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2466d260d3 test(redos): the dead row had the wrong payload, and the last wall clock is retired
Both rows that could not go red are decided, each by measurement.

test_lexicon.py::test_redos_pathological_subagent_input_returns_fast is REVIVED,
not retired. The row was not dead because the seed form is safe -- it was dead
because both earlier payloads made the prefix match at ONE start position, and
the cost is per-prefix-match. Repeating `spawn an agent that ` instead makes it
match K times, each driving its own O(N) lazy scan for a keyword never supplied:
K x O(N) against the seed's `(?:.*?\s+)?`, K x O(1) against the shipped
`{0,12}?` bound. Measured through scan_lexicon at 1500/3000/6000/12000 words:
seed 0.091/0.283/1.085/4.091s (exponent 1.92), shipped 0.047/0.051/0.094/0.190s
(exponent 1.01). Verified red with the seed form patched in: 4.21s against the
2.0s bound. The nesting the old comment blamed was a red herring.

test_output.py::test_pathological_input_returns_within_a_bound moves to CPU time
with a 20.0s bound, and the "or a hang" half of its claim is retired. The wall
clock was kept because a blocking hang burns no CPU -- true in general, and
inapplicable to a path with no open(), socket, subprocess, thread, lock or sleep
anywhere on it. Same payload, idle vs ~4x oversubscription: wall 3.30 -> 21.63s
(2x over the old 10.0s bound), cpu 3.30 -> 7.62s. It guarded a mode it could not
have while paying the full false-red premium. No in-repo vulnerable form can
turn this row red, so the bound was proved live against what it actually guards
-- a future pattern quadratic on long runs, `A+\s*EXFILTRATE` -- which failed it
at 64.77s CPU, 3.2x over.

redos_clock.py and the clock's pin test both documented this row as the
deliberate wall-clock holdout; both corrected.

792 passed, 6/6 documented gaps hold.
2026-08-13 21:47:43 +02:00
c48a2923ac test(redos): one CPU clock for every bound, and a second row measured dead
`5667063` moved test_output.py's ReDoS bounds off the wall clock, because a
loaded machine steals wall seconds without adding any cycles and two rows
failed at 2.24s / 3.66s against a 2.0s bound while census had the CPU. The
remaining ten bounds in five other files still ran on `time.monotonic()` and
carried the same defect. They now share ONE clock.

The clock is IMPORTED, not copied: `tests/redos_clock.py`. Five private copies
would leave four of them unpinned -- the instrument test
(test_the_redos_clock_ignores_time_this_process_did_not_spend) can only pin the
implementation it calls, and the suite already holds that rule for the code it
measures.

Every ported row was verified the only way a time bound can be: the vulnerable
form patched back in, red demanded, `git checkout --` after. Measured against
the 2.0s bound (3.0s for the url arm):

  active_content long-attr   `{0,63}` -> `*`        RED
  neutralize     long-attr   same patch             RED
  output gate    long-attr   same patch             12.41s
  okf link graph  `[^\]\[]` -> `[^\]]`               6.91s
  sanitize comment  str.find -> `<!--.*?-->`        17.56s
  lexicon md-link-anchor-text                      319.14s
  lexicon md-link-anchor-url                         8.55s
  lexicon md-link-ref-comment                       37.82s

Two rows did not go red, for two different reasons.

test_sanitize.py::test_legitimate_comment_heavy_document is the legitimate SIDE
of a separation, not a second pin on the defect: closed comments never withhold
the required literal, so the lazy form runs it in 0.016s. Recorded in place.

test_lexicon.py::test_redos_pathological_subagent_input_returns_fast is DEAD --
the same zero-signal shape the `<a ` carrier had, found by the same method. The
seed form is `(?:.*?\s+)?` (llm-security 7.8.0, injection-patterns.mjs:84) and
this repo has never carried it: the bounded `{0,12}?` port is in the pattern
table's first commit. Patched in by hand at the row's own size: shipped 0.135s
vs seed 0.113s, separation 1.2x. Not the keyword gate either -- a variant that
reaches the inner branch stays linear over four doublings (exponent ~1.0),
because the nesting is one lazy run inside an OPTIONAL group, never a repeated
one. Left standing with the measurement written into it; picking a new carrier
is an operator call, like the wall-clock row above it.

The dead sibling row named in STATE is fixed: test_active_content.py's
long-attribute row swaps carrier `<a ` -> `<script `, for the reason `5667063`
established on its composed-gate twin -- 0.7.0's own no-URL narrowing put `<a>`
in `_URL_AFFORDANCE_TAGS`, so the tag returns inert BEFORE its body reaches the
arm the row guards. Re-measured here, not inherited: `<a ` 0.041s and NO
findings against the vulnerable form; `<script ` 19.349s against 0.052s
shipped, 373x apart.

`test_pathological_input_returns_within_a_bound` deliberately keeps its wall
clock (operator decision): it claims to catch a hang, and only a wall clock
catches one.

792 tests, 129/129, 6/6.
2026-08-13 21:25:36 +02:00