OWASP's Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 renumbered the list; only LLM01
and LLM02 kept their meaning. Every finding's `owasp` was written against
2025 with no year, so EchoLeak findings said LLM05, which in 2026 means
Data and Model Poisoning. Row 2 of the 2026 done-criterion counted 95
such sites at 6702d7a (82 old meaning, 13 wrong); it is now 0.
- Producers name the risk, never the number: one table (`_owasp.py`)
owns `LLMnn:2026`. The vendored lexicon stays byte-equal with commons
and gets its year where the finding is made; a commons number whose
meaning moved between editions raises instead of being guessed.
- Mechanical map from the 2025 meaning (verified against the publisher
in session 1): LLM05 -> LLM10:2026, LLM06 -> LLM03:2026,
LLM10 -> LLM06:2026, LLM08 -> LLM09:2026, LLM04 -> LLM05:2026.
The 13 wrong-meaning sites, judged:
- Factual poisoning (PoisonedRAG gap, and the test that follows it):
LLM05:2026. The 2026 text names "RAG Knowledge Base Poisoning" as its
example 6. It said LLM09, which was Misinformation.
- Fail-secure (README row, matrix row): no number. It is the guard's own
failure semantics; no edition describes it. Was LLM10.
- Parser-surface refusals (nested mapping, block scalar, quoted flow
element, off-allowlist key): no number. Refusing a shape the parser
would have to interpret is not resource consumption. Was LLM10. The
anchor and merge-key rows stay LLM06:2026 (alias expansion is DoS).
- `resource` URL and cross-link scheme validation (4): no number. They
validate received bundle metadata; LLM10:2026 is about model output
and says input validation belongs to LLM01. Was LLM05.
- `_raise_case` default (OKF path traversal, absolute path, reserved
name, non-.md, bundle escape): no number. None is prompt injection.
Was LLM01.
A doubtful number would be the misreading the year exists to prevent,
so `Case.owasp` is now Optional and the matrix prints "-".
Self-safety (input caps, ReDoS) keeps LLM06:2026: the 2026 text, read at
the publisher, covers "input flood ... exploiting processing
inefficiencies" and application-side rechunking. The README's LLM09
anchor (Misinformation) is dropped; it was the factual-poisoning row.
The permanent test (tests/test_catalog_numbers.py) fails on an old or
wrong number, on a number without the year outside the vendored
lexicon, and on any finding the coverage matrix drives whose `owasp`
lacks the newest year; "newest" is read from the catalog register. The
census holds its wrong-rules to their counts at the frozen revision
only, so the frozen listing (da1aa0fa...6f) is unchanged.
A received OKF bundle MAY legitimately carry index.md (directory listing, read
first under progressive disclosure) and log.md (update history) at any level
(spec §3.1/§6/§7). import_bundle previously hard-rejected those basenames in the
T4 path gate, so a conformant third-party bundle was over-blocked in full
(FAIL_SECURE) — and because the reject fired before scan_concept, index.md's
body (the highest-priority injection surface) was never scanned.
import_bundle now defaults allow_reserved=True: reserved basenames are scanned
as structural files (path-safety checks — traversal / absolute / backslash / .md
— still apply). The shadow-reject (an *upload* masquerading as index.md) is
preserved: the front-end passes allow_reserved=False so a materialized upload
landing on a reserved basename is still refused. That front-end opt-in was
required to keep the shadow-reject once the default flipped (not in the plan's
Filer set; traced from the code).
- okf.py: validate_concept_path/_validate_concept/import_bundle gain the
keyword; validate_concept_path default stays False (strict standalone).
- tests: +3 (legit index/log admit; injection in index.md body caught;
okf_version frontmatter admits). Per-concept-iteration test switched to a
traversal vector; mode-b showcase's index.md surface reframed from
reserved-name-reject to index.md-body-scan.
- README honest-limits + CLAUDE.md context note the mode-b/upload distinction.
Suite: 341 -> 344 passed. Core invariant intact (dependencies=[]).
Two structural regions the office extractors missed, no new dependency:
- .docx table cells (they live outside doc.paragraphs);
- grouped .pptx shapes (add_group_shape moves a shape inside the group, so the
extractor recurses through MSO_SHAPE_TYPE.GROUP to reach it).
Each proven by an injection-in-region REJECT plus a clean-region ADMIT. Tests
310 -> 314.
The pptx payload hides where an audience watching the slides does not look. The
extractor surfaces all three regions into the concept text so the stage-2 scan
catches the injection:
- speaker notes (slide.notes_slide.notes_text_frame.text);
- off-slide (off-canvas) text boxes (shape.text_frame.text, position-agnostic);
- image/shape alt-text (cNvPr@descr, read off the XML — python-pptx 1.0.2 has no
stable public accessor across shape types).
Detach-proof: same visible slide without notes ADMITs. python-pptx imported
lazily (dev/showcase-scoped, not a core dep). Tests 305 -> 310.
The docx payload hides where a human reviewing the file in Word does not look.
The extractor surfaces all three regions into the concept text so the stage-2
scan catches the injection:
- hidden/vanish runs (w:vanish) — still runs, so paragraph.text includes them;
- review comments (doc.comments[].text);
- core metadata properties (subject/keywords/comments/title/category/author).
Detach-proof: the same visible body WITHOUT the hidden run ADMITs, so it is the
extractor surfacing the hidden region that caught it, not merely 'a docx'.
python-docx is imported lazily (dev/showcase-scoped, not a core dep). Tests
300 -> 305.
- .csv: cells leading with =/+/-/@ (leading whitespace stripped first) are the
CSV-injection/DDE vector the guard cannot recognize, so the front-end refuses
them; the raw cell text is still materialized so a prompt-injection phrase in a
cell is caught by the stage-2 scan (T1). Detach-proof: plain-cell version of
the same file ADMITs. Numeric -/+ leads are the accepted FP (honest-limits).
- folder: walked member-by-member with relative paths preserved, so a reserved
basename member (index.md) lands on the guard's T4 gate; symlinks refused.
Refactor: per-file dispatch shared by top-level drops and folder walk (strict
raises on unsupported top-level suffix, folder skips). Tests 293 -> 300.
The front-end reads zip entries in memory (never extracts to disk), so it owns
the container caps while a traversal entry maps onto the guard's path gate:
- zip-slip: a '../../evil.md' entry materializes onto a traversal concept path
(preserved verbatim, not normalized) -> stage-2 T4 -> FAIL_SECURE -> REJECT.
- zip-bomb: per-entry + per-archive uncompressed-size caps (OWASP LLM10) refuse
an oversize entry before its bytes are read; a bounded read defends a lying
header. Detach-proof: a generous cap admits the same archive, so the cap is
load-bearing.
- symlink entry: refused at the front-end (no legitimate concept meaning).
Caps are kwargs on extract_inbox/receive (small in tests, generous by default).
Tests 288 -> 293.
Realistic-upload showcase (PLAN §247), first slice. A stage-1 front-end reads
dropped files and materializes them into an OKF bundle {concept_path: text} +
provenance; receive() wires extract -> import_bundle -> verdict. This slice
covers .txt/.md (stdlib only); .zip/.csv/folder/.docx/.pptx follow.
- Front-end lives in tests/ (showcase/dev-scoped), core stays stdlib-only:
dependencies=[] untouched; python-docx/python-pptx added to the [dev] extra
(used from stage 2d/2e), never a public [extract] extra (not v1 per PLAN).
- .txt injection -> guard T1 -> REJECT; clean .txt -> ADMIT; a dropped .md keeps
its frontmatter so a dangerous value -> T2 REJECT; an index.* upload
materializes onto the reserved uploads/index.md -> T4 REJECT.
- Detach-proof: neuter extraction to an empty bundle -> the poisoned upload
ADMITs, proving the verdict depends on extraction carrying the payload.
Tests 282 -> 288.
