tag/html-comment/
data-uri), injection across raw + homoglyph + rot13 + whole-string-base64
(decode-and-rescan) channels with DISTINCT lexicon ids so dedup won't merge
them, plus a credential the mock transform leaks into its output (LLM02). All
10 planted labels caught; disposition FAIL_SECURE; egress evidence never
carries the secret value; a clean document + clean transform WARNs (no FP).
- test_corpus: adversarial recall == 100% over the planted classes (a silent
drop is a regression), and a false-positive corpus of attack-resembling legit
content (injection vocabulary, secret-shaped placeholders/varrefs, high-entropy
checksums) that disposes WARN under a trusted source — most producing NO
finding (the suppression rules hold). One MEDIUM homoglyph case proves hard-fail
is an explicit opt-in: same finding WARNs trusted, QUARANTINEs under upload.
Secret fixtures assembled from fragments (gitleaks-safe); every payload verified
against the real detectors before assertion. 12 new tests; 201 green total.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HyRCQMocjZ6SmSQ6JidJ2k
