0.3.3 swept 83 lexicon patterns arm by arm and left the other ten regex-bearing
modules on 0.3.2's hand-written rows. Generalising the sweep found three more,
and the two on the input path matter more than the count suggests: `sanitize` is
step 1 of `prepare_input`, and `MAX_SCAN_CHARS` is applied in `scan_lexicon` and
`scan_output` only, so there was no cap to extrapolate to. That missing input
cap is now a documented residual of its own -- extending it changes the contract
for existing callers and is not something to smuggle into a ReDoS patch.
Version synced in all four places + CHANGELOG. LIMITATIONS 30 -> 31 items;
the 0.3.3 entry claiming the lexicon sweep's scope is corrected in place, since
"the output path" was never the whole surface either.
676 tests, coverage 128/128 + 6/6 gaps, sweep clean across 150 patterns.
Version synced across the four locked points (pyproject, __version__, README
badge, README install pin) + CHANGELOG.
Corrections this release carries, both measured rather than reasoned:
- docs/LIMITATIONS.md said the script-tag change removed "the last"
quadratic-backtracking site on the output path. It did not. Corrected, with
the 334.7s gate measurement that falsifies it.
- README's coverage line claimed 126/126 classes; the matrix reports 128/128.
Stale since before v0.3.2. Test badge was 642, actual 666.
New residual recorded (LIMITATIONS, now 30 items, README synced): the sweep
flags on timing above a 1.5ms noise floor at N=8000, so an arm hiding under it
could still cost ~23s at the cap. What this supports is "no arm worse than ~23s",
not "no quadratic arm remains" -- and the blind spot is demonstrated, since a
generic-payload pass found only one of the two patterns.
666 tests green, coverage matrix 128/128 with 6/6 gaps holding, exit 0.
Version sync in all four places (pyproject, __version__, README badge, README
install pin) plus the changelog entry for cff0437.
Two claims that were about to ship in the release note did not survive being
measured against a v0.3.1 worktree, and are corrected in LIMITATIONS first:
- "Report-only, so the cost is a review, not a block" was wrong twice. HIGH under
a low-trust preset is fail_secure, not a review -- report-only means the text is
never mutated, not that a finding cannot block. And the new script-tag false
positive costs no consumer a disposition at all: any text containing a literal
`<script>` already produced active:raw-html at HIGH on 0.3.1, so the same prose
disposed fail_secure under PRESET_USER_UPLOAD before this change and after it.
The fail-open that was closed is narrower for the same reason -- it existed only
in scan_lexicon called on its own; through either composed gate, raw-html
already caught the unclosed tag. What changed is the label, not the outcome.
- "The realistic long value is still caught by egress:jwt-token" was true and
hid the part that matters. Measured at the 257-char boundary: a generic long
password still trips entropy:base64-blob at CRITICAL, disposition unchanged.
A JWT used as a DB password is the case that moves -- its remaining detections
top out below CRITICAL, so the any-tier block is lost and PRESET_TRUSTED_SOURCE
drops from fail_secure to quarantine_review. PRESET_USER_UPLOAD still
fail_secures. Recorded as a behaviour change in the changelog, not buried.
The first probe for that boundary used a 300-char run of "A" and found nothing on
either version: all-same-char values are suppressed as placeholders. The probe was
wrong, not the pattern.
662 passed, coverage matrix exit 0, LIMITATIONS still 29 items = README's 29.
v0.3.0 made the untrusted upload path unusable: measured on both doors, an
ordinary remote image fail_secure'd and an ordinary link/autolink/refdef
quarantined, so only documents without external references persisted.
Two independent defects compounded; neither fix works alone:
1. `markdown-image: HIGH` fired on any external image. The exfil primitive is a
URL that moves bytes outward, not an image. `is_ordinary_url` now grades on
shape - http(s)/protocol-relative, no query, no userinfo, no percent-escape,
no opaque host label or path segment -> LOW; anything data-carrying keeps the
carrier's severity. raw-html and data: URIs stay HIGH unconditionally.
Opacity reuses entropy's primitives; floors calibrated against real doc URLs
(worst legit token H=4.08, exfil segments 4.36-4.54) and frozen in
calibration.
2. The quarantine_default floor fired on ANY finding, a premise that broke when
every ordinary link became a finding. It now fires at MEDIUM+ - a no-op for
every detector that shipped before 0.3.0 (no LOW/INFO exists), which is what
makes this a patch rather than a minor.
The corpus blind spot that let this pass 522 green tests is closed: the FP
corpus carries realistic markdown and is asserted on the OUTPUT gate under
PRESET_USER_UPLOAD, with a counter-corpus of exfil-shaped URLs that must still
block. Beaconing and short opaque segments are conceded in LIMITATIONS and
asserted by the coverage matrix rather than papered over.
No new public API; no new preset (0.4.0 work); allow_reserved default unchanged.
Version-sync across pyproject, __init__, README badge/status/install pin and
CHANGELOG, and cut [Unreleased] to [0.3.0].
Why minor: 0772daf made allow_reserved default to True on okf.import_bundle,
so a consumer who upgrades without touching their code gets a LOOSENED gate --
a reserved index.md/log.md in a received bundle is now scanned and may become
mergeable, where v0.2.0 rejected it unconditionally. Under 0.x a >=0.2,<0.3
pin absorbs a 0.2.1 silently but stops at 0.3.0, which is the signal such a
change should send. Found by llm-ingestion-okf, our first real downstream
consumer, against main.
Development Status stays 3 - Alpha and the README keeps "the public API may
still change": this ships the hardened surface (Sessions A/A2/B) to consumers
who are still pinned at v0.2.0 and therefore have none of it. It is not the
v1.0 freeze -- that stays gated on the first real integration coming back
green, which is exactly what 0.3.0 makes possible.
Verified: 522 passed; coverage matrix exit 0; version string present in all
four files; no dangling 0.2.0 outside CHANGELOG history.
Realistic-upload showcase (PLAN §247), first slice. A stage-1 front-end reads
dropped files and materializes them into an OKF bundle {concept_path: text} +
provenance; receive() wires extract -> import_bundle -> verdict. This slice
covers .txt/.md (stdlib only); .zip/.csv/folder/.docx/.pptx follow.
- Front-end lives in tests/ (showcase/dev-scoped), core stays stdlib-only:
dependencies=[] untouched; python-docx/python-pptx added to the [dev] extra
(used from stage 2d/2e), never a public [extract] extra (not v1 per PLAN).
- .txt injection -> guard T1 -> REJECT; clean .txt -> ADMIT; a dropped .md keeps
its frontmatter so a dangerous value -> T2 REJECT; an index.* upload
materializes onto the reserved uploads/index.md -> T4 REJECT.
- Detach-proof: neuter extraction to an empty bundle -> the poisoned upload
ADMITs, proving the verdict depends on extraction carrying the payload.
Tests 282 -> 288.
