okf answered the exposure question with a measured no — zero call sites for the
three capped surfaces anywhere in their src/, and their screen_output path
reaches only scan_output, which truncates. So the blast radius is zero and 0.3.5
would have hurt nobody.
It is still 0.4.0. Adding a raise to a previously total public function is
breaking under SemVer, and this file declares SemVer; a survey that comes back
clean tells you the upgrade is easy, not that the contract held. The version
number describes the change, not the luck of who happens to call it.
Cost, stated: 0.4.0 was penciled in for the axis separation. That moves to 0.5.0.
Tags are never moved, so the choice is made once.
README still advertises v0.3.4 — it is updated after a clean-venv install proves
the tag resolves, so the install block never points at something unproven.
The per-repo gate flagged four ERRORs and two WARNs. Fixed, in the order the
work actually gets done in:
MISSING
- `## Honest limitations` -> `## Known limitations`, `## Out-of-scope
(documented boundary)` -> `## Non-goals`. Both sections existed under names
no reader or agent scans for; the contract wants predictable top-level
headings. Pointers followed: the in-README anchor, SECURITY.md's out-of-scope
preamble, CONTRIBUTING.md's scope section, and the consumer-facing
docs/ADOPTION-BRIEF.md. Historical records (CHANGELOG, docs/PLAN.md,
docs/OKF-INGESTION-BRIEF.md) keep the name they were written with.
WEAKENING
- README now opens with one line identical to the forge description, above the
badges. That is the only place a machine can check description == README.
- Forge description shortened 207 -> 178 codepoints (bound 180), and the same
string written to pyproject's `description` so the fourth copy cannot drift.
The tests badge is dropped, not updated. `tests-699_passing` as a static image
is a claim dressed as evidence: there is no CI runner on this forge, so nothing
verifies it. Replaced with the honest substitute in Install — the single command
that runs the suite from a clean clone, stated together with the fact that
nothing runs it automatically.
Two WARNs deliberately left standing:
- H1 `# llm-ingestion-guard` != repo name. The register itself records
llm-ingestion-guard as "a package, not a repo"; the H1 names what you pip
install. Renaming the repo is the operator's call, not this commit's.
- The `Status` badge trips the same claim-badge regex, but `alpha` asserts
maturity, not a run — the same reason version/license/platform are exempt.
Measured false positive in the gate's classifier, reported upstream.
0.3.3 swept 83 lexicon patterns arm by arm and left the other ten regex-bearing
modules on 0.3.2's hand-written rows. Generalising the sweep found three more,
and the two on the input path matter more than the count suggests: `sanitize` is
step 1 of `prepare_input`, and `MAX_SCAN_CHARS` is applied in `scan_lexicon` and
`scan_output` only, so there was no cap to extrapolate to. That missing input
cap is now a documented residual of its own -- extending it changes the contract
for existing callers and is not something to smuggle into a ReDoS patch.
Version synced in all four places + CHANGELOG. LIMITATIONS 30 -> 31 items;
the 0.3.3 entry claiming the lexicon sweep's scope is corrected in place, since
"the output path" was never the whole surface either.
676 tests, coverage 128/128 + 6/6 gaps, sweep clean across 150 patterns.
Version synced across the four locked points (pyproject, __version__, README
badge, README install pin) + CHANGELOG.
Corrections this release carries, both measured rather than reasoned:
- docs/LIMITATIONS.md said the script-tag change removed "the last"
quadratic-backtracking site on the output path. It did not. Corrected, with
the 334.7s gate measurement that falsifies it.
- README's coverage line claimed 126/126 classes; the matrix reports 128/128.
Stale since before v0.3.2. Test badge was 642, actual 666.
New residual recorded (LIMITATIONS, now 30 items, README synced): the sweep
flags on timing above a 1.5ms noise floor at N=8000, so an arm hiding under it
could still cost ~23s at the cap. What this supports is "no arm worse than ~23s",
not "no quadratic arm remains" -- and the blind spot is demonstrated, since a
generic-payload pass found only one of the two patterns.
666 tests green, coverage matrix 128/128 with 6/6 gaps holding, exit 0.
Version sync in all four places (pyproject, __version__, README badge, README
install pin) plus the changelog entry for cff0437.
Two claims that were about to ship in the release note did not survive being
measured against a v0.3.1 worktree, and are corrected in LIMITATIONS first:
- "Report-only, so the cost is a review, not a block" was wrong twice. HIGH under
a low-trust preset is fail_secure, not a review -- report-only means the text is
never mutated, not that a finding cannot block. And the new script-tag false
positive costs no consumer a disposition at all: any text containing a literal
`<script>` already produced active:raw-html at HIGH on 0.3.1, so the same prose
disposed fail_secure under PRESET_USER_UPLOAD before this change and after it.
The fail-open that was closed is narrower for the same reason -- it existed only
in scan_lexicon called on its own; through either composed gate, raw-html
already caught the unclosed tag. What changed is the label, not the outcome.
- "The realistic long value is still caught by egress:jwt-token" was true and
hid the part that matters. Measured at the 257-char boundary: a generic long
password still trips entropy:base64-blob at CRITICAL, disposition unchanged.
A JWT used as a DB password is the case that moves -- its remaining detections
top out below CRITICAL, so the any-tier block is lost and PRESET_TRUSTED_SOURCE
drops from fail_secure to quarantine_review. PRESET_USER_UPLOAD still
fail_secures. Recorded as a behaviour change in the changelog, not buried.
The first probe for that boundary used a 300-char run of "A" and found nothing on
either version: all-same-char values are suppressed as placeholders. The probe was
wrong, not the pattern.
662 passed, coverage matrix exit 0, LIMITATIONS still 29 items = README's 29.
v0.3.0 made the untrusted upload path unusable: measured on both doors, an
ordinary remote image fail_secure'd and an ordinary link/autolink/refdef
quarantined, so only documents without external references persisted.
Two independent defects compounded; neither fix works alone:
1. `markdown-image: HIGH` fired on any external image. The exfil primitive is a
URL that moves bytes outward, not an image. `is_ordinary_url` now grades on
shape - http(s)/protocol-relative, no query, no userinfo, no percent-escape,
no opaque host label or path segment -> LOW; anything data-carrying keeps the
carrier's severity. raw-html and data: URIs stay HIGH unconditionally.
Opacity reuses entropy's primitives; floors calibrated against real doc URLs
(worst legit token H=4.08, exfil segments 4.36-4.54) and frozen in
calibration.
2. The quarantine_default floor fired on ANY finding, a premise that broke when
every ordinary link became a finding. It now fires at MEDIUM+ - a no-op for
every detector that shipped before 0.3.0 (no LOW/INFO exists), which is what
makes this a patch rather than a minor.
The corpus blind spot that let this pass 522 green tests is closed: the FP
corpus carries realistic markdown and is asserted on the OUTPUT gate under
PRESET_USER_UPLOAD, with a counter-corpus of exfil-shaped URLs that must still
block. Beaconing and short opaque segments are conceded in LIMITATIONS and
asserted by the coverage matrix rather than papered over.
No new public API; no new preset (0.4.0 work); allow_reserved default unchanged.
Version-sync across pyproject, __init__, README badge/status/install pin and
CHANGELOG, and cut [Unreleased] to [0.3.0].
Why minor: 0772daf made allow_reserved default to True on okf.import_bundle,
so a consumer who upgrades without touching their code gets a LOOSENED gate --
a reserved index.md/log.md in a received bundle is now scanned and may become
mergeable, where v0.2.0 rejected it unconditionally. Under 0.x a >=0.2,<0.3
pin absorbs a 0.2.1 silently but stops at 0.3.0, which is the signal such a
change should send. Found by llm-ingestion-okf, our first real downstream
consumer, against main.
Development Status stays 3 - Alpha and the README keeps "the public API may
still change": this ships the hardened surface (Sessions A/A2/B) to consumers
who are still pinned at v0.2.0 and therefore have none of it. It is not the
v1.0 freeze -- that stays gated on the first real integration coming back
green, which is exactly what 0.3.0 makes possible.
Verified: 522 passed; coverage matrix exit 0; version string present in all
four files; no dangling 0.2.0 outside CHANGELOG history.
Realistic-upload showcase (PLAN §247), first slice. A stage-1 front-end reads
dropped files and materializes them into an OKF bundle {concept_path: text} +
provenance; receive() wires extract -> import_bundle -> verdict. This slice
covers .txt/.md (stdlib only); .zip/.csv/folder/.docx/.pptx follow.
- Front-end lives in tests/ (showcase/dev-scoped), core stays stdlib-only:
dependencies=[] untouched; python-docx/python-pptx added to the [dev] extra
(used from stage 2d/2e), never a public [extract] extra (not v1 per PLAN).
- .txt injection -> guard T1 -> REJECT; clean .txt -> ADMIT; a dropped .md keeps
its frontmatter so a dangerous value -> T2 REJECT; an index.* upload
materializes onto the reserved uploads/index.md -> T4 REJECT.
- Detach-proof: neuter extraction to an empty bundle -> the poisoned upload
ADMITs, proving the verdict depends on extraction carrying the payload.
Tests 282 -> 288.
