`scan_active_content` called directly and `okf.link_graph` were the two surfaces
still reading attacker-supplied text with no cap — the first reached by an
adapter that wants the active-content classes alone, the second running a
`findall` over every body in a bundle. Both are detection-shaped, so they
truncate and flag rather than raise the way the transform surfaces do: what a
detector shortens is its own coverage, not the caller's content.
Truncation is only honest if it is visible, so neither goes quiet: the scanner
emits `active:oversize-input` (LLM10), and `link_graph` records
`(from_id, body_length)` in `LinkGraphResult.truncated` — the field that lets a
caller tell "no links past here" from "no links read past here".
Reached through `scan_output`, the text is already under that surface's cap and
`max_scan_chars` is now passed down, so the flag is raised once, there.
The generalised sweep found what 0.3.2's hand-written rows missed. All three are
the documented class -- a run in front of a required literal that never arrives,
so every start position rescans the tail -- and all three are worse than the
0.3.3 findings, because `sanitize`, `neutralize`, `scan_active_content` and the
okf link graph apply NO input cap. `scan_lexicon`/`scan_output` are the only
entry points that do, so there is no ceiling to extrapolate to.
sanitize._HTML_COMMENT_RE `<!--`*100_000 20.1s, exponent 1.96-2.14
active_content.URL_IN_TEXT_RE `<a `+`A`*100_000 12.99s / 14.9s, exponent ~2.0
okf._MD_LINK_RE `[`*100_000 7.1s, exponent 1.99-2.05
Each fix is the one the pattern's own shape allows, not a copied choice:
- The comment stripper drops the regex for `str.find`. Excluding `<` would lose
every comment containing markup; bounding the run would be a carrier bypass
of the exact construct the stripper exists to remove.
- `URL_IN_TEXT_RE` bounds its scheme run to an RFC 3986 scheme (`{0,63}`).
Bounding is safe *here* only because it is a defanger inside a tag already
flagged `active:raw-html`. A lookbehind was measured too and rejected: it
drops `-http://evil.com`, a one-character evasion. Bounded: 0.185s at 1M.
- `_MD_LINK_RE` excludes `[`, matching `active_content.MD_LINK_RE` exactly,
including the nested-label trade already documented there.
`sanitize` claimed "no catastrophic backtracking" in a comment; that claim was
wrong in the same way `output`'s was before 0.3.2, and is corrected in place.
676 tests (+10), coverage 128/128 + 6/6 gaps, sweep clean across 150 patterns.
The okf destination run gets no row: `[^)\s]+` cannot fail, so a row for it
could never go red.
A received OKF bundle MAY legitimately carry index.md (directory listing, read
first under progressive disclosure) and log.md (update history) at any level
(spec §3.1/§6/§7). import_bundle previously hard-rejected those basenames in the
T4 path gate, so a conformant third-party bundle was over-blocked in full
(FAIL_SECURE) — and because the reject fired before scan_concept, index.md's
body (the highest-priority injection surface) was never scanned.
import_bundle now defaults allow_reserved=True: reserved basenames are scanned
as structural files (path-safety checks — traversal / absolute / backslash / .md
— still apply). The shadow-reject (an *upload* masquerading as index.md) is
preserved: the front-end passes allow_reserved=False so a materialized upload
landing on a reserved basename is still refused. That front-end opt-in was
required to keep the shadow-reject once the default flipped (not in the plan's
Filer set; traced from the code).
- okf.py: validate_concept_path/_validate_concept/import_bundle gain the
keyword; validate_concept_path default stays False (strict standalone).
- tests: +3 (legit index/log admit; injection in index.md body caught;
okf_version frontmatter admits). Per-concept-iteration test switched to a
traversal vector; mode-b showcase's index.md surface reframed from
reserved-name-reject to index.md-body-scan.
- README honest-limits + CLAUDE.md context note the mode-b/upload distinction.
Suite: 341 -> 344 passed. Core invariant intact (dependencies=[]).
